

श्रीविष्णुसेनद्विषयप्रकाशः—

उदयादिषु सर्वसिम्बुषुः

समुदीर्णास्तृयि नाप च्युता ।

न च तासु मयान् प्रप्यते

प्रविमृष्टासु सरिस्त्रिबोदधिः ॥

CONTENTS

	PAGES
PREFACE	xi-xii
INTRODUCTION	xiii-xxv
I Hemacandra and Mallisena	xiii-xx
II Evolution of the Darśanas	
(a) Logical	xx-xxvii
(1) The Great Vision	xxi
(2) Sāṃkhya	xxii
(3) Yoga	"
(4) Vaiśeṣika	"
(5) Nyāya	"
(6) Pūrvaṃśiṣa	"
(7) Vedānta	"
(8) Jainism	xxiii
(9) Buddhism	xxiv-xxvi
Evolution in each of the Darśanas	xxvii-xxxi
Sāṃkhya	xxviii
Yoga	xxix
Vaiśeṣika	"
Nyāya	"
Pūrvaṃśiṣa	xxix-xxx
Vedānta	xxx-xxxii
(b) Historical or Chronological	xxxii-xxxvi
IV Bird's-Eye View of the Nyāyāśāstra- manjari	xxxii-3
Stanakas I-III Introductory	xxxii-xxxiii
" IV-LX Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika System	xxxiii-xxviii
" X Criticism of Nyāya	xxviii-3
" XI-XII Criticism of Pūrvaṃśiṣa	3-3v

Stanzas XIII XIV	Criticism of Vedānta	cv-cix
" XV	" Sāṅkhya	cx-cxii
" XVI-XIX	" Buddhism	cxii-cxvii
" XX	" Ōrvāśa	cxix-cxx
" XXI-XXX	Jaina Doctrine	
	established	cxix-cxxiv
" XXXI-XXXII	Conclusion	cxvii
V A	Estimate of the Work	cxvii-cxxv

SANSKRIT TEXT

शब्द १-१	...	1-10
१-१ श्रीराम (वैदिक) पञ्चमीया	...	10-54
" १ श्री (वैदिक)	...	54-61
" ११ ११ पूर्वमीयाता	...	61-77
११ ११ वैदिक	...	77-94
११ शब्द	...	94-101
११-११ श्री	...	101-130
१ श्री	...	130-133
११-११ श्रीशिवान्तरात्मनः	...	133-150

NOTES

The Mangalam	...	1-5
Stanza I	...	5-19
II	...	19-20
" III	...	20-21
IV	...	21-20
V	...	21-54
VI	...	55-78
VII	...	79-84
VIII	...	85-105
" IX	...	106-117
X	...	118-126
" XI	...	126-135

Stanza	XII	---	---	186-144
"	XIII	---	---	144-153
"	XIV	---	---	153-166
"	XV	---	"	167-181
"	XVI	---	---	182-202
"	XVII	"	---	203-211
"	XVIII	---	---	212-218
"	XIX	---	---	219-223
"	XX	---	---	223-230
"	XXI	---	---	230-235
"	XXII	---	---	235-239
"	XXIII	---	---	239-259
"	XXIV	"	---	259-268
"	XXV	"	---	268-269
"	XXVI	---	"	269-272
"	XXVII	---	"	272-276
"	XXVIII	---	"	276-311
"	XXIX	"	---	312-316
"	XXX	---	"	317-322
"	XXXI	---	---	322-323
"	XXXII	---	---	323-327

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Stanza	I	---	---	328-332
"	III	"	"	333
"	VI	---	---	"
"	VIII	---	---	333-334
"	IX	---	---	334
"	X	---	"	334-335
"	XI	---	---	335-338
"	XII	---	---	338-344
"	XIII	---	"	344-349

				Page
Stanzas	XIV	348-353
"	XV	354-358
"	XVI	358-359
	XVII	360-363
	XVIII	363-366
	XLX	366
	XX	367-369
"	XXI	369
"	XXII	370
	XXIII	371
"	XXIV	371-373
	XXV	373-375
"	XXVI	375
"	XXVII XXVIII	376
	XXIX	377
	XXX	377-379
"	XXXI XXXII	379

APPENDICES

Appendix A	Various Readings	...	1-40
Appendix B	Quotations and References	...	41-63
Appendix C	Authors and works quoted referred to or borrowed from...	...	64-68

Index—English	69-71
" —Sanskrit	72-74

PREFACE

I undertook to edit the *Syādvādamāñjarī* many years ago, but other interests and preoccupations held up the work for a long time. Eventually I mustered up the 'will to do' and did it, but I regret that the pre-copy could not be carried through the press as expeditiously as I had wished. This was due to a number of causes (which it is useless to relate), of which dilatoriness of the press was not one. In fact, I am grateful to Dr S. K. Belvalkar sometime Superintendent of the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series and now Secretary of the B. O. R. Institute, and to the Manager of the Tatva-Vivechaka Press for the infinite patience they have shown in putting up with the delay. My thanks are also due to Mr Narayan for noting the Various Readings of the Text; also to M. Bhāskara Datta Mītra, M.A., LL.B., of the Sanskrit Department of the Central Hindu College for arranging the items of the Index (both English and Sanskrit) in alphabetical order.

In the interval a number of editions of the *Syādvādamāñjarī* were published of which the most noteworthy and scholarly was the one brought out by Sheth Motilal Ladhasi as a number of the *Ārista-Mata-Prabhākara Series* (often referred to as "AMP" in this book) published at Poona. I acknowledge my particular indebtedness to this publication for the facility it has provided for tracing the sources of the quotations made in this work. Even though many of these are well known and could have been easily traced by me independently it is no small relief to find that some one has already done the work which it is useless to duplicate.

It may be useful to mention some of the main features of this edition. As is well-known the "Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series" to which this publication belongs is intended for the average University student as well as for the advanced scholar. Accordingly the Notes have been made sufficiently copious. Their main purpose has been to elucidate every argument as

fully and clearly as possible. However a fair amount of knowledge of Sanskrit on the part of the student has been assumed, and consequently no effort has been made to give the meanings of words and phrases. Secondly in the body of the Notes as well as in the Appendices to the Notes large extracts have been given from Brāhmana, Buddhist and other Jain works with various ends in view : enable the advanced student to weigh for himself the cogency of the arguments on both sides, or to give an idea of the indebtedness of the author to earlier writers, or to show how he has correctly recapitulated the position of the school under review or to invite the attention of the reader to the influence which Mallikaraja has exercised upon later writers. Thirdly some explanatory ideas of the length of the Introduction. It is mainly intended to stimulate the study of Indian Philosophy as a whole with numerous branches whose history ranges over wide spaces both of time and thought. It is desirable that the student should, even at the threshold of his entering upon the study of each comprehensive point of view as the *Syādvāda*, have some idea of the different schools of thought and their history if he is to unite them into a single whole.

One word about the *Syādvāda* before I close. While the Vedānta seeks intellectual peace in the Absolute by transcending the antinomies of Intellect, the Jainas find it in the fact of the Relativity of Knowledge and the consequent revelation of the many-sidedness of Reality—the one leading to religious mysticism, the other to intellectual toleration. It may be that, in actual practice, the followers of both the schools have fallen short of the Ideal, but the Ideal in both cases was great and that was all the Masters could be expected to provide.

Benares
Himal Utracchi
February 16, 1924

A B DHURVA

Introduction

I HEMACANDRA AND MALLISENA

‘*स्वातन्त्र्यमञ्जरी*’ is a commentary by Mallisena on ‘*सप्तशतिका*’ of Hemacandra, the great Jaina scholar preacher and author who lived in the time of Siddharāja Jayasinha and his successor Kumārapāla, two famous kings of Gujarat in the first and the second half of the twelfth century of the Christian era. Not much is known about the personal history of Mallisena except what he himself has told us at the end of the *Śyādvādaśamanjari*, that he was a disciple of Udayaprabbhāṭī and that he composed and completed his work on “Saturday Ādivin Kṛpā Amāvasyā” in the Śaka year 1214† with the help of Jinaprabhāṭī.”

✓ But his greater predecessor—Hemacandraśāhī has been the hero of numerous biographical accounts which have been interwoven with those of his royal patron Siddharāja and his royal disciple Kumārapāla. Some of the stories related in these books are obviously coloured; but all taken together present certain facts which are well-authenticated not only by their recurrence in the several accounts, but by their inherent probability in view of their historical setting and of the great learning which is clearly manifest in the works of their hero. Here are a few indisputable facts:

Author of *सप्तशतिका* not to be confounded with *परमेश्वर* of Hemacandra.

† *सह-रवि-मिह* (सह-रवि-रवि-रवि).

§ Dr Bühler puts the matter very clearly in the following words: “The objects with which the *Caritas* and *Prabandhas* were composed, were to edify the Jaina community to convince them of the glory and power of the Jaina religion, or in cases where the subject is a purely secular one to provide them with an agreeable entertainment.”

which was named "Śiddha-Hema-Śābdānuśāsa" after the combined names of the patron and the author consists of Śūtras, with such appendices as belonged to Pāṇini's grammar viz. Dhātupāṭha, Unādi, Ityāgīya śāstra etc. together with V Hī (commentaries), long and short, by Hemacandra himself. During Śiddharāja's reign Hemacandra also composed two other works, "Abhidhānaśāntāraṇi" (also called *Haṃsi Nāmanāli*) and *Anekārtha-Saṅgraha* on the lines of similar sections in the famous *Koś* of Amaraśinhi, the Buddhist lexicographer whose work was read then as now by Brāhmaṇas as well as Buddhists. It has been observed that Śiddharāja honoured Hemacandra as scholar rather than as spiritual guide—a position which he occupied during the reign of his successor Kamaṇpala. This is no doubt true to great extent, but it is also true that the influence on Śiddharāja which Hemacandra originally acquired by his scholarship gradually grew till on many occasions his advice in religious matters was sought and accepted by Śiddharāja. As Professor Tawney the translator of *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi*, remarks, Hemacandra gained his favour first by his literary eminence and subsequently made good use of his gifts as a courtier to advocate the claims of his own faith. He did it, however with great patience and wonderful tact; for example, when he accompanied Śiddharāja to Somnātha, he advised the King to give up for the time being wine and meat as practices of Brāhmaṇas and not on the Jainas' ground of its offending against the principle of the Karma religion. Moreover when he was asked by Śiddharāja to pay his homage to god Śiva at Somnātha, his utterance was a marvellous stroke of literary and religious genius. He bowed to the god in the following words:

“यद्वीर्यदुःखदया शान्तया क्षममुपायता वत्स ।
 उवाच वा विष्णुर्वा इति विप्रो वा वयसस्त्ये ॥
 वय वय सजने वया उवा चेति लौक्यमिव वा वया वया ।
 वीतरौप्यमप्य त चेदुधानेक वय प्रमदमनोभ्यु ते ॥

While Hemacandra's influence on Siddharāja, a latitudinarian in religious views, was considerable that on Kumārapāla was immense. Under his influence Kumārapāla not only gave up meat-eating but promulgated the principle of ahimsa throughout his kingdom visited Jain temples and celebrated Jain festivals. Hemacandra composed a large number of works, some educational and literary others frankly sectarian and polemical. The writings of this encyclopaedic author "are said to have amounted to "three crores and half verses" Of these the first and perhaps the most celebrated is *सिद्धमेवमुदात्तम्* (-स्यारण). The work was written mainly on the lines of Pāṇini's Grammar with appendices as mentioned above; but, unlike the latter it also contains sections on Prakṛta and Apabhraṃsa which till this day remain a standard work on the grammar of these derived languages. The works on Grammar were followed by those of Kōśa (lexicon) viz., "अविद्याविमर्शमणि" "अनेकार्थसंग्रह" (with Vṛtti), "विद्यु" and "देवीनाममाहा" The last named work is particularly interesting as it places on record what in the days of Hemacandra were regarded as *desya* as distinguished from Prakṛta Śābdas. To illustrate the rules of his Grammar Hemacandra composed a Mahākāvya called "Dvyaśīrṣa" or "Kumārapāla caritram" which is both Sanskrit and Prakṛta and sings the glories of Cālukya (Solanki) Kings including Kumārapāla, the Prakṛti portion dealing with Kumārapāla's reign being later addition made in the time of Kumārapāla. The next group of Hemacandra's works is that relating to Poetics and Prose. This comprises "वृत्तार्थसागर" with Vṛtti called *अवतारवृत्तमणि* and a commentary on the same called *विदेह*; and "उद्देश्यसागर" with a commentary

C. R. Dalal's Introduction to Yashpāl's "Mohaparajaya," G. O. S.

* Some of Hemacandra's *desya* words, however are Prakṛti and are traceable to Sanskrit. This does not diminish the value of Hemacandra's list.

Hemacandra was born in 1134 Vikrama Samvat, that is 1078 A. C. in a family belonging to Modha Vāṇa caste. His birth-name was Oṅga-deva or Oṅgodeva his father's Oṅga, Oṅa or Oṅga† and his mother's Pāhlī. Once upon a time, when Oṅgodeva was only five years old, a Jain monk named Devacandra happened to visit Dhandhukā. While he was going round the shrine the boy went and sat on a seat beside the Ācārya. Struck by the boy during his sermon marking certain signs of high promise on his person Devacandra went to the house of Pāhlī and requested her to give him her boy for admission into the Jain order of asceticism. After a slight hesitation and with such pain as a mother would naturally feel when asked to part with her child, Pāhlī gave away the young Oṅgodeva to the Ācārya. The father was all this time abroad. When he returned home and heard the story he was very angry but was eventually made to give by Udayana, the Jain minister of Bhidharkāja, who pacified the father and himself organised the function of the boy's dīkṣā. The story is related somewhat differently by Mr. C. R. Dalal in his Introduction to Yastipāla's Mahāparīkṣā. He writes: "Once Devacandra Śūri of Pūrnatalla gaṇa came to Dhandhukā. Among the Jains who came paying their respects and hearing his lectures, there was one young lad, Oṅga-deva, with his maternal uncle Hemacandra. Oṅga-deva hearing the lecture requested him to initiate him. The Śūri asked who he was. His maternal uncle said that he was his sister's son. The boy's heart was

बन्धुवः स्यात् प्रजापत्यचरित ("बन्धुविव बन्धुर्न देहे वसति वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्) Obviously there is misreading of बन्धुवः which has crept into manuscripts.

† Bot. Gaz. p. 191

‡ देहिनी वाहिनी तस्य देहिनी वसिष्ठेन्द्रिया—Prabhāvakarīka.
वसिष्ठे—Kumārāpala-pratibodha.

turned to religion. The Ācārya replied that the boy should enter the order as he would, thereby be able to do good to the people like a Tirthankara, and asked him to take the permission of his father for initiation. Osha, however, refused but the boy persisted and followed the Ācārya and took the vow at Cambay. That the boy should have gone to the Ācārya with his maternal uncle is not unlikely but this and other minor differences of detail do not affect the main events of Hemacandra's life. On his thus entering the order of Jaina asceticism Oshodara (the future Hemacandra) was given the name of "Somacandra." Asceticism in those days was combined with scholarship and the first duty of the young neophyte was, as usual, to study Logic, Grammar and Literature. At the temple of Nemistha on mount Girnar Somacandra, says the legend, meditated upon the goddess Sarasvatī (Brāhmī) who out of the abundance of her grace bestowed upon him the *Sāraśvata mantra*, and told him that he need not go to any other land for perfecting his scholarship. Somacandra thus became great scholar. A few years later, recognition of his profound scholarship, his old Ācārya gave him the mantra and title of *Sāra* with a change of his name, from Somacandra to *Hemacandra*. The ceremony was performed at Vagave. says one authority. When H E M A C A N D R A visited Anahilapura, the capital of Gujarat, he was introduced to Siddharāj Siddhāja, who had seen a work on grammar composed by Bhoja King of Mālava was anxious to see a similar work produced in Gujarat. When he consulted his literary advisers, all eyes fell on Hemacandra. Hemacandra undertook to prepare the work. When completed, the new Grammar was carried with great eclat in a procession on the back of an elephant, and copies of it were sent to different provinces of India. The work

Stambhatīrtha = Skambhatīrtha = Khambhāt of the modern geography of Gujarat.

† तर्कसंग्रहसहितप्रियाः परेष्ठितवद्भुतम् ।

which was named "Śiddha-Hema-Sabdīnśāsana" after the combined names of the patron and the author consists of Śāstras, with such appendices as belonged to Pāṇini's grammar viz. Dhātupāṭha, Upādi, Lingīnśāsana etc. together with Vṛttī (commentaries), long & short, by Hemacandra himself. During Śiddharāja's reign, Hemacandra also composed two other works, "Abhidhānaśāstāmāni" (also called Haimi Nāmanāli) and "Anakātha-Saṅgraha" on the lines of similar sections in the famous Kośa of Amarasimha, the Buddhist lexicographer whose work was read then as now by Brāhmanas as well as Buddhists. It has been ✓ beerved that Śiddharāja honoured Hemacandra as a scholar rather than as a spiritual guide,—a position which he acquired during the reign of his successor Kumārāpala. This is no doubt true to great extent, but it is also true that the influence on Śiddharāja which Hemacandra originally acquired by his scholarship gradually grew till on many occasions his advice in religious matters was sought and accepted by Śiddharāja. As Professor Tawney, the translator of Prabandha-śāstāmāni, remarks, Hemacandra gained his favour & first by his literary endowments, and subsequently made good use of his gifts as a courtier to advocate the claims of his own faith. He did so, however with great patience and wonderful tact; for example, when he accompanied Śiddharāja to Bomanātha, he advised the King to give up for the time being wine and meat as practices of brāhmanas and not on the Jainas ground of his standing against the principle of the humane religion. Moreover when he was asked by Śiddharāja to pay his obeisance to god Śiva at Bomanātha, his utterance was a marvellous stroke of literary and religious genius. He bowed to the god in the following words:

“यत्तवीशान्तराज्ये राणायां क्षयस्तथा कल्पे ।
 मया वा विष्णुर्वा इति विप्रो वा नमस्तस्मै ॥
 यत्तु यत्तु तन्मया कथा कथा वीति क्षोत्स्नविपश्चा कथा कथा ।
 वीतिक्षोत्स्नस्तु तत्तु वीतिक्षोत्स्नस्तु तत्तु वीतिक्षोत्स्नस्तु ॥

While Hemacandra's influence on Siddharāja, a latitudinarian in religious views, was considerable that on Kumārapāla was immense. Under his influence Kumārapāla not only gave up meat-eating, but promulgated the principle of *ahimsā* throughout his kingdom, visited Jain temples and celebrated Jain festivals. Hemacandra composed a large number of works some educational and literary others frankly sectarian and polemical. The writings of this encyclopaedic author "are said to have amounted to three crores and half verses." Of these the first and perhaps the most celebrated is *सिद्धोपदेशसूत्रम्* (-सूत्रम्). The work was written mainly on the lines of Pāṇini's Grammar with appendices as mentioned above; but, unlike the latter it also contains sections on Prakṛta and Apabhraṃsa which till this day remain a standard work on the grammar of those derived languages. The works on Grammar were followed by those of Kōśa (lexicons) viz. "अभिज्ञानचिन्तामणि" "अनेकार्थसंग्रह" (with Vṛtti), "विश्व" and "द्वैतीशायनाम्". The last named work is particularly interesting as it places on record what in the days of Hemacandra were regarded as *desya* as distinguished from Prakṛta Śābdas. To illustrate the rules of his Grammar Hemacandra composed a *Mahākāvya* called "Dvyāśraya" or "Kumārapāla caritram" which is both Sanskrit and Prakṛta and sings the glories of Cālukya (Solanki) Kings including Kumārapāla, the Prakṛit portion dealing with Kumārapāla's reign being a later addition made in the time of Kumārapāla. The next group of Hemacandra's works is that relating to Poetics and Prosody. This comprises "राजमार्गशास्त्रम्" with a Vṛtti called "अनेकार्थपूरायणि" and a commentary on the same called *विश्व*; and "उन्नीतशास्त्रम्" with a commentary

O. H. Dahl's Introduction to Yashpāla's "Mohaparājaya," G. O. S.

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It now remains to note only those works whose subject matter is exclusively Jain. There is a "Tiryaṅgī-Sādhā - Puruṣa-caritra" or the Biographies of Sixty-three Supermen of Jainism, with "Parīkṣit" or supplements which he is said to have composed at Kumārapāla's request. They are written in a very simple readable style, and are interwoven with much general information regarding the principles and practices of Jain morality and religion. Of similar character is another work, "Jyotiṣa-saṅgṛhaṇī". Another work of this class is a series of twenty "Śānta-sūtras".

Devotional Stanzas addressed to the Pandion-free is one of the great merits of Jainism. These include two well-known "Śānta-sūtras" Sets of Thirty Two Stanzas—the "Anāgata-sūtra" and the "Anāgata-sūtra" i.e. that in which the author disproves the allegation that Jainism is wrong, and that in which he answers the claims of the systems that they are right. It is the last (Anāgata-sūtra) work—with its commentary—Śānta-sūtra —by Malluṣa with which we are here concerned.

[Original authorities and books of reference on the life and works of Hemacandra.—

Prasāda in Tiryaṅgī-Sādhā Puruṣa-caritra of Hemacandra

- "Prabhāvakacaritra" of Candraprabhācāri.
- Hemakumāracaritra of Somaprabhācārya.
- Kumārapālapratibodha of
- Kumārapālaprabandha of Jinasamādhānagani.
- Prabandhasaṁgraha of Haratungācārya.
- Prabandhakosa of Candrapālika.

Dr Buhler Über das Leben des Jain Mönches Hemacandra

† 'anāgata'—non-possession (of truth), 'anāgata'—others possession (of truth).

Dr. Peterson's Reports on Bombay Mss.

O. B. Dahl's Introduction to Yashpála's "Mohanāja parājaya" (G O B.)

Munirāja Jinavijaya's Introduction to Kumārapāla-Pratibodha (G O B.)

Introduction to "Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā" (Ārhatamata-prabhākara edition).

व्याकरणं पञ्चाहं प्रमाणवार्त्तं प्रमाणमीमांसाय् ।
 छन्दोर्लङ्घतिवृत्तामयी च वाक्ये विमुक्त्यर्थेभिर्युक्ता ॥
 एकार्थनेकार्थौ देशक विरुद्धे इति च चत्वारः ।
 निरुक्ताश्च नामकोशाः सुवि कथितास्तदनुपाध्यायान् ॥
 अनुसूच्यहिक्मका नरेन्द्रतत्त्वविमलविचारः ।
 अष्टमाष्टमबोधवार्त्तं विरुद्धे अगदुपहृतिविद्यायुः ॥
 मन्त्रव्यवहारित्वयुक् विरुद्धे च व्याख्येयं महाभारतम् ।
 चन्द्रे निवसिषुचौ च वीतरागस्त्वयामां च ॥
 इति त्रिद्विंशत्प्रमाणवर्त्तनैव हि च विद्यते ।
 नामापि न विरुद्धेलां ग्राह्या मन्त्रद्वयम् ॥

—Prabhāvakaraite, Hemastūprabandha vv 882 to 886.

Aufrecht's "Catalogue Catalogorum"—extracted in the Introduction to "Kāvyaśāstra" of the Kāvyaśāstra Series
 अनेकार्थकोशे अनेकार्थकोशः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः (नाममात्रा व्याख्या)
 अनेकार्थकोशः (नाममात्राव्याख्या) अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः, अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः
 अनेकार्थकोशः अनेकार्थकोशः देशकविमलविचारः [आद्यं वाच्यं
 सङ्गतिः] अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः
 नाममात्राव्याख्या, निवसिषुचौ [प्रमाणमीमांसा सङ्गतिः], अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः
 नाममात्राव्याख्या, निवसिषुचौ [प्रमाणमीमांसा सङ्गतिः], अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः
 अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः

The Introduction to the "Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā" (A.M.P. Edition) contains an exhaustive list of Hemastū's works, but his authorship of some of them is doubtful. Aufrecht's list also contains some confusion.]

The "अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः अक्षिप्राप्तिक्रियाभिः"—o "The Set of Thirty two Stanzas"—which is cast in the form of devotional ✓

panegyric addressed to the last Tīrthamkara, Mahāvīra, is virtually criticism of the Brāhmanya and Baidhīya systems of philosophy. But before we attempt general review of its contents as unfolded in the text and its commentary the *Syādvādaśāgari*, it will be useful to give short account of the evolution Indian Philosophy.

It is usual to confine such an account to the historical rise and growth of the different Darśanas but I think it will make for better understanding of the gist of each system if an attempt is made to indicate their *logical* relations in the movement of thought before proceeding to consider their *historical or chronological* order.

II EVOLUTION OF THE DARŚANAS:

() *Logical* †

The History of the Indian Darśanas has been generally regarded not as history in the sense of an evolving process of thought, but only as record of brilliant guesses and speculations which have occurred from time to time to men of genius and scholastic ability. This view however reflects itself by its very simplicity and unphilosophical character. Another view—that all Darśanas are broken lights of single Truth, and as such are complementary of one another—has been propounded fully in Madhusūdan Sarasvati's *Prasthāna-bheda* and partially in Vijnānabhikṣu's *Bhūmikya-Pravachanabhūṭya* and Anandabhaṭṭa's *Tarkatpikā*. This is the tradition I would postulate as the basis of the view presented in earlier writings, such as the *Nyāya-Kaumārīya* of Udayanācārya. From a practical point of view of those who are not interested in the history of

† This Section has been reproduced with few changes from my "Presidential Address" in the Indian Philosophical Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Benares in 1928.

philosophy for its own sake, but only in the use to be made of it for man's spiritual benefit, this view is natural and unimpeachable. Moreover such a synthesis had its analogues in the well-known attempts to harmonise the texts of the Brāhmanas, of the Upaniśads, and of the Śaṃpiti, which lapas of time had consecrated. But the historian cannot overlook the fact that the founders of the Darśanas did not meet at a council distribute their work, and part, each to execute his own appointed place. It is undeniably true that there were honest differences of opinion amongst them, which developed in the course of time into bitter controversies. However it is possible to reconcile in a higher synthesis the point of the historian with that of the practical religious man. For the differences of opinion, though real and quite sharp, originate from differences of outlook, which mark successive steps in a single revolutionary process. Let us follow this thought-movement through its different stages.

I. The period of the Great Vision—that is my word for "Veda" which means knowledge or thought, but which being philologically connected with Latin *videre*, to see I prefer to render by the word vision—closed with the teaching that "All this is Brahman" (सर्वं ब्रह्मैव कुल), and "Thou art That" (तुमसि). The earlier Rsis, so at least it was thought, had seen the Truth. The generation that followed had heard but not seen it: it had received the tradition but had not had the sight. The later sages, therefore asked the question: How is it I do not see that all is Brahman and that I am Brahman? and tried to devise means for converting faith into experience, ज्ञप्ति into ज्ञान. And their first answer to the question was: Because I am confounding matter and mind, or to go deeper: Nature and Spirit, which it is necessary for me to distinguish (विशेदकृपाति)—this is Wisdom (विद्वान्). It is to be noted that this answer just carries us one step forward and no farther. For the question still remains: How am I to turn this intellectual distinction into a reality of experience? That points to the next step

which was to show the practical method ('योग') of the separation of Nature and Spirit. This was the योग—the practical complement of the theoretical सत्यम्. The essential difference between सत्यम् and योग is more correctly formulated as the difference between the theoretical and the practical side of single system of philosophy than as the difference between two Sāṃkhya, one of which was 'nirivara' and the other sadvara (atheistic and theistic), as is sometimes done. But the mysticism of both Sāṃkhya and Yoga did not appeal to the scientifically-minded who thought that it was necessary to investigate the properties ('विशेष') of Nature and Spirit—(अकारम् and मात्तम्)—as we do those of any other natural object of experience. In order to carry on this investigation, the वैशेषिक (the investigator of *visēṣa* = distinctive properties) divided Reality into certain categories and studied them in detail. But is not our investigation bound to go wrong unless our method is right? Hence the necessity of a sound system of Logic ('न्याय'). Thus न्याय became a necessary complement to वैशेषिक. But Natural Philosophy (वैशेषिक) and Logic (न्याय) cannot altogether satisfy man's spiritual needs. Moreover people were frightened by the growing rationalism of the new schools. They compared the rationalists of their day to jackals howling against one another' (M. Bh. Śāntiparva). Consequently "Back to the Vedas" was the next cry. And the first attempt in this direction was to 'reflect upon' (नीतिशास्त्र) and systematize the teachings in the sacrificial section of the Veda via the Brāhmaṇas. This was नीतिशास्त्र — पूर्वनीतिशास्त्र — उत्तरनीतिशास्त्र अथवा नीतिशास्त्र. But the mechanical religion of पूर्वनीतिशास्त्र was soon found unsatisfactory and was superseded by the spiritual religion in उत्तरनीतिशास्त्र or अन्तरनीतिशास्त्र which was systematization of the teachings of the Upanads—the वेदान्त—the conclusion, the end, or the idealists of the Veda. The last two were revivalist schools whose ancient prototypes were the schools of the Yājñikas (ritualists) and Brāhmaṇas (the teachers of the Upanads) respectively.

Such is the *logical* development of the six Darśanas of the Brāhmaṇas. To prevent misunderstanding it should be noted that no system wiped out of existence its predecessor and so all the systems sometimes appear running parallel to one another like mountain-streams. But this does not militate against the *logical* principle of evolution which gave them birth, and which binds them together in a single movement of thought.

Next, let us turn to Buddhism and Jainism. We treat them separately from the Brāhmaṇa darśanas, not because they had no organic relations with those darśanas, but because the *essential ideas* of each of the schools falls within the inner history of that school itself, howsoever much some of its details may have been determined by the influence of neighbouring schools.

When the spiritual life and thought of the age of the Upaniads had, in certain quarters, degenerated into barren intellectualism on the one hand and superstitious sacerdotalism on the other there sprang those two movements of Religion which we know as Buddhism and J A I N I S M. Although their real beginnings go back to a earlier date when they were parts of one stupendous whole which we know as the Indian Religion, and even though with Gautama Buddha and Mahāvīraśvamin they were protests against the religion of their day and not independent religions as they are ordinarily represented, still they took a definite shape and acquired an individuality in the teachings of these two reformers who lived about the fifth or sixth century before the Christian era.

The problem of the post Upaniadic age—How to reach Brahman?—the answer of Gautama Buddha was: By getting rid of *trāṇā* which is the root of all misery; and by ceasing to believe in the self (*ātman*) which is the centre of all selfishness which causes transmigrations from life to death

† See "T vijja Sutta."

and from death to another life, *ad infinitum*; and lastly by undergoing a course of discipline which would help in achieving the goal. To justify the ending of *trish* and prove it to be futile—in fact, in order to shift the standard of values from the external to the internal world, and even to destroy both altogether in the interests of '*trishoodha* or '*vāṃśakṛpā*', the Buddhist philosopher slipped into metaphysics in spite of the Master's repeated warning against it. Eventually the numerous sūtras, which arose in the Buddhist Church soon after the death of the Master became crystallised in the four famous schools of Buddhist Philosophy viz., the schools of the *Veibhāṣikas*, the *Sautrāntikas*, the *Yogācāras* and the *Mādhyamikas*, maintaining respectively the doctrines of Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, Idealistic Phenomenalism, and Etherealistic Medialism—four logical steps in the process of thought from common sense to the highest wisdom, according to Buddhism. The *Mādhyamikas*, or *Madhyamikas* as they were sometimes called, were advocates of the metaphysical Middle Path an expression probably intended to correspond to the ethical Middle Path ('*madhyama pratipad*') of *Gautama Buddha*. The two extremes which they repudiate are *śūnyā* and *ajmāyā* which at the middle or meeting point destroy each other leaving nothing but *śūnyatā* as the core of Reality. The *śūnyatā* which is deduced as logical consequence of the doctrine of the Middle Path is not to be confounded with *ajmāyā* which is relative as distinguished from the former which is absolute.

अस्तीति वास्तीति ह्येति अन्ता
 अस्तीति वास्तीति ह्येति अन्ता ।
 तस्यान्ते अन्त विवर्तिविद्या
 यत्ने हि स्थानं न (१. यत्नेति स्थानं न) करोति रश्मिर्वा
 —*Samādhirāja Sūtra*.

* अथो याथावाच्यताह्वयविशेषात् सर्वसंवादावस्यविशेषात् याथावाच्यता
 यथावाच्य इति च यत्ने यत्ने इत्युच्यते —*Mādhyamika Vrtti*.

Of these, *Sarvativāda* or the doctrine that All is real[§] associated with the school of the *Vaiśbhāṣikas*, is said to be the earliest. But obviously if there is any point in the *śū* (all) of 'sarvativāda' it must have been preceded by a doctrine in which a part of Reality was affirmed and the rest denied. This must be evidently the doctrine of Idealism, in which ideas are declared to be the only reals. The conjecture is justified by our knowledge of the earlier schools of Buddhism of which one was called the school of *Prajñaptivādins* or Idealists, and another of *Vibhajjavādins* or part Realists. Thus originally there must have been only two schools of Buddhist Philosophy the school of Idealism and that of Realism. From the direct Realism of the *Vaiśbhāṣikas* the first step in the direction of Idealism is the Indirect Realism or half-hearted Idealism of the *Sautrāntikas* which in its turn logically leads to the complete Idealism of the *Yogācāra* school. The latter which was a resurrection of the *Vibhajjavāda* and *Prajñaptivāda* passed into what is called *Sūnyavāda* or Absolute Nihilism, but what, as noticed above, should more accurately be called

§ These doctrines were at first expressed in terms of the reality of Time. But Time in Buddhism, it should be noted stands for the contents of Time. Thus, *सर्वत्र सत्* In the "*Abhidharmakośa*, the name *Vibhajjavādin*" has been traced to the fact that the school answer the old question: Does all exist? "with a distinction; the present and the past which has not yet borne its fruit exist; the future and the past which has borne its fruit do not exist (see Keith's "*Buddhist Philosophy* p. 153). The reason for the distinction is plain in the half-hearted Idealism of the *Vibhajjavāda*. For while the future and the past which has already borne its fruit and is no more, exist only in idea, the present and the past which has yet to bear its fruit are real and cannot be denied. It will be noticed that, for what I consider to be valid reasons, I have modified the interpretations of the words *Sarvativāda* and *Vibhajjavāda* which are generally given.

Nihilistic Materialism of the Mādhyamika, or Mādhyamaka, is accordance with its logic contained in the Mādhyamika Vṛtti.

The Jaina Darsana is only one. It formulates the doctrine of the relativity of Truth and thereby knows that each of the different schools represents certain aspect of Truth (अव) and is so far true. ~ Thus partial truth (अव) belongs to the several darsanas while absolute and complete truth is revealed in the Jaina method of Syādvāda (अव). The doctrine of Naya (अव) or leading point of view as indicated by its comparative simplicity is perhaps older than the Syādvāda (अव) which is highly complicated. Besides, there is nothing in common between them except that both of them are expressions of the same point of view—viz. अव. ~ the doctrine of the many-sidedness of Truth. They cannot therefore be regarded as two stages of a single process of thought, but must be traced to separate sources united in a common point of view.

Such are the logical relations of the different systems of Indian Philosophy. Each of the systems moreover, has history which discloses similar evolution of doctrines, determined partly by their own principle of growth and partly by the influence of other systems. Thus, for example, Sāṃkhya which was originally theistic, as is clear from the evidence of the Upaniads the Bhagavadgītā, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas had become atheistic about the time of the last sections of the Mahābhārata, Sāṃkhya-kārikā and the Bādaīyana Sūtras under the pressure of its own doctrine of Prakṛti, which being charged with the energy of evolutionary activity rendered God superfluous and had him drop off from the system like a useless limb, until restored artificially at long last by the author of the Sāṃkhya-Pravāsa Bhāṣya under the influence of Vedānta. Another possible hypothesis which I put forward somewhat hesitatingly to explain the atheistic character of medieval Sāṃkhya is that the atheistic Sāṃkhya was not

a descendant of the Sāṅkhya of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, but of one of those systems which have been referred to and rejected in its introductory stanza “*कालः स्वमासी निपतिर्वयम्*” etc. Similarly such particular doctrines as those of *गुरु* and *सृष्टि* have undergone evolution in the course of ages. *गुरु* was originally the thinking substance and it was therefore absurd to deny that he was essentially *गुरु*. This view is held by Vyāsa, the commentator of Pāṇjara Sūtra. But it was felt that this was inconsistent with the transcendental nature of *गुरु* the basic doctrine of the Sāṅkhya philosophy and it was consequently discarded and *गुरु* was made mere *सृष्टि* instead of *गुरु* a view later rejected or modified by Vīśiṃbhikṣu in the Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya. Similarly Prakṛti was at first either the power of God or the primordial substance from which had emanated the manifold universe like a tree from a seed. Afterwards it came to be regarded as an independent energy which was another name for the potential unmanifested world. Later, the character of this Prakṛti or Avyakta came to be defined in a way which shows that the problem of philosophy had shifted from cosmogony to psychology and ethics. Prakṛti comes to be conceived as a complex of *सत्* *रस* and *सुख*, the three principles which represent respectively *ज्ञान* *गुरु* and *योग* in our life. Here is a unique form of idealism which is not cognitive, or conative, or imaginative, but emotional, that is to say an idealism in which the world is not conceived either as Idea or as Will or as Imagination but as Emotion, which it is the business of Puruṣa to get rid of. The Emotionalism, or Emotional Idealism if one can use such an expression without committing a paradox, was evidently preceded by a stage represented in the Bhagavadgītā in which the cognitive conative and emotional elements of idealism were still held together in the functions assigned to *सत्* *रस* and *सुख*. Moreover Vīśiṃbhikṣu restores the view in

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Such are the logical relations of the different systems of Indian Philosophy *inter se*. Each of the systems, moreover, has history which discloses similar evolution of doctrines, determined partly by their inner principle of growth and partly by the influence of other systems. Thus, for example, Sāṃkhya which was originally theistic as is clear from the evidence of the Upannads, the Bhagavadgītā, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas had become atheistic about the time of the late sections of the Mahābhārata, Sāṃkhya-kārikās and the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras under the pressure of its own doctrine of Prakṛti, which being charged with the energy of evolutionary activity rendered God superfluous and made him drop off from the system like an unused limb, until restored artificially at long last by the author of the Sāṃkhya-Pravṛttauś Bhāṣya under the influence of Vedānta. Another possible hypothesis which I put forward somewhat hesitatingly for explaining the theistic character of medieval Sāṃkhya is that the atheistic Sāṃkhya was not

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which Prakṛti is regarded as the *dravya* or *dharmas* of which *गुण*, *कृत्* and *वीक्ष* are *dharmas* or attributes as well as constituent elements.

A tenet of the Śāṅkhya which is particularly interesting to us from the point of view of Jainism is their unreserved condemnation of 'hiṃsā' including *sacrificial hiṃsā*. (See Vidyāśākhya's commentary on the Śāṅkhya Sūtras quoted in the Supplementary XI. Notes on St. XI). This attitude seems to be due to the association of the Śāṅkhya with the Bhāgavata Dharma (see the Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva). There is a story in the Mahābhārata which connects Kapila with opposition to sacrificial hiṃsā. Hopkins notices a passage in the Mahābhārata xii, 269-9 where Kapila is presented: the light of an adverse critic from the point of view of orthodox Brahmanism. "On seeing a cow led out for sacrifice, Kapila, filled with compassion, cried out "O ye Vedas! an exclamation of reproof against the Vedas, as incarnating cruelty to animals. At this he was attacked by the inspired cow with long discourse, challenging him to show why the Vedas should be regarded as authoritative in any regard, if not in regard to the slaughter of animals. Kapila appears in this tale as teacher of unorthodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the sacrifice of animals but the 'sacrifice (worship) of knowledge' is the best." Prof. Hopkins is mistaken in the view that in this passage there is any intention of representing Kapila as "unorthodox." Kṛpā is exclamation "O ye Vedas! only means "O ye Vedas! what sins are committed in thy name?" The whole point of the story is to suggest that there was a higher kind of sacrifice in Vedism itself which had as much right to be considered orthodox as the sacrifice of animals, because the original meaning of the word *यज्ञ* as its root (यज्) would indicate, was only worship of God.

The system of Yoga which came into existence as a complement to Sāṅkhya retained its pristine purity probably for a century or two after the death of Gautama Buddha. In the Sūtras of Patañjali the white light of spirituality is somewhat dimmed by a black jet of miraculous 'śāṅṣṭi' and 'śīṣṭi'. Later the system split into two branches, the Hatha Yoga and the Raja Yoga, of which the former sometimes associated itself with certain degraded forms of Sakti-worship and Mahāyāna Buddhism, while the latter namely Rājayoga restored purity to the system under the influence of Vedānta.

The problem of the Vaiśeṣika was to distinguish Ātman from Anātmā by the scientific method of investigating properties ('*śāṅṣṭi*') of things. Its consequent silence, more or less, on the problem of God in the Sūtras has been misunderstood as a mild form of atheism. But subsequently it allied itself with Nyāya which is enthusiastic about developing a system of logic, and by means of it proving the existence of God, Soul and Immortality. In its later stages the Nyāya mistook the means for the end and spent all its energies in building up a science of Logic discarding its minutest details with a hair-splitting subtlety which has no parallel in the history of human thought.

The system of Pūrvaśāṅkhya was at first a logic of Vedic interpretation, but since it was undertaken in the interests of the religion of the sacrifice, the sacrifice occupied a large place in the religious philosophy of that system. Every detail of the sacrifice became a fetish till at last in the philosophy of the system God was not and the gods were little more than *some things* which were expressed by words in the dative case in the formulae of offerings. Yet the principle which was responsible for this evolution or degeneration as some may call it, was far from ignoble. If the Brāhmaṇas came to be regarded as the centre of Vedic literature and sacrifice has the essence of religion it was because *doing* and not *being* was regarded as the ideal of life. Secondly in attributing to the sacrifice a compelling power which governed gods as

well as men, the system of Pūrvamīmāṃsā placed law above the arbitrary will of gods. Besides this, by defining Pramāṇya as that which makes known what was not known already it virtually separated the spheres of Reason and Faith: so that the Veda ruled only where the senses and reason had no authority that is, in matters which transcended their sphere. The school also distinguished between the main propositions and *hita* dīkṣa, and between a precept and the legend by which the precept was supported. It thus winnowed the wheat from the tares, and made for rationalisation of religion, although apparently no system could be more dogmatic.

The evolution of the doctrines of Vedānta is too well known to need much elaboration. However brief review of the philosophy of the Ācāryas may be attempted just to mark the principal stages of its evolution. The earliest school of the Vedāntic theology was *Bhēdābhēda-śāstra* i. e. Difference-Unity in which *bhēda* and *abhēda* were regarded as equally real, and the Ideal of life was supposed to consist in recognising this fact or in progressing from one to the other (These were the doctrines of *śaśvata* and *śaśvata*) respectively. Next came the *Upādhā-śāstra* in which *abhēda* was regarded as essential and real, and *bhēda* as dependent upon *upādhā* yet equally real. This more or less self-contradictory formula of the *śaśvata* and *śaśvata* was superseded by the *śaśvata* of Śaṅkara in which the Unity was declared to be real and the difference as unreal. The next stage was to refuse to relegate Individual Spirit and Nature to the category of the Unreal and to substitute for Śaṅkara Absolute-Monism-with-Māyā the doctrine of *trīṇa* (three-in-one) *śaśvata* Reality (*śaśvata*) consisting of three principles of

This school has not received the attention of Haṁsa and Mallikarjuna beyond one stanza and its commentary; moreover portion of the history of its development falls after the age of these Jain critics.

† This should not be unwelcome to the Jaina.

God, Nature and Man, individual spirits, of which the two latter were forms of the first, but all the three were equally real. To the next Ācārya—Vallabha—all the preceding doctrines including Śaṅkara's Kevalādvaita which was based on Māyā-vāda appeared to be a departure from rigorous Advaitism, inasmuch as in all of them something over and above Brahman was posited. Hence he claimed for his own doctrine of simple Brahman-without-Māyā the title of Brahmavāda or 'ब्रह्मवाद' i. e. pure advaita as distinguished from the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. The advaitisms of Rāmānuja and Vallabha remained stereotyped, but that of Śaṅkara assumed several forms. To use the simplest metaphor for illustrating the unreality of individual selves as against the reality of the Universal Self is to say that the former are 'प्रतिबिम्ब' or reflections of the latter. This was 'चित्रप्रतिबिम्बवाद' and it was as old as the Upanishads. But the difficulty felt in its acceptance was that this presupposes the existence of a separate medium of reflection, such as water or glass whereas Māyā or Avidyā cannot be said to be separate from Brahman. To meet this objection another theory known as 'वस्तुप्रतिबिम्बवाद' or the theory of delimitation, was started. According to it the individual selves were not the reflections of Brahman in a separate medium, but Brahman delimited or circumscribed by the walls of individuality. But walls, too are something other than the space which they enclose. To avoid this element of dualism, another interesting metaphor was suggested, namely 'कर्णप्रतिबिम्बवाद' i. e. as Karna, the famous Mahābhārata warrior mistook himself as the son of Rādhī when in truth he was the son of Pṛthā in the same way Brahman mistakes itself for jīva. Such was the progressive attempt at illustrating the unity of jīva and Brahman. Similarly the objective world (विषयविस्तृत-प्रत्येकजन्य) is at first made parallel with the subject (विषयविस्तृत-प्रत्येकजन्य) both being regarded as modes of a single Ideal Reality (देवत्व). This form of Idealism which might appear to be a connection to Realism is carried further in the same direction,

so that we have next a distinction drawn between ईश्वरसृष्टि and जीवसृष्टि i. e. the world which is a creation of God, and the world which is creation of the individual self; thus the external world which I see round about me is God-made, whereas the personal interest which I take in it is what makes it my world; so that Mōkṣa, in as-much-as it is my Mōkṣa, is the cessation of the latter not of the former. This is obviously a greater concession to Realism than that contained in the parallelism of निवर्तिष्यन् and निवर्तयन्. Next, the pendulum swings back full length and Idealism is reinstated with vengeance; thus, the external reality may be regarded as creation of the individual mind which, in its turn may be supposed to be a fictitious manifestation of Brahman; this is known as जीवसृष्टि; i. e. to see is it create, as opposed to the earlier ईश्वरसृष्टि, that is you see what is created already. This doctrine is coupled with एवावयवत्वं where एवावयव may be द्विवचनम् in which case the world would be a dream of the cosmic soul this is Objective Idealism. The last and the extreme point to which Idealism could go but which it had never reached so boldly since the days of Gauḍapāda and the Buddhist Nihilists and Śāṅkara, as he appears in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's kārikās, is that the external Reality does not exist at all, being no better than the footprint of bird in the sky' (जीवो देहो वै शरीरमिदं एवम्) ॥

Such is the evolution of the Darśanas, of the schools of the Āndhryas, and of the doctrines of some Śāṅkara commentators.

(b) Historical or Chronological

Let us now turn from the logical to the chronological evolution of the Darśanas. The task of determining their chronology is not hopeless, but it is certainly very difficult,

¶ For the different schools of Śāṅkara philosophy see Das Gupta's very valuable History of Indian Philosophy vol. II which I received after the foregoing paragraphs were ready for print.

because a number of confusions have to be avoided in drawing conclusions. First, it is to be remembered that early thought in the shape of stray ideas and references does not make a *darśana* in the sense of a system of philosophy which represents a later stage in its history; for example, in the case of Sāṃkhya and Yoga long centuries of thought and practice had to roll away before these *darśanas* came to be formulated in Sūtras. Secondly the age of the sūtras of a *darśana* should not be confounded with that of its beginning; for sūtras came only after the *darśana* had already undergone some systematisation. Thirdly the extant sūtras are not necessarily the first of their kind but the last, that have supplanted their predecessors by the law of the survival of the fittest; the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are an example to the point. Fourthly while determining the age of particular sūtras by means of external and internal evidence, it should be borne in mind that they were revised and enlarged from time to time as new opponents and new points of view presented themselves and consequently such evidence cannot be taken to be conclusive as regards the entire work. Fifthly each of the *darśanas*, apart from the sūtras, has had its history and has not remained the same in every large and small detail, and therefore the form in which we find a *darśana* presented in latter-day summaries and manuals is not the form in which it has really existed throughout the ages. This long list of caveats is sufficient to account for the complexity of the chronological problem and the resulting difficulty of arriving at indubitable conclusions. A large mass of controversial literature relating to the history of the *darśanas* has thus grown, which it is impossible to present and discuss within the space at our disposal. All that we can do is to mention a few salient points leaving the reader to gather more information from standard books and articles bearing upon the subject.

(1) The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga are the two oldest *Darśanas* the former being found in a sufficiently evolved form in the later Upaniṣads, and the practices of the latter being also

old and known to Gautama Buddha as an established method of discovering Truth. And yet the extant sūtras of the Śāikhya system seem to be unknown in Vācaspati's era (9th cent. A.C.) and even to Nāgārjuna the author of the *Śāstra-darśana* (1380 A.C.) and they appear for the first time with the *Vṛtti* of Aniruddha (1500 A.C.) and a little later with the *Bhāṣya* of Viśvanabhikṣu (second half of the sixteenth cent. A.C.) Even if such late date be not warranted it is significant that no sūtra of the work has been quoted by any writer earlier than Aniruddha and Viśvanabhikṣu; that Śaṅkara when dealing with the system extensively does not quote any one of the sūtras, and that the author of the *Kārikā* mentions the *Śaṅkara* as his source and not the sūtras. All this taken with the fact that the sūtras contain references to the philosophical doctrines of later Buddhism raises a high probability that the sūtras of this school belong to a very late date. Whom

Recently Marshall has opined that it existed even the pre-Vedic civilisation of the Indus valley

† Apart from the fact that Aniruddha had already written the *Vṛtti*, it may be taken as certain that Viśvanabhikṣu is not committed forgery since the work contains some sūtras such as *śūtra* which Viśvanabhikṣu finds exceedingly inconvenient for his theistic position.

‡ It is not unreasonable to contend that on the other hand this is only a argument from silence, and that in Buddha's plays which have been recently published, the Śāikhya Sūtras may have remained buried for centuries until Aniruddha and Viśvanabhikṣu—like Gaṇapati Sastri in the other case—unearthed them. This is rendered plausible by the fact that the fifth chapter of the work contains parables which it is said, were found in the old *Śaṅkara*, but are absent from all the late works except the sūtras. The nucleus of the sūtras may thus go back to the period of the Mahābhārat but not the work in its present form which discourses the tenets of all the other darśanas including those of later Buddhism.

be the author of the sūtras there is no doubt that the first teacher of the Sāṃkhya system was Kapila, whom tradition knows as "अग्नि विद्वांस" or the first philosopher. He is a semi-historical person to whom a reference seems to have been made in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad†. Kapila taught this holy and

‡ It is curious that the author of the Bhagavadgītā who speaks frequently of "Sāṃkhya" does not refer to Kapila in connection with Sāṃkhya, but refers to him in a different context—in the chapter on the "vibhūti" or glorious manifestations of God—as an ideal "siddha" ["सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः] But this difficulty is to some extent reduced by the occurrence of numerous passages in the Mahābhārata where Kapila is mentioned as the teacher of the Sāṃkhya. The word

Kapila in the passage in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad in which it occurs [अग्निं प्रवर्तयन् कपिलं वसुधये हविर्विभर्ति जायमानं च वसुधे] has been interpreted by one commentator as the

lawyer sungod and this interpretation has been accepted and supported by Max Muller probably under the impression that the commentary was Śaṅkara's, which it is not. It is not possible to rule out this interpretation as absurd, but it is less probable than the other which makes a reference to the sage of that name. That Kapila was known as historical person long before the time of Gautama Buddha is clear from the name of the birth-place of Gautama which was Kapila-vastu the residence of Kapila [Keith's

remarks to the contrary on p. 50 of his "Sāṃkhya System" in the "Heritage of India" Series are unconvincing] Moreover it is noteworthy that Śaṅkara in the course of his Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras, in meeting the claim of the Sāṃkhya that their system was the best exponent of the Vedic teaching inasmuch as the Veda (Śvet. Up.) itself declares Kapila as "perfect in knowledge" says that Kapila in the passage might very well refer to some other Kapila than the teacher of atheistic Sāṃkhya, such as one who was elsewhere called Vāmadeva Kapila, the sage who burnt the sons of Bāraka.

foremost system to Āsuri, and Āsuri taught it to Paṇcātīkha, who simplified it. From the last-named the system passed down, from master to pupil, to "Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmīki, Hārīta, Devala and others" and finally to Īvarakṛṣṇa, who made an abridgment of it in series of stanzas in āryā metre.

work which is known as the "Sāṃkhyakārikā. This work says the author "contains all that is found in the Rāṣṭrikas, less the Parables and the controversies with other schools. In the Mahābhārata xii, 819-52 along with Kapila, Āsuri and Paṇcātīkha, as teachers of the spiritual doctrine with twenty-fifth principle, are mentioned Jaigṛavya, Astika Devala, Parāśara, Vārsaganya, Bhṛgu, Śuka, Gautama, Āṣṭāśena, Garga, Nārada, Pulastya, Saṃatkrumāra, b kṛa and Kāśyapa. The teaching of many of these, as we know from other sources, was by no means distinctively Sāṃkhya and this, the afore only goes to prove that the Sāṃkhya at one time, was a general term for philosophy and was hardly distinguishable from Vedānta. The Chinese tradition reveals one more name, that of Voḍhā, as teacher of the Sāṃkhya system of the epic age. Among writers who succeeded Īvarakṛṣṇa in the literary history of the Sāṃkhya were Vārsaganya (= "Balabost" in Chinese) Vindhyavāsin, Mādhara, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣa. As Vārsaganya figures in the list given in the MBh which knows nothing of Īvarakṛṣṇa, he cannot be later than Īvarakṛṣṇa, and so far the Chinese tradition must be wrong.

Of the next exponent of the Sāṃkhya system—Āsuri—we know nothing except that verse has been attributed to

“साम्प्रदिदम्भं मुनिरासुरवेभ्यश्च यदस्ति ।

नासुरिरपि यद्विज्ञातं तेन च बहुवीक्षणं तन्मयम् ॥

—Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īvarakṛṣṇa No. 70.

† याम्येवोदयमाद्यवीरिहासितेरेक्यमुपजीव्यतस्तत् ।

—Mādhara-vṛtti on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā No. 71.

‡ विष्णुर्देवतामहमसीत्तद्वन्मेष चेतसावर्तिभिः ।

लक्ष्मिर्मातृवर्तिना तन्मयं विज्ञातं सिद्धमस्तत् ॥ —S. K. 71.

§ See Śyādvādamānjari on St. XV

him in which he says that pleasure and pain which are really forms of *Buddhi*¹ are reflected in the *Parna* like the moon in water (*Byād. St. xv*).

1) ✓ About *Pañcāsikha* however we know a great deal more from the *Mahābhārata* where his system has been presented in detail and he is associated with the teaching of the *Pāncarātra* doctrines, a distinctly theistic school of the *Sāṅkhya* known as early as in the time of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Several quotations are made from his works by later writers such as *Vācaspati* and others. The famous work known as *Śaṣṭitantra*[†] has been attributed to him by a Chinese tradition, though doubtless by an error; since his teachings as given in the *Mahābhārata*, differ in several of their details from those found in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* which profess to be founded upon it. Some attribute this work to *Varaṇagunya* who they say is a definite

^a Hopkins has made a short sketch of *Pañcāsikha's* *Sāṅkhya* in his "Great Epic of India." See pp. 142-155. See also Keith's *Sāṅkhya System* pp. 39-44.

† Some think that 'षष्टितन्त्रविधि'—is only a common name and like 'षोडशसूत्रम्' means only the teaching of the philosophy of the sixty principles. This, however is less probable. As a work it may be referred to about 150 B. C. If it be *Varaṇagunya's* as has been suggested.

§ Keith; contra Hiriyanna. See the latter's article on "The *Śaṣṭitantra* and *Varaṇagunya*" in *J. O. R. Madras Vol. III Pt. II*, where he argues in favour of the Chinese tradition that *Pañcāsikha* was the author of *Śaṣṭitantra*, "a book of 60,000 verses. This measure of the work's *Śaṣṭitantra* is different from the one given by *Vācaspati* in his *Sāṅkhya-tattva Kaumudī* on the authority of a *RājaVārtikā* and contained also in the *Ahīrbudhīya Samhitā*. See Keith's *Sāṅkhya System* pp. 62-63 and Woolfe's *Yoga Sūtra*, Preface.

historical figure, perhaps the first historical figure in the Śāṅkhya and Yoga tradition.

Vācasanya (=the Barnhart in Chinese) is mentioned in the Mahābhārata as one of the teachers of the Śāṅkhya-Yoga. Vācaspati describes him in the "Bhāmati" as one of the teachers who expounded the *Yoga-Sūtra* ("योगसूत्रप्रवर्तित")¹. Consequently it is probable that he belonged to the age when the Śāṅkhya and the Yoga were regarded as two branches of a single *Sūtra*. Some have gone the length of suggesting that he was Vedāntic—in all probability a "paripāśavādin"². The great "Bhāṭiantra" has been ascribed to him, in the "Akhirbuddhya Samhitā"; and if the table of contents given in the latter book can be trusted Vācasanya, as the author of the work was follower of the later Śāṅkhya. Only four or five quotations from his work now remain, in one of which he is cited as opposing the tonic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, in another as dealing with the fourfold character of Ignorance, in third as declaring that the phenomenal forms of the Gunas (Prakṛti) were mere illusion and so on. Māhara, the author of commentary on the Śāṅkhya-Kārikā is mentioned in the Ananyogadharma, a work of the Svetāmbara Jainas, which was given its present form between the third and the fifth century of the Christian era and therefore cannot be later than the second half of the second or the first half of the third century.

Of Viśvadevīśin we know something from Chinese sources and also from *śāstra* in Karmāśāstra & Ślokavārtika, Anuśāsan Parā 143 where he is said to have held the view that the inference of fire from smoke relates to particulars

See Hanyanna article in J. O. R. Madras Vol. II Pt. II.

↑ Webster

and not to universalise. To this some more light has been added recently by the publication of the "Tattvasamgraha" of Śāntarākṣita and its commentary by Kamalaśīla. In Parmārtha's "Life of Vasubandhu" which is found in Chinese it is recorded that Vindhyavāsin was successful in a debate with Buddhāmītra, a teacher of Vasubandhu and after this triumph he returned to his home on the Vindhya mountain and died there. Attempts have been made to identify him with Īśvarakṛpā. But Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the Tattvasamgraha quotes a verse in which "Rudrīka" is given as the proper name of Vindhyavāsin.

✓ The last but not the least of the important landmarks in the history of the Sāṅkhya system is Vhṛānabhikṣu a devout and learned theist who wrote a Bhāṣya known as the "Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya" on the Sūtras attributed to Kapila, wherein he interprets the Sāṅkhya system in the light of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas, and thus restores the theistic character which at one time belonged to the Sāṅkhya system but had been replaced by atheism in the latter half of the Mahābhārata period, and during the whole of the Kārikā period from Īśvarakṛpā to Vācaspatimīśra, the author of the Sāṅkhyatattvakāumudī.

The history of the Sāṅkhya thought may be divided into five periods, which can be approximately fixed:—

- संरिद्धमान्धसुखदुःखोद्योगो यमावता ।
विदेवचक्षमेव च विजितं विन्दव्यासिता ॥
- § कदेव इति तच्छीरे कच्छीरे तदधीति च ।
यदा इति केनैव कदापि विन्दव्यासिता ॥

G. O. S. Tattvasamgraha p. 22 Com.

Here Rudrīka the Vindhyavāsin is ridiculed as 'a dweller in the forest who cannot distinguish between milk and curds. The reference is to the Sāṅkhya's 'Sāṅkhyavāda

1. The Sāṃkhya of the Upaniṣads and that of the Bhagavadgītā [circa 1000 to 800 B. C.]

2. The Sāṃkhya just before the age of Gautama Buddha. Of this however we know very little.

3. The Sāṃkhya of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas: the earlier and the later stage the former theistic, the latter atheistic. [circa 600 to 300 B. C.]

4. The Sāṃkhya as known to Ānanda Śastrya, the author of the Vedānta sūtras, and the Sāṃkhya of the Kṛṣṇa [circa 300 B. C. to 200 A. D.] both distinctly theistic.

5. The Sāṃkhya of Viśaṅkabhikṣu which is distinctly theistic. (16th century A. D.)

(3) The Yoga Darśana appears in its fully developed form in the existing "Yoga Sūtras" of Patañjali who, if he is identical with the famous author of the "Vyākaraṇa Mātṛbhāṣya" belongs to the middle of the second century B.C. The identity however has been questioned on fairly reasonable, but by no means conclusive, grounds.† This darśana, owing to its mystic as well as practical character has been favoured by the Brāhmanas, the Buddhists and the Jainas alike, and has been passed over by Mallabera without criticism except in one or two places where the doctrines which are criticized are held by the Yogins as common property with the Sāṃkhya. As observed before, the system is undoubtedly pre-Buddhist. Tradition ascribes its origin to "Hiranyagarbha" (see Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad) who, like "Kapila", may be either historical person or the Cosmic Spirit of the "Golden Egg" of the famous Hiranyagarbha Sūkta of the Rgveda, Maṇḍala X. This, again is not

† See Wood's "Yoga Sūtras"; and Deussen's History of Indian Philosophy pp. 231-32

‡ The problem of interpretation is exactly similar

inconsistent with another tradition which makes Yājñavalkya the first ṛṣi who received his inspiration of Yoga from the Sun-god who is the spirit of the "Golden Egg." As already observed the Yoga darśana reveals two distinct strands, one mystic and truly religious, the other superstitious and gross. The case is similar to, or perhaps the same as that presented by the Atharvaveda and must be similarly explained. It is due to the amalgamation, or rather the crude mixture of the religious ideas and practices of the Āryans and the pre-Āryan inhabitants of India, and also of those of the upper and lower strata of the Āryans themselves. The principal works of this school which are of philosophical interest are,—the Yogasūtras of Patañjali; the Bhāṣya thereon which is attributed to one Vyāsa, who cannot be the same as the author of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas in their earlier forms; Vācaspati's commentary called *Tattva Vaiśārādī*; Bhojavṛtti "a brief commentary attributed to King Bhoja and lastly Vijñāna bhikṣu's "Yoga-śārtika on the Bhāṣya. There are numerous other works dealing with Hatha Yoga and Tāntṛic elements in the system and to some of occult philosophy and superstition—which we need not pause to notice, as they possess little that is germane to our study of the Sādvādaśāstra.

(3 and 4). The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya as observed before originated as separate systems, but the former which was in its origin a child of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, soon became a supplement—an adopted child, to use a metaphor—of the latter. Thus, Vātsyāyana the Nyāya-bhāṣyakāra treats the Vaiśeṣika as a pratītantṛ Siddhānta of Nyāya. In the post-Christian Buddhist age their alliance seemed to be so complete that the Sūtras of the Nyāya School were sometimes referred to as taken from that of the Vaiśeṣikas. For example Vasubandhu seems to have used the word *Vaiśeṣika* in this wider sense

* See Tucci's "Pre-Dharmśāstra II" *Bibliotheca Indica* (G. O. S.), Introduction pp. xxvi-xxvii.

and the commentator of Āryadeva refers to the quotations which the latter has made in his "Śaṅkṣitā" from the N. S. as those of the V. S. Yet for a long time the two systems received separate treatment and their authors remained separately attached to their respective systems. Udayana, in the tenth century was the first important writer who wrote on both, though separately. The alliance thus initiated by unity of authorship ended in complete fusion in later times, so much so that the two systems often came to be designated by a single name, Nyāya "or" Tarka.

✓ The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are beyond doubt later than the Śāṅkhya and the Yoga, and we owe their origin mainly to the spirit of inquiry which stirred the Indian mind about the time of Gautama Buddha. ✓ Of the two again, the Vaiśeṣika is older. This tradition seems to have been preserved as late as the time of Udayotakara, who calls the author of the Nyāya Sūtras 'uṣṭi' and that of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras 'uṣṭi'. The Vaiśeṣika darśana deals directly with the problem of the 'vibhakti' or properties of things, its system of logic being subsidiary to the process, and not vice versa as with the Nyāya. The Sūtras of the Vaiśeṣika system are ascribed to sage named Kanada or Ulika, whose latter name occurs in the Mahābhārata as that of Śāṅkhya-Yoga teacher—a fact which must be taken as indicating that the darśanas had not yet come to be clearly marked off from one another. The author of the Nyāya-sūtras was Gautama, who may or may not be identical with the author of the Gautama Dharma Sūtras †

† Could not this have been the origin of the designation 'uṣṭi' as applied to the Vaiśeṣikas?

† Except that 'Gautama' is a very common name among sages, there is nothing to favour the former alternative; all the same time it cannot be peremptorily rejected as a "worthless identification. That it could involve very early date for the Nyāya sūtras need not worry us. See my paper in the Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference."

ghoṣa's *Sātrāṅkīrṇa* which places the origin of the Vaiśeṣika system before Buddha.† Even if such an early date for the Vaiśeṣika darsana be denied, there can be no doubt that it must have originated long before the time of Aśvaghoṣa. According to U1 "the origin of the Vaiśeṣika was in the time of Mahāvīra and Buddha (the sixth fifth century B.C.)" although the systematisation [i. e. the composition of the *Sātras*] of the Vaiśeṣika is later than 500 B. C., probably in the first century B.C.‡ The latter conclusion is deduced from the following facts: ✓ First, "certain notions found in the Nyāya system and the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are met in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* written by the physician of King Kaṭaka (1st century of the Christian era)"; secondly Kaṭiāyana's *Arthaśāstra* (supposed to be work of the third century before Christ) divides *Ānvikṣiki* into *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga* and *Lokāyata* but makes no mention of *Vaiśeṣika* which shows that the systematisation of the *Vaiśeṣika* is later than 300 B.C., at the earliest and it probably took place in the first century B.C., some time after the sixth century (in A. D.) of Jainism.§ As the date of Kaṭiāyana's *Arthaśāstra* is now generally accepted to be 1st century or two after the Christian era, and not 300 B.C., as it was uncritically believed at one time, the above argument may appear to be shaky. But it should be noted that the introductory chapter of the "*Arthaśāstra*" in

Aśvaghoṣa's authorship of the work has been questioned. But the tradition recorded there still remains and cannot be set aside as worthless.

† U1's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*

‡ U1; Dr. Paddegam following Balal.

§ Paddegam. According to Keith, "not only is Caraka's date uncertain, but his work has suffered rehashing, and the authenticity of the text cannot be admitted."

¶ The value of this tradition which is recorded in the *Aras'ya* is questioned by Kailāsh who thinks that the passage in which it occurs is probably an interpolation.

which the reference is made to the branches of *Anvikṣikī** may well have been older the chapters which underwent revision being only those which related to the subject-matter of the "Arthaśāstra." Even taking the later date which is assigned to the "Arthaśāstra" it cannot be asserted that the *Vaiśeṣika* was unknown as late as the second century A. D. For As'va ghoṣa in his "Sūtrālamkāra" refers to "*Vaiśeṣika Śāstra*." Thirdly the doctrine of सामान्य and विशेष as presented in the "*Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*" is less advanced than that which is attributed to one Robagutta who it is said imported it into Jainism about the time of the sixth Jain schism (A. D. 18.).†

Whatever doubt may be cast on the value of the evidence mentioned above we are on absolutely solid ground when we come to later Buddhist writers. A series of them—Nāgārjuna, Ārya Deva and Harivarman—ranging roughly from the second to the end of the third century A. D.—show progressively detailed knowledge of the characteristic doctrines of the *Vaiśeṣika* system‡. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the lower limit of the date of the "*Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*" is the end of the first century A. D. While the upper limit may be several centuries before the Christian era and may go as far back as the time of Gautama Buddha as believed by the author of the "*Sūtrālamkāra*" ¶

* The passage runs thus: "Once there lived Brāhmaṇa Kauṭika by name, who had thoroughly mastered the Śāpekhyā Śāstra, the *Vaiśeṣika Śāstra* and the Śāstra of Jātīputra. — *Uṣ V Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* p. 40.

‡ सामान्यं विविधं १ महासाधारणं २ सत्तासाधारणं ३ सामान्य-वितेस-सामान्यं । तत्र महासाधारणं सत्त्वसि परार्थं परार्थत्ववृद्धिपरि । सत्तासाधारणं मृत्पार्थनवृद्धिविपादि । सामान्यवितेससामान्यम् इत्यन्तरादि । अन्ये तु व्याचष्टे—महासाधारणं इत्यन्तरादि सामान्यवितेस इति वीत्यदि । वितेसो एवविदो । एवं...अन्ते पर्यति । सामान्यं वृद्धिः । परं अपरं च । वितेसो वृद्धिो अतस्वितेसो अनेनवितेसो च ॥

§ See Uṣ V ■ *Phil.* pp. 4-54

¶ For summary of U's views, which I have accepted

For the date of the Nyāya Sūtras, the *locus classicus* is Jacob's article on "The Dates of the Philosophical sūtras of the Brāhmanas" published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. XXXI. Starting with an examination of certain Nyāya sūtras (N. S. IV II 10-25) which criticize Buddhist doctrines, he arrives at the conclusion that they refer to the Śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna, and not to the Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra school of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, as is supposed by the commentators. Consequently the N. Sūtras should be referred to the period following that of Nāgārjuna (3rd century) and preceding that of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga (middle of the 4th century). This deduction of Jacob has long held the field, and it is only lately that the opinion is gaining ground that it is wrong to suppose that Indian idealism was inaugurated by Vasu-

with certain substantial modifications in the above paragraphs, see "U. Vaidya's Philosophy" p. 65. It may be quoted here for ready reference. "Jacob searches into the dates of the sūtras of the six systems for the date of V. S. at about 200-500 A. D. and Basu, following Jacob's proofs places the date in 250-300 A. D. Jacob bases his proof mainly upon the relation of the Sūtras to the Buddhist schools, the Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda. V. S. does not directly relate to the Buddhist schools. Consequently he deduces the date from the date of N. S. But, as stated above, V. S. is quoted by the author of N. S., and such quotations are found in the work of Nāgārjuna and Deva makes comment on Nāgārjuna's quotations. Therefore V. S. would appear to have been composed before Nāgārjuna. But the date of V. S. cannot be earlier than Bhagavata and Arvaghaṇa. The conclusion is that V. S. was composed about 50-150 A. D. If Nāgārjuna is not so early as 115-315 the date of V. S. will be placed at a time later than 50-150 A. D. At any rate the date is earlier than Nāgārjuna, and the contents of V. S. do not contradict this supposition."

bandhu, since the Idealistic views had already been expounded in such works as *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*,[†] and "*Saṃdhi vimocana*" and already systematised by Maitreya etc.[‡]

The different views held on this subject have been clearly summed up by Dr. Tucci, who writes: "Jacobi maintained that N.S. and V.S. were composed between 200 and 450 A.D. § Small proposed for V.S. the date 250-300 and for N.S. the date 300-350. Steinhilber had first maintained that N.S. assumed its definite shape after the 5th century; then, he changed his view and held that no certain conclusion could be derived from the fact that there are in N.S. references to Buddhist Idealism, since the Idealism is not that of Vasubandhu, but an older one. U� proposed the date 150-250. Prof. Dasgupta is rather sceptical as regards the possibility of fixing the exact date when the sūtras were codified. I think, he is quite right, because we are still not in a position to determine the various strata that were superimposed in the actual redaction of the sūtras." ¶

I am inclined to hold that among the different strata that are traceable in the composition of the Sūtras the one

Keish discredits the evidence of "*Laṅkāvatāra*" on the ground that "the sūtra in its present form is not earlier than the sixth century A.D., as it prophesies the Hūna rule of that period."

† Tucci's *Pre-Dharmapala Buddhist Texts on Logic* Introduction xxvi (G.D.S.). See for the early date of Indian Idealism my paper in the "*Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference*."

‡ J.A.O.S. V 1 XXXI.

§ U� proposes the date 200-250 A.D. for systematisation of the doctrine and 300-350 for the redaction of N.S.—a view which is endorsed by Tucci.

¶ "*Pre-Dharmapala Texts of Logic, from Chinese Sources*" Introduction p. xlv.

to which belongs the sūtra relating to the division Anumāna ("Trivikham Anumāna" L.L.5) is the 1. The work as a whole, however may be referred to the 1st half of the second century B.C., to some date about B.C. in the age of the Āhnikas or Dīly Lāsane, so the Navikula of Patanjali Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya. This general statement is subject to the qualification that some of the sūtras are demonstrably earlier and some than the age to which the bulk of the sūtras belong. This conclusion regarding the date of the sūtras I arrive at the fact that the sūtra relating to the division of Anumāna is obscure even to Vātsyāyana, the author of the Nyāyabhāṣya and therefore considerable time must be supposed to elapsed between the age of the sūtra and that of Vātsyāyana. Now it is possible to ascertain the lower limit of the age of Vātsyāyana with the help of the date of the "Anuyogadvāra" work of the younger Jaina Canon, and the Mātbara-Vṛtti, commentary on Īśvarakṛpā's "Bhāṣya-kārikā". Thus—If we compare Vātsyāyana's account of the three kinds of Anumāna referred to in the 2nd sūtra (L.L.5) with Mātbara's exposition of the subject we cannot help concluding that the Mātbara-vṛtti on the Bhāṣyakārikā represents definite step forward in the history of Indian Logic. Similarly if we compare the account of the same as given in the "Anuyogadvāra" with that found in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, we cannot but be impressed by the great many details which the former presents distinguished from the latter. This is as it should be; for the Anuyogadvāra is even later than Mātbara, to whose work it refers as an important branch of learning studied in those days.

With its 34 kinds of Fallacy 9 of which are 14 of 15 and of 16. Of the list of Fallacies in the Nyāyapraśaṅga (G.O.8)

† The passage is repeated with slight variations in Navikula—another work of the Jaina canon.

If we accept Weber's view that the *Jaina Śiddhānta* was given its present shape between the third and fifth century A. D. the latest date for the passage of the *Anuyogadvāra* will be the beginning of the fifth century A. D. The same passage occurs with slight alterations in the *Nandishūtra*, and supposing the *Nandishūtra* is a work of Devardhigani (end of the fifth century A. D.) the passage in question from *Anuyoga* will have to be placed some time before it. Now if *Vātsyāyana* is later than *Nāgārjuna* (250 A. D.—Dr. Vidyābhūṣana), *Vātsyāyana* and *Māthara* have to be accommodated in the interval between 250 A. D. (the date of *Nāgārjuna*) and 400 A. D. (the date of the passage of the *Anuyogadvāra*). Allowing a margin of 50 years on either side the remaining period of 50 years is all too short to account for the great development of Logic, such as we have noted above, between *Vātsyāyana* and *Māthara*. If, on the contrary we accept the *Jaina Śvetāmbara* tradition as it stands—and we cannot set it aside except for very cogent reasons—and assign the present edition of *Anuyoga* to Āryaraksita who lived in the second half of the first century A. D., the dates of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (= Kaṇvagastari) and the *Māthara-Vṛtti* will have to be shifted to the first century B. C. and early part of the first century A. D. respectively. Now one strong reason for assigning the passage in *Anuyoga* to the latter part of the first century A. D., rather than to some period between the third and the fifth century A. D. is that the passage refers to Buddhist scriptures in an altogether general way—it calls them merely 'द्वयसूत्र'† while the *Sāṃkhya* works referred to are no less than three, which are mentioned specifically over and above the general 'द्वयसूत्र' (the philosophy of Kapila). Had the *Anuyogadvāra* been written in the 3rd or 5th century

The *Jaina* tradition ascribes not only the division of *Anuyoga*, but also the compilation or composition of *Anuyogadvāra* to Āryaraksita (see Āvśyaka I 74).

† द्वयसूत्र—*Nandishūtra*.

A. D., in the age of such eminent Buddhist teachers as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Buddhabhāsa, we would have found these or their works mentioned individually as has been done in the case of the Śālikhyas authors. The list clearly reveals an atmosphere of flourishing Brahmanism which, as we know characterized the three or four centuries from the death of Aśoka to the coronation of Kaniska. That the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa were popular works read at certain hours of the day among the people in the time of the Anurādhavāsa does not impair the conclusion we have arrived at. For we know that they were read in the remote Indian colony of Cambodia about 600 A. D. and the custom of reading them as sacred literature may have been established in India several centuries before. Land grants dated in the 6th century A. D., and found in various parts of India, quote Mahābhārata as an authority possessed of the character of Smṛiti or Dharmasūtra—the status and breadth of popularity which it cannot have acquired in a couple of centuries.

Having thus seen that the Mādhava-Ūṭṭi may with a great deal of probability be referred to the first century A. D., we place Vātsyāyana a century or two earlier which will account for the vast development of the Science of Logic which took place in the interval between Vātsyāyana and Mādhava.

The date here proposed for Vātsyāyana may appear to be a violent outrage upon the general opinion of Orientalists in regard to this writer who place him in the fourth or fifth century A. D. But I submit that the arguments by which their theory is supported are in the first place inconclusive; and, secondly they have not been so limited with the evidence of the works cited above point of view which has been entirely overlooked by these scholars. Even if Dr Jacobi is right in holding that Vātsyāyana revised edition of the Nyāya-Sūtras decreases the Śānyavāda or Nihilism of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna (about 200-250 A. D.) but not the

opponent's position in his own words, and, besides, show little disposition to vary the statement. Besides, the very fact that the parallels which Dr Vidyābhāṣa has cited there often a difference of words without difference of sense points to the conclusion that the author of the Sūtras had used some work of Mādhyamika philosophy other than the Mādhyamika Vṛtti of Nāgārjuna. Thus, for example, Nāgārjuna's 'एतं न गच्छते' etc. which Dr Vidyābhāṣa cites as the original of the Śyāva Sūtra 'वर्तमानाद्यं वस्तुः वतिवपतिव्यवर्तते एवमेव' appears to me to be really not its original but only a parallel, the original being some other work earlier than both. Prof. Vidyaśekhara Bhattacharya has rightly observed: "Certainly Nāgārjuna established the Mādhyamika school. But it does not follow from it that all the materials for building the new structure were his own. He chiefly collected them from the works previous to him such as the Prajñāpāramitā, Laṅkāvatāra etc."

Now the Laṅkāvatāra itself clearly indicates that it is based upon older traditions of the Mādhyamika philosophy. The very mythological setting of the treatise in which Buddha teaches the doctrine of Śūnyatā to Nāgapa, shows that the author wants the reader to accept the doctrine as an old heritage. Besides, it is clearly declared to have been taught by 'former Buddhas,' which need not be taken literally but which does point to a date long prior to the composition of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Besides one of the passages of the Laṅkāvatāra shows that the doctrine of Karmatā had been criticised by earlier writers and the author had therefore to

Of this we have numerous instances in the commentaries on the Tāvādharm Aśāstra which are cited by me in my paper on the subject. Moreover in the Laṅkāvatāra we read the illustration वर्तमानाद्यं वस्तु वतिवपतिव्यवर्तते । It is so stated that the Upaniṣad which contains the illustration of वर्तमानाद्यं is posterior to Laṅkāvatāra?

† "वर्तमानाद्यं वै पूर्ववद्व्यवर्तितम् ।"

stand on his defence and explain what it really meant and what it did not mean. Thus, we read :

विश्वोपायं कश्चित् विविक्तं वाचयति तम् ।
अहमस्मि न वयोनां कश्चिदर्थं वदाम्यहम् ।
वत्पुनस्तर्हि यत् न वै वेदेभि वाचिकाः ।

All this is not surprising if we remember that the doctrine of Kṣāṇikā, Naiśāmya or Śūnyatā, is of the very essence of Buddhism and its logical representation must have been attempted centuries before the age of Nāgārjuna and Laṅkāvatīra Sūtra. The controversy of Śāśvatavāda and Uchhedavāda is at least as old as Buddhism, perhaps even the Upaniṣads (see Br Up.); moreover the very existence of a school of Buddhist thinkers who call themselves Sarvśāśtravādin (a sub-division of the Sthāviras and one of the primitive schools of Buddhism) implies that there existed a rival school which denied that "All exists." This may be either the school of Vijñānavādin who held that "not all, but only vijñānas exist" or those who denied the existence of every thing, including even the *vyākāras* †

We may therefore claim that the Buddhistic doctrines which are noticed in the Nyāya-Sūtras do not compel us to believe that they belong to a period posterior to the Laṅkāvatīra Sūtra or the Mādhyamika Vṛtti.

After quoting Dr Keith who says " We need not, of course, take seriously the conception of Nāgārjuna as the creator of the Śūnyavāda philosophy " Dr. Randle rightly adds :
" Therefore references in the Śūnyavāda in the Nyāya Sūtra

† The two doctrines were more or less inseparably bound up together and even as late as the Nyāya Sūtra it is difficult to decide whether particular adhikaraṇa contains a refutation of the one or the other. So also in the quotation from Vṛtikāra which occurs in Śābara Bhāṣya of the P. Mīmāṃsā Sūtras.

re not necessarily references to Nāgārjuna: unless the phrases in N. B. which are parallel to phrases in Mk. (Mādhyamika Kārikā) first originated with Nāgārjuna. It is possible to regard these as "tags" which are repeated by Nāgārjuna from earlier Śānyasāhāda writers: in which case Vidyābhāṣa's argument for the priority of Nāgārjuna to the N. B. passages is question and Jacob's assumption that the date of Nāgārjuna gives the earliest limit for the composition of the Śyāva Sūtra fall to the ground."

(Indian Logic in the Early Schools, p. 18 footnote)

The principal authors of the Vaiśeṣika and Śyāva schools up to the age of Mallinātha are

1. Bāṛaṇa—the author of a work known as "Bāṛaṇa Bhāṣya" which is not extant but seems to have been known to Śaṅkarācārya. He is earlier than the author of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Could it not be that the "सर्वत्र" of the Kārikā quoted by Praśastapāda in the section on Inference and Fallacies (".....सर्वत्र सर्वत्रोपपत्तिरिति") was Bāṛaṇa, 'son of Kāśyapa'? A work consisting of kārikās or maxims like this would thus fall between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda.

2. Praśastapāda—the author of a Vaid. work called Padārtha-Dharmasamgraha, popularly known as "Praśastapāda Bhāṣya," which is not a regular Bhāṣya, an exposition of each Vaiśeṣika sūtra but an independent work running along the lines of the Vaid. Sūtras. In his hands the Vaid. system has undergone much development. Among his special contributions to the system, Kaṇāda owes his recognition in place of the seventeen qualities of general ty and particularly and inherence, which assume

† See Kaṇāda I. L. A. p. 27 and M. N. Kappaswami Sastri's article in the Madras J. O. S. Vol. III Pt. I.

‡ See Śāṅkarācārya Bhāṣya on B. Sūtra II. 11 and Prakāśārtha Vyāsa thereon.

new shapes in his hands; the occurrence of a complete theory of creation in which the Supreme Lord appears as creator; and the elaboration of logical doctrine, which is particularly evident in the case of the doctrine of fallacies." As regards his date, the general view is that he belonged to the fifth century A. D. and was posterior to the Buddhist logician Dinnāga who should be referred to 400 A. D.† After examining all the pros and cons of the problem however I come to think that the balance of probability is in favour of Praśastapāda's priority to Dinnāga—a view which Stcherbatsky has now urged against his own theory of an earlier date.‡

3. Vātsyāyana—the author of the *N Bhāṣya*. It is difficult to surmise which of the two viz., Vātsyāyana and Rāvaṇa, was earlier. For the work of Rāvaṇa is lost and consequently there is no internal evidence to help us. But there is no doubt that Vātsyāyana was acquainted with the Vaiśeṣika system. For his date see *supra*.

4. Uddyotakara—He wrote his epoch-making work—the "*Nyāya vārtika*"—to answer the criticisms of the "bad (Buddhist) logicians who had attacked the system of Akpāda (Gaṇṭama). His work has been very helpful in reconstructing the history of mediaeval Buddhist Logic (See Randle's "*Fragments from Dinnāga*"). Bāṇa, contemporary and court poet of King Harsha (A. D. 590-644) mentions Subandhu's "*Vaiśnavadattā*" and the latter refers to Uddyotakara, consequently Uddyotakara cannot be later than the first half of the seventh century and was probably a little earlier.

5. Vācaspati Miśra—an author of great versatility and depth of thought. He has written works on Sāṃkhya, Yoga

† Keith's *L. L. A.* p. 27

‡ See my Introduction to the "*Nyāya praveśa*" Part I (G. O. S.) pp. xv to xxi where the problem has been fully discussed.

Vedānta and P. Mīmāṃsā. These are: "Nyāyaśloka-sambhāṣa" "Nyāyavārtikā-tīkā-paryatīkā" a commentary on Uddyotakara's "Nyāya-Vārtika"; Śāhikhyatattvakaumudī, a commentary on Śivarakṣa's "Śāhikhyakārikā"; Tattvavārtikā a commentary on "Vijaya Bhāṣya on Patanjali's "Yogasthira" Vāhivivaka and Nyāyakaṇṭhī" both works of P. Mīmāṃsā. He flourished in the ninth century (about 850) A. D., as appears from the date given in his Nyāya-śloka-sambhāṣa, 898—which has been understood to be the Vikrama Śaka year corresponding to 841 of the Christian era.

6. Bhāṣaraja—author of the "Nyāyaśloka". This work is noteworthy because of its giving a distinct place to Śaivism within the framework of Logic. This association was hitherto an historical accident due to the writers on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika being Śaivites in religion. In the Nyāyaśloka, Śaivism for the first time finds a distinct place in the system. The work is further important for our purpose, as Mallinātha quotes in one place the "Nyāyabhāṣya" which is a commentary on the Nyāyaśloka and is referred to by Ratnakīrti, Buddhist writer of the tenth century.

7. Udayana or Udayanabhaṣya —He has written several works both on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, though separately. These are "Lakṣaṇavali" book of logical definitions; "Kiraṇavali" commentary on Praśastapāda's Vārt. Bhāṣya; "Nyāyavārtikā-tīkā-paryatīkā" commentary on Uddyotakara's N. Vārt. Tīkā; "Karmasāra" famous work on the proofs of the existence of God and allied questions such as life before and hereafter being counterblast to the "Īśvarabhāṣya-kārikā" of Kalyāṇarāghava, a Buddhist writer of the 9th century; and "Ātmatattva-vivaka" work on the nature of the soul in which the author criticises the Buddhist doctrines of Apoka, Karmabhāṅga and Śrutī-aprāmāṇya. His date is definitely fixed at 984 A. D. on the evidence of his own statement in his "Lakṣaṇavali". He brought fresh vigour to the Nyāya school and is very frequently quoted by later writers as a great

authority on the tenets of that school which was now being amalgamated with the Vaiśeṣika. Besides being a logician and a metaphysician he was a religious teacher of the Śaivite school. It may be noted in passing that just as the Śāṅkhya was associated with Vaiśvāmya Yoga partly with Śāktism so was Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with Śaivism. The last fact—of the association of Nyāya-Vaiś. with Śaivism—has been duly noted by the Jaina author of the “*Śaṅḍarśana—Samuccaya*” (See Notes).

8 Śrīdhara, the author of the “*Nyāyakandali*,” a very important work written as a commentary on Praśastapāda’s Bhāṣya of the Vaiśeṣika system, and freely extracted in the *Syādvāda-manjari*. He composed this work as he tells us, in A. D. 991.

9 Jayanta—the author of the “*Nyāyamanjari*”—a full and free exposition of the important principles of the Nyāyadarśana along the lines of the Sūtras. Jayanta could not have lived earlier than the 9th century since he quotes Yāgyapati (841 A. D.); neither could he be later than the 12th century as he is referred to in the “*Syādvāda-tanākara*” by Devatūri (1036–1169 A. D.); and by Ratnaprabha (1181 A. D.) in the “*Ratnakaravāṭīrīka*,” who was an elder contemporary of Hemacandra. A few verses from Jayanta’s “*Nyāyamanjari*” have been extracted by Malliṣeṇa under Stanza VIII. Like Udayana, he too opposes Kalyāṇaraksita and Dharmottara.

10. Gaṅgeśa:—The author of the “*Tattvacintāmaṇi*” in which the logic of the Nyāya darśana attains its final shape. He (A. D. 1150–1200) was the founder of the Nadia (Nava dīpa) school of “*Navya-Nyāya*,” which in the subtleties of its logical definitions went far beyond the founder of the school. But the development of the new school is later and therefore it is of little interest to us as readers of the “*Syādvāda-manjari*.”

✓ (6) *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* :—As the *Valīśika* was engaged in determining the properties of things, and the *Nyāya* in formulating the principles of Logic, the main function of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school—which is demonstrably older than both—was to lay down the principles of Interpretation, originally that of Vedic texts relating to the Sacrifice. But its constant contact with rival systems which attacked the authority of the Veds drew it into the arena of polemology and metaphysics. Thus, from the 'Vṛtti' of the *Vṛtikāra* of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. When Śābaravāmiṇi, the *Bhāṣyakāra* of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra*, quotes we observe this new element in the *dārśana*, which has been further developed by *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila* and their later exponents *Śālikarāmbha* and *Pārthasarathihara*.[†] While the epistemological and metaphysical problems were foreign to the original purpose of *Mīmāṃsā*, the system found its natural development in the direction of logic, with the result that the *Mīmāṃsā* came to be called also *Nyāya*, and was the parent of what is now known as the *Nyāya-dārśana*.[‡] ✓ But the great popularity of the *dārśana* and its importance as a philosophical system date from the time of its revival under *Kumārila*, who criticised many of the favourite doctrines of Buddhist philosophy with great vigour and dialectic skill.

The principal writers of this school are —

1. The *Vṛtikāra*, to be identified with *Upavarṇa* or *Dedāyana*.[†]

2. The *Bhāṣyakāra* Śābaravāmiṇi; His quotation from

The two-membered syllogism which *Vātsyāyana* notes in his commentary on I. 1. 23 seems to be an early effort of the *Mīmāṃsā* school on this line.

† After *Jaimini*,—the *sūtrakāra* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. The both of these is attributed commentary on the two (*Pūrvā* and *Uttara* or *Karma* and *Brahma*) *Mīmāṃsā*.

‡ See Keith's *Karmamīmāṃsā* p. 9 Madras J. O. R. Vol. I. Part III—"Vṛtikagrantha" By Dr. A. Sankaran,

"Vṛttikāra" and the latter's reference in 'Sūnyavāda and Nirālambanavāda of the Buddhists, Nāgārjuna etc. suggest "that 400 A.D. is the earliest date to which he can be assigned." The force of this argument, however, has much diminished since these schools are now dated before Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu.

3 Prabhākara and Kumārila. They belong to the 7th or 8th century A. D. Their relative chronology is a much debated problem which is still unsettled. The latter who wrote "Vārtikas" or supplementary commentaries called the "Śloka-vārtika" and "Tāntravārtika" on Śābarasvāmī's Bhāṣya is particularly famous for his strong criticism of Buddhist logic and philosophy. He was generally supposed to belong to the latter half of the 7th century A.D., and was believed to be an elder contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. This date, however, has now been pushed back a few decades in the light of a recent publication in the J. O. R. For while his criticism of Dharmakīrti who flourished in the first half of the 7th century A. D. furnishes the upper limit of his date, the lower limit is supplied by references made to his views by Śāntarakṣita, the author of the "Tattva-saṃgraha" who is

A review of the arguments of both sides is impossible within the space at our disposal. See Das-Gupta's "Indian Philosophy" p. 69; Kelth's "Karmamīmāṃsā" pp. 9-10; Dr. Gaanganath Jha's "Prabhākara school"; Prof. Kuppurwami Sastri's paper in the Proceedings of the Second (Calcutta) Oriental Conference; "Introduction to Pūrva-mīmāṃsā" by Paṇpatināth Sastri, "Introduction to Prabhākara-Vijaya" by Pt. Amanta Kṛṣṇa Sastri; and "Kumārila and Prabhākara" by Pt. Chignaswami Sastri; "Prabhākara: Old and new" by Prof. Hiriyanna, Madras J. O. R. Vol. IV Pt. II.

† See Dr. K. B. Pathak's article in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the R. A. B. Vol. XVIII.

full of Kumārila and lived in the first half of the 8th century A. D.†

Other important writers on Pūrva-mīmāṃsā are later than Hemacandra and Mallikarjuna and consequently we need not note them here.

(6) The Philosophy of "Vedānta, like that of (Pūrva-) Mīmāṃsā, is at once old and new. As the name signifies the philosophy originates from the Upaniṣads, the end ('ant') or conclusion ('addhānta') of the Veda. But its great popularity is due to its revival under Śaṅkarācārya in the 9th century A. D. It is called "Brahma-mīmāṃsā" as opposed to "Karma-Mīmāṃsā, or "Uttara Mīmāṃsā" as opposed to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

This difference of nomenclature is founded upon the difference of view of the relation of the one system to the other. Śaṅkara considers Karma and Jñāna to be essentially inconsistent and therefore rejects the claim of the Karma-Mīmāṃsā to be regarded as necessary antecedent to Brahma-Mīmāṃsā. It is probably that the two were treated at one time as parts of a single study. As Bodhāyana has remarked "विश्वस्यैकम्" There can be no point, however in the remark that the two form one continuous whole, unless the two were really separate but were to be joined, or doubt had been cast on their continuity before the time of Bodhāyana. That the two must have originated separately admits of little doubt. But later tendency to wards syncretism must have set in, which accounts for the above remark of Bodhāyana; and this is further corroborated by the fact that Upaniṣads commented on both of them and thus practically treated the two as parts of a single whole. It should be noted, however that this does not make the two really one, since they have originated in fundamentally different types of thought, and are ascribed to different writers.

† Dr B. Bhattachārya's foreword to the 'Tattva-saṃgraha' Vol. I p. LXXXIII (G. O. S.).

✓ The "Sūtras" of the Vedānta darśana which are ascribed to Bādarāyana are presumably old, but the work as it stands at present would seem to be posterior to post-Christian Buddhist schools which it criticises.† Some attempt has been made‡ to show that the sūtras relating to the criticism of Buddhism, like similar sūtras of the Nyāyad rāna, if correctly interpreted, would appear to refer to Śūnyavāda and not to Viśiṣṭavāda, and therefore their date must fall between that of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. But this argument has lost its point, since as already remarked evidence is growing to show that Viśiṣṭavāda existed even before Vasubandhu, and probably Śūnyavāda also before Nāgārjuna. The underlying assumption that a particular Vāda began with its ācārya may well be set aside; for an ācārya is not an originator but only a promulgator of the doctrines of his school. But the bulk of the Sūtras since the Sāṃkhya which they criticise is atheistic, cannot be dated earlier than the later Mahābhārata period when the Sāṃkhya had begun to gravitate towards atheism.

The only doctrine of "Vedānta" which Hemacandra and Mallisena have noticed is that of Śaṅkara's school and there again that of "Māyā" only which Śaṅkara and his grand teacher—Gaṇḍapāda—are said to have borrowed from Buddhism. There can be no doubt that the language of Gaṇḍapāda's "Kārikā" in certain places savours of Buddhist influence, but there is a fundamental difference between the Vedāntic "Brahman" and the Buddhist's "Śūnya" which cannot be ignored. As regards Śaṅkarācārya also, a similar

† A reference to "Brahma Sūtras" is to be found in the "Bhagavadgītā" ["ब्रह्मसूत्रसिद्धिरिति श्रुतिः"]. That this work could not have been the same as the "Brahmasūtras" which we have at present is beyond question. But it is difficult to decide whether it was the nucleus of the work which we now have or was entirely different.

‡ By Jacobi in the article mentioned above.

obarge has been made,* but it does not seem to be well founded. The doctrine of "Māyā" is only a description by analogy of Nirupādhyaṭā," and the latter is implied in the antimony which is said to surround the nature of Brahman in the Upaniṣads and is distinctly declared in the Bh. Gītā which says "य एवावस्थितः". Moreover in tracing the doctrine to the B. dhist source, the originality of the latter is taken for granted. It has never been investigated whether the word 'सृष्टि' of Mahāyāna Buddhism could carry any sense unless there was Reality which was 'सृष्ट' i. e. red or obscured, and whether 'सृष्ट' could mean such a Reality at all. Is not the word 'सृष्टि' suggested by the 'मयासृष्ट' of हिमालये पर्वते सत्यस्थानिर्दिष्टं सुदृढं । यच्च पूज्यमासृष्टु सत्यवर्माणं सत्ये ! " and "निर्दृष्टे" of "सर्वेषु आत्मा विद्यमाने तर्हि स्वात्मा ?" Moreover is not 'मायस्त्व' of the Buddhist 'wheel of causes' a reminiscence of the same word or words occurring in the Upaniṣad? Besides, in the "Kathāvattha" (P. lots of Controversy —P. T. B.) where the question "whether Matter is subjective" is discussed, the word used is ārambhaṇa (= sūti ārambhaya) and the commentator there notes the two meanings of the word ārambhaya —a word which comes down from the famous text of the Upaniṣadic Idealism, viz., "सृष्टारम्भे विद्यते नादरेण सृष्टिरेवेव सत्यम्" (Upaniṣad), which is the abstractness of Sankara's Vedānta.

It should be remembered in this connection that Mahāyāna Buddhism was development of the original Buddhism under the influence of Brahmanism and local creeds; and that the dialectical method of the Mādhyamika school was anticipated in the earlier speculations relating to the nature of Brahman, in the Śyādvāda of the Jains, and in such pre-Buddhist thought as that of Saṃjaya recorded in the B. dhist canon.

That he has been called असृष्टः is no proof of his being really so. It is after all an argument in al. baculum which is not meant to be taken seriously.

The philosophical literature of Vedānta is immense. It can be classified, however under the following heads:

(1) Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

(2) The Vedānta of the post Upaniṣadic period of the Mahābhārata and the Bhagavadgītā.

(3) The Vedānta of the Sūtrakīaras—first, that of the predecessors of Bādarāyaṇa, such as Aśvalomi, Āśmarathya, Kāśakṛtsna etc., and afterwards that of Bādarāyaṇa.

(4) The Vedānta of pre-Śāṅkara commentators of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras—such as the Vṛttikāra etc.

(5) The Vedānta of Śāṅkara.

(6) Post-Śāṅkara Vedānta of his followers.*

(7) The Vedānta of the other Ācāryas, such as Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva, and of his or teachers, such as Vijñānabhikṣu, which differed radically from that of Śāṅkara and flourished side by side with that of his followers.†

It would be going too far beyond the scope of this section if we were to enter into the chronology and the teachings of these schools, especially because Hemacandra and Mallikarjuna had mainly concerned themselves with a single problem of Vedānta—viz., the Māyāvāda—which is the characteristic feature of the Vedānta of Śāṅkara.

Among the post-Bādarāyaṇa and pre-Śāṅkara Vedāntins we may note

1. Bodhāyana—the Vṛttikāra of the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Some identify him with—

For a summary of the Vedānta of the followers of Śāṅkara and their dates see Dr. Das-Gupta's "History of Indian Philosophy" Vol. II.

* For the minor schools of Vedānta, before and after Śāṅkara, see Prof. Hiriyanna's articles in the Madras Journal of Oriental Research.

3. Upavarsa—who is said to have written a commentary on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā. Sufficient evidence in favour of the identification of Bodhāyana with Upavarsa is, however wanting. Both of these must have flourished before the Christian era, if the nucleus of the Bādarāyaṇa sūtras is distinguished from their present form.

2. Damaśākhya—an ācārya who belonged to the Dravida country

4. Tachka—who is also supposed to be the same as Ācārya Brahma-gandha—and is known as "Vākyakṛta"

5. Bhartrihari—Like Anandavardhana he stood for the doctrine of "Bheda-bheda" and Brahma Paripāṇa. His identity with Bhartrihari is doubtful.

Among the early exponents of the Sādhikā school we have—

6. Maṇḍana—Different from Maṇḍana-miśra who, if we are to believe late tradition, was pupil of Kṛṣṇa and great Pūrva Mīmāṃsaka whom Śaṅkarā vanquished in debate and converted to Vedāntism. There was one Maṇḍana who was Vedāntin. He was probably contemporary (A.D. 800) of Śaṅkara (who died c. A.D. 820), and advocated an extreme form of subjective Idealism or Solipsism, which was revived later by Śaṅkara Vedānta, the author of the Vedānta-Sādhikā-Muktāvalī. He composed Brahmasiddhi and several other works of importance.

7. Suresvara—(circa 820 A.D.) said to be the name of Maṇḍanamiśra after he became aśraiyā and a disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, according to the tradition of the "Śaṅkara-Digvijaya". At any rate he is not to be identified with Maṇḍana, the solipsist, from whose view Suresvara is distinguished carefully by Suresvara's pupil Sarvajñananda, the author of the "Saṅkṣepa Sūtrikā" and by his commentator. He was the author of Bhāṣya on the Sūtras and

Naṣkarmyaśālikā—works of great importance in the history of Sāṃkara Vedānta.

8. **Pañcapāda**—(circa 820 A. D) another disciple of Śaṃkarācārya who wrote a work called "Pañcapāda. On it Prakāśatman wrote "Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa" about 1200 A.D., and the latter received a commentary from Vidyāraṇya (1350 A. D) called "Vivaraṇa-Prameya Saṃgraha"

A little later but still ranking among the early Śaṃkartes are—

9 **Vācaspati-miśra**—(about 840 A.D) the famous writer on Sāṃkhyā, Yoga, Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. His great work of the last school is a lucid commentary on Śaṃkara's Śāriraka Bhāṣya of the Vedānta Sūtras, named Bhīmānī after his wife.

10 **Sirvaṇṇātman Muni** (900 A. D)—a disciple of Sureśvarācārya and a younger contemporary of Vācaspati-miśra. His famous work "Saṃkṣepa-Śāriraka" is more than a mere abridgement of Śaṃkara's Śāriraka Bhāṣya as it modestly calls itself.

To the later Śāṃkara schools belong—

11. **Prakāśārtha**—a work of the 11th or 12th century A. D It is a commentary on Śaṃkara's Śāriraka Bhāṣya, and has been commented upon in a work of about 1700 A. D called "Prakāśārtha Vivaraṇa"

12. **Sri Hira**—(1150 A. D) the author of the famous "Khaṇḍanakhanaśālikā" a work full of the subtle dialectics of Vedānta composed in the interests of "Anirvacanīyātātkhyātī" Vāda.

13. **Prakāśatman** (1200 A. D.)—the author of "Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa."

14. **Citrakṣācārya**—(1270 A. D)—the author of the famous "Citrakṣa" a work which is much admired in the school of Śāriraka Vedānta.

3 Upavarsa—who is said to have written a commentary on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā. Sufficient evidence is in favour of the identification of Bodhāyana with Upavarsa, how ever wanting. Both of these must have flourished before the Christian era, if the nucleus of the Bādarāyaṇa sūtras is distinguished from their present form.

2. Damaśāstrya—an ācārya who belonged to the Dārṣa country

4. Tanka—who is also supposed to be the same as Ācārya Brahma-nandīna—and is known as "Vākyakara"

5. Bhartṛhasyaṇa—Like Anuśloṇī he stood for the doctrines of Bhedābheda and Brahma Paripāṇa. His identity with Bhartṛhari is doubtful.

Among the early exponents of the S'ādikara school we have—

6. Maṇḍana—Different from M. vāda-mītra who it we are to believe a late tradition was pupil of Kumārila and great Pūrva-Mīmāṃsī whom Saṅkara 1 vanquished in a debate and converted to Vedāntism. There was one Ma. jana who was Vedāntin. He was probably contemporary (A.D. 800) of Śaṅkara (who died in A. D. 820), and advocated extreme form of subjective Idealism or Solipsism, which was revised later by Śaṅkara Vedānta, the theor of the Vedānta-Siddhānta-Mīmāṃsā. He composed Brahmaśūktī and several other works of importance.

7. Sureśvara—(dies 820 A. D.) said to be the name of Maṇḍanamūrti after he became samnyāsa and a disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, according to the tradition of the "Śaṅkara-Digvijaya". At any rate he is not to be identified with Maṇḍana, the solipsist, from whose view Sureśvara is distinguished carefully by Sureśvara's pupil Sarvajña of the theor of the "Saṅkhyā S'ūtrika" and by his commentator. He was the author of Bhāṣya on the Bhāṣya Vārtika and

haṭhakarṇyaśikṣā—works of great importance in the history of Śāṅkara Vedānta.

8. **Pañcapīḍa**—(circa 820 A. D) another disciple of Śaṅkarācārya who wrote a work called *Pañcapīḍikā*. On it Prakāśatman wrote "*Pañcapīḍikā vivaraṇa*" about 1200 A. D., and the latter received a commentary from Vidyāraṇya (1350 A. D) called "*Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*"

A little later but still ranking among the early Śaṅkarītes are—

9. **Vācaspathimītra**—(about 840 A. D) the famous writer on Śiṅkhyā, Yoga, Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. His great work of the last school is a valuable commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śāriraka Bhāṣya* of the Vedānta sūtras, named *Bhāmā* after his wife

10. **Sirvajñāna Maṇi** (900 A. D)—a disciple of Sureśvarācārya and a younger contemporary of Vācaspathimītra. His famous work "*Śaṅkara-Śārirak*" is more than a mere abridgment of Śaṅkara's *Śāriraka Bhāṣya* as it modestly calls itself.

To the later Śāṅkara schools belong—

11. **Prakāśārtha**—a work of the 11th or 12th century A. D. It is a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śāriraka Bhāṣya* and has been commented upon in a work of about 1700 A. D. called "*Prakāśārtha vivaraṇa*"

12. **Śrī Hara**—(1150 A. D) the author of the famous *Khaṇḍa māhaṇḍakīya* work full of the subtle dialectics of Vedānta composed in the interests of *Anirvacanaśikṣā* Vāda.

13. **Prakāśatman** (1200 A. D.)—the author of *Pañcapīḍikā-vivaraṇa*.

14. **Citkoṭṭācārya**—(1200 A. D)—the author of the famous "*Citkoṭṭā*" work which is much admired in the school of Śāṅkara Vedānta.

15. Vidyāraṇya (12-0 A. D.)—the greatest name in the history of later Śāṅkara Vedānta, and mediaeval Brāhmaṇism. He wrote a commentary called "Vivaraṇaprameyamangraha" on the "Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa" of Prakāśātman, Pañcodak, a comprehensive work on Śāṅkara Vedānta written in verse in popular style, and "Jīvanmuktiviveka" : valuable work on Vedāntic life.

Among the latest representatives of Śāṅkara Vedānta we have to note—

16. Madhucūḍana Sarasvatī—the author of the famous "Advaitasiddhi" and commentary on the Bhagavadgītā and some Bhakti works. He lived in the early part of the sixteenth century.

17. Prakāśananda—the author of the famous Vedānta "Siddhanta-Muktāvalī" lived in the latter half of the 16th century. He is a powerful advocate of "Dṛṣṭi-ṣṭa" —or paregoneism as extreme form of idealism preached in Yoga-Viśiṣṭa and by M. Vijaya. (See supra.)

18. Appayadīkṣita—a great writer of the seventeenth century on Śāṅkara Vedānta and of numerous Bhakti works the author of the "Bhikṣuśāstra" digest of Śāṅkara Vedānta which is most owing to his vast knowledge of Śāṅkara schools and his wonderful power of judgment.

It will be remembered that in tracing the logical relation of the systems we dealt with Dharmic systems only. We omitted the Jaina darśanas from the account not because they were in any way less important, but because they did not constitute links in the same logical chain. No historical account of Indian philosophy however can be complete without statement of the essential tenets of the Vedāntist and Jaina darśanas and of the stages through which they have passed. A short note on the Lokāyata or Cārvāka would also be added since it has been noticed both by Hemacandra and Mallikarjuna in our book.

(7) Buddhism—The teachings of Gautama Buddha the historical founder of Buddhism, are supposed to have been embodied in the "Tripitaka" or the three Baskets of the Pali canon, consisting of Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. The last is undoubtedly later than the other two, but even these in their present form belong linguistically to the age succeeding that of Asoka's Edicts and are thus divided by several centuries from the original source. Attempts have, therefore, been made to reconstruct Gautama's original teachings as distinguished from those attributed to him in the Pali canon. But like all reconstruction this is based upon certain assumptions:

* See "Buddhism or Buddhist origins" by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

† Steinhilber rejects this method. He writes "It is thus assumed that there has been primitive Buddhism, very much different, even, as it would seem, quite contrary to what later on finds its expression in the Pali canon. Pantheism, Nihilism, Soul-denial, psychology without a Soul, an abolition as ultimate end, all those features that mark out Buddhism among other religions, Indian as well as non-Indian did not exist. It was the Buddhism of the Buddha himself which was so radically different from anything that appeared later in historical times as Buddhism. The consequence of this hypothesis of a simple creed preceding historical Buddhism is an attempt to interpret the latter in the light of the former. Dr. Steinhilber thus rejects the hypothesis of 'a simple creed' of Gautama preceding historical Buddhism and regards the founder as a speculative philosopher whose philosophical position has been followed—

"As far as we can understand his [Gautama Buddha's] philosophical position, it seems that he was deeply impressed by the contradiction of assuming an eternal pure spiritual principle which, for comprehensible reasons must have passed into this flesh and bone existence. He later on, to revert to its original purity. He was thus led to a denial of any permanent principle of the mind."

which we fear go too far. This much, however, can be safely asserted—that Gautama Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and not a speculative philosopher whose ethical teaching was based not on a system of theology or metaphysics but on psychology—or to be more definite, on the psychology of Pain with which all sentience was bound up. In the interests of this particular type of ethics, he asserted certain propositions which, in the course of time, came to be understood too literally by his followers, who supported them by arguments which involved them in controversies with Brāhmanas and Jainas. For example, one great error which

appeared to him as evil in an infinite process of evanescent elements (dharma), the only ultimate realities, beside Space and Annihilation. The conception of an impersonal world-process was probably prepared by the idea of an impersonal unique substance of the world, as developed in the Upanishads. The analysis of the world into its elements of Matter and Mind was probably to a certain extent, prepared by the work of the Sāṅkhya school. The originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether and converting the world-process in concerted appearance of discrete evanescent elements. Forgoing the Monism of the Upanishads and the Dualism of the Sāṅkhya, he established a system of the most radical Pluralism. That the essence and the starting-point of Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly if we give credit to the records about the other wandering teachers who were the contemporaries of Buddha and then engaged in controversies with him. The questions at issue between them were of speculative nature. Ethical questions, the explanation of retribution, were predominant, but they always were narrowly linked together with some system of ontology and some doctrine of Final Release. —Steinert's *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* pp. 5.

I do not think Dr Steinert is right in his view that Gautama Buddha was essentially a speculative philosopher

Gautama Buddha found to be the root of all evil was belief in an entity called *Ātman* which engendered selfishness both in this world and the world hereafter. Belief in *permanence* and *reality* of the world with its many supposed joys was another hallucination which gave rise to longings of all sorts, including thirst for life and its pleasures. Gautama declared that all was painful (*दुःख*), all was transitory (*व्यभिच*) all was emptiness, that is to say nothing at all (*अव्यय*), or nothing but ideas (*व्यभिच* or *विचार*) or a mere creation of mental habits (*वासना*), or imagination (*विचार*). All these doctrines which in their rudimentary form may well be supposed to be part of the original teaching of Gautama Buddha and which are clearly stated in the Pāli canon are elaborately treated in the third and last stage of the history of Buddhism—that known as "Mahāyāna" or "Sanskrit Buddhism" which is the only form of Buddhism known to most of the Brāhmaṇa and Jaina writers.

Of the three stages into which the history of Buddhism is divisible viz.—

- (1) Original teaching of Gautama Buddha,
- (2) Buddhism of the Pāli canon and
- (3) Sanskrit Buddhism,

it is the last with which we as students of *Syādvāda*manjari are concerned.

Its principal schools are those of—

(1) The *Vaiśāṇavikas*—the followers of the *Vibhāṣā* or commentaries, who declare that *all is real*;

(2) the *Sautrāntikas*, or followers of the *Sūtras* or texts, who held that the external world is not directly perceived but only indirectly inferred from the images which it creates in the mind;

(3) the *Yogādśras*—who assert that ideas are the only real, there being no external reality either directly perceived or mediately inferred. They are so called because their leaders incidentally practised Yoga, and their idealism was naturally suggested by this practice which is mainly concerned with mental life.

(5) the *Mādhyamikas*—who deny reality of both the ends, being (bhāva) and non being (abhāva), and affirm II of the centre (śūnya) only which is neither being nor non-being but simply 'śūnya' = Emptiness.

- ✓ According to a tradition referred to by Mr Sogen, "the Vaibhāṣikas arose in the third century after Buddha's death; the Sautrāntikas in the fourth; the Mādhyamika school, as Aryadeva states, came into existence five hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha; and Asaṅga, the founder of the Yogācāras or the Vijñānavādiṇs is at least, as late as the third century of the Christian era." This chronological order was till lately generally accepted; the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras were supposed to be late than the first two, and as between them the Mādhyamika was considered earlier than the Yogācāra in accordance with the relative chronology of their respective śākyas, viz., Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga & Vasubandhu. The fallacy of arguing from the date of the śākyas to the date of the originator of the school is obvious; for śākyas are only propagators and not the founders of their schools. As I have already shown, Vijñānavāda existed long before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and so there is no reason to make it posterior to the Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna. From the position of the Sautrāntika who is half an idealist, the next step is naturally to that of the Yogācāra who is a complete idealist,† rather than to the Mādhyamika who is a nihilist.‡

See Supra p. xxv

† Curiously this historical sequence of Buddhist darśanas agrees with the mental evolution of Vasubandhu, who began his career as a Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādin, but had strong Sautrāntika sympathies and was later converted by his eldest brother Asaṅga to the Yogācāra school.

‡ For contrary opinion see Kalik's Buddhist Philosophy p. 128.

It became a definite school of thought attributed to one Aśita Keśakambhita, which is duly noticed in the "Śāmaṇīya Phala Sutta" of the Buddhist canon. This teacher is there reported to have taught his doctrine, which closely resembles that of the Cārvāka school, as follows: "There is no such thing, O King, as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. A human being is built up of the four elements. ("अपि हिं विं गुहं...गृह्यमाणं अमृतं एव विद्यते अरं करोते एते करोते...अमृतमहामृतिरो अरं पुरिषो"....) When he dies the earthy in him returns and reappears to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his faculties pass into space.... It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts, it is an empty lie, mere idle talk when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not." At a later stage in Buddhist and Jain works this school of the Lokāyatika or Cārvāka is condemned as the school of sceptics (Vaitapdikas). It seems that just as Science and Atheism-cum-Materialism are not essentially identical, and yet they have often coalesced in the history of Western thought, so the Lokāyata (Nāture-lore and economics) and the Cārvāka (epicureanism) in India, though originally different, became one at a later stage. Bṛhaspati Sātra co-ordinates the Lokayatas or Laukayatikas with the Kāpālikas, and Guṇaratna, a commentator of "Gaḍḍārjuna Samuccaya" refers to the Kāpālikas as one of the two schools of Hāstikas' that is, Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas; one of which, it is said, recognises four elements and the other five.

The history of the system can be divided into the following stages—

Haitreyi is said to have took aghast when Yājñavalkya remarked that at the time of death man was absorbed in the elements and nothing remained behind.

(1) The Upaniṣad period (Vide the Dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi).

(2) The early Buddhist period (Vide the account of the philosophy of Aśita Kośakambalin, the Materialist, in the *Sāmaṇa Phala Sutta*).

(a) Lokāyata—i. e. Nature Lore or Physical Science (Vide Dialogue of Buddha B. II B. Vol. II p. 166).

(b) Bṛhaspati's and Kauṭilya's Artha-śāstra i. e. Science and art of producing wealth.

(3) Later Buddhist period—when the Lokāyatas were stigmatized as sophists indulging in irresponsible arguments and quibbles.

(4) Association with immoral and superstitious life e. g. that of the Kāpālika. (Vide Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Śaddarśana Saṃmuṇecaya*).

✓ (5) Jainism—Jainism is par excellence the doctrine of abhina—abhina not only of physical life but also of intellectual outlook (darśana). In the latter moreover it did not stop short at a mere negative attitude of toleration towards other schools, but took the positive step of investigating how each of those schools erred. As a result it came to the conclusion that the errors of those schools were only partial truths as seen from particular angles of vision—that none of them was wholly wrong and if each of them would see things from the point of view of the opponent as well as from their own, there would be perfect harmony all round. The principle of the relativity of knowledge which constitutes this doctrine is an important discovery; yet, in its general form, it is not such as might not occur to common sense. Consequently we are not surprised that in the "Udāna Sutta" of Pāli Buddhism there occurs a story—the "Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant"—

• Pāli *Udāna Sutta*—Skt. *Udāna Sutta*—the Section of "The Dorn Blin".

where certain blind men are said to have come by an elephant and when asked to describe the shape of the animal, each of them gave a description according to the particular limb which he happened to have felt.†

This general principle of Relativity and Consistency of Contradictories has been tacitly admitted in their systems both by Brāhmanas and Buddhist writers but they know not what they think says the Jainas. The original contribution, therefore, which Jainism may be said to have made to Philosophy as a result of what I have called the attitude of 'Intellectual abstinence' is its investigation of the different glasses of vision or Pathways to Reality (અવસ્થા) and its formulation of the doctrine of the Possibility (સંભવ) of apparent contradictions in real whole. According to Jainism while its own darsana visualises the whole truth (સર્વવસ્થા) other darsanas possess only the glimpses of the broken light (વિવસ્થા). Both these doctrines, the Nayavāda and the Śyādvāda are varieties of Anekāntavāda, i. e. the doctrine of the many-sidedness of Truth. But beyond this there is nothing common between them, and consequently they do not represent two stages in single development of thought, and must therefore be traced to separate origins united in common viewpoint. Of the two, it is difficult to decide which is earlier. That both of them are anterior to the rupture of Jainism into Śvetāmbara and Digambara about the first century of the Christian era admits of little doubt; for in spite of the differences of the two sects regarding the Jain canon they both uphold the Nayavāda and the Śyādvāda. Of the two the Nayavāda would seem to be earlier by reason of its comparative simplicity and this view is in harmony with the fact that Umāsvāti, the author of the Tattvadarśana Sūtra (First century A. D.), while he refers to the different

† इमेणु किर लम्बेति एके लवणमात्रमा :

पिपासं च निरुतिं यथा दृष्टवत्सिन्धोऽ—Uddāma.

—दृष्टवत्सिन्धो those who see a single limb only

kinds of Nayas,* makes no mention of the Syādvāda and its seven propositions.† And yet it is highly probable that the Syādvāda existed long before his days. We find the doctrine in an earlier or possibly erroneous or misunderstood form, recorded in the Buddhist Suttas where however it is not attributed to the Nigganthas or Jainas but to 'some recluses and Brāhmaṇas'. This would show that the doctrine had possibly non-Jaina beginnings. There, referring to a class of thinkers whom the speaker characterises as 'amarāvikkhepi-kaṇ' that is 'eel-wrigglers' or equivocators, Gaṇḍama Buddha says: "Thus fearing and abhorring the wrong in an expressed opinion ('सुसारायस'), he will neither declare anything to be good nor to be bad, but on question being put to him on this or that, he resorts to eel-wriggling to equivocation and says: I do not take it thus, I don't take it the other way. But I advance no different opinion. And I don't deny your position. And I don't say it is neither the one nor the other."

Thus does he equivocate and in like manner about each of such propositions as the following

- () 1. There is not another world.
- 2. There both is, and is not another world.
- 3. There neither is nor is not another world.
- (d) 1. A man who has penetrated to the truth continues to exist after death.
- 2. He does not.
- 3. He both does, and does not.
- 4. He neither does, nor does not.

विश्वस्यैवमवस्थानं सुखस्यैवमवस्थानं ॥ T. S. I. 84.

† The T. Sūtra which is supposed to refer to the subject is 'अविज्ञानविनिर्मुक्तिः' (T. S. V 81), which however refers only to the general principle of Relativity or Anekānta. In the Bhāṣya, three of the seven propositions are mentioned viz. affirmation (अद्य), denial (अद्य) and indescribability (अद्य), yet not all the seven.

In the "Blasenna-Phala Sutta" ("The Fruits of the Life of a Reciever"),^e another work of the Buddhist Pīṭi canon the same kind of prevarication is attributed to one Saṅgiya of the Belattha clan who says: If you ask me whether there is another world—well if I thought there were, I would say so. And I don't think it is other-wise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is nor is not another world.

These passages at once put one in mind of the Jain "Śyādvāda". It is possible that the Buddhist here does injustice to the school which in answer to certain definite questions refused to commit itself to a definite proposition, because in its opinion the proposition would convey only a partial truth and would consequently be 'gṛhya'. It does not necessarily prove that the positive side to the doctrine was wanting. If, however in view of the fact that the doctrine is attributed to the 'recluses and Brāhmanas' we hold that it could not have been the "Śyādvāda" of the Jains it must be understood as an early reference to the 'anirvacanīyādvāda' of the Vedāntin, which led to the 'Śyādvāda' of the Jains as the next positive step.

The teaching of Mahāvīra Svāmīn like that of Gautama Buddha was primarily ethical, and consequently logic and metaphysics may well be expected to occupy a subordinate place in the early Jain canon. Accordingly there occur in it only a few rare references to the principle of Śyādvāda which are relied upon by later writers as providing the Scriptural authority for their doctrine; moreover these references occur in connection with concrete problems of spiritual philosophy which were debated in the schools and are not evolved as principles of abstract logic.

Hitherto only one or two passages have been traced in the Jain canon which contain reference to the Śyādvāda. They occur in the Bhagavatsūtra and are quoted by the

author of the "Nayasakra" who says: "सर्ववार्ता त्रिप्रबन्धस्यैव
विद्वन्मन्त्रात् त्रिप्रबन्धमिति चेत्—उच्यते । विद्वन्मन्त्रं चास्य 'जाया
(Skt. जाया) अन्ते वान्ते (=Skt. ज्ञानं) अन्तान्ते (अज्ञानं)" इति स्वामी
गोपतस्वामिना इहो व्याख्येयं 'गोपता जाणे निवन्ता' अतो ह्यन्ते विद्वन्मन्त्राजि
हावस्त्वान्मन्त्रविरेकेन वृत्त्यवधौनात् इ 'जाया पूज सिव (=Skt. व्यात्) आने
सिव अन्तान्ते'

The Sādhvāda as found in the Bhagavatīśāstra consists of three propositions only—those of अस्ति (affirmation) नास्ति (negation) and अवरुध्य (In-describability). Thus: "गोपता अवरुणो जातिरे अद्य (=जाया), वरुण जातिरे नो जाया (= न जाया), तदुपपत्त्य जातिरे अवरुध्य (अवरुध्यं) अन्ता सि यन्तो अन्ता सि व" इति. Among other early references we have one in Bhadrabāhu's "Sāra kṛtāṅga-niryukti" and another in "Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya" which has already been noted. Later the doctrine is found in its fully developed form of 'Seven Propositions' in the "Pravacana-sāra" and "Pañcāstikāya" of Kundakundaśāstra, in the "Āptamīmāṃsā" of Samantabhedra, in the "Śaṅgamā-tarka" and Nyāyavārtā of Siddhasena Divākara, in the "Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika" of Akalaṅka, in the "Tattvārtha Śloka-vārtika" of Vidyāmanana, in the "Pramāṇanaya-tattvā lokā-lakṣikā" of Devastūti and several other independent works and commentaries both of the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects. But the most exhaustive treatise devoted entirely to the subject is the famous Bapṭabhaṅgī taramgūṇī of Vimala dāsa, a Digambara writer of a much later date. Except the formal difference in the order of the third and fourth propositions of the 'Bapṭa Bhaṅgī' inter se,—which, again, does not coincide with the difference of Jaina religious sects—there

* I am indebted for this quotation to an article in the "Jaina Sāhitya Samśodhaka" by Mr. Rāmakṣa U. Parikh whose attention was first drawn to it by Mr. Śrī Jinavajaya.

† There came to be known as "वृत्त्यङ्ग" when late they came to be developed into seven.

has been no change in the Bapṭabhaṅgi ever since it became set of seven propositions instead of three. In regard to Nayas, their number has been variously given. The author of the "Tīrtarīhikāgama Sūtra" first mentions *five* nayas—*वैयर्थ्यनिरूपणवशादेव* (I 34) & I next adds "अवयवी द्विविधेरी" (I 35), but does not name these subdivisions. These realized, however in the Bhāṣya, viz., *देवगतिहेरी* and *सर्गगतिहेरी* subdivisions of *वैयर्थ्य* and *संज्ञित सममिद* and *सर्वज्ञ* subdivisions of *सर्व*. These omitting the subdivisions of *वैयर्थ्य* which are regarded as unimportant, make *seven*. Siddhasena Divākara mentions only *six* nayas, omitting *वैयर्थ्य* from the earlier list. Some books, such as the *Anekānta-jayapatikā* of Haribhadra, discuss only the more comprehensive proposition of "Anekānta" with special reference to the problems of *ज्ञान* and *सर्वज्ञ* *निश्चय* and *अविश्व* *साक्षात्* and *विशेष* etc.

As important as the Śyādvāda and the Nyāyāda but occupying a less spectacular place in Jainism, is its definition of Reality—*अवयवव्यतीत्यर्थं सर्व* which like the other two doctrines is characteristic example of the Jain's "अनेकान्तवाद".

The principal writers who have contributed to the philosophical literature of Jainism fall in two distinct lines, that of the Śvētāmbaras and that of the Digambaras. While the Digambaras insist personality as essential in ascetic life, and question the authenticity of the canonical works recognised by the Śvētāmbaras, and while they are divided in the matter of certain miscellaneous dogmas such as the possibility of spiritual emancipation of women there is no important difference in their philosophical tenets. And yet the two traditions

Those according to the Śvētāmbara tradition were first collected in Council held at Pāṭaliputra about 300 B. C. under the presidency of Śhīlābhadrā, and were finally redacted and reduced to writing by Devardhagaṇi & Vallabhi about the beginning of the 6th century A. D.

run in separate lines, the writers of one sect rarely quoting or referring to those of the other. Consequently all the authors whom Mallisena quotes belong to the Śvetāmbara tradition except one or two who command respect throughout the Jaina community.

The history of the philosophical writings of Jainism may be divided into the following periods:

I. The period of the canonical works, many of which were composed before the Christian era, and some were added in the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts. To this early period belong speculations about the many-sidedness of Reality about the spirit and nature of matter and the affection of the former by the latter.

II Next comes the age of the beginnings of systematic works of which the earliest writers are Umāsvāti and Kunda kundaśākyā.

↓ (1) Umāsvāti is claimed as a Digambara by the Digambaras and as a Śvetāmbara by the Śvetambaras. He was either too high-souled to belong to either of the two warring sects, or what is more probable, by his time the sects had not ranged themselves in hostile or separate camps. He belongs to the first century A. D. His great work "Tattvārthasiddhigama Sūtra" probably suggested by the 28th chapter of Uttarādhyayana, has had the honour of becoming a basis of numerous commentaries and subcommentaries both of the Śvetambaras and the Digambaras sect. The Bhāṣya on the Sūtra is regarded as Umāsvāti's own composition by the Śvetambaras while the Digambaras attribute to him only the Sūtras. Among the numerous commentaries and subcommentaries of the Sūtras the following may be noted as chief. The Bhāṣya "by Umāsvāti himself or some other writer of the Śvetāmbara sect. Sarvārthasiddhi" (Digambaras) of Pūjyapada Devanandi (5th century A. D.) "Gaṇḍakabhāṣī Bhāṣya" attributed to Samantabhadra by Digambaras and to Siddhasena Divākara

by Śvetāmbara, but considered to be work of Siddhasena Divākara, writer who lived sometime between the 7th and the 9th century of the Vikrama Samvat according to Pandit Sukhlal; *Rājavārttika* by Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (Digambara 8th century A. D.), and *Śloka-vārttika* by Vidyāmaṇi (Digambara 9th century A. D.).

(2) *Kandakundāśrīya*—an eminent Digambara writer also of the 1st century A. D. His most famous works are *Pravacanasūtra* and *Panchastikāya*. The first like the *Tattvārthasamgraha* of Umiśālī is comprehensive summary of Jainism.

III The third period which passes with Siddhasena Divākara (Śvetāmbara) and Samantabhadra (Digambara) is the golden age of Jain philosophy. These two writers recognising the fact that the use of Sanskrit for Jain works was as much need of their times as that of Prakrit was at the age of Mahāvīra, wrote in Sanskrit, and their example was followed widely by later writers on Jain philosophy.

Siddhasena-Divākara, Bāṅkasa convert to the Śvetāmbara sect of Jainism, is assigned to the end of the 6th century A. D. by Dr. Bhatishandra, or to the last quarter of the 7th century A. D. by D. Jacobi and D. P. L. Vaidya. This is done by all on somewhat inconclusive grounds, but the date can be taken as fixed within these broad limits. Besides the famous *Dvāitirmitika* "Sets of Thirty-two Stanzas" he composed two standard works of Jain Logic, the *Nyāyavārtika* and the *Sammatī*—or *Sammatī Tarka*. The former was commented upon by Siddhasena in the beginning of the 10th century A. D., and the latter by Abhayadevasūri about the same time.

2. Samantabhadra, Digambara contemporary of Siddhasena-Divākara, wrote *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* said to be the introductory part of the *Gandhabastī Bhāṣya* which according to Digambaras, is a work of Samantabhadra.

3 Haribhadra—There have been two Haribhadras, one of whom belongs to this age. He is a voluminous writer on Jain religion and philosophy. To the latter branch belongs the famous “Śaddarśana-Samuccaya” which is a very careful and impartial though brief statement of the different systems of Indian philosophy.

4. Bhatta Akalaṃka or Akalaṃka Deva—a famous Digambara writer of the latter part of the 8th century wrote the monumental Rāja-Vārtika” on the “Tattvārtha” of Udayācārya and Aṣṭaśatī” a commentary on Samantabhadra’s “Āpta-Mīmāṃsā”. He also wrote “Nyāyavivēka” “Tattvārtha-Vārtika-Vyākhyānālekhaṇa” and numerous other works.

5. Vidyānand or -candī—a Digambara writer of the early part of the 9th century A. D. He wrote commentary called “Aṣṭaśatī” on the Aṣṭaśatī of Akalaṃka and “Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika”—both polemical works of great value to advanced students of Jain philosophy.

6 Māṇikyānandin—another Digambara author of the 9th century who wrote “Parikṣāmukhaśāstra” a manual of Jain Logic.

IV The next and for our purpose the last, period of Jain philosophy extends from Devaśūl and Hemacandra (11th century A. D.) to Gharasena (15th century A. D.)

1. Devaśūl (1083-1169 A. D.—Dr Satishchandra) an elder contemporary of Hemacandra wrote Pramāṇa-nay-tattvālokālaṃkara” and its commentary Śyādvāla-ratnaḥ kara.

2 Hemacandra (1089-1172 A. D.—Dr Satishchandra) contemporary of Devaśūl. A most voluminous writer who besides writing some Dvāitśāstrikas on the model of Śaṅkarasena-Dvāitakara similar works, wrote a work on Jain Logic called Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā; and further he provided

the Jaina readers with standard works on Vyākaraṇa and Alamkāra to replace those composed by Brāhmaṇas. He is therefore, called "Kallikāla Sarvajña" for his versatility.

Ratnaprabhastūri (1181 A. D)—He wrote 'Syādvāda ratnākara vārtikā' shorter commentary on the 'Syādvāda ratnākara' on Pramāṇanayatatvaślokaśāṅkara.

Malliprasasti—(1292 A. D) The author of our text—the Syādvādaśāṅgarī which is mainly review of Brāhmaṇa, Bauddha and Cārvāka systems in the shape of commentaries on Hemacandra's Anyayoga-vyavāśheda-Dvātrīṃśikā.

Among later miscellaneous writers, Rājasekhara (1343 A. D) wrote "Pñjikā" on Ratnākara-vārtikā of Ratnaprabha, and Jāṇacandra (1350) tiṇṇapa on the same. The ge may be said to have closed with Goparāta (1409) wh has written very lucid and exhaustive commentary on the "Śaddarśana-Ś mucaya" of Haribhadra.

IV A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WORK.

Stanzas I-III.

The first three stanzas are introductory.

St. I

This contains the characterisation of the last Tīrtiśākhya Śrī Vardhamāna otherwise known as Mahāvīra Svāmī, as an ideal teacher possessed of what is technically known in Jainism as the four 'अतिशय' or excellences: (1) अज्ञातिशय—Excellence of wisdom, that is wisdom which is falling of least, expressed in one word as 'ज्ञेयज्ञान' (2) अबाधयत्नशक्तिश्च—Excellence consisting in freedom from all evil, viz the passions (3) अवशतिशय—Excellence in teaching since he has taught the doctrine of Syādvāda which has stood invulnerable

The word ha bant II Śākhya tiṇṇapa which, as we know from the history of Śākhya and Jainism, is not accidental.

against all attacks of rival systems. (4) पूजाविषय—Excellence consisting in the fact that he has deserved and received worship from all beings, gods as well as men. With regard to (5), note that it is a special feature of Jainism that it leaves no room for doubt that 'अरि' or moral life is as important as *ज्ञान* in an ideal man. Of सम्पूर्णज्ञानअरिअवि मोक्षमार्ग Talivrārtha I L. As regards (4) it may be remembered that Vaishnavism with its theory of human incarnations of God, Jainism and Buddhism have lifted the ideal man to a position above that of gods.

St. II.

Of the innumerable qualities of the bleater the one which will engage the attention of the author is his "अपार्श्वार्थ" i. e. his philosophy which is true to facts, that is to say the many-sidedness of Truth or Reality—the fundamental doctrine of Jain philosophy.

St. III.

The author implores all readers, whether Jains or not, to ponder upon the truth of Jain philosophy which emerges out of the examination of the partial truths of other systems. In other words, the object of the author is not to revile other systems but to serve the cause of Truth—which is not absolutely confined to any single system. Compare the object of the "khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khāḍya," i. e. the interests of Vedānta.

Stanzas IV-IX: Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika System.

St. IV

First, of its doctrines of सामान्य and विशेष:

Freely rendered the Stanza means: Things are of themselves—*sua moto*—capable of co-ordination with things of their own class, and differentiation from things of a different class; their nature is not to be explained by assuming realities—(सामान्य and विशेष)—other than the things themselves. Those fools err who declare that the two, viz., सामान्य and विशेष are

distinct realities (distinct *inter se* and distinct from the things in which they are supposed to inhere) since they are not such.

The Jain view on the point, like that of several other schools, is that things are *by themselves* co-ordinated with things of their own class & differentiated from things of other classes, and consequently there is no need to assume, as the V. Mīmāṃsikas do, the two hypothetical realities, *सामान्य* and *विशेष*. This, besides being gratuitous assumption according to the Jain view involves the absurdity of making two such contradictory things as *सामान्य* and *विशेष* reside in one and the same thing unless you reconcile them in the Jain manner by regarding them as two relative aspects—and aspects only—of one and the same thing.

Although the later Vaiśeṣikas regarded *सामान्य* and *विशेष* as two distinct realities over and above *द्रव्य* *गुण* and *कर्माणि* in which they were supposed to inhere they seem to have been originally meant as merely logical categories (*वृत्तवत्*) i. e. relative to the *gata* as the V. M. Bōtrākara calls them V. M. B. J. 1. 6) or at most, as hypothetical realities assumed to account for certain ideas which none can dispute viz. co-ordination (*अनुवृत्ति*) and differentiation (*व्यावृत्ति*). The Jain position is very clearly formulated by Malliṣṇa in the following words:—
 “सामान्य एव एव सर्वमाशया वस्तुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिरत्यन्तौ एतत् एव व्यवहर्तते ।
 सत्यदि एव एव तावत् पुनरुद्गोदराभावात्तावत् वतीतिविश्वीयवत् सत् जन्मान्ति
 उपपत्तिवृत्तं वदन्ति । परवत्तत्वात् वैयर्थ्यव्यावृत्तत्वात् च प्रत्यक्षवत्
 सामान्याकारा नमते । स एव चैतरेभ्य सामान्यविश्वीयवत्तौ द्वयभेदेनैव
 भावेराभ्यां व्यावर्तकं विशेषव्यावृत्तवृत्ते । इति च सामान्यविश्वीयवत्तौ द्वयवत्
 वदन्तितावत्तत्त्वं व्यावृत्तम् ।” Mark that *सामान्य* and *विशेष* are regarded by the Jainas as two relative aspects of single reality not even two related realities, that is to say they are only aspects of Reality and these, *gata*, are relative not absolutely opposed.

St. V

All things incl. *ling* *दीर्घ* and *अक्षरम्* (generally believed to be *अपिण्ड* and *विण्ड* respectively) are subject to the law of

સ્વાસ્થ્ય—that is to say a *śīpa* which is regarded as an exemplar of *anirita* things is *also* *nitya*, and *anirita* which is regarded as a type of *nitya* things is *also* *anirita*. All reality according to Jainas, is both *nitya* and *anirita*; one might almost say at once *nitya* and *anirita* although from different points of view so that there is no logical contradiction. The Jainas characterise Reality or *satya* as “*સ્વાસ્થ્યવૈભવોપદ્રવ્ય*” (See *Tattvārtha*).

Light when extinguished has not passed into nothingness and ceased to be; it has only changed its form which is now darkness. Like light, darkness is too a *dravya* (substance)§—and not a mere *anirita* (Of *સમન્વેષ-સામાન્યમાત્ર*—*Tarkadipikā*) as the *Vaiśeṣika*s think—which is possessed of a black colour and a cool feel. Similarly *anirita* is both *nitya* and *anirita*. The Jainas reject the definition of *nitya* which is generally given by other schools, viz., *અવ્યુત્થાદ્યવિલિપ્તરૂપ્ય નિત્ય*, which means absolute changelessness. He defines it thus “*સ્વાસ્થ્યવં નિત્ય*” (પ્રોત્પન્ન) i. e. *nitya* is that which continues to exist in spite of *utpatti* and *niṣṭa*. To what would *utpatti* and *niṣṭa* belong, argues the Jainas. If nothing continues? Therefore a continuous reality he says, must be posited for the very possibility of *utpatti* and *niṣṭa*. In fact, says the Jainas, modes and substances i. e. *change* and *permanence* exist together; neither is possible without the other (इष्टं परापरिवृत्तं परांपर इत्यविरिक्तम् । इह कदा चेह विच्छेदा एव मारेव च न वा ? इष्टं परापरिवृत्त इत्यविरिक्तम् एव प्रकृतं नित्य—*Sammatistarka*). Mallinātha observes that the tenet of the *Yāgya* school agrees with that of the Jainas in this matter.

Note that the Jainas differs equally from (1) those who hold that all is eternal and (2) those who hold that all is evanescent, and also from (3) those who hold that some things are eternal and some evanescent. According to him all things

§ Mark that *dravya* or substance is not to be confounded with matter. The former is anything that can stand under attributes, and need not be solid, liquid or gaseous, as matter is.

are both eternal and evanescent although from different points of view (See Brahmajala Sutta of the Bulihhats for the earlier exponents of these extreme doctrines.) In a way says the Jain even the Vaiśeṣika absolutist admits—without being aware of it—that *dravya* is both *śiva* and *asṛiva* : i. e. not only are some cases of *dravya* *śiva* and some *asṛiva* but *dravya* co-exists simultaneously with both *śiva* and *asṛiva*. In conclusion, Malliṣya reproduces the criticism of absolute eternalism and absolute non-eternalism from Hemaṇdra's *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* (L. L. 33) almost verbatim, and winds up with the observation that the Vaiśeṣika admits the *avasthāntara* of the Jain in some of his doctrines without being aware of it; e. g. the Vaiśeṣika holds that *dravya* is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive *dravya* which belongs to single whole substance; similarly many things in the Vaiśeṣika school are supposed to be *avasthāntaravasthi* i. e. enduring for a certain limited length of time; this means that one and the same thing both endures and perishes, that is, it possesses two contradictory aspects (*avasthāntaravasthi dravya na hi śivaśiśvare*).

St. VI.

The doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which is most criticised is that of the existence and nature of God. God according to this school is—

- (1) the maker of the world;
- (2) one
- (3) Overruling by his presence of his lodge—his
liques and emanation;
- (4) Independent;
- (5) eternal.

The *prima facie* case for this doctrine is made out as follows—

- (1) That he is the maker of the earth, the mountains etc. (that is to say of the object of the world as we see it) can be inferred from the fact that all these

realities are *effects* and therefore require a *cause* (a maker); that they are effects may be easily deduced from another obvious fact that they are limited in their nature. The point of the argument is this: A *definite* nature implies a *conscious* maker a maker who has made this rather than that. It may be urged that the argument involves a paralogism or the fallacy of *arguing from a part to the whole*. The Naiyāyika† guards against this attack by making his pakṣa *not the whole* of Reality—the totality of being—but confining it to such *particular* things as the earth, the mountains etc., (whether such a concept of God is right is a different question,) leaving as *opponents* all other things which are known to be of our making that is, made by sentient beings. The argument is thus from particular to adjacent particulars and not from some to all which includes the some and thus involves a fallacy. In short, he argues for a power that is not we.

No (1) is criticised by Mallikena, mainly on two grounds: First, that the *anumāna* is precluded by *pratyakṣa* which definitely bears witness to the fact that these things (earth, mountains etc.) have no maker. Secondly in the cases in which we have observed making the making belongs to persons with a body. If to escape the difficulty you say that he can put on a body through his infinite power or that he may possess it owing to an own alaya, it is a gratuitous assumption which amounts to begging the question.

No (2): He is one Force the world is one consistent whole and not a congeries of several conflicting forces, since it is a cosmos and not a chaos. The thing is self-repelling. Not necessary if it rests somewhere in many places the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika are to be understood as one.

Through these like useful words make and 'maker' because creates here far or author may prove calling in the use of the Vākyavāda idea of God who is not a proved being a creator of the world or of nothing but has fashioned it out of atoms as a potter makes his pots.

early so. For many may co-operate to produce a single result; we often find many co-operating to produce a single result without any conflict of wills and consequent confusion as the bees that make their hive.

No (3): Since His making takes place in all parts of the universe, he must be supposed to be *everywhere*, and he must be also *all-knowing*. If he is everywhere, he, says the Jain, absorbs everything into his own self, leaving nothing to exist outside it. If he knows everything, he knows, we suppose, even hell and knowledge in his own being direct experience. He is to be supposed to experience hell! [Mark that in the preceding argument the Vaisesika had confined God's making to things which are not for making and he cannot, therefore, argue that he is omnipresent and omniscient. Consistently he can only say God is present where we are not present, or God experiences what we do not experience.]

The Jain confutes. we may agree that certain souls are *U-knowing*, in which case God would be one of such souls, that is to say he would be on a par with emancipated souls. But mark says Mallisena reviving his position, that knowledge does not really travel from the knower to the known; and therefore, omniscience does not necessarily involve omnipresence. Moreover what is the proof of his omniscience?—he asks. It cannot be *pratyakṣa*, for we cannot have *pratyakṣa* (direct perceptions) of his omniscience, unless we ourselves are omniscient, or become so in the process. It cannot be *śraddhā*, if you cannot argue from the finite to the infinite. (See Caird "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion"). It cannot be *śraddhā*, that is, hypothesis or assumption necessary for explaining the wonderful variety and richness of the world. For the *śraddhā* of living beings including the vegetable kingdom will explain one part of it, and the remaining part which belongs to the inanimate kingdom may well be existing eternally so, and eventually become the object of the joys and sorrows of

sentient beings. It cannot be *śāstra* or the authoritative text of the sacred scriptures. For the scriptures on which you rely are full of contradictions and are therefore unreliable.

No (4): By the very nature of the case he is said to be independent. Then, why does he create a world so full of misery and inequalities unless he is wantonly cruel and unjust? If misery is a punishment for a foul deed and inequality is due to our varying karmans this hypothesis of *karmans* will suffice to explain everything, and God will be superfluous.

No (5): He is said to be *eternal*. If so he should be eternally active, or eternally inactive. In the former case his work would at no point be finished, and so nothing could be ever accomplished. In the latter case nothing could even begin. Moreover, how could he have eternally conflicting natures viz., making and unmaking at the same time?

It is said that very likely "the (Vaisēṣika) system was originally atheistic and some of the sūtras which the old Sanskrit commentators have interpreted as containing a reference to God, have been understood by modern scholars as possibly referring to *dharma* & *prajāpati*. But at no stage of its history has the Vaisēṣika system been avowedly atheistic or even suspected of atheism. The silence of the Sūtras about the existence of God must be explained as due to the main problem of the system being the nature of *Ātman* and *añātman* and the investigation of the proper (*विशेष*) of things by first classifying them into categories. The Nyāya sūtras are also sparing in references to the problem of God. There is only one reference, occurring in three connected sūtras (Ns. Adv. IV II. 19-21) which run as follows:—*अथ वाच्यं इत्यर्थमाह—वाच्यमाह (19), न पुनश्चास्माकं अप्रतिपत्तिः (20), and अप्रतिपत्तिर्वाच्यः (21)*. In regard to this Section, as D. Gangenath Jha rightly notes, "there is difference among commentators. According to the Bhāṣya, the Vārtika and Vācāṅkara's Vṛtti it is

meant to propound the Naiyāyika Siddhānta, that the universe has been created by God, and in accordance with his view Śū. 19 puts forward the final Siddhānta, Śū. 20 puts forward an objection against the Siddhānta, and Śū. 21 answers that objection from the standpoint of the Siddhānta. But in view of the fact that the interpretation of Śū. 19 as Siddhānta sūtra is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the Bhasya that “अनन्तं मातृवत् एवः सृष्टेः” i. e. “we now proceed to show up the doctrines of philosophers, tall-talkers or sophists—the Tālparya, I II wed by the Parīśaddhi and Prakāśa, has taken it as representing the criticism of the Vedānta doctrine that God is the ~~conscious~~ cause of the

Universe. By this interpretation Śū. 19 represents the Vedānta view Śū. 20 shows the untenability of that view and Śū. 21 puts forward the reference to the question of the existence of God. Thus, there is only one section of three Śūtras and that too occurs not in the constructive but in the destructive part of the work which deals with the doctrines of ‘talkers’. Thus, again, is explained in two different ways, neither of which seems to be entirely satisfactory. The difficulty of interpretation is inherent in the fact that the section consists of only three Śūtras, an odd number of which the first is expected to be pūrvapakṣa and if the second is its answer—the Siddhānta—what about the next? Should not this as the last sūtra of the set be expected to be the Siddhānta? The difficulty however can be surmounted to some extent only by taking the third Śūtra as continuation of the second. But this is not the only trouble. As Dr Ganganath Jha says—

There is also wider issue involved in this Section. The commentators are agreed that the Siddhānta view here put forward is that God is the Creator of the Universe. Now the question arises—How is it that this cardinal doctrine of the system has been inserted by Gaṭiama as said above? He has put it forward only among certain philosophical doctrines and not as the true doctrine. Nor is it easy to reconcile the doctrine of God being the creator with the view that there is

no such thing as beginning of creation as is often found reiterated by the Vārtika (e. g. on p. 445 and p. 466) ; if there is no beginning, God may be the *Controller* the *Ruler* He cannot be the *Creator*. From the Bhāṣya also (p. 801 l. 3) it seems that God is held to be only the *Seer* *Knower* *Ornament*, *All-powerful*.^{*} †

But, with all respect for Dr Ganganath Jha, I think that in denying "creative power" to the God of the Nyāya Bhāṣya he has overlooked a sentence which has gone before, wherein the author says "यथा विद्यापयानां तथा विप्रवृत्त ईश्वरो मृतापाद्य" This analogy however is somewhat different from that which occurs in later Nyāya books which compare him to a potter who makes his pots from clay

It should be noted that long before the time of Mallinātha, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism had acquired the definite form in which it is formulated in all later manuals, and which was given to it in the "Nyāyaśāstra" of Bhāskararāja, the "Nyāya-Kuṣumāṇjali" of Udayana and the Nyāyakandall of Śrīdhara. It is the last mentioned book on which Mallinātha has largely drawn for the statement of the pūrvapakṣa

It may be noted in passing that the theism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika differs from the theisms of Vedānta and Yoga which Mallinātha does not note. ✓ The theism of the Vedānta differs essentially from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in two respects: First, it regards God as both the *sumata* and the *upādāna* or *material kārana* of the world; that is to say God according to it is not only the maker of the world, but also the stuff out of which it is made; in other words, He has created the world out of Himself and is not a mere architect as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. Secondly He is not demonstrable, that is,

* Dr Ganganath Jha Translation of N. S. etc. Vol. IV p. 77 footnote on or Bhāṣya on N. S. 4-1-19

† आत्मपाद्य इहा बोद्धा सर्वज्ञता ईश्वर इति —N. S. Bhāṣya.

1. 'सर्व' (the highest सामान्य or Universal)—which is supposed to reside not in all that exists, that is in all reals but in certain reals only viz. ब्रह्म एव and कार्ये the remaining being denied the right. The latter are सामान्य विशेष and समवाय together with अस्मात् the last being added by commentators to Kanāda's list of categories. But Mallikarjuna does not care to notice this because it was a later addition, although it was made long before his time.

2. चैतन्य which he would expect to be regarded as the very essence of जाग्रत is treated by the Vaiśeṣikas as an adventitious (औपचारिक) quality (जाग्रदवस्थाव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानाकार्यं गुणम्) which comes temporarily into जाग्रत as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition (ज्ञान) viz. कार्ये इन्द्रियेण संयुज्यते इन्द्रियमवस्था यत् जाग्रदवस्था इति is thus something different from जाग्रत [This applies to प्रवृत्त] But in the case of the other varieties of यम, so far as the adventitious character of cognition is concerned, the position is the same viz., one द्वार through the working of मयस्य causes another द्वार to come into जाग्रत.]

3. Liberation of जाग्रत is not a positive state of संवित् (consciousness) and आनन्द (joy), but a negative condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy ("आव्यभिक्तं दुःखार्थसौ योग" —Tarka).

1 (a). The commentator begins by setting forth the principles of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy quoting Kanāda's Vaiśeṣika-sūtras and Udayana's famous verse relating to the restrictions on the field of वाचि (सामान्य par excellence). He makes a long extract from Prasastapāda's Bhāṣya on the first point, and quotes from Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī on the second and the third. According to the Vaiś. school there is a definite reality called 'सर्व' or परसामान्य.

Udayanabāṣya points out in his Kiranāvalī ("चक्षुरेवैव, etc.) certain conditions in which an apparent सामान्य (°त्व) is not a real सामान्य (°वाचि). See Notes for the conditions and their reasons.

(1) It is not *gṛa*. For it is lacking in the characteristic nature of *gṛa*, which is to be either made up of many *gṛas* as its constituents (e. g. a *gṛa* which is made of many *gṛas*) and not to be complete in single *gṛa* (e. g. *gṛa* which is not complete in single *gṛa* unlike *saṃyama* or *saṃyama* which is complete in each single *gṛa* (e. g. *saṃyama* in each *gṛa*), or to be made up of no constituent *gṛa* at all (e. g. *saṃyama* which has no constituent as structural parts whatsoever).

(15) It is not a *gṛa*, because it exists in *gṛas*, which no *gṛa* does. (*gṛa* *gṛasamāhāra*).

(16) It is not *gṛa* for the same reason, *mutatis mutandis*.

1 (b). Similarly there exist *viśeṣas* as a special category. For just as *saṃyama*—of which *gṛa* is the highest—is the principle of co-ordination (*saṃyama*) of individualities, so is *viśeṣa* the principle of differentiation or distinction (*viśeṣa*). By its very nature *viśeṣa* belongs to each particular separately and therefore there should be as many *viśeṣas* as there are particulars in the Universe. Possession of different *saṃyamas* and possession of different *viśeṣas* are two other principles which serve to distinguish things. For example, *saṃyama* distinguishes *gṛa* from *gṛa*, and the possession of parts which is not identical with the parts of another *gṛa* distinguishes the first *gṛa* from the second. Hence it is not necessary to assume by *viśeṣas* in these two cases. But these methods of distinction will not do in the case of *gṛas* of the same substance, which are distinct from one another and yet alike, or in the case of *saṃyama* which being single whole does not possess either *saṃyama* or *viśeṣa*. (See *Dīpaṅkari*)

1 (c). *saṃyama* is the bond of things which are inseparable, such as *gṛa* and its *gṛas*, *gṛa* and its *gṛas*, or *gṛa* and *gṛas* etc. and it is therefore not one of the things themselves.

2 and 3. The ground of the V *śālikas* for regarding *gṛa* and *saṃyama* as adventitious, and not essential is obvious: We are conscious of our ideas coming and going and so also of

pleasure and pain which belong to us and are positive in character. Passing states cannot be the essence of things; they belong to us, they are ours, they are not we.

Criticism—Nalīyoga criticises these three doctrines as follows:—

1. 'सर्वम्' is being and everything that is must possess सर्वम्. Moreover its function is to co-ordinate, and therefore wherever things appear to be alike in one respect or another and are thus capable of co-ordination there is the field for सर्वम्. We can co-ordinate all things that exist, and consequently सर्वम् can reside in all. The difficulties raised by Udayana do not arise, because the Jain is not prepared to admit सर्वम् as a real apart from and over and above the particulars which it co-ordinates, nor does he regard particulars as simply particulars incapable of being referred to a universal. According to the Jain, सर्वम् is only an aspect and not a real per se and further सर्वम् and विशेष are two aspects of the same real and are not mutually exclusive. Remember that the ancient Vaiśeṣikas who spoke of a सर्वम्-विशेष—the two-in-one—were, according to the Jain view wiser than their successors who made the categories so many water tight compartments. In the doctrine that सर्वम् exists only in गुण गुण and कर्म and not in the remaining categories one may see a sound distinction made between real categories and conceptual categories (see remarks under St. IV).

2. The distinction between गुण and कर्म is may be urged, is the distinction between कर्म and कर्म. But the distinction is false. The कर्म is not always external to कर्म. We speak of a serpent making a coil of himself by himself where कर्म कर्म and कर्म are all one. Again, it has been urged that we are conscious of possessing गुण and not being गुण itself and consequently गुण must be regarded as distinct from कर्म. Answer: N. गुण is not external to कर्म, it is not possessive of something externally related to it. It is a production drawing out of something from the कर्म itself and is there-

fore only an aspect or mode (परिचाय) of सात्वत् and nothing distinct.

2. As regards सुख the Jaina would distinguish between संसारसुख which is perishable and मोक्षसुख which is everlasting.

All these weaknesses of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine would seem to arise from two fundamental errors: First, conceptual realities are hypostatized, and secondly he takes a mechanical view of the Universe where things are taken as essentially so many particulars which come together and separate like actors on a stage—and so carry on mutual intercourse as real ties external to each other. The first of these opens up much deeper questions whether the logical or conceptual is not the real. This we cannot afford to discuss here. The second is to some extent the position of particularists and pluralists of modern European and American philosophy.

計 14

The doctrine next examined is that of the *विशुद्ध* of *आत्म*—that *आत्म* is everywhere— doctrine which on the face of it, say the Jains, is contrary to our experience. For all are agreed that thing must be where its quality is found, e.g. *गंध* exists where its form exists and *गंध* elsewhere. It may be argued. Don't we smell from distance? Answer No; the particles which possess the smell fly to our nose. But it may be asked Does not *मग्न* work at distance? Answer No; the presiding deity of the magical formula or practice who roams elsewhere is working there. Having thus justified his position in general way Mallinagani lays down syllogism for attacking the *Vishuddha* doctrine of the *विशुद्ध* of *आत्म*—*आत्मा सर्वत्रो व संप्रति । सर्वत्र तदुपाहृतत्वे । यो व सर्वत्रोपाहृतत्वात् । एव स स सर्वत्रो व भवति यथा वर । यथा आत्म । तस्यात् तत् । अतिरेके व्यापारि* and then proceeds to answer the objections of the opponent : such as, *किं हेतुः संप्रति* etc. In the course of his answer he argues that the *आत्म* of *गंध* *आत्म* is supposed to act even at distance—and it cannot be there hanging in the air so to say without an underlying substratum; consequently our

જાતન must be supposed to be existing even there. And since જાત works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., જાતન must also exist everywhere. But the Jaina denies that જાત is acting there and everywhere. Things, he says, have their own nature—a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation—and that nature is not caused by જાત. To say that the natures of things are determined by જાત is to leave no room for your God. Next, since the Vaiseshika holds that જાતન are many if each of them is વિદ્યુ also, as he believes, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of જાતન would ensue! Moreover each of them would enter the જાતન of God Himself and each would thereby become a creator! It may be urged: Unless જાતન was વિદ્યુ how could the જાતન draw to himself the particles for the body in which he has to dwell in the next life? Or even if he could, would not his body-sized જાતન as a consequence be સત્ત્વ and therefore a જાતૈ just like the body itself? The Jaina, however is prepared to accept the logical consequence. [More accurately he says that જાતન has ક્ષેત્ર though not સત્ત્વ] The Jaina believes that જાતન is સત્ત્વ is પરિવાસિદ્ and does change from time to time. He is no believer in absolute changelessness of જાતન, or for the matter of that in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever. It may be asked in support of the વિદ્યુ theory: If જાતન were body-sized how could જાતન enter the body? For two distinct things cannot occupy the same space at the same time. The Jaina answers the objection by denying સ્થૂલ (અપારિમત etc.) in one sense (materiality) and affirming it in another (સત્ત્વ ગતત્). The Jaina expresses and explains his view that જાતન is subject to change and is yet eternal, as follows: —“પર્યવત્તત્ત્વા નિમત્સેરિ દ્રવ્યો વિદ્યત્તાત્. He further points out that at some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the જાતન in them.

It may be noted that the Jaina is the only Indian schoolman who holds that જાતન is middle-(body)-sized. The only other philosopher who holds an analogous though

not the same doctrine is Bāṇasūjātīya, according to whom the *ātman* of *ajñāna* though not the *ajñāna* himself, is *śūnyatā*. I order to appreciate the Jaina position one has to reinterpret II and understand II in the only sense in which it is possible to defend it—viz., that the phenomenon of consciousness is limited to the body though the consciousness belongs to *ajñāna* and is its essence (of *ajñāna*). Similarly when Śaṅkara speaks of the *śūnyatā* or *śūnyatā* of *ajñāna* what he means is *ajñāna* is a reality which is not bounded by time or space. And the same in the case with the Bāṇasūjātīya. Also it may be added, one must free *ajñāna* from all material analogies, and must abandon the conception of *ajñāna* as *śūnyatā* like *śūnyatā* etc. which is the fundamental error of what Kant calls 'rational' (i.e. 'unofficial' or 'dogmatic' in the Kantian sense of the word) Psychology. Let us remember in this connection, that when the Vaiśeṣika speaks of *ajñāna* as a 'śūnyatā' or 'substance', he does not mean material substance but only substance which possesses qualities (cf. Descartes), not, however as mere logical subject possessing predicates, for such a *śūnyatā* would deprive *ajñāna* of all reality making him merely nominal.

Śāstra X: Criticism of Nyāya.

St. X.

The first & last criticism in this śāstra and its commentary is that of the Nyāyika who are here called 'śūnyatā' and are distinguished from the 'śūnyatā'.

I work of Logic, as the Jaina, what we should expect is a exposition of the laws of correct thinking, and we have of the fallacies which one is likely to commit knowingly. But it is strange that the 'śūnyatāśāstra'—a work which professes to deal with subjects which should be carefully studied in order to achieve the summation of—these that should treat such subjects as *śūnyatā* etc. which are various forms of irresponsible and honest and sophistical reasoning. The Uṣṇasāstra apologists may plead that G. śāstra has not in any way recommended this but that is of no use for the

intellectually weak, he has only drawn their attention to such logical traps as the enemy is likely to devise for his ruin. Mallikarja ridicules such an apologia. He next proceeds to deal with the definitions of certain terms which are contained in the fundamental sūtra of Nyāya: "प्रमाण-प्रमेय etc.

1. प्रमाण. Mallikarja examines and rejects the definition given in the Nyāya Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana, and in the Nyāya sūtra " by Bhāṣarvajña, viz—(1) 'अर्थोपपत्तिबोधेन प्रमाणम्' and (2) 'सम्बन्धवत्त्ववशात् प्रमाणम्'. In neither of the two definitions, he says, the essential fact that प्रमाण is ज्ञान is brought out. On the contrary in the Nyāya system इन्द्रियार्थसम्बन्ध and not the rudimentary ज्ञान which springs from it is regarded as a कारण of प्रमाण. Moreover in the case of the first definition, the word बोध which occurs there is too wide and might include कर्तृ and कर्म as well as कारण. The correct definition of प्रमाण says Mallikarja, is "सम्बन्धवत्त्ववशात् ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्" (cf. Pramāṇa N yā-Tattva-loka-lambkāra).

2. प्रमेयम्—Crileism: कर्तृ etc. are included in ज्ञानम् and do not require to be separately mentioned. प्रमाणावस्था and अपवर्तन are similarly states of ज्ञानम्. A more fundamental objection is that ज्ञानम् is not a प्रमेय but प्रमाण. बोध can be included in प्रमाण, and are only activities of ज्ञानम् which has been separately mentioned. बुद्धि and इन्द्रियार्थ are ज्ञान as one of the Brāhmaṇa logicians, Jayanta, admits. In conclusion Mallikarja says that the right definition of प्रमेय is "इन्द्रियवर्तमानवशात् प्रमेयम्".

It may be pointed out that Mallikarja forgets that there are two meanings of the word 'प्रमेय'—प्रमाणं बोधम् and प्रमाणं वस्तुम्—of which the former is intended in the Nyāyasūtra, and the latter in the Vaiśeṣika; in other words, the वार्ता of the Nyāyasūtras are topics (प्रमाणं बोधः), not categories, unlike the वार्ता of the Vaiśeṣika which are categories (प्रमाणं वस्तुः).

Mallikarja next explains various kinds of ज्ञान, चादि and निरात्मक as is done in the Nyāyasūtras and observes once more at the close that this subject is unworthy of the attention of

one who lays claim to *Śiṣya*. Let us remember however that Hemacandra has devoted section of his *Prasāpa-Mīmāṃsā* to the treatment of these very subjects.

Stanzas XI XII: Criticism of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

St. XI.

The author next criticises the defence of *śiṣya* as made by certain Vedists. After quoting texts from Brāhmaṇa scriptures which prescribe *śiṣya* Malliṣya condemns it and pithily asks: " *śiṣya* के चर्चयेत् कथम्? चर्चयेत्तुर् *śiṣya* कथम्! To say that *śiṣya* is *वेदविहित* and therefore 'चर्चयेत्' is to condemn the Veda, and is, moreover a contradiction in terms. He rejects the weak plea of the Vedists that *śiṣya* though ordinarily a sin is not a sin when it is prescribed by the Veda. Malliṣya has no difficulty in rejecting this plea as an outrage upon our sense of right and wrong. It may be said that just as the Jains make an exception in the case of the *śiṣya* of insects, worms and reptiles which are unavoidably killed in the process of building

Jaina temple, so the Vedist makes an exception of the Vedic *ṛg* which involves *śiṣya*. Malliṣya meets this plea by pointing out that the *śiṣya* which takes place while building a temple is unavoidable; moreover the service which Jaina temple renders to the spiritual life of the community far outweighs the evil of the *śiṣya*. The *śiṣya* involved in a Vedic *yajña* is not necessary for obtaining *ṛg* which, as the Brāhmaṇa scriptures admit, can be obtained by the practice of *ṛg* etc. The Vedists say: *शौचम्* etc. If this be so hell will be desert and

e The context of the Stanzas and the latter part of the poem on St. XI show that the system criticised is principally that of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā which is primarily responsible for this doctrine. But as the Nyāyikas have held the same view in regard to sacrificial slaughters of animals I have used the word Vedists as including both. Just as this may apply both to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, so the next Stanza also applies to both.

heaven an overpopulated city! Mallinaga endorses the remark of "पराशरि ब्रह्मि" the Śāṅkhyaas —who say:

“दुर्गतिरा पश्यन् ह्यथा काला दक्षिणरश्मयः।

वधाय गच्छन्ते स्वर्गे नरकं येन गच्छन्ते ॥

—Quoted in Mādhava Vrtti †

Besides Mallinaga points out that the Vedic promise of स्वर्ग in such a case does not stand to reason and must be taken to be false like many another rites in connection with marriage etc. Mallinaga then quotes other dāṭṭas of Brāhmaṇa philosophers such as those of the Vedāntins who like the Śāṅkhyaas have condemned हिंसा even for a व्रत. Mallinaga condemns also the Śrāddha ceremony which was a great occasion with the vedic Brāhmaṇas for slaughtering animals and eating animal food.

Lastly Mallinaga takes up the scholastic problem whether the Veda is to be regarded as चीरदेव or अचीरदेव. He says that language and its utterance can never be अचीरदेव and every sentence has a certain समय which implies a तथैव and is thus चीरदेव. Secondly the logic of Exception requires that exceptions should relate to the same matter to which the general rule is applied. If not on the other hand, exceptiōis as not for the purpose of propitiating gods, gurus and manes, whereas the general rule (the prohibitory) is "न हिंसायः सर्वं कुर्यात्" (1) is for avoiding sin and its consequences. Where is the economy of propitiating them by हिंसा when other methods are available? The desire of स्वर्ग in such a case is as foolish as "समुत्पन्नाय कुर्यात् हिंसायः".

It will be well known that "पराशरि (see p. 11, Ś. 1)" There is considerable similarity between Śāṅkhya and Jainism despite many important differences.

† See Mādhava Vrtti, Śāṅkhya Śāstra etc. 2. 17. 1. Many of the quotations here made by Mallinaga seem to have taken from Mādhava Vrtti.

A short historical note on this subject may be added. There is no doubt that animal slaughter both for food and propitiation of gods and manes was very common among ancient Aryans. At the same time from the evidence of the sermons of Mahāvira Brāhmī and Gaṇtama Buddha it is easy to see that *ahimsā* was also an ancient practice which they tried to revive. There is a famous passage in the *Āltaraya Brāhmaṇa* which clearly shows that strong tendency in favour of *ahimsā* must have set in long before his time. Had the passage been post-Buddhist, *ahimsā* even for Vedic sacrifice would not have been complacently recommended in that Vedic work at a time when the precepts of Jainism and Buddhism were laying their axe at the root of Vedic practices. The Jgana and Bhakti movements had large share in making the Vedic *hiṃsā* obsolete. Of this we have ample evidence in the Mahābhārata and the ruling philosophy of the day—the Sāṃkhya,—which was already in the field when Jainism and Buddhism came to be preached. It should be borne in mind in this connection that what the two reformers condemned was not the whole of the Vedic religion but even in their day. Apart from the couplet which has been cited by Mallinātha as that of the Sāṃkhya, there is whole *adhikaraṇa* in the Sāṃkhya Sūtras, which though much later may well be supposed to record old Sāṃkhya traditions—devoted to repudiation of *hiṃsā* altogether even from the Vedic sacrifice.

The history of *hiṃsā* and *ahimsā* has passed through the following stages.

1. First Stage: When *hiṃsā* was practised by the people generally both for food and for worship of gods and manes.
2. Second Stage: When it was discarded from food but was retained in worship. This is easy to understand. For while a secular practice can be easily changed, superstitions in which gods and ancestors are supposed to be involved die hard.
3. Third Stage. When the moral sense of the people was so far awakened by a deeper sense of religion—of Jñāna and

bhakti—that it revolted against all forms of *ज्ञान* whether religious or secular

St. XII

Next, Hemacandra and his commentator examine the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā theory (that of the particular school of P. Mīmāṃsā which was established by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) regarding the nature of *ज्ञान*. The problems raised therein are: (1) How do we know that we know?—i. e. how is knowledge itself known, that is, brought to consciousness? (2) How do we know objects?

The Jaina holds that *ज्ञान* or consciousness has this dual nature: (1) it reveals itself (‘स्वावबोधज्ञान’) and (2) it reveals also the world of objects (‘अवबोधज्ञान’). He thus rejects the view of Kumārila that *ज्ञान* itself is known by process of implication (‘अवधारण’ or ‘आलोचन’), being implied in the fact of *ज्ञान* of the object, which is its effect. With it he also rejects a similar theory of the ‘*वीतर*’ (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) who regard *ज्ञान* as *अहमप्रकाशमान* i. e. known by a *further act of knowing* (‘अहमप्रकाश’) directed upon the first fact of knowledge. The commentator could well have added that the Jaina view excludes also the idealistic position that knowledge does not disclose any external reality ideas being the only ultimate reality of objects (‘विज्ञानवादा’). For this is the point of *अर्थ* in the dvandva compound ‘स्वार्थ’ (स्व+अर्थ) in the first line of the Stanzas (‘स्वावबोधज्ञान स्व वीतर’). Hemacandra says that the doctrine of the self-revelation of *ज्ञान* is a perfectly sound proposition and yet some weak-kneed philosophers have succumbed to the criticism levelled against it by their opponents—which they need not have done.

As regards the main part of the substance of the Stanzas—whether *ज्ञान* is self-revealed or after revealed—the commentator states and examines Kumārila’s theory of *ज्ञान* and the implication of *ज्ञान* in *ज्ञान*. The argument against the self-revelation theory is that ‘*ज्ञानं स्वविवर्तितं न प्रवर्तते*। स्वात्मनि

विचारितोवाद् । न हि सुक्ष्मिणिषोऽपि बहु एवमन्वयविरोधं क्षमा । न च सुक्ष्मिणाप्यविचारं सर्वं ठेनवादिनप्याचारः ॥ The reply is that is based on the analogy of वहीर which reveals itself, while revealing other objects also and does not require to be revealed by another वहीर. The argument of the opponent which was based upon such analogies as those of वर and अग्नि is met by an appeal to experience and its irrefragable authority (अहमस्मिदेव विरोधासिद्धेः). Moreover how could Kaśarīha assume that ज्ञातता was an obvious fact on which he could base his argument of implication? What reason is there in assuming that ज्ञातता is self-revealed any more than that ज्ञेय is self-revealed? In fact we are conscious of the self-revelation of ज्ञेय rather than that of ज्ञातता. There is one more important objection to meet: If ज्ञान is हेतु i. e. अहमृति is अनुवाक्य it is no more अहमृति ('अहमृतेऽहमप्यन्ते वासिपरवह-वृत्तिसमस्तम्'). The answer to that is made with the help of the Jaina theory of aspects & relativity of knowledge (सर्ववेदका-हवृत्तित्वाद्; एतन्नेह वा वाहवाप्यन्ताद्) on the analogy 'स्वविदुषा येनैवैकस्य दुश्चरितुल्यम् विरोधाभावाद्')

Mallapa winds up his examination of Bhaṭṭa's complex theory of the knowledge by analysing it into three steps (त्रिपुटीयमवधारणा)—

(1) Sensation (इन्द्रियवृत्ति) arising from contact with reality ('सर्वप्रवेसे इन्द्रियवृत्तिजन्यत्वात् ज्ञानम्').

(2) Knowledge of the Reality ('सर्वमाकलयद्').

(3) Knowledge that the Reality was known deduction of the existence of knowledge (कारण) from that of the fruit of that knowledge (फल) viz. the knowaness (ज्ञातता) of the object (उपाधार्थापत्तित्वात् अतीतज्ञानत्वोपपन्नम्).

Mallapa next turns his track towards the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who puts forward his अनुपपत्तत्वात् theory as follows. "ज्ञानं स्वानुपपन्नकत्वात् । ईश्वरज्ञानान्तरे एति तदेवञ्चात् वदन्" and meets the charge of अनपत्तत्वात् by saying that as matter of fact there is no demand for any further act of knowledge (विज्ञाता)—"ए

अथवा न स्यात् । अथवा न स्यात् । अथवा न स्यात् । अथवा न स्यात् ।
In doing so he points out:

(1) That the हेतु is 'अवयववापरिह' (This is a slip. It should be really अवयवविपरिह—otherwise known as अवयवसम—In the old Brāhmaṇa logic) since the अवयव above set forth can be met by a counter-अवयव as follows "विवादाव्याप्तिर्न ह्यर्थ स्वतन्त्रिदिग्म् । ह्यवयवम् । ईश्वरप्रभवम् ।" With reference to the example, Mallikena makes an interesting remark regarding the Jaina attitude towards the problem of the existence of God "युद्धपरिहारेण स्वतन्त्रत्वात् नैवैतत् स्वतन्त्रत्वेन तदवयवस्य तेषां प्रसिद्धिः"—otherwise the example would be fictitious.

(2) That the हेतु is 'अर्थविशेष्य प्रमेयत्वात्' in the हेतु serving no purpose.

(3) That it is 'अवयवम्' as the argument 'स्वतन्त्रत्वात्' ईश्वरावयवत्वे एव प्रमेयत्वात्' is applicable to this हेतु which are 'वस्तुप्रत्यक्षेण' and not to ह्यर्थ—"ईश्वरावयवत्वे प्रमेयत्वे च न स्यात् । नैव नैव स्वतन्त्रत्वे तदेव स्वतन्त्रत्वेन प्रमादत्वे ।" As regards the denial of the possibility of अवयवत्वा—on the ground that there is no demand for any further act of knowledge, Mallikena refuses to admit that it is possible to stop at any point after the regressus has begun.

Stanzas XIII XIV Criticism of Vedānta.

St XIII

From the Pārva-Mīmāṃsā, the critic next turns to Uthara-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta and there to that particular school of Vedānta which in the time of the critic occupied the fore-ground and here again to that particular tenet of the school which has made it famous—viz. मायावाद.

Hemacandra's criticism of मायावाद is simple: (1) If माया is, there is no more ब्रह्म; for ब्रह्म is one and माया would be another thus making two. (2) If माया is not how will there be this world, which it is sought to account for by assuming माया? Moreover to say that something is माया—false—and that it serves to account for the world is a contradiction.

in terms. For unless something exists how can it do the duty of accounting for another thing?

Mallinātha next proceeds to elaborate the criticism. The Vedāntin's argument, he says runs thus "ननु तु यद्वदो दिव्याकृत्यः । प्रतीयमानत्वात् । यदेव तदेव यदा वदति ।" etc. the world is unreal, because it appears that is to say all phenomena, by the simple fact of their phenomenality are mere appearances. Mallinātha now challenges the opponent to explain the meaning of दिव्याकृत्यः

(1) If it means absolute non-existence it is accepting the position of असत्त्ववदिति—which the Vedāntin would not take up, lest it might expose him to the charge of being considered बुद्धवदिति (Buddhist). (2) If it means *one takes* i. e. one thing appearing as another it is विपरीतवदिति which too the Advaitins cannot adopt as it involves two reals—the thing which is mistaken and the thing as it is mistaken. (3) If it means that it cannot be definitely characterized as either existent or non-existent (अनिर्दिष्ट) —explanation may well be demanded as regards the meaning of this 'अनिर्दिष्टत्वम्'. If 'अनिर्दिष्टत्वम्' अनिश्चयवत् it will involve अज्ञानवदिति or अज्ञानवदिति according as 'स्वभाव' is निश्चयवदिति or taken to be a शब्द अज्ञानवत्. Again, if निश्चयवत् प्रतीयमानवत् how can any world (दृश्य) be even talked about? Moreover it will be inconsistent with the fact प्रतीयमानत्वात् as प्रतीयमानवत् means अज्ञानवत्. If निश्चयवत् only means that it does not really possess its स्वभाव i. e. it is not what it appears to be this is again विपरीतवदिति (See supra).

Besides, the whole argument is बुद्धवदिति. The Vedāntin now becomes desperate and gives as follows: The very fact of the world being दृश्य is the reason for regarding it as mere phenomenon, and therefore unreal. According to this school all

The philosophy of Khyātis is too intricate to be expounded in this short resumé. The reader may therefore be referred to Randle's valuable account of the Khyātis in his *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* pp. 59-75

thought—a particular School of Sāṅkhya Vedāntins—प्रत्यक्ष is only a sensation in which what is revealed is the thing-in-itself and not its predicate (निर्दिष्टिप्रत्यक्ष), and it is afterwards transferred into perception (ग्रहण) by the addition of an element (which falls outside the province of प्रत्यक्ष) whereby a definite character as against all other characters is predicated of the subject. This is what we call the world (ग्रहण). This added element is not based on प्रत्यक्ष. Mallinātha says that this is all wrong: प्रत्यक्ष is not merely sensation; it bears testimony to the existence of a certain character and exclusion of other characters; besides this, it reveals the fact that the world consists of many things every one of which possesses its own nature to the exclusion of every other nature. Moreover the argument is अनुमानवाचिन. Thus: ग्रहणो मित्या न भवति अद्विष्टवत्त्वात् आत्मवत्। But you will say when one अनुमान is confronted by another अनुमान there must be something to turn the balance. Very well here it is—If प्रतीयमानवत् is to be taken as a reason for मित्यात् ग्रहणं is मित्या too.

Adopting a somewhat different form of argument Mallinātha makes out a *prima facie* case for the Vedāntin on the grounds of प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान and ज्ञान and afterwards attacks each one of them. The Vedāntin's argument, he says, would be briefly this: प्रत्यक्ष only affirms, it does not deny ("आहुर्निषारु मय्यहं न निषेदु निषिद्धा") that is to say it affirms Reality and therefore whatever involves exclusion—the world of objects each one of which is supposed to possess a certain nature as against a certain other nature—falls outside the domain of प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान also supports the same view and so does ज्ञान (the Veda) which it is well known, affirms ब्रह्म as the sole Reality. Mallinātha rejects all these arguments as "the outpourings of a drunken man." For no man in his senses, says M, would question that there is no affirmation which is not at the same time negation (exclusion): the two are the positive and negative aspects of *angel Reality* which are presented together. Therefore the Vedāntin's argument which makes all *Brahm* one single reality with nothing by its side

to be excluded, is contrary to all experience. In fact, all our experience bears witness to definite characters of things. All are determinate (सविशेष) and things are many.

St. XIV

1. The problem of the reality of one or many which is involved in the Vedāntin's position discussed under the preceding Stanza, presents itself in another form in this Stanza: What do words express—सामान्य विशेष?—and general or particulars, one or many? Some P. Mīmāṃsakas, the Advaita Vedāntins and the Sāṃkhya are universalists, and some of them singularists also; the Buddhists are particularists and pluralists; and the Vaiśeṣikas and Nāyāyikas are both. According to the Jains, they are all partially right. The first group of thinkers look to the unity of substance (द्रव्यास्तिब्रह्मसत्त्वास्ति or 'सामान्यवस्तुत्वमिदं'), the second confine their attention to its manifold modes or changes (वर्तमानवस्तुत्वमिदं), the third considers both, but treats them as separate, self-sufficient realities (वैयर्थ्यवस्तुत्वमिदं). Mallinātha points out wherein each of them errs, what aspect each of them has ignored. The last school—that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—comes nearest to the Jain position; yet it fails to appreciate the relativity of सामान्य and विशेष—the Universal and the Particular the One and the Many.

Mallinātha remarks after detailing the three partial truths: तदेतत् पञ्चमवपि न कथ्यते कोऽपि । यथावदतिवृत्त्या । सामान्यविशेषो-
पपत्तयस्त्वैव वस्तुनो निर्मिक्तानवस्तुत्वमन्वयात् ... 1" तदेव सामान्योपपत्त-
यतीति विशेषेऽपि वस्तुन सामान्यविशेषात्पत्तये तद्व्यवस्थान्तरात् प्रकाशयामाह ।
यदि हविर् कदाचित् वेदचित् सामान्यं विशेषितमस्तु तदा हवरेति विशेषो वा
तद्व्यवस्था । यथा हवरेति वस्तुनो निर्मिक्तानवस्तुत्वमन्वयात् तद्व्यवस्था-
वदन्ति वाचिष्ठा । तदेव सामान्यवस्तुत्वमन्वयात् 2" Not only do सामान्य and विशेष
both call for recognition, but they do so for recognition as
relations i. e. as two aspects of single reality ("सामान्यस्य
विशेषाच्च न कदाचित् परस्परान्वयितरेरेकैवमेव कथ्यते वा व्यवस्थितत्वात् । विशेषे
वेद्ये प्रतिरिक्तत्वादि सामान्यवस्तुत्वमन्वयेऽपि । सामान्यात् तु विशेषाजामन्वयि-
तेनैव तेषामप्येव कथ्यते 3")

STANNA XV: Criticism of the Sāṅkhya

St. XV

In the Sāṅkhya system—

(1) चित् (चैतन्यवर्ति or बुद्ध) has nothing to do with the knowledge of वस्तु. He knows things being regarded as a function of बुद्धि. बुद्धि is regarded as अव्यक्त, being an evolute of प्रकृति and not a वस्तु of चित् or बुद्ध. Here is a twofold offence against truth, says the critic: The function of बुद्ध should be to know and बुद्धि should be वस्तु, not बुद्ध and not a product of प्रकृति.

(2) कर्मादयः and other गुण are said to have sprung from the subtle तन्मात्रा via बुद्ध etc.

This is quite contrary to what we observe, says Mallinaga, regarding their relation कर्मादयः etc. are the वस्तु or गुण of the चैतन्यवस्तु and not the germs of the latter.

(3) कर्मादयः and जीव say the Sāṅkhyas, do not really belong to बुद्ध but belong ever free.

Then why so much ado about जीव and जीवभाव? asks Mallinaga.

Mallinaga first gives a summary of the Sāṅkhya system by quoting from the Sāṅkhyakārikā, and show that it has gone wrong in the matter of the points mentioned by Hemacandra.

(1) If चित् does not know things, it surrenders its very nature. All talk about चित् being reflected in बुद्धि and thereby enabling it बुद्धि to know is absurd. For only material thing can be reflected. (Is this not taking the metaphor too literally?)

The Sāṅkhya is afraid that if he attributes knowledge to बुद्ध he would make him as much the principal of activity and therefore subject to परिचाय. But he forgets, says the Jain, that without some sort of activity and consequent परिचाय he cannot so much as make himself reflected and without parting with his original nature he cannot have बुद्धगुण जीव.

and if he parts with it he cannot help being *सदृश* so far. The theory that *युग* is really free from activity and therefore from *योग* and yet appears to be subject to it on the analogy of a *सदृश* which receives its apparent colour from the *वपुस्त्व* which is lying near it is rejected by Mallikarja on the ground that here too the *सदृश* is subject to a real change of state, for it is only a *सदृश*—a transparent crystal—which takes the reflection and not an opaque stone (*वपुस्त्व*). Mallikarja thus disposes of the position of the *Sāṅkhya* declared in a text of "Patanjali" (or rather the commentary by Vyāsa from which the quotation is made), in that of *वासुदेव* in regard to the theory of *योग*, as formulated by Āsuri in the same connection and as formulated by Vindhyavāsin also.

Note that as between Āsuri and Vindhyavāsin, Āsuri speaks of the reflection of *युग* in *हृदि* like that of the moon in a sheet of water the stirring of the water making the moon stir also, as it were. Vindhyavāsin on the other hand speaks of the colouring of *युग* by *हृदि* like that of a pure white *सदृश* assuming the colour of the *वपुस्त्व* which is near it. Thus the two speak of two different reflections while one speaks of the reflection of *युग* in *हृदि* the other that of *हृदि* in *युग*.

The *Vāda-Mahāmāyā* accordingly speaks of reciprocal reflections, and so does also *Vijñānabhāṣya*, the last great exponent of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy.

Mallikarja next deals with certain minor details of the *Sāṅkhya* system.

(1) *सर्वं ज्ञानं वैराग्यं* and *वेदवै* and their opposites really belong to *वासुदेव* and not to *हृदि* as the *Sāṅkhya* holds.

(2) Further *बहुरूप* is not a product of *हृदि*; it is an attribute of *वासुदेव* which *हृदि* which is said to be *अवेद्य* cannot produce.

(4) *वायव्य* etc. is not a product of *वासुदेव*, and it is surprising, says Mallikarja, that the *Sāṅkhya* who claims to be the foremost of those who believe in the absolute eternality of

things (as an advocate of *अमरत्व* and consequent *निर्वेदमरण*) should speak of *अमरत्व*—apparently a type of eternal thing—as product!

(5) *ब्रह्म* etc. are regarded by the Sāṅkhya as *इन्द्रिय*. But they are not. For an *इन्द्रिय* is that which does what nothing else can do—a condition not fulfilled by *ब्रह्म* etc.

(6) It is vain to think that there is no *सर्व* and no *योग*. For there is a real confusion of *प्रकृति* and *पुरुष* which makes our *सर्व*.

Maṇḍana then deals with the three kinds of *सर्व* mentioned in Sāṅkhya works: (1) *साधुर्विषय*, (2) *वैयर्थ्यविषय* and (3) *सुखविषय*—that is, (1) that which consists in regarding *प्रकृति* as the highest ideal of worship like *पुरुष*, (2) that which consists in regarding the *विद्यारूपा* of *प्रकृति* such as *सूक्ष्म*, *स्रष्टा*, *वह्न्युत्पत्ति* and *इन्द्रिय* as the objects of worship just like *पुरुष* and (3) that which consists in practising the religion of ritualism. Maṇḍana points out they are all different kinds of causes which create what the Jaina calls *वर्षादसर्व*. Unless *सर्व* is real and not imaginary as the Sāṅkhya wants us to believe, there is no sense in speaking of *योग*.

(7) As regards the Sāṅkhya idea of *योग* that it consists in the cessation of the activity of *प्रकृति* Maṇḍana points out that the activity of *प्रकृति* can never cease inasmuch as activity is her very nature. If *प्रकृति* can choose to retire from the stage like an actress she may also choose to return there some day and so cause *सर्व* once more! *योग* really consists of the real exhaustion of all *Karman*. The Jaina conception of the nature of *मोक्ष* and his *योग* is essentially the same as that of the Sāṅkhya with this important difference, however, that while the Sāṅkhya regards *सर्व* *विषय* *सर्व* and *योग* as erroneously connected with *मोक्ष*, the Jaina regards them as its real states.

Stanzas XVI—XVIII: *Criticism of Buddhism.*

The authors next criticise Buddhism, particularly Buddhist Idealism.

¶ XVI.

I The identity of *प्रज्ञा* and *ज्ञान* (*प्रवृत्ति*), according to the Buddhist, does not bring an external object into touch with consciousness, as is generally supposed, or to be more accurate, it does not make (external) reality an object of (internal) knowledge; what it does is, it defines consciousness, that is to say it produces conditioned consciousness; thus, nothing enters into consciousness from without, the act of knowing being nothing but consciousness in every part.

This position is criticised on the following grounds:

The relation between *jñāna* and *kṛt* is a causal relation—which implies that the two cannot be simultaneous, nor can the two be successive, each enduring for a single kṣaṇa only and leaving no trace behind for causality is not possible under such conditions. Besides, the causal relation is a relation and as such it implies two correlates, consciousness and something other than consciousness. Mallinātha takes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyaśloka* and its tika by Dharmottara as a representative text of this school of thought and criticises it on the ground that no such make-shift as the substitution of *anubodha* for *pratyakṣa* as between *cetana* and *saṁskāra* can succeed in doing away with the necessity of recognising two instead of one factor in the act of knowledge (*anubodhasamvaya-pratyakṣasamavayavi ca śaṅkharādeḥ dvaitatvādiksmibhātavyat*). The Jain rejects at the same time the extreme dualism of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School—for the simple reason that *jñāna* and *kṛt* (*प्रवृत्तिः*) both belong to one and the same person, so that their unity in *vyākhyāna* somehow cannot be denied altogether. Note that this hardly differs from the Buddhist's "Tisittuṃ vācāreṇa nissiddhiṃ jñānam-kṛtam" except in that it would substitute *vācār* for *nissiddhi* and reject absolute dualism even of the aspects which the Buddhist formula cannot wholly exclude.

II. Another favourite doctrine of the Buddhists is their 'अनन्यता'—the doctrine of Monotheism. The main ground on which it rests is that nothing can perish unless it is its

things (as an advocate of *सत्त्वज्ञान* and consequent *निर्वैराग्यता*) should speak of *अमृत*—apparently a type of eternal thing—as a product!

(5) *ब्रह्म* etc. are regarded by the *Sāṅkhya*s as *प्रतिवृत्ति*. But they are not. For a *प्रतिवृत्ति* is that which does what nothing else can do—a condition not fulfilled by *ब्रह्म* etc.

(6) It is vain to think that there is no *बन्ध* and no *मोक्ष*. For there is a real confusion of *वृत्ति* and *गुण* which makes our *बन्ध*.

Mallinaga then deals with the three kinds of *बन्ध* mentioned in *Sāṅkhya* we know (1) *माहृति* (2) *देवप्रतिवृत्ति* and (3) *इन्द्रिय*—that is, (1) that which consists in regarding *वृत्ति* as the highest ideal of worship like *गुण*, (2) that which consists in regarding the *प्रतिवृत्ति* of *वृत्ति* such as *ब्रह्म*, *इन्द्रिय*, *अहङ्कार* and *इन्द्रिय* as the objects of worship just like *गुण* and (3) that which consists in practising the religion of ritualism. *Mallinaga* points out they are all different kinds of causes which create what the *Jaina* calls '*वर्तमान*'. Unless *बन्ध* is real and not imaginary as the *Sāṅkhya* wants us to believe, there is no sense in speaking of *मोक्ष*.

(7) As regards the *Sāṅkhya* idea of *मोक्ष* that it consists of the cessation of the activity of *वृत्ति* *Mallinaga* points out that the activity of *वृत्ति* can never cease inasmuch as activity is her very nature. If *वृत्ति* can choose to retire from the stage like an actress she may also choose to return there some day and so cause *बन्ध* once more! *मोक्ष* really consists of the real exhaustion of all *Karma*. The *Jaina* conception of the nature of *बन्ध* and *मोक्ष* is essentially the same as that of the *Sāṅkhya* with this important difference, however, that while the *Sāṅkhya* regards *बन्ध* *प्रतिवृत्ति* *बन्ध* and *मोक्ष* as eternally connected with *ब्रह्म* the *Jaina* regards them as his real states.

Stanzas XVI—XVIII: Criticism of Buddhism.

The author next criticises Buddhism, particularly Buddhist Idealism.

84. XVI.

I The identity of *ज्ञान* and *चक्षुः* (प्रतिधि), according to the Buddhist, does not bring an external object into touch with consciousness, as is generally supposed, or to be more accurate, it does not make (external) reality an object of (internal) knowledge; what it does is, II defines consciousness, that is to say it produces *conditioned* consciousness; thus, nothing enters into consciousness from without, the act of knowing being nothing but consciousness in every part.

This position is criticised on the following grounds:

The relation between *ज्ञान* and *चक्षुः* is a causal relation—which implies that the two cannot be simultaneous, nor can the two be successive, each enduring for a single kṣaṇa only and leaving no trace behind, for causality is not possible under such conditions. Besides, the causal relation is a relation and as such II implies two correlates, consciousness and something other than consciousness. Mallikāra takes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Hyāyabindu* and its tika by Dharmottara as a representative text of this school of thought and criticises it on the ground that no such make-shift as the substitution of *चक्षुः* for *ज्ञान* can succeed in doing away with the necessity of recognising two instead of one factor in the act of knowledge (*चक्षुः* and *ज्ञान*). The Jainas reject at the same time the extreme dualism of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School—for the simple reason that *ज्ञान* and *चक्षुः* (प्रतिधि) both belong to one and the same person, so that their unity in *ज्ञान* *somehow* cannot be denied altogether. Note that this hardly differs from the Buddhist's "विधिज्ञानं चक्षुः" except in that it would substitute *चक्षुः* for *विधि* and reject absolute dualism even of the aspects which the Buddhist formula cannot wholly exclude.

II. Another favourite doctrine of the Buddhist is their 'ममत्व'—the doctrine of *Memorandum*. The main ground on which it rests is that nothing can perish unless II is in its

nature to perish, which means that perishability is its nature and since the nature of a thing does not depend upon anything other than the thing itself perishability amounts to actual perishing. As regards the apparent persistence of a thing (e. g. वर) in time, the Buddhist explanation is that here *similarity is mistaken for identity* nothing (वर) being existent for more than single अव the seemingly persistent thing (वर) being nothing more than a series of perishing things (वरा).

The doctrine of अवयव is rejected by the Jain on the ground that it is one-sided, the aspect of permanence (धैर्य) being as necessary as that of change, that is production (सृष्टि) and destruction (व्यय). The former (permanence) belongs to अव and the latter (change) to its वर which are aspects of the same अव. This doctrine of Permanence-and-Change (i. e. persistence and change) has been criticised by the Buddhist as involving a contradiction, being as absurd as the statement that Devadatta is at once living and dying). But the Jain sees no absurdity in such a proposition. According to him, while we are living we are also dying, for the petals of lot are falling away from us all the while we are living.

The argument advanced by the Buddhist philosopher Mādhyamaka against the doctrine of Permanence in order to establish that of Momentariness falls flat on the Jain, for it is welcome to him in so far as it proves out half of the whole truth in which he believes.

III. Next is criticised Buddhist Realism, according to which the धैर्य अवयव is also a tenet of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school but the special trouble of the Buddhist is due to his अवयव which makes the realistic position as difficult to maintain as the idealistic position which was discussed above. Moreover says the Jain, it is not true that the अवयव has to be real in order to be a अवयव of अवयव, for there can be अवयव even when there is no अवयव but only अवयवधैर्य. The Buddhist Realist may perhaps argue that the अवयव (the revealer अवयव)

implies the प्रकाश (the revealed, ज्ञेय) — प्रकाश (ज्ञेय) which is also the *cause* of its प्रकाश (ज्ञान). This argument is answered by citing the example of ज्ञापि and ज्ञ between which no causal relation exists although one is प्रकाश and the other ज्ञ. Further it is pointed out that the cause need not be real, it may be only ideal. For example ह्युति is not caused by ज्ञेय but by ज्ञ (अनुपम) and yet it is the very breath of अनुमानमपम.

Buddhist Realism is divided into two schools that of Presentationists and 'Representationists' (वैपरिक् and वीचरिक् respectively), the latter being midway between Realism and Idealism. The former holds that ज्ञान is produced by ज्ञेय ('सुस्पष्टि'), the latter that it bears the form ('सद्व्यवस्था') of ज्ञेय. The point of the realistic argument consists in this that unless the reality of ज्ञेय were recognised as a cause of ज्ञान anything would be the object of that ज्ञान and that all distinction between right and wrong knowledge would vanish. The critic dispenses with the *causality* in the ज्ञेय and substitutes *causality* in the ज्ञान by way of a rejoinder to the Realist. Moreover he sees no likeness (सद्व्यवस्था) between ज्ञान and ज्ञेय (e. g. the feeling of heat is not *like* heat in the fire). Likeness, gain, cannot account for epistemological relations thus the reflection of the moon in the water does not apprehend the moon in the sky.

Taking up the Second Half of the Stanza, Mallinson attacks the school of Buddhist Idealism (विज्ञानवाद of the योगवाद) which asserts that ideas (ज्ञान) are the only reals there being no causal (सद्व्यवस्था ज्ञेय) or corresponding (सद्व्यवस्था ज्ञेय) world of external reality. It attacks the reality of the external world, discarding the problems of epistemology i. e. of the theory of knowledge, as an imaginary bogbear by subjecting it to a number of *dilemmas*, such as, are the wholes identical with parts, that is, are the bodies nothing more than the constituting atoms, or are they something ever and above them; are they permanent or transitory;

is the object in consciousness or outside it etc. None of the positions survives critical scrutiny with the result that the belief in external world cannot be regarded as due to its external reality but must be accounted for by the hypothesis of *वसना* due to *वसिना* (nescience).

This is criticised as follows :

This idealistic position which makes our belief in external reality a huge mis-take involves the reality of something that is not-taken, that is taken away, which strikes at the root of this extreme Idealism.

All knowledge is of something which is other than the knowledge itself and is the *विषय* of that knowledge; it is a *विषय* which is directed towards something which is other than the *विषय* itself.

(3) *Atoms* are real. That body is not separable from them is no reason why their reality should be questioned.

Moreover it possesses objective reality which is the same for all subjects.

(4) The object is not the subject. The fact of self-consciousness implies that there is reality other than the self from the consciousness of which the consciousness of the self is distinguished.

Moreover an object possesses objective reality which is the same for all subjects.

(5) The *सर्वप्रमाण* by which the non-existence of external reality is so ght to be proved can have no value against the evidence of *मनस* which decides the question in favour of its existence.

(6) That *मनस* and its *विषय* are found together is an unwarranted assumption.

(7) The two have distinct *मातृ* res, e.g. one I experienced as in me, the other outside me; one is already there, which the other notes afterwards.

The last stanza and its commentary having dealt with the *svayambhūta* which was held by the *Valbhāṣika* in common with all the other schools of Buddhism, and also the half-hearted and the extreme forms of Idealism (*śūnyavāda*) which were propounded by the *Sautrāntika* and the *Yogācāra* schools, the critic next proceed to attack the *śūnyavāda* of the *Mādhyamikas* generally understood to mean the doctrine of absolute and universal emptiness or void. It may be noted here that the doctrine attributed to the *Mādhyamikas* in the stanza quoted by *Mañjuśrī* towards the close of his commentary on St. XVII makes *śūnyavāda* a synonym of the *Para-Brahman* of the *Bhāṅkara Vedāntins*, and many *Mahāyāna* hymns may be cited in which *śūnyavāda* is glorified in language which the *Vedāntin* employs with respect to his *Para-Brahman*. But this is really a confusion between *śūnyavāda* and *śūnyavāda*.

Mallick like all other critics of the 'सुखादान' has understood it as the doctrine of the Universal Void or Emptiness.

An obvious objection which is taken to this doctrine is that it leaves no ground even for itself to stand upon, its only logical position being dead silence ("सुखास्य पूर्ववत् दुःखा व दुःखः सम्यक्परीक्षितत्वात् सुखदुःखानामन्यथा"). Yet it may be interesting to examine the argument which is advanced in its favour. The argument is a sophistical demonstration of the logical impossibility of the supposed reals, viz., *सत्ता* *अवेय* *प्रमाण* and *प्रतिष्ठि*. This, says Mallinaga, the Buddhist tries to prove in extenso in "सत्त्वोपपत्तिरिह" a work which is not now available, but which was according to its author as the title implies, 'a lion that confounds the animals of Reality'.

This position is met by showing that *nyay* etc. are by no means impossible; on the contrary they can be shown to be undeniably real. I feel assured that if it is to be worthy of

ॐ पूर्णविद्ं हर्षम् पूर्णान् हर्षमाप्स्यते ।

पूर्वस्य पूर्वमाहाव पूर्वमेवावशिष्यते ॥—Upasadd.

credence, must be supported by *ananta* which, however will mean negation of *ananta*.

St. XVIII

Next, we have a criticism of the Buddhist's *ananta* in its application to the problem of *ananta*. In the absence of an abiding *ananta*, says the critic,—

(1) There can be no moral retribution in our life (*ananta*). The Buddhist no doubt substitutes for the single *ananta* a series of *ananta* of which each preceding one is supposed to be connected with each succeeding one, and vice versa. But who connects them? What is the synthesising principle?

(2) Similarly there is no room for Liberation (*ananta*). For if there is no *ananta*, who is to be liberated from the bondage of life (*ananta*)? The heap of *ananta* which has to be destroyed must belong to some one to that very person who has been in bondage (*ananta*).

(3) Even such an ordinary psychological fact as *ananta*—memory—becomes impossible.

St. XIX.

The doctrine next criticised is that of *ananta*—a kind of make-shift which is intended to do duty for the principle of permanence which the Buddhist denies.

All Indian philosophers are firm believers in transmigration of the soul, and the Buddhist who denies the existence of the soul and yet believes in transmigration has somehow to make it possible. This he does by adopting the theory of *ananta*. It is intended to account for the apparent continuity of our psychic experience not only in our present life but also of the past and the future. But the problem which he has in face is that of reconciliation of *ananta* with *ananta*. Hemacandra and with him Mallisena point out how the task is hopeless. They put forward this trilemma. Are *ananta* and *ananta* (i.e., series of moments, that is things conditioned

by moments) one (अवेद) or separate (वेद) or neither one nor the other (अवयव)?—and they show how the Buddhist doctrine breaks on the spearheads of this triad. In the first case nothing is gained by the addition of वास्तव. In the second case, it must either conform to the principle of अवयव or not—if it does, no gain; if it does not, the universality of the principle of अवयव is so far violated. In the third case, the position becomes impossible; for it must be either the one (अवेद) or the other (वेद). There is only one escape from all these troubles and that is by taking shelter underneath the shady tree of the Jain doctrine of अवेदावयव I. e. वेद-*cum*-अवेद. As Hemacandra graphically puts it, the birds that have flown away far across the wide sea without any hope of finding a resting place must return to their home (एवाहार) on the mast of the ship.

In connection with this hypothesis—वेदावेद—Mallikarjuna generously points out how in this case the difference is merely verbal. He says: “एवाहारवादिनापि हि प्रतिक्षणं वदनवपराय परंपरीत्यविपरिवर्तः । तथा च लघुवदस्य । अतीतावागतवर्तमानपरम परंपरतत्त्ववदं चान्वदितव्यं तत्र वास्तवेति संशयान्तरमात्रेणमित्रमेव । न च वास्तवमेतद् वास्तवोऽपि कोविदावात्” Mallikarjuna further shows how वास्तव is not possible without a permanent something on which it should rest (स्थिरस्य संवत्सस्य च वज्रावेर्धनमपरिना वास्तव्यं एव).

Stanza XX: Criticism of the Cārvāka.

St. XX.

The two principles of the Cārvāka which are criticised are:

(1) That *प्रत्यक्ष* is the only *ज्ञान*; not even *अनुमान*

(2) That there is no soul, beyond the physical body and consequently there is no moral responsibility and no life after death (*कृतकित्ता*).

1 The first is impugned on the following grounds. As a result of your doctrine, we cannot be ware of the mind

of other persons, as we have evidently no *प्रत्यक्ष* or direct experience of it. We cannot classify our cognitions as *व्यपक्ष* and *अव्यपक्ष* (व च तन्निहितार्थवन्मात्रमनन्तं पूर्वापरपरम्परैक्यं इत्यर्थं पूर्वापरकालमपित्रीणां हान्यप्यधीनां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यवस्थारथं निमित्तमुपलब्धविनुं ह्यपते ।) Moreover we should not forget that we call even *प्रत्यक्ष* *प्रमाण* on the strength of our experience and generalisation from observed cases—that is to say our belief in the credibility of our senses rests on Inference.

2. The materialistic view of the soul is condemned by M with the help of a long passage quoted from “*Dravya-lakṣaṇa*” where it is shown that consciousness is not the product of *सूत्र* (व सूत्रवर्तमानवशेन). And even an ugly and a diseased body may hold a beautiful and healthy soul.

STANES XXI XXX: *The Jaina Doctrine*

St. XXI: *Nature of Reality: Permanence and Change.*

The authors assert here the Jaina doctrine of Reality as possessed of *व्यपक्ष* *व्यपक्ष* and *व्यपक्ष* as against those who obsessed by the phenomena of the first two overlook the third, viz. the Buddhists, and also those who contrariwise, notice only the third and forget the first two for example, the Sāṃkhya Vedāntins. Recall here the pre-Buddhist schools noted in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, the Eternalists (अमरतत्त्वा-वाचयित्वाः) and the non eternalists (अमरतत्त्वा-अवाचयित्वाः).

St. XXII: *Reality, manifold.*

The Jaina insistence upon the entirety or wholeness of truth has found expression in various forms. In the preceding stanza it was expressed as “*व्यपक्षवर्तमानवशेन व्यपक्ष*” Now note the proposition in which it is set forth in *अव्यपक्षवर्तमानवशेन व्यपक्ष*—Truth has numberless aspects.

St. XXIII: *Septabhedgi*

Next the author points out how one and the same thing may be viewed synthetically or analytically as one or as many—as one substance or as many attributes or modes. This fact

has been expressed in the famous 'set of Seven Forms'—the "सप्तव्युक्तिः". For a full statement of these seven forms see the text of the *Syādvāda-manjari* under St. XXII and the Notes thereon.

St. XXIV: *No contradiction of the so called opposites.*

The authors now explain how the synthesis of opposites recommended in the previous Stanza does not involve any contradiction inasmuch as the opposites are conditioned by 'upādhis' and are relative to them.

St. XXV: *No contradiction—continued: application of the principle to certain problems of philosophy*

The सप्तव्युक्तिः be it remembered, gives only the forms of the propositions. The principle has to be applied to actual problems of philosophy on which various schoolmen stand divided owing to their viewpoints being partial. The problems are: (1) Permanence versus Change (2) Universal versus Particular; (3) Expressible versus Inexpressible i.e. Positivism versus Transcendentalism; (4) Being versus Non-being, or Real versus Unreal.

St. XXVI: *Criticism of the absolutely eternal and the absolutely transitory*

Of these the author takes up the first, viz., Permanence versus Change or the Eternal versus the Transitory and shows how the arguments of the two sides destroy each other with the result that the doctrine of *Syādvāda* emerges from their mutual conflict. Compare here Kant's philosophy of antinomies.

St. XXVII: *Criticism of Absolutism continued.*

Absolutists cannot solve the problems of *सुख-दुःख* (जोग), *ज्ञान-अज्ञान* and *ब्रह्म-बोह*.

St. XXVIII: *Duraya, Naya, and Pramāṇa.*

The author next refers to the Jain philosophy of *द्वैत-वैत*, *नय* and *प्रमाण*. (1) *द्वैत* is the mis-take of partial truth for the

whole truth to the exclusion of the latter, (2) *वदन्ति* are the statements of partial truths, without the recognition that they are only partial; and (3) *वदन्ति* is the whole truth. The commentator here sets forth the famous doctrine of the *वदन्ति*.

The doctrine of *वदन्ति* o Relativity of Knowledge is the most remarkable contribution of Jainism to Philosophy. It means that Reality is conveyed (from *वदन्ति*) to the mind differently from different points of view or to take it from the other end, the mind approaches Reality differently from different points of view. A very useful and fundamental division of *वदन्ति* which is made is that i to (1) *द्रव्यवदन्ति* (द्रव्य) *वदन्ति* and (2) *वर्णवदन्ति* (वर्ण) *वदन्ति*, i. e. (1) that which regards *द्रव्य* o substance and (2) that which regards *वर्ण* or modes. The *वदन्ति* are also divided into five, six or seven kinds. Of these seven the first four are *वर्णवदन्ति* and the last three *द्रव्यवदन्ति*, or to adopt the fundamental divisions of *द्रव्य* and *वर्ण* the first three are *द्रव्यवदन्ति* and the last four *वर्णवदन्ति*. These are:

(1) *वैश्ववदन्ति*—(variously derived) which notes both the universal and the particular;

(2) *वदन्ति*—which notes the universal only;

(3) *वदन्ति*—the point of view of daily life, which does not penetrate below the surface of things;

(4) *वदन्ति*—It confines itself to the present, and takes note of actual phenomena—the attributes or changes occurring in substance and not the substance itself.

(5) *वदन्ति*—which pays attention to the character of the world. Thus, while it distinguishes between the different connotations of words, does not do so in regard to their denotation.

(6) *वदन्ति*—This *वदन्ति* goes further in the direction of attaching much importance to the form of the word. It makes distinctions of things corresponding to the etymologies of the words. Thus no two synonyms denote the same thing.

(7) **सर्वत्र**—This **सर्व** takes the word as signifying an object while it possesses the **विषय** connoted by the etymology.

The Jaina observes that the Nalīyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika systems are cases of **सर्वत्र** so far as they recognize both the universal (**सर्वत्र**) and the particular (**विषय**). The Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya are cases of **सर्वत्र** the former because it merges all particulars in the universal **सर्व** and the latter in so far as it represents an attempt at marshalling particulars under certain general concepts, and regarding the former as forms of the latter the effect being contained in the cause. The Cārvāka's way of looking at things is that of **सर्वत्र**. The Buddhists follow **सर्वत्र** inasmuch as they accept phenomena and deny the noumenon; and the grammarians are by the very nature of their profession inclined towards **सर्व** etc.

It is obvious that the whole set of seven **Nayas** could not have come into existence all at once. As a matter of fact, they represent a gradual growth as is apparent from the number of **सर्व** recognized at different times (see Notes) and also from their varying importance.

See the text of the *Byādvidamajhari* on this Stanza and Notes for fuller account.

St XXIX *The number of Souls.*

The souls are divisible into six kinds but the number is endless.

St XXX: *The doctrine of the Byādvidā, all-comprehensive and impartial.*

The teaching of the Master is important and all-comprehensive. He has hardly to attack any of the other systems, as those systems quarrel inter se and destroy each other. In other words, the Jaina philosophy emerges as the whole truth from the mutual conflicts of the several schools. For details see the Text, Notes and Supplementary Notes with Appendices.

This note presupposes the existence of the schools. If so, it only points to late date of the Jaina point of view

as compared with that of the other schools between which it mediates.

STANES XXXI-XXXII: *Conclusion.*

St. XXXI-XXXII: *Praise of the Lord Mahadeva.*

The *Dvātrīṅgī* closes as it began with the panegyric of the *Tīrthankara*.

V AN ESTIMATE OF THE WORK.

From this short summary of the contents the reader will see what a wide range of philosophical topics has been covered in this work. None of the rival systems has been examined in its entirety but only those tenets have been selected for criticism from each of the schools in which the Jaina is really interested, and these are some of the greatest problems of religion and philosophy such as the problems of the universal and the particular, the permanent and the changing, God the one, omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient maker of the world, the sanctity of all life, the state of the liberated soul, the theory of knowledge, the nature of Reality etc. The examination, moreover, is not in the nature of irresponsible criticism (*vitandā*), but care has been taken to present the Jaina view on each of the points that has been considered; and, in conclusion, a clear statement has been made of the Jaina doctrine of *Maya* and *Śyādvāda*—in one phrase, of the Relativity of Knowledge which is determined by the point of view from which Reality is approached. If this great achievement is difficult to apportion credit between *Harisandra*, the author of the *Anyayogavyavachheda Dvātrīṅgī*, and *Mallaputra*, the writer of the *Śyādvādaśaṅgī*. The former is genuine devotional lyric, pulsating with reverence for the Master and is at the same time a review of some of the tenets of the rival schools on which the Jaina sees reason to differ. Devotion and thought are here happily blended together in one whole, and are expressed in such noble and dignified language that it deserves to rank as a piece of literature no less than that

of philosophy. To Mallikarjuna belongs the credit of constructing a systematic work out of the brief critical remarks which Hemacandra throws out at random. His knowledge of the different systems, however, is not equally deep. In some of the systems such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika he is evidently well read, while of others such as the Vedānta he has touched only the fringe. But on the whole he has conducted the examination of the different systems with knowledge and mastery of detail, and that too in a wonderfully lucid style which lifts his work from the position of mere parasitical commentary to that of an original work of independent value.

इह हि विपमदुःपयाररजनिनिभिरतिरस्कारभास्कराद्भारिणा
 वसुधावच्छादनीणमुपासारिणीदिश्यद्भनाविज्ञानपरमाहृतीकृतभी-
 २० कुमारपात्रस्थापात्रमवर्तिताभयदानाभिधानजीवानुसंभीवितनाना
 जीपमदुःखाधीर्वाद्माहारम्यकस्यावधिस्थापिबिध्वद्यष्टाःशरीरेण नि
 रमद्यवानुर्धिधनिर्माणैकवक्षणा भीहेमयन्त्रमूरिणा अगत्मसिद्धभी
 सिद्धसेनदिपाकरविरचितद्वाग्निष्ठद्वाग्निष्ठिकानुसारिभीवर्धमानमि
 नस्तुतिरूपमयोग्यवच्छेदान्ययागव्यवच्छादामिधानं द्वाग्निधि
 क्यद्वितयं विद्वज्जनमनस्तत्त्वावबोधनिबन्धनं विदुषे । तत्र च प्रथम-
 २५ द्वाग्निष्ठिकायां मुखोभेयत्वाद्व्याख्यानमुपेक्ष्य द्वितीयस्यास्वस्या
 निःशेषदुर्बादिपरिपदधितेज्ज्वालायां कतिपयपदार्थविबरजकरजेन
 स्वस्तुतिबीजमवबोधविधिर्विजीयते । तस्यावेदमादिकाभ्यम्-

अनन्तविज्ञानमतीतदोष-

मघाभ्यसिष्ठान्तममर्त्यपूज्यम् ।

भीवर्धमानं जिनमासमुख्यं

स्वर्यंमुर्वं स्तोतुमहं यतिष्ये ॥ १ ॥

भीवर्धमानं जिनमहं स्तोतुं यतिष्ये इति क्रियासंख्याः । किं
 विशिष्टम् । अनन्तमप्रतिपाति विशिष्टं सर्वत्रव्यपार्यापविषयत्वे
 ३० नोत्कृष्टं ज्ञानं केपुञ्चाभ्यं विज्ञानं ततोऽनन्तं विज्ञानं यस्य सोऽनन्त
 विज्ञानस्यम् । तच्चापीता नि सचापीभूतत्वेनातिक्रान्ता दोषा रा-
 गादयो यस्यात्म तच्चा तम् । तच्चावाभ्याः परैर्वापितुमशक्या-
 सिद्धान्त स्याद्वावस्तुतल्लक्षणो यस्य स तच्चा तम् । तच्चापत्त्या
 देवस्तेषामपि पूज्यमाराध्यम् ॥

३५ अत्र च श्रीवर्षमानस्वामिनो विशेषणद्वारेण चत्वारो भूषाति
 ष्टपाः मतिपादिताः । तत्रानन्तविज्ञानमित्यनेन भगवतः केवल
 ज्ञानलक्षणविशिष्टज्ञानानन्त्यप्रतिपादनाद्विज्ञानातिशयः । अतीत
 दोषमित्यनेनाष्टादशदोषसंज्ञाभिधानादुपापगमातिशयः । अ
 वाप्यसिद्धान्तमित्यनेन कुतीर्यकोपन्यस्त्वकुरस्तुसमूहाद्वयवत्प
 ४० स्याद्वादकपसिद्धान्तप्रपञ्चप्रणनाद्वचनातिशयः । अमर्त्यपूज्यमि
 त्यनेनाकृषिमक्तिभरनिर्भरसुरासुरनिकायनायकनिर्मितमहाभा-
 विहार्यसपर्यापरिज्ञावनात्पूजातिशयः ॥

अत्राह परः । अनन्तविज्ञानमित्येतादृशस्तु नातीतदोषमिति ।
 गतार्थत्वात् । दोषास्तपयं विनात्यन्तविज्ञानत्वस्यानुपपत्तेः ॥ अत्रा
 ४५ ष्यते । कुनयमतानुसारिपरिकल्पिताभ्युपगम्यवच्छेदार्थमिदम् । तथा
 चादुरामीषिकनयानुसारिणः—

ज्ञानिनो धर्मवीर्यस्य फर्गारः परमं पदम् ।
 गत्वागच्छन्ति भूयोपि भवं तीर्थनिकारतः ॥

इति । तद्धूनं न ततीतदोषाः । कथमन्यथा तेषां तीर्थनिकार-
 ५० दशनेपि भवावतारः ॥

आह । यथेवमतीतदोषमित्येतास्तत्रानन्तविज्ञानमित्यतिरिच्यते ।
 दोषास्तपयं यमावित्वादनन्तविज्ञानतयस्य ॥ न । कैश्चिदोपायाने
 पि तदनभ्युपगमान् । तथा च तद्वचनम्—

सर्वं पश्यन्तु सा मा वा तत्परमिष्टं तु पश्यन्तु ।
 ५५ कीदृशं व्यापारिज्ञानं तस्य नः कापयुज्यते ॥

तथा—नस्मादनुष्ठानगतं ज्ञानमस्य विनायकम् ।
 ममार्गं दूरदर्शी च दनं गृह्यन्तु राम्यदे ॥

तन्मतव्यपोषार्थमनन्तविज्ञानमित्यदुष्टमेव । विज्ञानानन्तर्यं विना
एकस्याप्यर्थस्य यथानुत्तरिज्ञानाभावात् । तथा चार्थम्—

६० जे एगं जानइ से सब्ब जानइ ।
जे सब्ब जानइ स एगं जानइ ॥

तथा—
एको भाषाः समया येन दृष्टा
सर्वे भाषाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः ।
सर्वे भाषाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टा
॥६॥ एको भाषाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः ॥

इति ॥

मनु सर्ववाच्यसिद्धान्तमित्यपार्थक्यम् । यथाकृत्तुगुणयुक्तस्या-
व्यभिचारिवचनत्वेन तदुक्तसिद्धान्तस्य बाधायांगात् ॥ न । अत्रि
मायापरिज्ञानात् । निर्दोषबुद्धयमणीत् एवावाच्यसिद्धान्तो
७० नापरेऽन्यारूपेयाया असंभवादिदापाप्राप्तत्वात् इति द्वापनार्थम् ।
आत्ममात्रतारक्यमूकान्तकृतेऽन्यस्यादित्यमुष्णकेवळिनो यथोक्तसि
द्धान्तमणयनासमर्थस्य व्यवच्छेदार्थं वा विधेयगमेतत् ॥

अन्यत्वाद्वा । अमर्त्यपूजयमिति न वाच्यम् । पादता यथोदिष्ट-
गुणगतिष्ठस्य त्रिभुवनत्रियोरमर्त्यपूजयत्वं न कर्त्तव्यं व्यभिचरती
७५ ति ॥ सत्यम् । लौकिकानां ह्यमर्त्या एव पूजयतया प्रसिद्धास्ते
यामपि भगवानेव पूजय इति विधेयगमेयानेन द्वापयवाच्यार्थः
परमेश्वरस्य देवाधिदेवत्वमावेदयति ॥

एवं पूर्वार्थे चत्वारोतिशया वक्तव्यः ॥

अनन्तविज्ञानमर्त्यं च सामान्यकेवळिमाप्यवश्यं भाषीत्यत
८० स्तद्व्यवच्छेदाय श्रीवर्धमानमिति विज्ञाप्यपक्षमपि विधेयगम्यतया

व्याम्याग्नेर्माश्रिया चतुर्विंशदतिशयसमृद्धानुमवात्मकमाधारित्य
 रूपया वर्षमानं वर्षिण्यम् ॥ नन्वतिशयानां परिमितवर्षेव सिद्धान्ते
 प्रसिद्धत्वात्सर्वे वर्षमानतापपत्तिः ॥ इति चेन्न । यथा निशीथ
 पूर्णा मगनता श्रीमद्देवतामष्टोत्तरसहस्रसम्पदाप्रमणसंगत्याया
 85 उपपन्नत्वेनान्तरद्वायसणानां सत्त्वादीनामान्त्यमुक्तम् । एवम
 तिशयानामपि कृतपरिगणनायागप्यपरिमितत्वमविरुद्धम् । तथा
 नातिशयभिया वर्षमानत्वं दापाश्रय इति ॥

अतीतदापता चोपज्ञान्तमोद्गुणस्थानवर्तिनामपि संभवतीत्यत
 क्षीणमाहात्म्यामविपातिगुणस्थानमाप्तिमविपर्ययं भिनमिति विन्न
 90 पणम् । रागादिनेहत्वाञ्जिनः । समूहकापकपितरागादिदोष
 इति । अत्राप्यसिद्धान्तता च श्रुतकृत्यादिष्वपि दृश्यतेतस्तस्या
 दायाप्तसुखमिति विन्नपणम् । आप्तिर्हि रागद्वेषमाहानार्मिकान्तिक
 आत्यन्तिकम् सत्य । सा येषामस्ति त सत्त्वात्मा । अज्ञादित्वा
 न्मत्वर्यायाऽश्नत्ययः । तपु मध्य सुगमिव सर्वाङ्गानां प्रधानत्वन
 95 सुगमम् । नास्वादय इति तुल्य यः । अमत्यपूषयता च
 तपारिषगुणपदरूपपरिषर्पापर्यामविद्याचरणमपधानां सामान्यमुनी
 नामपि न दुपदा । भगवन्धिराकरणाय स्वयमुवमिति विन्न
 पणम् । स्वयमागमनेष पगापदेशनिरपगतयारगमतस्या भवतीति
 स्वयम् स्वय संकुटम् । तमर्षविषं परमजिनेन्द्र स्तानु मृति
 100 विषपीकृतुपदं योगिष्य यत्र परिष्यामि ॥ अत्र चापापों भविष्य
 स्यसन्नपोगेन योगिमामप्यग्नयानुष्टानं मगरदृणस्तबनं मन्यमान
 भद्रामव स्तुतिकरणमाधारणं वागर्णं प्रापयन्वत्र करणपर मदधीन
 म पुनर्येगावस्थितमगरदृणस्तबनमिष्टिरिति युक्तित्वान् । मर
 मिति च गताधम्यपि पगापदग्नान्वानुष्टयाभिनिगपत्तनवा निन्न
 105 अदप्येव स्तुतिवारम्भ इति प्रारनाथम् ॥

अथवा । श्रीवर्षमानादिविशेषणस्य तु एवमनन्तात् ^{ज्ञानादिपद}
 चतुष्टयेन सह हेतुहेतुमद्भावेन व्याख्यायते । यत एव श्रीवर्ष
 मानमत एवानन्तविज्ञानम् । अत्रिया कृत्स्नकर्मसंपादिसृष्टानन्त
 चतुष्कसंपदूपा वर्षमानम् । यद्यपि श्रीवर्षमानस्य परमेश्वर
 110 त्यानन्तचतुष्कसंपदेऽस्पर्यनन्तरं सर्वकालं तुर्यत्वावस्थापचयौ
 न स्वस्वयापि निरपचयत्वेन द्वावतिष्ठावस्थानयोगाद्भवेमानत्वं
 भूषयते । यद्यपि च श्रीवर्षमानविशेषणेनानन्तचतुष्कमन्तर्मा-
 नित्वेनानन्तविज्ञानत्यमपि सिद्धं तथाप्यनन्तविज्ञानस्यैव परो
 पकारसाधकत्वमत्वाद्गवत्यहृतेष्व परोपकारैकनिबन्धनत्वादन
 115 न्तविज्ञानत्वं शेषानन्तप्रयास्युपहनिषोषोपायेणोक्तम् ॥

ननु यथा जगन्मायस्यानन्तविज्ञानं परार्थं तथानन्तदर्शनस्य
 1 केवलकृतपरपरायस्य पारार्थ्यमप्याहृतमेव । केवलकृतनैवम
 दर्शनाभ्यामेव हि स्वामी क्रममदृष्टिभ्यामुपकर्म्यं सामा-
 र्थ्यं पदापसार्य परेभ्यः प्रकल्पयति । तद्विक्रम्यं तन्मोषाद्यम् ॥
 120 इति चेदुच्यते । विज्ञानशब्देन तस्यापि संग्रहादक्षोपः । ज्ञान
 माभाया उभयत्रापि समानत्वात् । य एव द्वाभ्यन्तरीकृत
 समतार्यधर्मो विषमताधर्मविशिष्टा ज्ञानेन गम्यन्तयास्त एव
 द्वाभ्यन्तरीकृतविषमताधर्मोः समताधर्मविशिष्टा दर्शनेन गम्यन्ते ।
 श्रीवस्त्राभ्याम् । सामान्यप्रधानद्वयमर्जनीकृतविशेषधर्मप्रद्वय
 123 दर्शनमुच्यते । तथा प्रधानविशेषद्वयमर्जनीकृतसामा-
 र्थ्यं च ज्ञानमिति ॥

तथा यत एव भिनमन एवातीतक्षोपम् । रागादित्रेहुरादि
 भिनः । न चाभिनस्यातीतक्षोपता ॥ तथा यत एवातदुस्यमन
 एवावाप्यसिद्धान्तम् । आत्मा हि यस्यपित उच्यते । तत आतेषु
 द्वाभ्यं श्रेष्ठमातृमुच्यते । आतृमुच्यते च यमोरविर्मवादिबभनतया

130 दिव्यमिन्द्रास्यमित्यात्र ११ अत एवावाप्यसिद्धान्तम् । नहि यथा
 वज्रानामवाप्यसिद्धान्तं सिद्धान्तं कुनैर्वापितुं शक्यते ॥ यत
 एव स्वयम्भुवत्प्रभृत्येषामर्त्यपूज्यम् । पूज्यते हि देवदेवो जग
 त्प्रथमिष्ठस्तण्डिलेन स्वर्गसंस्तुतत्वगुणेन सौमर्मेन्द्रादिभिरमर्त्य-
 रिति ॥

33 अत्र च श्रीवर्षमानमिति विधेयतया यद्व्याख्यातं तद
 योगव्यवच्छेदामिषानमवमद्वाग्निषिकामथमकाव्यतृतीयपादवर्षमान
 श्रीवर्षमानामिषमात्मरूपम् इति विश्वप्यमनुवर्तमानं बुद्धौ सम्प्रसार्य
 विज्ञेयम् । तत्र छात्ररूपमिति विधेयपदम् । आतृष्या वा
 विधेयतमपि विधेयतया व्याख्येयम् ॥

40 इति मयमहर्षिः ॥ १ ॥

अस्यां च स्तुताव्ययोगव्यवच्छेदोभिकृतः तस्य च तीर्थान्त-
 रीयपरिकल्पिततत्त्वामासनिरासेन तेषामाप्तत्वव्यवच्छेदः स्वल्पम् ।
 तत्र मगबतो यथावस्थितवस्तुनस्त्ववादिस्वरूपापनेर्नैव प्रामाण्यम-
 स्तुते । अतः स्तुतिकारश्चिन्तगङ्गुरोर्निःशेषगुणस्तुतिमदाहुरपि
 5 सद्रूपवस्तुवादित्वात्सर्वं गुणविधेयमेव वर्णयितुमात्मनोभिमायमा
 विष्णुर्वेमाह—

अथ जनो नाथ तव स्तवाय

गुणान्तरेभ्यः स्पृहयालुरेव ।

विगाहता किंतु यथार्थवाद्-

मेकं परीक्षाविधितुर्विदग्ध ॥ २ ॥

हे नाथ अथ यद्गणतो जनः तव गुणान्तरेभ्यो यथार्थवाद्

अप्यतिरिक्तेभ्योनन्यस्वधारणशरीररूपसङ्गोद्भूतन्तर्दिष्टादिपद-
 अद्याहरेष । किमर्थम् । स्वधाय स्तुतिकरणाय । इति एव श्रीवर्ष
 10 पूर्वपदं तु—स्पृहेर्ध्याप्यं वा इति सङ्गणा । तत्र दिर्भूतामन्त
 स्तोतु स्पृहायानेवार्थं मन इति भावः ॥ ननु यदि गुणान्तरस्तुता
 अपि स्पृहयास्तुता तस्मिन्मर्थे तत्रोपेक्षा । इत्याशङ्क्योत्तरार्थमाह ।
 किंस्मित्यभ्युपगमविशेषघोषने निपातः । एकमेकमेव । यथार्थमाह
 यथावस्थितवस्तुतत्त्वमस्यापनास्यं त्वदीयं गुणम् । अर्थं जनो
 15 विमाहृतां स्तुतिक्रियया समन्ताद्दधामोतु । तस्मिन्नेकस्मिन्नपि
 हि गुणे वर्णिते तच्चान्तरीयदेवतेभ्यो वैशिष्ट्यस्यापनद्वारेण वस्तुतः
 सर्वगुणस्त्वनसिद्धेः ॥

अथ प्रस्तुतगुणस्तुतिः सम्यक्परीक्षासमाजां दिव्यहृदयमेवौ
 चितीमञ्जति नार्वाग्रहणां भवाहृदयमित्याशङ्क्यां विधेयनद्वारेण
 20 निराकरोति । यतोऽयं भवः परीक्षाविधिदुर्बिदग्धोपि कृतगुण-
 विधेयपरीक्षणविधौ दुर्बिदग्धं पण्डितमन्य इति यावत् । अयमा-
 श्रयः । यद्यपि अगदुरोर्ध्वार्कवादिस्वगुणपरीक्षणं माहृतां मतेरगोचर
 स्वभापि भक्तिभ्रष्टातिष्ठयात् तस्यापहपात्मानं बिदग्धमिव मम्य
 इति बिभृदभ्रष्टाभक्तिभ्यक्तियान्नक्यत्वात्स्तुतेः ॥

25 इति हृदयार्थः ॥ २ ॥

अथ ये हृतीर्ध्याः कुशाक्षभासनावासितस्वान्ततया विदुषम
 स्वामिनं स्वामित्वेन न प्रतिपन्नाः तानपि तत्त्वविचारणां प्रति
 शिष्यमाह—

गुणेष्वसूयां दधत परेमी

मा शिष्यपन्नाम भवन्तमीशम् ।

३० विचारविचारसमूहस्थितौ तस्मिन् विलोचनानि

वञ्चानावच्छेदितशरयन्तां नयवर्त्म सत्यम् ॥ ३ ॥

एवं स्वर्पणम् इति अदसस्तु विमृष्टे इति वचनात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वमि
८ मर्शबाधतया त्वीकरणादित्यादिप्रकृष्टाः परे कुटीर्मिकाः मबन्त
त्वाम् अनन्यतामान्यसकलगुणनिष्कयमपि मा ईशं शिश्रियन्मा
स्वामित्वेन प्रतिपद्यन्ताम् । यतो गुणेष्वसूपां दधतः गुणेषु
बद्धमत्तराः । गुणेषु दोषाविष्करणं ह्यसूया । यो हि यत्र गुणे
मत्तरीमवति स तदाश्रयं नाप्नुक्यते । यथा माधुर्यमत्तरी करम

१० पुण्ड्रेष्टुकाण्डम् । गुणाभयम् यवान् ॥ एवं परतीर्मिकानां भगव
दाज्ञामतिपत्तिं प्रतिपिब्य स्तुतिकारो माभ्यस्त्वमिवास्वराय तान्मति
दितश्चिन्तामुत्तरार्धेनोपदिशति । तथापि त्वदाज्ञामतिपत्तेरमात्रेपि ।
लोचनानि नेत्राणि । संमील्य मिश्रितपुटीकृतम् । सत्यं युक्ति
युक्तम् । नयवर्त्म न्यायमार्गम् । विचारयन्तां विमर्शविपयीकुर्वन्तु ॥

१५ अत्र च विचारयन्तामित्यात्मनेपदेन कृत्वत्कर्तृविपयेनैवं
ज्ञापयत्वाचार्यो यद्वितयनमप्यविचारणया तेषामेवकलं धर्मं
केवलमुपदेशारः । किं तत्कृत्वम् इति चेत्येसावचेति ब्रूमः ।
संमील्य विलोचनानीति च ब्रूतः प्रायस्तत्त्वविचारणमेकप्रता-
हेतुमयननिमीलनपूर्वकं लोके प्रसिद्धमित्ययिमाया ॥ अथवा अप
२० मुपदेशस्तेभ्योऽरोचमान एवाचार्येण वितीर्यते । ततोऽस्त्वदमानो
प्यर्थं कटुकौपयपामम्यापनायतिष्ठुत्वात्प्राज्ञमग्निर्नेत्रे निमीलय पेय
पयेत्याकृतम् ॥

मनु च यदि पारमेष्ठरे वसति तेषामविबेकातिरेकादरोचकता
तत्किमर्थं तान् प्रत्युपदेशकैश्च इति ॥ नेत्रम् । परोपकारसार-

२८ प्रवृत्तीनां महात्मनां प्रतिपाद्यगतां रुचिमरुचिं पानपेक्ष्य हितोप-
 बेष्टमवृत्तिवर्धनात् । तेषां हि परायेस्त्वं स्वार्थत्वेनामिमवत्त्वात् ।
 न च हितोपदेष्टावपरः पारमार्थिकः परार्थः । तथा चार्पणम् ।

वसुधैवा कुटुम्बकम् ।
 मासिपण्या हिवा भासा सपवसपुण्यकारिया ॥

३० इति । उवाच च वाचकमुख्यः—

न भवति धर्मः श्रोतुः सर्वस्यैकान्ततो हितभक्त्यात् ।
 सुवतोनुग्रहपुण्या वक्तुस्त्वैकान्ततो भवति ॥ १ ॥

इति ह्युवाच ॥ ३ ॥

अथ यथावश्यवर्त्मनिचारमेव प्रपञ्चयितुं परामिमेतवत्त्वानां
 मामाह्यं निराकृष्टमादितस्तावत्तद्व्यपदकेनोत्तमयमतामिमव
 तत्त्वानि दूषयितुकामस्तद्व्यपदकेनोत्तमयमतामिमव
 रूपवत्त्वात्—

स्वतोनुग्रहव्यतिष्ठतिभाजो
 भाषा न भावान्तरनेयरूपाः ।
 परात्मतत्त्वावस्थात्मतत्त्वायू
 ग्रह्यं वदन्तोऽकुशलाः स्वलन्ति ॥ ४ ॥

४ अथान्न भवति भविष्यति चेति भाषाः पदार्था आत्म-
 पुद्गलादयम् । स्वत इति सर्वं हि वाच्यं सावधारणमाममन्ति

स्वत एव आत्मीयस्वरूपादेश । अनुवृत्तिव्यतिवृत्तिमात्रः ।
कारा मतीतिरेकसम्बन्धाव्यपत्ता चानुवृत्तिः । व्यतिवृत्तिः
वृत्तिः । समावीयविजातीयेभ्यः सर्वथा व्यपच्छेदः । ते क्षमे
पि संयुक्ते भवन्त आभयन्तीति अनुवृत्तिव्यतिवृत्तिमात्रम् ।
आमान्यविशेषोभयात्मका इत्यर्थः ॥

अस्यैवार्थस्य व्यतिरेकमाह । न भावान्तरनेयस्या इति । नेति
निषेधे । भावान्तराभ्यां पराभिमतभ्यां द्रव्यगुणकर्मसमवायेभ्यः
पदार्थान्तराभ्यां यावद्व्यतिरिक्तसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां नेयं मतीति-
विषयं प्रापणीयं कृतं यथासंख्यमनुवृत्तिव्यतिवृत्तिरूपं स्वरूपं
येषां ते तथोक्ताः । स्वभाव एव त्वयं सर्वभावानां यदनुवृत्ति-
व्यतिवृत्तिप्रत्ययौ स्वत एव अनयन्ति । तथाहि । घट एव तारत्पु-
पुष्पोदराष्पाकाराप्रतीतिविषयीभवन्तस्तन्मनानपि तदाकृतिभूतः
पदार्थान्यदङ्गपतया घटैकसङ्ख्याव्यवस्था च मस्याय

न्यास्यां कथ्यते । स एव चेतरेभ्यः सजातीयविज्ञा-
द्रव्यज्ञेयकासमाधैरात्मान व्यावर्तयन्विशेषक्यपदेशमश्नुते । इति
न सामान्यविशेषयोः पृथक्पदार्थान्तरत्वकल्पनं न्याय्यम् । पदाय
धर्मत्वेनैव तयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् । न च धर्मो धर्मिणः सकाशा
दस्यन्त व्यतिरिक्ताः । एकान्तभेदे विशेषणविशेष्यभाषानुपपत्तेः ।
करमरासभयोरिष धर्मधर्मिण्यपदेशाभाषमसङ्गात् । धर्माणापि
च पृथक्पदार्थान्तरत्वकल्पन एकस्मिन्नेव भस्तुनि पदार्थानन्त्य
मसङ्गः । अनन्तधर्मकत्वाद्भस्तुनः ॥

तदेवं सामान्यविशेषयोः स्वतर्कं यथायदनवपुष्पमाना अङ्ग
क्षणाः अतश्चाभिनिविष्टाः तीर्थान्तरीयाः स्वसन्ति

- ३० म्यापमागाहून्यानि निरुत्तरीयवन्नीत्यर्थः । स्वप्नेन वा
 मामाणिकजनोपहसनीयता ध्वन्यते । किं कुर्यात्ताः इवन्तु
 वृद्धिप्यावृद्धिस्तत्र मत्स्यपदार्थं वदन्तः । कस्मादेतत्प्रत्यक्षं
 वदन्तः इत्याह । पराम्भनत्वात् । परं पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तता
 दन्त्यो परस्परनिरपेक्षौ च यौ सामान्यविशेषौ त्वपार्थक्यात्मनः
 ३१ स्वरूपमनुवृद्धिप्यावृद्धिस्तत्र तस्मात् तदाश्रित्येत्यर्थः गन्ध-
 यपः कर्मापारे इत्यनेन पश्यमी । कर्षभूनात् परात्मनत्वात् ।
 इत्याह । अनयात्मतयात् । या भूत्परामिमतस्य परात्मतयास्य
 तान्यरूपतति विशषणापेक्षम् । यथा यनैकान्तभेदस्तत्रेन प्रकारेण
 परैः प्रकृतित न तथा तत्र प्रकृतेणारम्भतर्षं हररूपं यस्य तत्तथा ।
 ४० तस्मात् । यतः पदार्थेष्वविच्छेदभावेन सामान्यविशेषौ वर्तेते
 तस्य चो तस्य परस्मिन् कल्पिता । परस्मिन् पान्यत्वम् । तथैतान्
 भेदादिनामादि ॥

किं पदार्थेभ्यः सामान्यविशेषपारक्यात्मभिन्नम् इतीदं
 माण एकवन्तुविशेषमनुवृद्धिप्यावृद्धिर्गन्धमत्स्यपदार्थं मानयेन ।

- ४१ एकान्तामने चान्यतरस्यातश्चमगह सामान्यविशेषपरहागमा
 वध इयात् । सामान्यविशेषपारक्यात्मकतानव वातुमा ममाणेन
 मर्मानः । परस्परनिरपेक्षतास्तु पुरस्ताद्विचोऽदिप्यत । अतः
 एव तयो वाचिनां स्वप्नविशेषादगनीपरपपिष्यप्यते । या
 ध्वन्यपानिगन्धं वस्तुस्वरूपमप्येष मतिरप्यमानः परेभ्यम्
 ४२ तथैव प्रशङ्क्यन्तर्षं मष्ट पराप्राप्तयि च तदु मय्यादस्य
 प्ररहागमावम् ॥

इति ह्यर्थः ॥ ४ ॥

अथ तदमिमतायेकान्तनिस्त्यानित्यपक्षौ दूषयन्नाह—

आदीपमाव्योम समस्वभाव
स्याद्वादमुद्गानतिमेदि वस्तु ।
तस्मिन्त्यमेवैकमनित्यमन्य
दिति स्वदाज्ञाद्विपत्तां प्रलापा ॥ ५ ॥

आदीप दीपादारभ्य । आव्योम व्योम पर्यायीकृत्य । सर्वम् ।
वस्तु पदार्थस्वरूपम् । समस्वभाव सप्तः तुल्याः स्वभावः स्वरूपं
यस्य तत्तया । किंच वस्तुनः स्वरूपं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वमिति
५ प्रमा । तथा च बाधकमुख्यं—उत्पादव्ययव्यौभ्यमुक्तं सत्
इति । समस्वभावत्वं कृतः । इति विशेषणद्वारेण इदमाह—स्या
द्वादमुद्गानतिमेदि । स्यादित्यभ्ययमनेकान्तघोतकम् । ततः स्या
द्वादोऽनेकान्तबाधः । नित्यानित्याद्यनेकरूपमेष बलैकवस्त्वभ्युपगम
इति यावत् । तस्य मुद्रा मर्यादा वा नाविमिनचि नातिक्रामतीति
10 स्याद्वादमुद्गानतिमेदि । यथा हि भ्यायैकनिष्ठे राजनि राज्यधिर्यं
शासति सति सर्वाः भजास्तन्मुद्रा नातिवर्तितुमीशते तदतिक्रमे
तासां सर्वार्थहानिमावात् एवं विजयिनि निष्कण्टके स्याद्वाद
महानरेन्द्रेनश्रीपुत्रां सर्वेपि पदार्था नातिक्रामन्ति सङ्गुहने तेषां
स्वरूपव्ययस्याहानिप्रसक्तः ॥

15 सर्ववस्तूनां समस्वभावत्वकथनं च परापीष्टस्यैकं वस्तु व्यो
मादि निन्यमेषान्यच्च प्रदीपाद्यनित्यमेवेति वादस्य प्रतिशेषमीदृम् ।
सर्वे हि भावा द्रव्याधिकनयापेक्षया नित्याः पर्यायार्थिकनया
देशात्पुनरनित्याः । तत्रैकान्तानित्यतया परस्त्रीकृतस्य मदीपस्य
तावन्मित्यानित्यत्वव्ययस्यापने दिव्यभावमुपपदे ॥ तथाहि । प्रदीप

- 20 पर्यायापभास्तैमसाः परमाणवः स्वरसतस्तैस्तथावाभिपातद्वा
 ज्योतिरपर्यायं परित्यज्य तमोर्ज्यं पर्यायान्तरमासादयन्तोपि
 नैकाम्नेनानिस्थाः । शुद्धसद्रूप्यरूपतयावस्थितत्वाच्चेष्टाम् । न चे
 तावदेवानिस्त्यत्वं यावता पूर्वपर्यायस्य विनाश उत्तरपर्यायस्य
 चोत्पादः । न स्पष्टं शुद्धं स्वासक्येष्टकुसुमधिवरूपदायकत्वा
 25 न्तराभ्यापयमानमप्येकान्ततो विनष्टम् । तेषु शुद्धभ्यान्नुगमत्वा
 ✓ बाह्यगोपाळं प्रतीतत्वात् । न च तमसाः पौत्रस्मिन्त्वमसिद्धम् ।
 बाह्यस्त्यान्यपानुपपत्तेः । मदीपालोक्तवत् । अथ यथाश्रुते तत्सर्वं
 स्वप्रतिभासे आलोकमपेक्षते । न चेत् तमा । तत्कर्म बाह्यम् ॥
 मैवम् । तच्छादीनामालोक्तमन्तरेणापि तत्प्रतिभासात् । यैस्त्व
 30 स्मदादिमिरम्यबाह्यं यदादिकमालोक्तं विना नापसम्भवे तैरपि
 तिमिरमालोक्त्यप्यते । विविधत्वाद्वादानाम् । कवमन्यवा
 पीतत्वेतादयोपि स्वर्णसुवताफल्गवा आलोकपेक्षदर्शनाः । न
 दीपकन्त्रादयस्तु मकाशान्तरनिरपेक्षा । इति सिद्धं तमबाह्यम् ॥
 रूपवत्त्वाच्च स्पर्शवत्त्वमपि प्रतीयते । क्षीनस्पर्शप्रसयमनक
 35 त्वात् । यानि स्वनिविद्यावयवम्भममतिपातित्वमनुभूतस्पर्श
 विज्ञेयत्वममतीयमानस्वणावयविद्रव्यमभिमागत्वमित्यादीनि तमस
 पौत्रस्मिन्निपेक्षाय परैः साधनान्युपन्यस्तानि तानि मदीप
 प्रमादष्टान्तेनैव प्रतिपेक्ष्यानि । तुल्ययोगसेमत्वात् । न च बाह्यं
 तैमसाः परमाणवः कर्म तमस्त्वेन परिणमन्त इति । शुद्धानां
 40 तत्तत्तामसीसङ्कृतामां विसदृशकार्योत्पादकत्वस्यापि दर्शनात् ।
 ह्यो ह्यार्द्रं धनसंयोगवशाज्जास्वरूपस्यापि शब्देरयास्वरूपधूमस्य
 कार्योत्पत्तिः । इति सिद्धो निस्थामित्यः मदीपाः । यदापि निर्वाणा
 दर्शान्देदीप्यमानो दीपस्तदापि नवनपर्यायोत्पादविनाशभावत्वा
 त्मदीपत्वान्वयाच्च निस्थानित्य एव ॥

45 एवं व्योमाप्युत्पादभ्ययघ्नौ व्योमात्पुत्राभित्पानित्यमेष । तथा
 अथगाहकानां जीमपुत्राक्षानामथगाहदानोपग्रह एव तल्लक्षणम् ।
 अथकाष्ठदमाकाष्ठम् इति वचनात् । यदा चाथगाहका जीम-
 पुत्राः प्रयोगतो विसृज्यतो वैकस्मात्प्रमः प्रदेष्टात्मदेष्टान्तरमुप-
 सर्पन्ति तदा तस्य व्योमस्तैरथगाहकैः सममेकस्मिन्प्रदेशे विभाग
 50 उत्तरस्मिन् प्रदेशे संयोगः । संयोगविभागौ च परस्परं विरुद्धौ
 पर्मा । तज्ज्ञेदे चाथस्य चर्मिणो भेदः । तथा चाहुः—अयमेष हि
 भेदो भेदेतुर्षा यद्विच्छेदधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदभेति । तत्र
 तदाकाष्ठं पूर्वसंयोगविनाशस्तल्लक्षणपरिणामापत्त्या विनष्टोत्तर-
 संयोगोत्पादाख्यपरिणामानुमदाच्छोत्पन्नम् । अथयथाकाष्ठद्वयस्या-
 55 नुगतत्वाच्छोत्पादभ्यययोरेकत्राधिकरणम् । तथा च यत्—अय-
 म्युत्पानुत्पन्नस्थिरैककर्म नित्यम् इति नित्यलक्षणमावृत्तये तद-
 पास्तम् । एवंविधस्य कस्यचिद्वस्तुनोऽभावात् । तदाभावायं
 नित्यम् इति तु सत्यं निश्चलक्षणम् । उत्पादविनाशयोः सत्ता-
 वपि तज्ज्ञेबाद् अन्वयिकपाधम भ्येति तन्मिथ्यमिति तद्वर्षस्य
 60 यद्वर्तमानत्वात् । यदि अयम्युत्पादिकलक्षण नित्यमिष्यते तदोत्पाद-
 भ्यययोर्निराधारत्वमसद्ग । न च तयोपयोगि नित्यत्वहानि ॥

द्रव्यं पर्यायविपुलं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्णिताः ।

क कदा केन किं क्वा क्वा मानेन केन वा ॥

इति वचनात् । न चाकाष्ठं न द्रव्यम् । लौकिकानामपि यदा
 65 काष्ठं पटाकाष्ठमिति व्यवहारमसिद्धेराकाष्ठस्य निश्चानित्यत्वम् ।
 पटाकाष्ठमपि हि यदा पटापगमे पटेनाशान्तं तदा पटाका-
 ष्ठमिति व्यवहारः । न चायमोपचारिकत्वादप्रमाणमेष । अपचा-
 रस्यापि किंचित्साधर्म्यद्वारेण मुख्यार्थस्य स्थित्वात् । नमस्तो हि

यत्किञ्च सर्वव्यापकस्य मुख्यं परिमाणं तदाभेयधटपट्टादिसंबन्धि-
 70 नियतपरिमाणकथात्कल्पितमेतद् सत्यतिनियतदेवव्यापितया सम्-
 बन्धितमार्गं यदाकाशपट्टाकाशादि तत्तद्व्यपदेशनिबन्धनं यवति ।
 तत्तद्व्यादिसंबन्धे च व्यापकत्वेनावस्थितस्य व्योम्नोवस्थान्त-
 रापत्तिः । ततश्चावस्थामेवेवस्थान्तोपि भेदः । तासां ततोऽ-
 विज्वग्मावात् । इति सिद्धं निस्थानिस्थस्य व्योम्नः ॥

75 स्वायंद्वा जपि हि निस्थानिस्थमेव वस्तु प्रपन्नाः । तथा
 बाहुस्ते-त्रिविधाः सत्त्वयं धर्मिनः परिणामो धर्मकलनावस्था-
 रूपः । सुवर्णं धर्मि । तस्य धर्मपरिणामो वर्धमानकलनादिः ।
 धर्मस्य तु कलनपरिणामोऽनागतत्वादिः । यदा सत्त्वयं हेमकारो
 वर्धमानकं मरुत्वा कलनकारयति तदा वर्धमानको वर्धमानता-
 80 कलनं हित्वाहीतवाकलनमापद्यते । कलनस्तु अनागतवाकलनं
 हित्वा वर्धमानवाकलनमापद्यते । वर्धमानतापन्न एव तु कलनो
 नवपुराणमाद्यमापद्यमानोवस्थापरिणामवान्भवति । तोयं त्रिविधः
 परिणामो धर्मिनः । धर्मकलनावस्थाश्च धर्मिनो मिथ्याभाविनाम् ।
 तथा च ते धर्म्यमेवावस्थित्यत्वेन निस्थाः । भेदाद्योत्पत्तिभि
 85 नाद्यविषयत्वम् । इत्युभयमुपपद्यमिति ॥

अपोचरार्थं विधियते ॥ एवं चोत्पादम्ययग्रीव्यात्यक्त्ये सर्वं
 भावानां सिद्धेऽपि तद्वस्त्वैकमाकाशात्पादिकं निस्थमेव अम्यव
 मधीपपटादिकमनिसमेव इत्येवकारोभापि संबन्धते । इत्थं हि
 दुर्भववादापत्तिः । अनन्तधर्मात्मके वस्तुनि स्वाधिमेषनिस्थत्वादि
 90 धर्मसमर्पनप्रवणः श्रेयधर्मविरस्कारेण भवर्तमाना दुर्नया इति
 व्युत्पन्नात् । इत्यमेनोष्ठेलेन स्वशास्त्राद्विपत्तां भवत्प्रणीतघासन
 विरोधिनां प्रकाशाः प्रकल्पन्यसंबन्धवान्मीति यावत् ॥

- अथ च मयमयादीपमिति परमसिद्ध्या अनित्यपक्षोद्धेत्तेपि यदुत्तरं यथासंख्यपरिहारण पूर्वतर नित्यमेव कमित्युक्तं तदेव
- १११ ज्ञापयति—यदनित्यं तदपि नित्यमत्र कथंचित् यद्य नित्यं तदप्य नित्यमेव कथंचित् । प्रकान्तवादिभिरप्येकस्यामेव पृथिव्यां नित्यानित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथा च प्रशस्तकर — सा तु द्विविधा नित्यानित्या च । परमाणुलक्षणा नित्या कार्यलक्षणा त्वनित्या इति । न चात्र परमाणुकार्यद्रव्यलक्षणविषयद्वयभेदाभेदाभिकरणं नित्या
- १०० नित्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । पृथ्वीत्वस्योभयभाष्यमभिधारात् । एवमवादिष्वपीति । आकाशेपि संयोगविभागाङ्गीकाराच्चैर नित्यत्वं युक्त्या प्रतिपन्नम् । तथा च स एवाह—दृक्कारणत्वं वचनात्संयोगविभागो इति नित्यानित्यपक्षयो संबन्धित्वम् । एतच्च सन्नता भावितमवति ॥
- १०२ अत्रापमायत्वं च परवचनानामित्यं समर्थनीयम् ॥ वस्तुन स्नावदर्थनिर्याकारित्वं लक्षणम् । तर्ह्यन्तानित्यानित्यपक्षयोर्न पण्ड ॥ अपच्युतानुत्पन्नस्तिरककपो हि निम्नः । न च क्रमेणार्थ- क्रियां कुर्वति अक्रमण वा । अन्यान्यव्यवच्छेदरूपाणां महारान्तराममवात् ॥ नत्र न तावत्क्रमण । न हि काष्ठान्तर
- ११० भाविनी क्रिया मयमक्रियाकाल एव मस्य कृपात् । समर्पस्य काष्ठक्षेपापागात् । काष्ठक्षपिणो वा असामभ्यवात् । ममर्पोपि तत्तत्सहकारिसमवधाने तं तमर्थं करावीति चेत् न तर्हि तस्य मामर्प्यम् । अपरसहकारिसापेक्षद्वित्वात् । सापेक्षमसमर्थ- मिनि ग्यापात् । न तेन सहकारिणाऽपस्यन्त अपि तु कार्यमत्र सह
- १११ कारिणसहकारिसमवधानपन्न इति चेत् नर्तिक स मावाऽसमर्थ ममर्पो वा । समर्थमत्र किं सहकारिसमुत्पन्नणर्दीनानि तान्यपक्षते न पुनर्गतिरिति पश्यति । ननु ममर्पमपि बीजविज्ञा

अस्मानिष्पदिसहकारिसहितमेवाहुर्न करोति नान्यथा । तर्हि
तस्य सहकारिभिः किञ्चिदुपक्रियेत न वा । यदि

१२० नापक्रियेत तदा सहकारिसंनिधानात्प्रागिव किं न तदाप्य
र्षक्रियायाद्भवास्ते । उपक्रियेत चेत्स तर्हि तैरुपकारोऽभिज्ञा
मिभ्यो वा क्रियेत इति वाच्यम् । अभेदे स एव क्रियते ।
इति कायमिच्छतो मूलसत्तिरायाता । कृतकत्वेन तस्मानित्य-
त्वापत्तेः । मेदे तु स कर्म तस्योपकारः । किं न

१२५ संवन्धिष्यद्वेरेषि । तत्संबन्धात्तस्यापमिति चेत् उपकारोपकारयोः
का संबन्धः । न चावसंयोगः । द्रव्ययोरेव तस्य साक्षात् ।
अत्र तूपकार्यं द्रव्यमुपकारश्च क्रियेति न संयोगः । नापि
समवायः । तस्यैकत्वाभावात्तस्यावस्थासचिविषयकर्मभावेन सर्वत्र
तस्यत्वाच्च नियतेः संबन्धिभिः संबन्धो युक्तः । नियत

१३० संबन्धिसंबन्धे चाद्वितीयमात्रे तत्कृत उपकारोऽस्य समवा-
यस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तथा च सत्युपकारस्य भेदाभेदकल्पना
तदवस्थैव । उपकारस्य समवायादभेदे समवाय एव कृतः
स्यात् । मेदे हुनरपि समवायस्य न नियतसंबन्धिसंबन्धत्वम् ।
तस्मात्तन्तनित्यो भावः क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कुरुते ॥ नाप्यक्रमेण ।

१३५ न द्वेको भावः सकलकाककस्यकलापमात्रिणीर्गुणतत्सर्वाः क्रियाः
करोतीति प्राप्तीति । कृतां वा । तथापि द्वितीयसमये किं
कुर्यात् । करणे वा क्रमपक्षमात्रे दोषः । अकरणं स्वर्षक्रिया
कारित्वाभावाद्भवस्तुत्वमसङ्गः । इत्येकान्तनित्यात् क्रमाक्रमार्थ्या
भ्यासावक्रिया व्यापकात्तुपसृष्टिष्वकाव्यापकमिदृशा निवर्तयाना

१४० स्वभ्याप्यमर्षक्रियाकारित्वं निवर्तयति । अर्षक्रियाकारित्वं च
निवर्तयानं स्वभ्याप्यं सर्वं निवर्तयति । इति नैकान्तमिदमप्यु-
क्तिसप्तः ॥

एकान्तानित्यपक्षोपि न क्लीकरणार्हः ॥ अनित्यो हि
 मतिक्षणविनाशी । स च न क्रमेणार्थक्रियासमर्थः । देशकृतस्य
 145 काष्ठकृतस्य च क्रमस्यैवाभावात् । क्रमो हि पौर्वापर्यम् । तच्च
 क्षणिकस्यासंभवि । अवस्थितस्यैव हि नानादेशकाष्ठव्याप्तिर्वैश्व
 क्रमः काष्ठक्रमव्याप्तिर्भाष्यते । न चैकान्तविनाशिनो सास्ति ।
 यदाहुः—

यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ।

150 न देशकाष्ठयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते ॥

न च संवत्सरापेक्षया पूर्वोत्तरक्षणानां क्रमः संभवति । संवत्-
 नस्यावस्तुत्वात् । वस्तुत्वंपि तस्य यदि क्षणिकत्वं न तर्हि क्षणेभ्यः
 कश्चिद्विशेषः । अथाक्षणिकत्वं तर्हि समाप्तः क्षणमद्वयवाक्यः ॥

नाप्यक्रमेणार्थक्रिया क्षणिके संभवति । स ह्येको बीजपूरादि
 155 स्पादिसप्तो युगपदनेकान् रसादिसप्तान्नयभेदेन स्वभावेन
 जनयेमानास्वभावेना । यद्येकेन कदा तेषां रसादिसप्तानामेकत्वं
 स्यादेकस्वभावमन्यत्वात् । अथ नानास्वभावेर्मनयति किञ्चिद्
 पादिकमुपादानभावन किञ्चिद्रसादिकं सहकारित्वनेति चेत्
 स्वभावास्तस्यात्मभूता अनात्मभूता वा । अनात्मभूताश्चेत् स्वभा-
 160 वत्त्वहानिः । यथात्मभूतास्तर्हि तस्यानेकत्वधनेकस्वभावत्वात् ।
 स्वभावानां वैकल्यं प्रसज्येत । तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्तेषां तस्य
 वैकल्यत्वात् । अथ य एव एकप्रोपादानमात्रः स एवान्यत्र सहकारि
 भाव इति न स्वभावभेद इष्यते । तर्हि नित्यस्यैकरूपस्यापि
 क्रमेण नानाकार्यकारिणः स्वभावभेदः कार्यसाधक्यं च कथमिष्यते
 165 क्षणिकवादिना । अथ नित्यमेकरूपत्वात्क्रमम् । अक्रमाद्य क्रमिणां
 नानाकार्याणां कथमुत्पत्तिरिति चेत् अहो स्वपक्षपाती देवानामिमो
 यः स्वसु स्वपक्षस्थाधिराद्वपादिसंज्ञात्कारणायगपदनेककारण-

साध्यान्त्यनेककार्याभ्यङ्गीकृर्वाणोपि परपक्षे नित्येपि वस्तुनि क्रमेण
 नानाकार्यकरणेपि विरोधमुन्नाययति । तस्मात्तणिकस्यापि
 170 भावस्याक्रमेणार्थक्रिया दुर्धन्य ॥ इत्यनित्यैकान्तादपि क्रमाक्रमयो-
 र्थापकयोर्नित्यस्यैव व्याप्यार्थक्रियापि व्यावर्तते । तद्व्यावृत्तौ च
 सत्त्वमपि व्यापकानुपपत्तिष्वसन्नैव निवर्तते । इत्येकान्तानिश्च
 वादोपि न रमणीयः ॥

स्थलदे त्व पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्तिष्ठन्नपरिणामेन
 175 भावानामर्थक्रियोपपत्तिरविरुद्धा । न चैकत्र वस्तुनि परस्परविरुद्ध
 यर्माध्यासायोगादसन्स्थाद्वाद इति बाध्यम् । नित्यानित्यपक्ष-
 विरुद्धतस्य पक्षान्तरस्याङ्गीक्रियमावस्थात् । तत्रैव च सर्वैरनुमतात् ।
 तथा च पठन्ति—

भागे सिंहो भरो भागे घोर्ध्वो भागद्वयात्मकः ।

180 तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं श्रवणवे ॥ इति ॥

बैधेर्निरपि विभक्त्यस्त्यैकस्यावयविनोऽप्युपगमादेकस्यैव पदादेवका
 चरकारकावृत्तानावृत्तत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मानामुपपत्त्येः । सौगतेरप्ये-
 कत्र विषयटीक्ष्णाने भीक्षानीक्षयाविरोधानङ्गीकारात् ॥

अत्र च यद्यप्यधिकृतादिनः श्रुतीपादिकं काळान्तरावस्थापि-
 185 स्थात्सन्निक न मन्यन्ते तस्मिन् पूर्वापरान्तापच्छिन्नायाः
 सत्ताया एवानित्यतावृत्ततात् तथापि शुद्धिमुत्सादिकं तेषां
 सगिरुतयैव प्रतिपन्नाः इति तदधिकारेपि सगिरुतादधर्मा
 भानुपपन्ना । यद्यपि च काळान्तरावस्थापि वस्तु तदपि नित्या
 नित्यमव । सन्नोपि न खलु सोस्ति यत्र वस्तुत्वादभ्यय
 190 प्रौढ्यात्मकं नास्ति ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥ ५ ॥

अथ तदभिमतमीश्वरस्य जगत्कर्तृत्वान्युपगमं मिथ्यामिनि-
यद्वरूपं निरूपयथाह ।

कर्तास्ति कश्चिज्जगत स चैक

स सर्वग स स्ववश स नित्य ।

इमा कुहेवाकविडम्बना स्यु

स्तेषां न येषामनुशासकस्त्वम् ॥ ६ ॥

जगतः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलब्ध्यमाणशराशररूपस्य विश्व-
त्रयस्य कश्चिद् भानिर्बचनीयस्वरूपः पुरुषविशेषः कर्ता स्रष्टा अस्ति
विद्यते ॥ ते हीस्य प्रमाणयन्ति । उर्वीर्षततर्बादिक सर्वं बुद्धि
मत्कर्तृकम् । कार्यत्वात् । यद्यत्कार्यं तत्तत्सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकम् यथा
यत् । तथा च दम् । तस्माच्चया । व्यतिरेके व्योमादि । यत्र बुद्धि
मास्तत्कर्ता स भगवानीश्वर एवेति ॥

न चायमसिद्धो इत्युक्तः । यथा धूमूपरादेः स्वस्वकारणकलाप-
नान्यतयावयवितया वा कार्यस्य संप्रदादिनां प्रतीतमव । नाप्यनैका
नित्यो विस्तो वा । विपत्तादस्यन्तव्याहृतत्वात् । नापि कालात्स्या
पदिष्ट । प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाबाधिर्यमर्थमर्थनन्तरमविपादितत्वात् ॥
नापि प्रकरणमम* । तस्यातिपन्थिधर्मोपपादनसमयप्रत्यनुमानाभा
वात् । न च बाध्यमीश्वर* पृथ्वीपृथ्वीपरादेर्विधाता न भवति
भगवतीत्वात् निर्वातात्मवदिति प्रत्यनुमानं तद्व्यापकमिति । यथाग्रे
श्वररूपा यमी प्रतीताऽप्रतीता वा प्ररूपिताः । न तावदप्रतीता । इना
राश्रयासिद्धिममद्वात् । प्रतीतमन् येन प्रमाणेन स प्रतीतस्तेनैव
किं स्वपुत्रत्वादिनस्त्वान्नर्न प्रतीयते । इत्यतः कथमगरीरत्वम् ।
व्यम्बाभिरवयव एवायं इत्युक्तिः ॥

२० स चैक इति । च पुनरर्थे । स पुनः पुरुषविशेष एकः अद्वितीयः ।
बहूनां हि विश्वविधाभूत्स्वीकारे परस्परविभक्तिसमाधनाया अनि-
वार्यत्वादेकैकस्य यस्तुनोऽन्यान्यरूपतया निर्माणे सर्वमसमञ्जसमा-
पद्येतेति ॥

तथा स सर्वग इति । सर्वत्र गच्छतीति सर्वगः । सर्वभ्यापी ।
२५ तस्य हि प्रतिनियतदेशपरित्यक्तं नियतदेशवृत्तीनां विश्वमयान्तर्ब-
र्तितद्वार्धसार्धानां यथावभिर्माणानुपपत्तिः । कुम्भकारादिषु तथा
दर्शनात् ॥ अथवा सर्वं गच्छति जानातीति सर्वमः सर्वज्ञः । सर्वे
गत्यर्थाः ज्ञानार्थाः इति वचनात् । सर्वज्ञत्वाभावे हि ययोचित-
पादानकारणाद्यमभिज्ञत्वादनुरूपकार्योत्पात्तिरस्येति ॥

३० तथा स स्ववशः स्वतन्त्रः । सकसमाणिनां स्वच्छया सुख-
दुःखोपनुभावनसमर्थत्वात् । तथा शक्तम्—

ईश्वरेरिता गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा भ्रमणं वा ।

अन्यो जन्तुरनीशोऽप्यमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥

पारतन्त्र्यं तु तस्य परब्रह्मशक्तितया सुखकनुत्त्वव्यापादादनी-
३५ श्वरत्वापत्तिः ॥

तथा स नित्य इति । अप्रमथ्यवानुत्पन्नस्तिरेकरूपः । तस्य
अनित्यत्वे परोत्पाद्यतया कृतकत्वमाप्तिः । अपेक्षितपरव्यापारो
हि भावः स्वभावनिवृत्तौ कृतक इत्युच्यते । यथापरस्तत्कर्ता
कल्प्यते स नित्याऽनित्या वा स्यात् । नित्यभेदधिकृतचरेण
४० किमपराद्धम् । अनित्यभेदस्याप्युत्पादकान्तरेण भाव्यम् ।
तस्यापि नित्यानित्यत्वकल्पनायामनवस्थाशैथिल्यमिति ॥

तदेवमेकत्वादिविशेषणविशिष्टा भगवानीशसिद्धिप्रगत्कर्तेति
पराभ्युपगममुपदेश्योत्तरार्धेन तस्य दुष्टत्वमाशये ॥ इमा एवा

- ४५ अनन्तरोक्ताः । कुर्याकविदम्बनाः कुत्सिता इवाका आग्रहभिषेपाः
 कुर्याकाः कदाग्रहा इत्यर्थः । त एव विदम्बनाः विचारधातुरी
 चाश्वत्थेन विरस्काररूपस्वादिगोपकमकाराः । स्यु भवेयु । तेषां प्राप्ता
 णिकापसदानाम् । येषां हे स्वामिन् स्वं नानुष्ठासकः न शिष्यावाता ॥
 तदभिनिषेधानां विदम्बनारूपस्वभापनार्थमथ पराभिषेत्पुरुषपि
 ४० द्वेषेण मृत्येकं तच्छब्दमयोगमस्यार्थमाभिर्भाषयाचकार स्तुति
 कारः । तथा वैवमेव निन्दनीयं प्रति वक्तारो वदन्ति । स मूर्खः स
 पापीयान् स वरिद्र इत्यादि । त्वमित्येकवचनसंयुक्तमुष्मच्छब्द
 मयोतेषु परमेष्ठितुः परमकारुणिकदयानपेक्षितम्बपरपक्षविभागम
 द्वितीयं द्वितीयदेशकत्वं ध्वन्यत । अतोभाषमाश्रयः । यद्यपि
 ४५ भगवानभिषेपेण सकलजगज्जन्तुमातृहितायहां सर्वेभ्य एव देव
 नावाचमाश्रये तथापि सैव केषांचिन्निमित्तनिकाचितपापकर्मकलु
 पितात्मनां रुचिभ्यतया न परिणमते । अपुनर्बन्धकादिभ्यतिरि
 क्त्वेनायोम्यत्वात् । तथा च कादम्बर्या वाणोपि वमाण—अपग
 तयले हि मनसि स्फटिकमणाविव रमनिकरगमस्तयो विद्यन्ति
 ५० सुखमुपद्रव्यगुणाः । गुरुवचनममलमपि सखिसमिव महदुपजनमति
 भवणस्पर्शं शुल्लममम्यस्य इति । अतो वस्तुहृत्तया न तेषां भगवा
 ननुष्ठासक इति ॥ न चैतावता जगद्गुरोरसामर्प्यसंभाषना । न हि
 कासदगुप्तज्जीवयन् समुज्जीविततरदण्डको विपमिपगुपास्यम
 नीयः । अतिमसद्भात् । ॥ हि तेषामेव दोषः । न खलु निसि
 ५५ छद्मवनाभोगमवभासयन्तापि भानवीया मानवः कौञ्चिकलोच-
 स्याल्लोकहेतुतामयजमाना वपाश्रम्यसंभाषनास्पदम् । तथा च
 श्रीसिद्धसेन —

सदमशीमवपनानपकौञ्चस्य

पञ्चोक्तवाग्यव तथापि सिद्धान्तमूचन् ।

७०

तस्माद्भूतं सगङ्गुकेष्विह सामसेषु

सूर्याधना मधुकरीपरणावदाताः ॥

अथ कथमिह तत्कुरेवाकानां विद्वन्बनारूपत्वमिति । शून्यः ।
यथायदुक्तं परैः सिद्ध्यादयो बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकाः कार्यत्मादृढवदिति ।
तदपुनरुक्तम् । व्यासुरग्रहणात् । साधनं हि सर्वत्र व्याप्ता प्रमाणेन
७५ सिद्ध्यायां साध्यं गमयेदिति सर्वथादिसंवादाः ॥ स चायं जगन्नि
घ्नन सञ्चरीरोऽञ्चरीरो वा स्यात् ॥ सञ्चरीरोपि किमस्मदादिब-
भुज्यञ्चरीरविशिष्टं सत पिप्वाचादिबदहस्यञ्चरीरविशिष्टम् । मयमपक्षे
प्रत्यक्षबाधः । तमन्तरण्यपि च जायमाने तुण्डरूपुरंदरघटुरभ्रादौ
कार्यत्वस्य दर्शनात् मययत्मादिबन्ताधारणानेकान्तिके हेतुः ।
८० द्वितीयविकल्पे पुनरहस्यञ्चरीरस्य तस्य माहात्म्यविशेषः कारणम्
आहोस्विदस्मदाद्यष्टैशुप्यम् । मयमकारः कोषपानप्रत्यायनीयः ।
तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमावात् । इतरेतराभयदोषापत्तेषु । सिद्धे हि
माहात्म्यविशेषे तस्याहस्यञ्चरीरस्य प्रत्येकप्यम् । तत्सिद्धौ च
माहात्म्यविशेषसिद्धिरिति । द्वितीयकस्तु प्रकारा न संभरत्येष
८५ विचारगोचरे । संशयानिहतेः । किं तस्यासत्त्वादहस्यञ्चरीरस्य
बान्ध्वेयादिबत् किं वास्मदाद्यष्टैशुप्यस्यात्पिप्वाचादिबदितिनिश्चया
मावात् ॥ अञ्चरीरभेदवा दृष्टान्तवार्तामित्रकार्यैपम्यम् । यदात्रया
हि कार्यरूपाः सञ्चरीरकर्तृका दृष्टाः । अञ्चरीरस्य च सतस्तस्य
कार्यप्रवृत्तौ कृतः सामर्थ्यम् आकाशादिबत् । तस्यात्सञ्चरीराञ्चरीर
९० स्मरने पक्षद्वयेपि कार्यत्वहेतोर्ग्यात्म्यसिद्धिः ॥ किं च त्वन्मतेन
आत्मात्मयापदिष्टोप्यर्थं हेतुः । अर्थ्यकदेशस्य तद्विषुदभ्रादेरिहा
नीमप्युत्पद्यमानस्य पिप्वातुरनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन प्रत्यक्षापित
धर्मनन्तरं हेतुमणनात् । तदेवं न कश्चिज्जगतः कर्ता ॥

एकत्वादीनि तु जगत्कृत्यत्वम्यवस्थापनायानीयमानानि तद्धि

- १५ शेषजानि पर्णं प्रति कामिन्या रूपसंपत्तिरूपणप्राप्यप्यप ।
 तथापि तेषां विचारासहस्रस्यापनार्यं किंचिदुच्यते ॥ तत्रैकत्वधर्च
 स्तावत् । बहुनामेककार्यकरणे वैमर्शसंभावेनेति नायमेकान्तः ।
 अनेकघटिकाश्चतुर्निष्पाद्यत्वेपि अकमूर्धोनेकशिल्पिकल्पितत्वेपि
 मासस्यादीनां नैकसरयानिर्बर्तितत्वेपि मधुच्छादीनां वैक
 १०० रूपताया अविगानेनोपक्रम्यत् । अयैतेष्वप्येक एवेश्वरः कर्तेति
 भूपे । एष चेद्वत्सो मयानीपतिं प्रति निष्पत्तिमा वासना
 तर्हि हृदिन्दुकुम्भकारादितिरस्कारेण पण्डटादीनामपि कर्ता स एष
 किं न कल्प्यते । अथ तेषां मत्पक्षसिद्धं कर्तृत्वं कथमप्युक्तं
 शक्यम् । तर्हि कीटिकादिभिः किं तेषां विराट् पक्षेपामसहस्र-
 १०५ तादृशमयाससाध्यं कर्तृत्वमेकैक्यैवापकल्प्यते । तस्माद्वैमत्यमया
 न्योद्देशितुरेकत्वकल्पना भोजनादिष्वयमयात्कृम्यणस्यात्यन्तबहुम
 पुत्रकृच्छादिपरित्यजनेन क्षुण्णारण्यानीसेवनयिष ॥

- तथा सर्वगतत्वमपि तस्य नोपपद्यम् । तदि क्षरीरात्मना ज्ञाना
 त्मना वा स्यात् । अथमपक्षे तदीयनैबदेहेन जगन्नयस्य व्याप्तत्वादि
 ११० तरनिर्मेयपदार्थानामाश्रयानवकाशः । द्वितीयपक्षे तु सिद्धसाध्यता ।
 अस्माभिर्गपि निरतिशयज्ञानात्मना परमपुरुषस्य जगन्नयकोटी
 करणाम्युपगमात् । यदि परमेवं मयत्यमाप्तीकृतन वेदेन
 विरोधः । तत्र हि क्षरीरात्मना सर्वगतत्वमुक्तम् । विश्वतमस्तु
 क्व पिश्वतोमस्तो विश्वतापाणिकत विश्वतपात् इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥
 ११५ पक्षोक्तं तस्य मतिनियतदेशवर्तित्वे त्रिभुवनगतपदार्थानामनि
 यतदेशवर्तीनां यथावभिर्माणानुपपत्तिरिति । तत्रैवं पृच्छ्यते । स
 भगवन् निर्ममाणस्त्वसादियत्साक्षोद्व्यापारेण निर्मिमीते यदि
 वा संकल्पमात्रेण । आद्ये पक्षे एकस्यैव भूभूतपरादेर्विधानेऽतोदी

यसः काञ्चनैषस्य संभवाद्द्वितीयसाध्यनेहसा न परिसमाप्तिः ।

120 द्वितीयपक्षे तु संकल्पमात्रेणैव कार्यकल्पनायां नियतदेशस्यापि
 स्वपि न किञ्चिदुपपन्नमुत्पद्यमानः । नियतदेशस्यापिनां सामान्यदे-
 शानामपि सकल्पमात्रेणैव तत्तत्कार्यसंपादनमतिपक्षेः ॥ किं च
 तस्य सर्वगतत्वेनाङ्गीक्रियमाणं शुचिषु निरन्तरसन्तपक्षेषु
 नरकादिस्वप्नेष्वपि तस्य वृत्तिः प्रसज्यत । तथा चानिष्टापत्तिः ।

125 अथ पुन्यत्पक्षेपि यदा ज्ञानात्मना सर्वजगद्वयं व्याप्नोतीत्युच्यते
 तदा शुचिरसत्त्वादादीनामप्युपपन्नसंभावनाभरक्यादिदुःखस्वरूप-
 संबेदनात्मकतया दुरस्तानुभवप्रसङ्गाच्चानिष्टापत्तिस्तुल्यैवतिष्ठति यत्
 तदेतदुपपत्तिमिदं प्रतिकूलमवकस्य भूषिभिरिवावकुरणम् । यतो-
 ज्ञानमप्याप्यकारि स्वस्वछस्वमव विपर्यय परिच्छिनत्ति न पुनस्त्व

130 गत्वा । तत्कुतो भवदुपायम्माः समीचीनः । वदं भवतोप्यशुचि
 ज्ञानमात्रेण तद्रसास्वादानुभूतिः । तज्ज्ञाने हि संकल्पन्दनाद्वना
 रसवस्यादिचिन्तनमात्रेण न वृत्तिसिद्धौ तस्यास्तिप्रयत्नवैफल्यमसक्ति-
 रिति ॥ यत्तु ज्ञानात्मिना सर्वगतत्वं सिद्धसाधनं मायुक्तं तच्छक्ति
 मात्रमपस्य मन्तव्यम् । तथा च वक्तारो भवन्ति । अस्य मनिः

135 सर्वज्ञानेण प्रसरतीति । न च ज्ञानं माप्यकारि । तस्यात्मवदत्त्वन
 बहिर्निर्गमायाशान् । बहिर्निर्गमे चात्मनोऽर्च्यतन्मापस्याऽङ्गीकृत्यम-
 सङ्गः । न हि धर्मो धर्मिणमतिरिच्य कचन केवलो विव्याकृताः ।
 यच्च पर इष्टाग्तयन्ति यथा मूर्धस्य किरणा गुणरूपा अपि
 मूर्धान्निष्कृत्य भुवनं प्रासयन्त्येवं ज्ञानमप्यात्मना सकाशाद्बहि

140 निर्गतस्य प्रमेयं परिच्छिनत्तीति तदेदमुत्तरम् । किरणानां गुणत्वम-
 सिद्धम् । तेषां तत्रसमुद्भव्यत्वेन न्यवस्थात् । यच्च तेषां मर्यादात्मा
 गुणः स केभ्यो न जानु पृथग्भवतीति । तथा च धर्मस्तद्विध्या
 श्रीहरिभट्टाचार्याणां—

किरणा गुणा न दृषं तेषि पयासो गुणो न वा दृषं ॥

45

नं नार्ण आयगुणो कश्चिद्वो स अभ्युपगम्य ॥ १ ॥

गन्तुं न परिच्छिद्य नार्ण वेद्यं तयस्मि देसस्मि ।

आयत्वं विद्य नमरं अभिन्तसत्ती उ निष्णोय ॥ २ ॥

छोहोपच्छस्स सत्ती आयस्या चेव मिश्रदेसपि ।

छोहं आगरिसंती दीसह इह कञ्च पञ्चस्त्वा ॥ ३ ॥

150

एवमिह नाप्यसत्ती आयस्या चेव इति लोगतं ।

नह परिच्छिद्य सम्मं को गु विरोहो भवे तस्य ॥ ४ ॥

इत्यादि ॥

अय सर्वगः सर्वज्ञ इति व्याख्याने तत्रापि प्रतिविधीयते ।

ननु तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं केन प्रमाणेन गृहीतम् । प्रत्यक्षेण परोक्षेण

155

वा । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षेण । तस्यन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नतयाती-

न्द्रियग्रहणासामर्थ्यात् । नापि परोक्षेण । तस्यनुमानं शब्दं वा

स्यात् । न तावदनुमानम् । तस्य किञ्चिद्वाक्येन किञ्चिद्व्यभिचारि-

स्मरणपूर्वकत्वात् । न च तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वेनुमेये किञ्चिदव्यभिचारि-

किञ्च पश्यामः । तस्यास्यन्तविप्रकृतत्वेन तत्प्रतिबद्धस्मिन् संबन्धग्रहणा-

160

माभात् । अय तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं विना जगद्वैचित्र्यमनुपपद्यमान सर्वज्ञत्व

मर्यादापादयतीति चेन्न । व्यभिनाभावाभावात् । न हि जगद्वैचित्र्यी

तत्सर्वज्ञत्वं विनान्यथा नोपपत्ता । द्विविधं हि जगत् । स्यादरभङ्गम-

भेदात् । तत्र जगत्माना वैचित्र्य स्तोपाच्छ्रुमाश्रुमकर्मपरिपाक

पक्षेनैव । स्वाभराणां तु सचेतनानामियमेव गतिस्चेतनानां ॥

165

तदुपयोगयोग्यतासाधनत्वेनानादिकाशसिद्धमव वैचित्र्यमिति ॥

नाप्यागमस्तत्साधकः । स हि तत्कृतोऽगमकृतो वा स्यात् ।

तत्कृत एव चेत्तस्य सर्वज्ञता साधयति तदा तस्य महत्त्वमिति ।

स्वयमेव स्वगुणोत्कीर्तनस्य महतामनधिकृतत्वात् । अन्यच्च तस्य
 शास्त्रकर्तृत्वमव न युज्यते । शास्त्रं हि वर्णात्मकम् । ते च तात्त्वा-
 170 दिव्यापारमन्याः । स च शरीर एव संयमी । शरीराभ्युपगमे च
 तस्य पूर्वोक्ता एव दोषाः । अन्यकृतमेतन्नोन्यः सर्वज्ञोऽसर्वज्ञो वा ।
 सर्वज्ञत्वे तस्य ईतापत्त्या प्रागुक्तवदेकस्याभ्युपगमवाधस्तत्तापक्रम
 माणचर्चायामनवस्थापातव्य । असर्वज्ञमेतत्तस्य वचसि विश्वासः ।
 अपरं च मन्त्रमीष्ट आगमाः मस्युत तस्यनेतुरसर्वज्ञत्वमेव साधयति ।
 175 पूर्वापरविरुद्धार्थवचनोपेतत्वात् । तथाहि न हि स्यात्सर्वभूषानीति
 मयममुक्त्वा पश्चाच्चनैव पठितम् ।

पद्मवतानि निमुग्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहमि ।

अन्वमेवस्य वचनान्मूनानि पशुमिक्षिभिः ॥

तथा अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाकमेत सप्तदश प्राजापत्याम्यशूनास्त
 180 मेत इत्यादिबचनानि कबमिद न पूर्वापरविरोधमनुकल्पन्ते ॥
 तथा नादूर्ध्वं ब्रूयात् इत्यादिना अनुतमापणं प्रथमं निविध्य पश्चाद्
 प्राध्वनार्थमदूर्ध्वं ब्रूयात् इत्यादि । तथा—

न भर्मयुक्तं वचनं दिनस्त्रि

न स्त्रीषु राज्ञश्च विचारकाळे ।

185

प्राजात्रय सर्ववचनापहारे

पश्चानुतान्याहुरपातकामि ॥

तथा अदत्तादानमेकया मिरस्य पश्चादुक्तम्—यद्यपि ब्राह्मणा
 इतन परकीयमात्रं छ्येन वा तथापि तस्य नादत्तादानम् । यतः
 सर्वमिदं ब्राह्मणेभ्यो वर्त्त ब्राह्मणानां तु दार्ढ्यस्यादुपमगः परिसृज्यते ।
 190 तस्मादपहरन् ब्राह्मणः स्वमादत्त स्वमेव ब्राह्मणो ब्रूते स्वं वस्त्रे
 स्वं ददाति इति ॥ तथा । अपुत्रस्य गतिर्नास्ति इति सपित्वा

अनेकानि सहस्राणि कुमारव्रजवारिणाम् ।

दिश गतानि विमानामकृत्वा कुलसन्ततिम् ॥

इत्यादि ॥ क्रियन्तो वा दधिमापमोजनात्कृपणा विवेच्यन्ते ।

११० तदेवमापमोपि न तस्य सर्वज्ञतां भक्तिः । किं च सर्वज्ञः सप्तसी
चराचर चेद्विरचयति तदा जगदुपप्लवकरणस्त्वेरिणः पश्चादपि
कर्तव्यनिग्रहान्दुरचेरिण एतद्विज्ञेयकारिणश्चास्मदादीन्क्रियार्थं
सृजतीति । तस्मात् सर्वज्ञः ॥

तथा स्वब्रह्मत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यम् । तदपि तस्य न क्षोदक्षयम् ॥ स हि
२०० यदि नाम स्वाधीनः सन् विश्वं विपक्षं परमकारिणिकञ्च स्वया
वर्ण्यते तत्कृत्यं सुखिनायवस्थामेदहन्दस्वपुटितं पश्यति शुबन
मकाम्ब्रह्मसंपत्कान्तमेष तु किं न निर्मिमीति । अथ जन्मा
न्तरापरामितवत्तदीयशुभाशुभकर्मभिरितः सत्स्वया करोतीति ।
दृष्टस्तर्हि स्वब्रह्मत्वाप जज्ञाञ्जलिः । कर्मजन्यं च त्रिभुवनवैविध्यं
२०५ त्रिपिण्डेहेतुकविष्टपसृष्टिकल्पनायाः कर्तृकफलत्वादस्मग्मतमेवा
द्वीकृतं प्रज्ञावता । तथावायातोऽर्थं पञ्चकृत्या ममावमितिन्यायः ।
किं च प्राणिनां पर्यापर्यायपेक्षमाणभेदेयं सृजति प्राप्तं तर्हि
यदयमपेक्षते तन्न करोतीति । न हि कुलास्मा दण्डादि करोति ।
एव कर्मापेक्षभ्रदीश्वरो जगत्कारण स्यात्तर्हि कर्मणीश्वरत्वमीश्वरानी-
२१० श्वरः स्यादिति ॥

तथा नित्यस्वमपि तस्य स्वगृह एव प्राणिगण्यमानं ह्यम् ॥ स
स्वगृहं नित्यस्वनेकरूपः सन् त्रिभुवनसंगस्वभावोऽतत्स्वभावा वा ।
प्रथमविधायां जगत्प्रमाणान्तरादिपि मापरमत् । तदुपरम
तत्स्वभावस्वरूपानि । एव च सगोक्रियाया अपययसानादेकरूप्यापि

- ११५ कार्यस्य न सृष्टिः । घटा हि स्वारम्भस्यणादारभ्य परिसमाप्ते
रूपान्धस्येन प्राणभिन्नयनयामिमायेन न घटस्यपदेष्टमासादयति ।
जलाहरणाद्यप्यक्रियायामसाधकतमत्वात् । अतस्त्वभाषयते तु न
जातु नगन्ति सुमेस्त्वभाषायोगाङ्गनवत् । अपि च तस्यैकान्त
नित्यस्वरूपत्वे सृष्टिस्तोहारोपि न घटत । नानारूपकार्यकरणे-
२२० ऽनित्यत्वापत्ता । स हि धनव स्वभाषन भगन्ति सुमेचेनैव तानि
संहरेत् स्वभाषान्तरेण वा । तेनैव चेत् सृष्टिर्सहारयार्योगपद्यमसङ्गः ।
स्वभाषामेदात् । एकस्वभाषात्कारणादनेकस्वभाषकार्योत्पत्ति
विरोधात् । स्वभाषातरण चेत् नित्यस्वहानिः । स्वभाषमेद एव
हि स्रज्जगमनित्यतायाः । यथा पार्ष्वसरीरस्याहारपरमाशुसह
२२५ कृतस्य मस्यहमपूर्वापूर्वोत्पादन स्वभाषमेदादनिवृत्तम् । इष्टम भवत्य
सृष्टिर्सहारयोः स्रज्यी स्वभाषमेदः । रज्जुगुणरमकृतया सृष्टी
तमोगुण्यत्मकतया संहरण सात्त्विकतया च स्थितौ तस्य व्यापार
स्वीकारात् । एवं चावस्थामदस्रज्जदे चावस्थावतोपि मेदामित्य
त्वल्लतिः ॥ अथास्तु नित्यमभाषापि कार्यं सततमेव सृष्टौ न घटते ।
२३० इच्छावद्वाचयन्तु ता अपीच्छाः स्वसत्ताभाषनिबन्धनात्मस्रभाषाः
सदैव किं न प्रवर्तयन्तीति स एवापासकम्भः । तथा मम्माराष्ट्रगुण
पिकरणत्वे अयमेदातुमेवाना तदिच्छानामपि विषयरूपत्वहानिः
कन वापदे । किं च मेदाकर्मा मङ्गलिः स्वाधकृष्णाभ्यां व्याप्ता । तत
एवाप्यं जगत्सर्गे व्यापियत स्वार्थोत्कारण्य्याहा । न तावत् स्वापान् त
२३५ स्य कृतकृत्यस्वान् । न च आरुण्यात् । परदुःखमहाजगच्छा हि कारुण्यम् ।
ततः प्राकृमगाग्नीरानाभिन्त्रियसरीरत्रिपयामुत्पत्तौ दुर्गामावन
कस्य महाणेच्छा कारुण्यम् । सर्गोत्तरकाल ॥ दुःखिमावधोऽय
कारुण्याभ्युपगम दुरुत्तरमितरतराभ्यर्थ कारुण्यनसृष्टिः मृष्टया च
कारुण्यम् । इति नाम्य जगत्सृष्ट्यै कथमपि सिद्ध्यति । तदेवमव

- 240 विषदापकलुपितं पुरुषविश्वं यस्सर्पां सबाह्वाकः स खलु केवलं
 पञ्चबन्मोहविहम्बनापरिपाक इति । अथ च यद्यपि मध्यवर्तिनो
 मकारस्य पञ्चाङ्गासान्यायेन याजनादर्थातरमपि स्फुरति
 यथा इमाः कुहेवाकनिहम्बनास्तेषां न स्युर्येषां स्वमनुष्ठासक इति
 तथापि साऽपि सहृदयेन हृदयपारशीयोऽन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदस्या
 245 विवृतत्वानिति काम्यार्थः ॥

अयं चैतन्यादयो रूपादयश्च धर्मा आत्मनिर्घट्यदेव धर्मिणोऽ
 त्यन्त व्यतिरिक्ता अपि सम्बाधसंबन्धेन संबद्धा सन्तो धर्म
 धर्मिण्यपदेशमभ्युनक्त तन्मतं दूषयन्नाह ।

न धर्मधर्मित्वमतीवमेवे

वृत्त्यास्ति चेन्न सितय चकास्ति ।

इहेवमित्यस्ति मतिश्च वृत्तो

न गौणभेदोऽपि च लोकवाध ॥ ७ ॥

- धर्मधर्मिणारतीवमेवे [अतीवेत्यत्र वदन्त्यो वाक्यान्तङ्कोरं तं
 8 धर्मायोऽतिवृत्त्यात्किञ्चेन्न मयुज्यते धाम्निक्ता यथा-आव
 र्जिता किञ्चिदिष स्तनाभ्याम् वदन्तं क इव सुस्तावह
 परेपामित्यादि] ततश्च एकान्तमिभत्त्वङ्गीक्रियमाण धर्मधर्मित्वं
 न स्याद् अस्य धर्मिण इमं धर्मा एषां च धर्मिणामयमाश्रयभूता
 धर्मित्येवं सम्प्रामिडा धर्मधर्मिण्यपदेशा न प्रामोति । तयारत्यन्त-
 10 भिन्नस्यपि तत्कल्पनायां पदार्थान्तरप्रमाणायपि विवक्षितधर्म
 धर्मित्वापत्तः ॥ एवमुक्तं मति परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठन । इत्यास्तीति ।
 अयुतसिद्धानायापायापारभूतानामिहमन्यदेतुः संबन्धः सम्-
 बाध । स च समरपनात्सम्बाध इति द्रव्यगुणतमसामान्य

- य व्यरहितसंज्ञास्तर्थात् य व्याख्यातम् । इदमत्र हृदयम् । यया
 स्वन्मते पृथिवीत्वाभिसंज्ञात्पृथिवी तत्र पृथिवीत्वं पृथिव्या एव
 ४० स्वरूपमस्ति त्वात्त्यं नापरं यस्मिन्तरं तत्र स्वरूपज्ञेयं समं यो
 सावभिसंज्ञाः पृथिव्याः । एव समवाय इत्युच्यते । भासा
 नामय भासिः समवायः इति वचनात् । एवं समवायस्याभिसंज्ञा
 त्समवाय इत्यपि किं न कल्प्यते । यनस्तस्यापि यत्समवायत्वं
 स्वस्वरूपं तत्र सार्वं सवन्पोस्त्यय । अन्यथा निरुपमावत्त्वा
 ४५ पृष्ठविपाणवद्वस्तुत्वमेव भवत् । तत्रम् । समवायं समवायत्वं
 मित्युद्धेनेन इहमस्यप समवायेपि पुच्छा घटत एव । ततो यया
 पृथिव्या पृथिवीत्वं समवायेन समवर्तं समवायपि समवायत्वमेवं
 समवायान्तरेण सवन्धनीय तदप्यपरेणेत्यर्थं दुस्तरानवस्था
 महानदी ॥ एव समवायस्यापि समवायत्वाभिसंज्ञां पुच्छा उप
 ५० पादिते साहसिज्यमासम्य पुनः पूर्वपक्षवादी वदति । ननु पृथिव्या
 दीनां पृथिवीत्वाभिसंज्ञाभिसंज्ञा समवायो मुम्यः । तत्र स्वतन्त्रा-
 दिमत्ययामिभ्यङ्ग्यस्य सगृहीतसकलावान्तरजातिसङ्गणक्यक्ति
 भेदस्य सामान्यस्योद्भवात् । इह तु समवायस्यैकत्वेन व्यक्तिमे
 दामात्र भावेरनुद्भूतत्वाद्भावायं मुम्यत्परिकल्पित इति मत्यय
 ५५ साध्य समवायस्याभिसंज्ञास्तत्साध्यत्र समवाय इति । तदेव
 यत्वेन यमत्कारकाणाम् । यथाशपि जातिरुद्भवन्तो कन निरु-
 ध्येत । व्यक्तेरभेदेनेति वक्ष्य । तत्तदवच्छेदकवशात्तद्वदोपपत्तौ
 व्यक्तिमेदकन्यनाया दुर्निवारत्वात् । अन्यो हि घटसमवायो न्यय
 घटसमवाय इति व्यक्त एव समवायस्यापि व्यक्तिभेद इति न
 ६० सिद्धो सिद्ध एव जात्युद्भवः । तस्मादप्यतःपि मुम्य एव समवायः ।
 इहमत्ययस्याभयवाप्यमिवागत् ॥

तदतस्तत्त्वं सपूर्वपक्षं यथापान यनसि निपाय

सिद्धान्तवादी प्राह । न गौणमेव इति । गौण इति योयं मेदः
स नास्ति । गौणसत्तनाभावात् । वल्लक्षणं चेत्यभासते—

६६ अथमिषारी मूलयोऽधिक्यस्य साधारणोऽन्तरङ्गश्च ।
विपरीतो गौणार्थः सति मुख्ये धीः कथं गौणे ॥

तस्मादमर्षमिणोः संबन्धने मुख्यः समवायः समवाय
च समवायत्वापिसंबन्धे गौण इत्यर्थं मेदो नानात्वं नास्तीति
भावात् । किं च योयमिह तन्नुष पठ इत्यादिप्रत्ययात्समवायसाधन
७० मनोरथः स त्वश्नुहरते नपुंसकादपत्यमसममनोरथम् । इह तन्नुष
पठ इत्यादेर्मन्त्रहारस्यान्नाकिञ्चिदस्वात् । पांशुलपादानामपीह पठे
तन्नुस्त्वर्थं प्रतीतिवर्धनात् । इह भूतले घटाभाष इत्यत्रापि सम-
वायमसङ्गात् । अत एवाह अपि च श्लोकभाष इति । अपिचेति रूपणा
भ्युचये । आकाशं मामाभिरुक्तोक्तः सामान्यश्लोकश्च । तेन बाधो
७५ विरोधो श्लोकभाषः । तद्विपरीतम्यन्त्रहारसाधनात् । बाधश्चन्द्रस्य
ईहाद्याः प्रत्ययमेवे इति पुंस्त्रीलिङ्गत्वात् । तस्मादमर्षमिणो-
रविज्वग्भावसङ्गण एव संबन्धः प्रतिपद्यम्यो नाम्नः समवायादि-
रिति काव्यायः ॥ ७ ॥

अथ सत्तामिषान पदार्थान्तरमात्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानात्म्यं
८० गुणमात्मविधेयगुणोच्छेदस्वरूपां च श्रुतिमज्ञानादङ्गीकृतवता
परानुपहसबाह ।

सतामपि स्यात्कचिदेव सत्ता
चेतन्यमोपाधिकमात्मनोन्यत् ।
न सविदानन्दमयी च मुक्ति
सुसूत्रमासूत्रितमस्वदीये ॥ ८ ॥

- वेधेपिकाणां द्रव्यगुणरूपसामान्यविशेषसमवायाम्भ्याः पद-
 पदार्थास्तत्त्वतयाभिप्रेताः ॥ तत्र पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशः
 काष्ठो दिग् आरमा मन इति नव द्रव्याणि ॥ गुणभट्टविशति ।
 ५ तद्यथा—रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगवि-
 भागौ परत्वापरत्व शुद्धिः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नमेति
 सूत्रोक्ताः सप्तदश । अथ सप्तविंशतिनाम सप्त-द्रव्यत्वं गुरुत्वं संस्कारः
 स्नेहो घमाभयो दम्बश्च । इत्येवं अतुर्विंशतिर्गुणा । संस्कारस्य वेग
 भावनास्थितस्थापकमेवार्थविध्येषि संस्कारस्त्वजात्यपेक्षया
 १० एकत्वाच्छायादीनां चार्वाकान्तर्माषाधाधिक्यम् ॥ कर्माणि
 पञ्च । तद्यथा—उत्सर्पणमरक्षपणमाकुञ्चन प्रसारण गमनमिति ।
 गमनप्रवृत्ताद् भ्रमणरेचनस्पन्दनाद्यविरोधः ॥ असन्तम्यावृत्तानां
 पिबानां यत् कारणादन्योन्यस्वरूपानुगमः प्रतीयते तदनुवृत्ति
 मतमहेतुः सामान्यम् । तत्र द्विविध परमपरं च । तत्र पर सत्ता
 १५ भावो महासामान्यमिति चोच्यते । द्रव्यत्वाद्यवान्तरसामान्यापेक्षया
 महाविषयत्वात् । अपरसामान्यं च द्रव्यत्वादि । एतच्च सामान्यं
 विद्वत् इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते । तथाहि द्रव्यत्व नवसु द्रव्येषु वर्तमान
 त्वात्सामान्यं गुणकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद्भिन्नेषु । ततः कर्मपारये
 सामान्यविशेष इति । एव द्रव्यत्वापेक्षया पृथिवीत्वादिकमपरं
 २० तदपेक्षया घटत्वादिकम् । एव अतुर्विंशती गुणेषु वृत्तगुणत्वं सा-
 मान्यं द्रव्यकर्मभ्या व्यावृत्तेषु विद्वत् । एवं गुणत्वापेक्षया रूपत्वा-
 दिक तदपेक्षया नीलत्वादिकम् । एव पञ्चसु कर्मसु वर्तनात्स्मर्यत्वं
 सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणभ्या व्यावृत्तत्वाद्भिन्नेषु । एवं कर्मत्वापेक्षया
 उत्सर्पणत्वादिकं ज्ञेयम् ॥ तत्र सत्ता द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योमान्तरं
 २५ क्वा पुरुषति यत् । उच्यते । न द्रव्यं सत्ता द्रव्यादन्येतदयः ।
 परद्रव्यवत्त्वात् । एकैकस्मिन् द्रव्ये यत्तत्त्वादित्यर्थः । द्रव्यत्ववत् ।

यथा द्रव्यत्वं यत्र तु द्रव्येषु प्रत्येकं वर्तमानं द्रव्यं न भवति किं
 तु सामान्यविशेषसङ्घर्षं द्रव्यत्वमेव एवं सत्तापि । वैशेषिकाणां
 हि अद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यम् अनेकद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यम् । तथा द्रव्यमात्रसङ्घः
 80 कामो विन् आत्मा मनः परमाणवः । अनेकद्रव्यं तु द्रव्यशुद्धादि
 स्कन्धः । एकद्रव्यं तु द्रव्यमेव न भवति । एकद्रव्यवती च सत्ता ।
 इति द्रव्यसङ्घजविसृजणत्वाच्च द्रव्यम् । एवं न गुणः सत्ता ।
 गुणेषु भावादः । गुणत्ववत् । यदि हि सत्ता गुणः स्यात् तर्हि गुणेषु
 वर्तेत । निर्गुणत्वाद् गुणानाम् । वर्तते च गुणेषु सत्ता । सन् गुण
 85 इति प्रतीतेः । तथा न सत्ता कर्म । कर्मसु भावत् । कर्मत्ववत् । यदि च
 सत्ता कर्म स्यात् तर्हि कर्मसु वर्तेत । निष्कर्मत्वाद् कर्मणाम् । वर्तते
 च कर्मसु सत्ता । सत् कर्मेति प्रतीतेः । तस्मात् पदार्थान्तरं सत्ता ॥
 तथा विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोन्त्या अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिहेतवस्ते
 द्रव्यादिवैकसम्प्राप्ता पदार्थान्तरम् । तथा च प्रवृत्तकरः—अन्तेषु
 40 यथा अन्त्याः । स्वात्मपविशेषकत्वादिशेषाः । विनाधारम्मरहितेषु
 नित्यद्रव्येष्वन्वाकाशकाशविद्यात्ममनासु प्रतिद्रव्यमेकैकज्ञो वर्त
 माना अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिशुद्धित्वात् । यथास्मदादीनां गणादिष्वन्वा
 दिभ्यस्तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियावयवोपवयावयवविशेषसंयोगनिमित्तः ।
 प्रत्यक्षव्यावृत्तिर्ज्ञा मोः शुद्धः क्षीप्रगतिः पीनः ककुच्चान् महापञ्च
 45 इति तथास्मद्विशिष्टानां पाणिनां नित्येषु तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियेषु
 परमाणुषु वृत्तारममनःसु चाप्यनिमित्तासंभवाद्येभ्यो निमित्तेभ्यः
 प्रत्याधारं विच्छिन्नोप विच्छिन्नोपमितिप्रत्ययव्यापृतिर्देहकास-
 विमल्लये च परमाणौ स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च भवति तन्त्या
 विशेषा इति । अमी च विश्वरूपा एव न तु द्रव्यत्वादिपरसामान्य
 50 विशेषोपपत्तयः । व्यावृत्तरेव हेतुत्वात् ॥

तथा अणुसिद्धानामाधारपदार्थानामिहमस्यपहेतुः संभवः

- तथा चैतन्यमिहादि । चैतन्यं ज्ञानम् । आत्मनः स्रेष्ठज्ञात् ।
 अम्यत् अस्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् । असमासकरणादस्यन्तमिति सम्यक्त ।
 अस्यन्तमेवे सति क्वमात्मनः संबन्धि ज्ञानमिति व्यपदेश इति
 80 परावृत्तापरिहारार्थम् औपाधिकमिति विशेषणद्वारेण हेत्व
 मिधानम् । सवाचेरागतम् औपाधिकम् । समवायसंबन्धसंज्ञे-
 मोपाधिना आत्मनि समवत्तम् । आत्मनः स्वयं लक्ष्यत्वात् ।
 समवायसंबन्धोपाधौक्तिमिति वाक्यम् । यथात्मनो ज्ञानादव्यति-
 रिक्तत्वमिष्यते तदा दुःखजन्ममृत्युविदोपमिष्याज्ञानानामुत्तरो
 85 उत्तरपाये छन्दन्तराभावाद् बुद्ध्यादीनां नवानामात्मविशेषगुणा-
 मामुच्छेदावसर आत्मनोप्युच्छन्त्यात् । तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ।
 अतो मिश्रमेवात्मनो ज्ञानं यौक्तिकमिति ॥ तथा न संबिदित्यादि ।
 बुद्धिर्मोक्षः । न संबिदानन्दमयी न ज्ञानसुलक्षणा । संबिद ज्ञानम् ।
 ज्ञानन्दः सौख्यम् । ततो हन्ता । संबिदानन्दो मङ्गलौ यस्यां सा
 90 संबिदानन्दमयी । तादृशी न भवति । बुद्धिसुलक्षणाद्वैप-
 र्यक्समर्पणार्थसंस्काररूपाणां नवानामात्मनो वैशेषिकगुणानां
 यत्सन्तोच्छेदा मोक्ष इति वचनात् । वक्ष्यः पूर्वोक्तान्मुप-
 नमद्वयसङ्ख्येयः । ज्ञानं हि सन्निकृत्वादिमित्यं सुखं च सप्रसन्नवत्तया
 95 सातिशयवत्तया च न विधिष्यते संसारावस्थायाः । इति तदुच्छेदे
 आत्मस्वरूपेणावस्थानं मोक्ष इति । प्रयोगधाम्न—नवानामा-
 त्मविशेषगुणानां संतानोत्पत्तमुच्छिद्यते । संतानत्वात् । यो यः
 संतानः स सोऽस्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते यथा मदीपसंतानः । तथा धार्यं ।
 तस्मादस्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते इति । तदुच्छेद एव मोक्षो न कृतकर्म
 100 सप्रसन्न इति । न हि वै सञ्चारीरस्य मिषाभिययोरपहतिरस्ति ।
 अञ्चारीरं वा वसन्तं मिषाभिये न स्पृष्टवः इत्यादयोपि
 वेदान्तास्तादृशीमेव बुद्धिमादिशन्ति । अतः हि मिषा

मिये सुखदुःखे ते पाचरीरे मृक्तं न स्पृश्यतः । अपि च

यावदात्मगुणाः सर्वे नाच्छिन्ना वासनादयः ।

105

तावदात्मन्तिकी दुःखम्याहृतिर्न विकल्प्यते ॥ १ ॥

अपार्षदनिमित्तो हि संभवः सुखदुःखयोः ।

मृच्छयूतौ च तावैव स्वस्मौ संसारसंघनः ॥ २ ॥

तदुच्छेदे च तत्कार्यधरीराधनुषमुवात् ।

नात्मनः सुखदुःखे ह्यस्त्वसौ मृक्त उच्यते ॥ ३ ॥

110

इच्छाद्वयमववादि योगायतनवचनम् ।

उच्छिन्नभोगायतनो नात्मा तैरपि पुण्यते ॥ ४ ॥

तदेव विषणादीनां नवानामपि मृक्ततः ।

गुणानामात्मनो ह्येतः सोपवर्गः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ ५ ॥

ननु तस्यामवस्थायां कीदृशात्मावस्थित्यते ।

115

स्वस्मैकमविष्टान् परित्यक्तोत्तिष्ठैर्गुणैः ॥ ६ ॥

कर्मिषद्कातिर्गं रूपं तदस्याहुर्मनीषिणः ।

संसारवन्धनापीनदुःखक्रेष्ठापदूषितम् ॥ ७ ॥

कामक्रोधमोहमर्षदम्भहर्षाः कर्मिषद्कमिति । तदेतदभ्युपगमय

मित्त्वं संमर्षयन्निःस्पृहीयैस्त्वदाज्ञावद्विर्युतैः कणादमलानुगायिमिः

120 सुसूत्रमासूत्रितम् सम्यगागमः प्रपञ्चितः । अथ वा सुसूत्रमिति क्रि-

याविशेषणम् । सोमम सुषं तस्तुभ्यवस्थापतनाभिज्ञानं यमेवमासूत्रितं

तत्तच्छास्त्रार्थोपनिबन्धः कृत इति हृदयम् । सुषं तु सूचनाकारि

ग्रन्थे तस्तुभ्यवस्थयोः इत्यनेकार्थवचनात् । अथ सुसूत्रमिति

विपरीतसंज्ञणयोपहासगर्भं प्रदर्शयन्वचनम् । यथा—उपकृतं बहु तत्र

125 किमुच्यते सुमनता मयिता भवता धिरम् इत्यादि । उपहासनीयता च

युक्तिरिक्तत्वात् तदङ्गीकरणम् । तथा हि अविशेषेण सत्सुद्विषेष्टेभ्योऽपि

सर्वव्यापेभ्य इत्यादिव्येव विषु सत्साम्यवन्धः स्वीक्रियते न सामान्या-

- विशेषे इति महतीर्यं पश्यतोद्हरता । यतः परिभाष्यतां सत्ताशब्दस्य
 अर्थः । अस्तीति सन् । सतो भावः सत्ता अस्तित्वम् । अस्तित्वस्य रूपं
 130 निर्विशेषमज्ञेयत्वापि पदार्थेषु स्वभाष्युक्तम् । तस्मिन्निदमर्थमुरीर्यं
 यद्ब्रह्मादिष्वपि एव सत्तायोगो नेतरत्वं ज्ञेयं इति । अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यया
 भाषायां सामान्यादिष्वपि सत्तायोग इति चेत् न । तत्राप्यनुवृत्ति
 मत्स्यवस्यानिवार्यत्वात् । पृथिवीत्वमोक्षपक्षत्वादिसामान्येषु
 सामान्यं सामान्यामेति विशेषेणपि बहुत्वादवमपि विशेषोपपत्ति
 135 निश्चय इति समवाये च भागुक्तस्युक्त्या तत्तदवच्छेदकमेवात्
 एकाकारमतीतेरनुमत्तात् । स्वस्वत्वसाधर्म्येण सत्ताध्यारोपात् ।
 सामान्यादिष्वपि सत्सदित्यनुगम इति चेत् तर्हि मिथ्यामत्स्ययो-
 यमापद्यते । अथ मिथ्यात्वमात्रेणैकानुगमो मिथ्यैवेति चेत्
 ब्रह्मादिष्वपि सत्ताध्यारोपकृत एवास्तु मत्स्यवानुगमः । असाति
 140 ब्रह्मैक्येध्यारोपस्यासंभवात् । ब्रह्मादिषु ब्रह्मणोपपन्नमत्तः मत्स्यः सा
 मामान्यादिषु तु गौण इति चेत् न । विपर्ययस्यापि सत्त्वकस्त्वनत्वात् ।
 सामान्यादिषु बाधकसंभवात् ब्रह्मणोनुगताः मत्स्यः ब्रह्मादिषु
 तु तदभावाद्ब्रह्मण्य इति चेत् ननु किमिदं बाधकम् । अथ सामान्येपि
 सत्ताध्यापनमेवमस्या विशेषेषु पुनः सामान्यसद्भावे स्वरूपहानिः
 145 समवायेपि सत्ताकल्पने तद्वत्त्वं संवृत्तान्तराभावात् इति बाधका
 नीति चेत् न । सामान्यपि सत्ताकल्पने यथनवस्था तर्हि क्वचन सा
 ब्रह्मादिषु । तेषामपि स्वरूपसत्तायाः प्रागेव विद्यमानत्वात् । विशेषेषु
 पुनः सत्ताध्यापनमेपि न रूपहानिः । स्वरूपस्य मत्स्यतोषेन्नत्वात् ।
 निःसामान्यस्य विशेषस्य कश्चिदप्यनुपसम्पत्तात् । समवायेपि सप्त
 150 बाधकसंभवायाः स्वरूपसत्तायाः स्वीकारे अपपद्यत एवादिष्व
 गृह्यमाणकः सर्वव्यापः । अन्यथा तस्य स्वरूपाभावात्सद्भावात् । इति
 बाधकभावात् तेष्वपि ब्रह्मण्यम्बुल्य एव सत्तासंबन्ध इति व्यर्थ

- द्रव्यगुणधर्मस्वेव सत्ताकल्पनम् ॥ किं च तैर्बादिभिर्यो द्रव्यादित्रये
 भूत्स्य* सत्तासंबन्ध कक्षीकृतः सोऽपि विचार्यमाणो भिन्नीयेत ।
- 185 तथा हि—यदि द्रव्यादिभ्योऽत्यन्तविलक्षणता सत्ता तदा द्रव्या-
 दीन्यसद्रूपाण्येष स्युः । सत्तायोगात्सत्त्वमस्त्येवेति चेत् असत्तां
 सत्तायोगेपि कृतः सत्त्वम् । सत्ता तु निष्कलः सत्तायोग ।
 स्वरूपसत्त्वं भावानामस्त्येवेति चेत् तर्हि किं द्विस्वण्डित्वा सत्तायोगेन ।
 सत्तायोगात्प्रमाणं भावो न सन् नाप्यसन् सत्तायोगात् सभिति चेत्
- 160 बाह्यमात्रमेतत् । सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रकारान्तरस्यासमवात् । तस्मात्
 सत्तामपि स्यात्कविदेव सचेति तेषां वचनं विदुषां परिपदि
 क्यमिव नोपहासाय जायते ॥ ज्ञानमपि यथेकान्तनात्मनः सत्ता
 द्वात्रिंशमिष्यते तदा तेन वैश्वज्ञानेन मैत्रस्येव नैव विषयपरिच्छेद
 स्यादात्मनः । अथ यथैवात्मनि समवायसंबन्धेन समवेतं ज्ञानं
- 165 तथैव भावायभासं करोतीति चेन्न । समवायस्यैकस्याभित्यक्त्वा
 व्यापकत्वाच्च । सर्वत्र वृत्तेरविशेषात्समवायवद्वात्मनामपि व्याप
 कत्वादेकज्ञानेन सर्वेषां विषयावबोधमसङ्गः । यथा च घटे
 रूपादयः समवायसंबन्धेन समवेतास्तद्विनाशे च तदाश्रयस्य
 घटस्यापि विनाश एव ज्ञानमप्यात्मनि समवेतम् तच्च सगिकम्
- 170 ततस्तद्विनाशे आत्मनोपि विनाशापत्तेरनिवृत्त्यापत्तिः । अथास्तु
 समवायेन ज्ञानात्मनो संबन्धः । किं तु स एव समवायः
 केन तपोः संबध्यते । समवायान्तरेण चेत् अनवस्था । स्वेनैव
 चेत् किं न ज्ञानात्मनोरपि तथा । अथ यथा मदीपद्वयमा
 व्यादात्मानं परं च प्रकाशयति तथा समवायस्येदमेव स्वभाषो
- 175 यदात्मानं ज्ञानात्मानो च सवधयतीति चेत् ज्ञानात्मनो
 रपि किं न सत्तास्वभावात्ता येन स्वयमेवैती संबध्येते । किं च
 मदीपद्वयान्तापि मयस्ते न जायतीति । यतः मदीपस्तावद्भूयं

मकाशम तस्य चर्मो धर्मधर्मिणोश्च स्वयात्यन्तं भेदोभ्युपगम्यते
 तत्कर्म मदीपस्य मकाशात्मकता । तदभावे च स्वपरमकाशकस्वभाव
 180 ताभणितिनिर्मूलैव । यदि च मदीपात्मकाशस्यात्यन्तभेदेऽपि
 मदीपस्य स्वपरमकाशकस्वमिष्यते तदा घटादीनामपि तदनुपगम्यते ।
 भेदाविशेषात् । अपि च तौ स्वपरसंबन्धस्वभावाौ समवायाद्विभौ
 स्यातामविभौ वा । यदि विभौ ततस्तस्यैतौ स्वभावाविति कर्म
 संबन्धः । संबन्धनिबन्धनस्य समवायात्स्वरस्यानवस्थाभावादन
 185 भ्युपगमात् । अथाविभौ ततः समवायमात्रमत्र । न तौ । तद्व्यतिरि
 क्त्वाचत्स्वरूपवदिति । किं च यथा इह समवायिषु समवाय इति
 भेदः समवायं विनाप्युपपन्ना तथा इहात्मनि ज्ञानमित्ययमपि
 मत्स्यवस्तुं विनैव भेदोपपद्यते तदा को दापः । अवात्स्या कता ज्ञानं करणं
 कर्तृकरणयोश्च बट्टकिनामीवभेद एव मतीतस्वरूपं ज्ञानात्मनोरभेद
 190 इति । तच्च । इष्टान्तस्य वैपम्यात् । वासी हि कार्यं करणं ज्ञानं
 चाभ्यन्तरं तत्कथमनयाः साधर्म्यम् । न वैवं करणस्य द्वैविध्यम
 मसिद्धम् । यत्तादुर्लभमिति ।

करणं द्विविधं ज्ञं वागमाभ्यन्तरं पुनः ।

यथा गुनाति दात्रेण मरुं गच्छति चेतसा ॥

195 यदि हि किंचित्स्वरणमान्तरमेकागतेन भिन्नमुपदर्शयत ततः
 स्यात् इष्टान्तदाष्टमित्युक्त्याः साधर्म्यम् । न च तथाविधमस्ति । न च
 वायुकरणगतो यमः सर्वोप्यागतर पात्रयिर्गुं धरयत । अन्यथा
 दीपन चक्षुषा दृश्यतः पश्यतीत्यत्रापि दीपाभिर्युपाप्यकान्तन
 देवदत्तस्य भद्रः स्यात् । तथा च मति साक्यतीनिविरोध इति ।
 200 अपिच साप्यविकल्पापि वासीवट्टकिइष्टान्तः । तथा हि मायवट्टकिः
 काष्ठमिदमनया वास्या घर्गयिष्य इत्यर्थं वामीप्रवृण्वणिआमना
 परिणतः सन् तामगृहीत्वा यदयति किं तु तथा परिणतस्तां गृहीत्वा ।

- तथा परिणामन बासिरपि तस्य काष्ठस्य घटने व्यापियते पुरुषापि ।
 इत्यर्थं स्रग्गणकायमात्रकत्वाद्वासीषद्धन्यारमदोप्युपपद्यते । तत्क
 205 यमनयोर्भेद एवत्युच्यते । एवमात्मापि विवक्षितमर्थमनेन ज्ञानन
 ज्ञास्यामीनि ज्ञानग्रहणपरिणामनान् ज्ञानं गृहीत्वायं व्यवस्थातिगतम
 ज्ञानात्मनारुभयारपि संविचिन्त्यस्य फलकार्यसाधकत्वाद्भेद एव । एव
 कर्तृकरणयोरभेदे सिद्धे संविचिन्त्यभणं कार्य किमात्मानि व्यवस्थितं
 आहोस्विद्विषय इति वाच्यम् । आत्मानि चेत् सिद्धं न समीक्षितम् ।
 10 विषय चेत् कथमात्मनोनुभवः प्रतीयते । अयं विषयस्तिनसविधे
 सद्वाद्यानात्मनानुभवः तर्हि किं न पुरुषान्तरस्यापि । तद्वेदादि
 स्रपात् । अथ ज्ञानात्मनारमदपक्षं कथं कर्तृकरणभाव इति चेत् ननु
 यथा सप आत्मानमात्मना वेष्टयतीत्यत्र अभेदे यथा कर्तृकरण
 भावस्तथाप्रापि । अथ परिकल्पिताऽयं कर्तृकरणभाव इति चेत्
 215 वष्टनात्मन्यायां प्रागवस्थाविमर्शणगतिनिरोपत्वमणार्थक्रियादर्श
 नात् कथं परिकल्पितत्वम् । न हि परिकल्पनाच्चतैरपि शैलस्तम्भ
 आत्मानमात्मना वष्टयतीति वक्तुं शक्यम् । तस्मादमदेषि
 कर्तृकरणभावः सिद्ध एव ॥ किं च चैतन्यमिति शब्दस्य चिन्त्यता
 मन्वयः । चैतनस्य भावार्थान्वयम् । चैतनमात्मा त्वयापि
 220 कीन्यते । तस्य भावः स्वरूपं चैतन्यम् । यद्य यस्य स्वरूपं न
 तत्तना विमर्शं भवितुमर्हति । यथा दृष्टादृशस्वरूपम् । अथास्ति
 चेतन आत्मा । यत्र चेतनामपरायसरं प्राप्तुं न शक्नोति तथावतीति
 चेत् नश्युक्तम् । यत् प्रतीतिधर्माणां क्रियेत तर्हि निराधस्तपया
 गतमक एवात्मा प्रविष्टानि । न हि प्रातुषित्स्वरूपचेतनारं चेत
 225 नायागाद्यनत भवतन वा ययि चेतनायां मयवाय इति मनी
 तिगति । ज्ञाताहमिति सामानाधिकरणतया मनान् । भेद तथा
 मनीतिरिति चेत् न । कथं विज्ञातादात्म्याभावे सामानाधिकरण्य

- प्रतीतिरदर्शनात् । यष्टिः पुरुष इत्यादिप्रतीतिस्तु भेदे सत्युपपा-
 रात् इष्टा न पुनस्त्याग्यिकी । उपधारस्य तु बीजं पुरुषस्य पाष्टि-
 ११० गतस्तत्त्वस्थादिगुणैरमेदः । उपधारस्य सुम्प्यार्थस्पर्धित्वात् । तथा
 चात्मनि ज्ञाताहमिति प्रतीतिः कथयितव्यतनात्मता ममयति ।
 तामन्तरेण ज्ञाताहमितिप्रतीतिरनुपपद्यमानत्वात् । अत्रादिषत् । न हि
 पदादिरचेतनात्मको ज्ञाताहमिति प्रस्थतिः । केनन्ययोगाभावादसौ
 न तथा मयेत्येतीति चेत् न । अचेतनस्यापि चैतन्ययोगाचेतनाहमि-
 ११५ ति प्रतिपत्तेरनन्तरमेव निरस्तत्वात् । इत्यचेतनत्वं सिद्धमात्मना
 जडस्यार्थपरिच्छेदं पश्यकरोति । तं पुनरिच्छता चैतन्यस्वरूपतास्य
 स्वीकरणीया ॥ मनु ज्ञानवानहमितिप्रत्ययादात्मज्ञानयोर्मेदः अन्य
 वा धनवानितिप्रत्ययादपि धनधनवतामेदंभाषानुपपन्नात् । तदसत् ।
 यतो ज्ञानवानहमिति नात्मा भवन्मत्त मत्प्रेति जडत्वंकान्तक्यत्वात् ।
 १२० पठयत् । सर्वेषां जडत्वं स्यादात्मा ज्ञानवानहमितिप्रत्ययस्य स्याद्
 स्य विरोधाभावात् इति मा निर्णयेत् । तस्य त्वतोन्पश्यसंभवात् । ज्ञा-
 नवानहमिति हि प्रत्यया नागृहीतज्ञानास्ये विज्ञेयमे विज्ञेये वा
 त्पनि जातृत्वात् । स्वमतविरोधात् । नागृहीतविज्ञेयत्वा विज्ञेये
 बुद्धिः इति वचनात् । गृहीतत्वास्तथाकल्पयन् इति चेत्कुतस्तदगृहीतिः ।
 १२५ न तावत्प्रत्ययः । स्वयंभेदज्ञानभ्युपगमात् । स्वयंविदितं तास्मिनि
 ज्ञाने च स्वतः सा युज्यते नाम्यया । संतानात्तरयत् । परतमेतद्
 तदपि ज्ञानात्मनं विज्ञेयं नागृहीतज्ञानत्वविज्ञेयस्य प्रतीतिं मरयम् ।
 गृहीतं हि प्रत्यये पश्यजडमिति ज्ञानान्तराद्यजडत्वेन नाम्यमित्य
 मवस्थानात् कुत मरयमरययः । तदर्थं नाम्यनो जडत्वमप्यता
 १३० संगच्छते । तदसंगता च चतुर्थमापाधिकमात्मनाभ्यम् इति ज्ञा-
 दमानम् ॥

तथा यदपि न संविदानन्दमयी च मुक्तिरिति व्यवस्था
 पनायानुमानमपादि संतानत्वादिति क्त्वाभिधीयते । ननु किं-
 भिद् संतानत्वं स्वतन्त्रमपरापरपक्षोत्पत्तिमार्गं वा एकाग्रयाप
 25 रापरोत्पत्तिर्वा । तथापि पक्षः सञ्चयिचारः । अपरापरेषामुत्पा
 दुक्तानां पञ्चदश्यादीनां संतानत्वेऽप्यस्यन्तमनुच्छिद्यमानत्वात् । अथ
 द्वितीयपक्षः तर्हि तादृशं संतानत्वं मदीये नास्तीति साधनविकल्पो
 दृष्टान्तः । परमाणुपाकजम्पादिभिश्च व्यवधिकारी हेतुः । तथापि संता
 नत्वस्य तत्र सञ्जापेऽप्यस्यन्ताच्छेदाभावात् । अपि च संतानत्वमपि भवि
 35 व्यति अत्यन्तानुच्छेदश्च भविष्यति । विपर्ययबाधकप्रमाणाभावात् ।
 इति सदिग्धविषयसम्पादितिकत्वादप्यनकान्तिकोयम् । किं च
 स्वाहान्वादिनां नास्ति कश्चिदत्यन्तानुच्छेदो द्रव्यरूपतया स्या-
 स्तुनामेव सत्ता यावानामुत्पादव्ययपुक्तत्वात् इति विरुद्धम् । इति
 नाधिकृतानुमानाद्भुव्यादिगुणोच्छेदरूपा सिद्धिः सिध्यति । नापि
 45 न हि हि सञ्चरीरस्य इत्यान्तेरागमात् । न हि शुभाशुभादृष्टपरिपाक
 अन्ये सांसारिकमियाप्रिये परस्परानुपक्त अपेक्ष्य व्यवस्थितः ।
 मुक्तिद्वयार्था तु सकलादृष्टयहदुर्लभैकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकं च कथं
 प्रियमेष तत्कथं प्रतिपिष्यते । आगमस्य धायमर्थं सञ्चरीरस्य
 गतिषुष्टयान्यतमस्थानवर्तिनः आत्मनः प्रियाप्रिययोः परस्परा
 55 नुपक्तयोः सुखदुःखयोरपहतिरभावा नास्तीति । अवश्यं हि तत्र
 सुखदुःखयोर्भावाभावात् । परस्परानुपक्तत्वं च समासकरणादभ्युपगते ।
 सञ्चरीरं मुक्तायमानम् । बाणस्यैवकारार्थत्वात् सञ्चरीरमपि सन्तं
 सिद्धिसेवमभ्यासीन प्रियाप्रिय परस्परानुपक्तं सुखदुःखं न सृ-
 65 ष्यतः । इदमत्र इत्यम् । यथा किञ्च समागिणं सुखदुःखं परस्प
 75 रानुपक्तं स्यात् न तथा मुक्तात्मनः किं तु केवलं सुखमपि ।
 दुःखमस्य सञ्चरीरस्यैवभावात् । सुखं स्वात्मस्वम्पत्वादवस्थितमेव ।

स्वस्वरूपावस्थानं हि मोक्षः । अत एवाक्षरीरमित्युक्तम् । आग-
मार्थभाषामित्येष समर्थनीयः । यत एतदर्थानुपातिन्येव स्थिति-
रपि दृश्यते ।

२४० मुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिप्राप्तमतीन्द्रियम् ।

तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयादुपपापमङ्गनात्मभिः ॥

न चाप सुखद्वन्द्वो दुःखाभावमात्रं वर्तत । मुख्यमुख-
पापतायां बाधक्यमावात् । अयं रोगादिप्रमुक्तः मुक्ती
भात इत्यादिवाक्येषु च सुरतीतिप्रयोगस्य पीनरुक्ष्यममङ्गात् ।

२४१ दुःखाभावमात्रस्य रागादिप्रमुक्त इतीयमेव गतत्वात् । न च यत्र
बुद्धीरितो मोक्षः पुंसामुपादयतया संमतः । को हि नाम सिद्धि-
कल्पमपगतसकलमुन्मसषेदनमात्मानमुपपादयितुं यतेत । दुःखसं-
वेदनकपत्वात्स्य मुखदुःखपारेकस्याभावेऽपरस्यावश्यमावात् ।
अत एव त्वदुपहासः श्रूयते ।

२४२ यत्र बुद्ध्यापन रम्ये कोऽस्त्वमपिषाभिच्छत् ।

न तु वैश्वपिकीं मुक्तिं गौतमा मन्तुमिच्छति ॥

सांपाधिकसाधविकपरिमितानन्दनिष्पन्दात् स्वगाद्व्यभि-
तद्विपरीतानन्दमम्भनङ्गानं च मोक्षमाचक्षत विचक्षणा । यदि
तु अहः पाषाणनिर्विघ्न एव तस्यामयस्थापामात्मा मयत्र त्व-

२४३ समप्रवर्गेण । संसार एव वरमस्तु । यत्र तापदन्तरान्तरापि दुःख-
कमुक्तिमपि किपदपि मुक्तमनुमुच्यते चिन्त्यतां तारत्किमन्य
मुच्यतुमवा मय्य अत सर्वमुत्सोच्छेद एव । अवास्ति तथाभूते
मात्रे साभातिरक्तः प्रज्ञादलाणाम् । त एवं विवेचयन्ति । संसार
तावत् तद्व्यासृष्टं सुखं न संभवति इत्यं चावश्यं इयं विवेक-

२४० इत आनयात्कमाजमपतिगतिमयुनोरिव दुःखमयमत्र एव इ-
अपि स्पष्टयत । अथ संसारान्माता ओषान् । यतोऽत्र इत्यं

- सर्वथा न स्यात् । वरमिषती कदाचित्कमुत्तमाभापि त्यक्ता
 न तु तस्याः कृते दुःखभारश्चान् व्युद् इति । तदेतत्सत्यम् । सांसा-
 रिकमुत्तस्य मधुविग्धवाराकगच्छमन्दलाग्रग्रासबहुः स्वरूपत्वादेव
 305 युक्तैव मुमुक्षुणां तन्निहासा । किंत्वात्यन्तिकमुत्तविशेषलिप्पना
 मेव । इहापि विषयनिवृत्तिर्मे सुखमनुभवसिद्धं तद्यदि मोक्षे विधिष्टं
 नास्ति ततो मोक्षो दुःस्वरूप एवापद्यत इत्यर्थः । ये अपि विष
 मधुनी एकत्र संपृक्ते त्यज्येते ते अपि सुखनिशेषलिप्स्यैव ।
 किञ्च यथा प्राप्तिनां ससारान्वस्यायां सुखमिष्टं दुःखं चानिष्टं तथा
 310 मोक्षान्वस्यायां दुःखनिवृत्तिरिष्टा सुखनिवृत्तिस्त्वनिष्टैव । ततो यदि
 त्वद्विमतो मोक्षः स्यात्तदा न मेक्षावर्ता मवतिः स्यात् । मवति
 वेयम् । ततः सिद्धो माक्षः सुखसंवेदनस्वभावः । मेक्षावत्पद्वे
 रन्वयानुपपत्तेः । अथ यदि सुखसंवेदनैकत्वभाषो मोक्षः स्यात्तदा
 तद्वागेण मवतमानो मुमुक्षुर्न मोक्षमपिगच्छेत् । नहि रागिणां
 315 मोक्षास्तिरागस्य बन्धनात्मकत्वात् । नैवमु । सांसारिकमुत्तमेव रागो
 बन्धनात्मको विषयादिमहच्छेदतुत्वात् । मोक्षसुखे तु रागो न बन्धना
 त्यकः । परां कोटिमाकृष्टस्य च स्पृहायाप्ररूपोप्यसौ निवर्तते । मोक्षे
 मवे च सर्वत्र निःस्पृहो मुनिसत्तमः इति वचनात् । अन्यथा मवत्य-
 सेपि दुःखनिवृत्त्यात्मकमोक्षाङ्गीकृतो दुःखविषयकपायकालुष्यं
 320 केन निषिध्यत । इति सिद्धं कूलकर्मसत्यात्परमसुखसंवेदनात्मका
 माक्षो न सुखादिविशेषगुणोच्छेदरूप इति ॥ अपि च मोः तप-
 स्विन् कथं विदुच्छेदोत्प्राकमप्यमिमत् एवैयामिति वा विरूपं
 वनः कृपाः । तथा हि मुदिद्वन्द्वेन ज्ञानमुच्यते । तच्च मतिश्रुताव-
 भिमनःपर्यायकेवलमेवात्यव्या । तत्रार्थं ज्ञानबन्धुष्यं सायोपश
 325 मित्वात् केवलज्ञानाविर्भावकाल एव मसीनम् । “नष्टमि च छात्र-
 मस्तिय नाण” इत्यागमात् । केवलं तु सर्वद्वन्द्वपर्यागतं सायिक

स्वेन निष्कृष्टास्माभ्युपत्वाद्दस्त्येव मोक्षावस्थायां भुर्गं नु कथयिष्ये
 तत्र नास्ति । तदतोर्बेदमीयमर्मणोऽभावात् । यत्तु निरतिशयमस्य
 मनसमनन्तं च सुखं तद्वर्णं विधत् । दूःखस्य चापर्ममृमरणा
 830 तदुच्छेदादुच्छेदः । नन्वत्र सुखस्यापि परममूलत्वाद्दर्मस्य चोच्छे-
 दाच्चदपि न युज्यते । पुण्यपापस्यो मास इत्यागमवचनात् ।
 नैवम् । वैपयिक्तसुखस्यैव परममूलत्वाच्चतु तदुच्छेदा न पुनरन-
 पत्तस्यापि सुखस्योच्छेदः । इच्छाद्वेषा पुनर्मोक्षेदत्वात् तस्य
 च समूलकार्पण्यवितत्वाद्भावाः । अयत्नश्च क्रियाभ्यापारगोचरा
 835 नास्त्येव । कृत्कृम्यत्वात् । वीर्यान्तराप स्योपनतम्बस्त्येव प्रपत्नो
 दानापिच्छन्निवत् । न च कश्चिदुपपुज्यते कृन्मर्त्वात् । धर्माधर्म-
 योस्तु पुण्यपापपरपर्याययोश्चोच्छेदोऽस्त्येव । तदभावे मासस्यैवा
 योगात् । संस्कारश्च मतिज्ञानविधेय एव । तस्य च मोक्षपानन्तरमेव
 क्षीयत्वाद्भावा इति । तदेवं न संविदानन्दमयी च मुक्तिरिति
 840 मुक्तिरिक्तेयमुक्तिरिति काम्यार्थः ॥ ८ ॥

अथ ते वादिनः कायप्रमाणत्वात्पुनः स्वयंसंवेद्यमानमप्यय-
 म्य तादृशकुशाक्षश्च स्वसर्पकविनष्टादप्यस्तस्य विदुस्त्वं मन्यन्ते । अत-
 स्तत्रोपाख्यमाह ।

यत्रैव यो दृष्टगुणः स तत्र
 कुम्भादिष्वग्निष्यतिपक्षमेतत् ।
 तथापि देहाद्बहिरात्मतत्त्व
 मतत्त्ववादोपहृताः पठन्ति ॥ ९ ॥

यमेव देहे यः पदार्थो दृष्टगुणः दृष्टाः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतोत्त-
 ८, भूता गुणा धर्मा यस्य स तथा स पदार्थस्तत्रैव विवक्षितदेश एवो
 पपद्यते । क्रियाभ्याहारो नम्यः । पूर्वस्यैवकारस्यावधारणार्थस्यावा-

- प्यमितसंघात् तत्रैव नान्यत्तत्तन्मन्ययोगस्यच्छेदः । अमुमेवार्थे
 दृष्टान्तेन दृश्यति । कुम्भादिष्विति । घटादिषु । यथा कुम्भादे
 र्यत्रैव देहे रूपादयो गुणा उपलभ्यन्ते तत्रैव तेषामस्त्वित् प्रतीयते
 10 नान्यत्र एवमात्मनापि गुणाभैतन्यादयो देह एव दृश्यन्ते न
 हि तस्मात् तत्प्रमाणं पृथग्यमिति । यद्यपि पुष्पादीनामवस्थान-
 देशादन्यथापि गन्धादिगुण उपलभ्यन्ते तथापि तत्र न व्यभि-
 चारः । तदाश्रया हि गन्धादिपुद्गलास्तेषां च वैलसिक्या
 प्रायोगिक्या वा गत्या गतिमत्त्वेन तदुपलम्बकघ्राणादिवेक्षं याव
 15 दागमनोपपत्तेरिति । अत एवाह । निष्पत्तिपक्षमेतदिति । एतन्नि-
 ष्पत्तिपक्षं बाधकरहितम् । न हि दृष्टानुपपन्नं नामति न्यायात् ।
 ननु मन्त्रादीनां भिन्नदेशस्थानामप्याकर्षणोच्चाटनादिको गुणो
 योमनश्चतादेः परतोपि दृश्यते इत्यस्ति बाधकमिति चेत् मैवं
 बोधः । स हि न मल्लु मन्त्रादीनां गुणः किं तु तद्विष्ठातृदेवतानाम् ।
 20 तासां चाकर्षणीयाच्चाटनीयादिवेक्षगमन कौतस्कुतोऽप्यमुपास्यम् ।
 न नानु गुणा गुणिनमतिरिच्य भवन्त इति ॥

अपोत्तरार्थं व्याख्यायते । तथापीत्यादि । तथाप्येष निःस्पृहं
 व्यवस्थितेति तत्र । अतस्त्वयादोषहताः । अनाचार इत्यत्र नमः
 कृत्स्नार्थत्वात् । कुत्सिततत्त्ववादेन तद्विधिमतास्त्रायासपुरुषविशेषमधीतेन
 25 तस्यामासमरूपणनापहता व्यापारिताः । देहादृहिः शरीरव्यति-
 रिक्तेषु दृष्टं । आत्मतत्त्वमात्मरूपम् । पठन्ति स्मार्त्तरूपतया मणयन्ते ॥
 इत्यस्यार्थः ॥

भाषार्यस्त्वयम् । आत्मा सर्वगतो न भवति । सर्वत्र तद्-
 गुणानुपलभ्ये । यो यः सर्ववानुपलभ्यमानगुण स सर्वगतो
 30 न भवति यथा घटा । तथा चायम् । तस्मात् तथा । व्यतिरेकं व्योमा-
 दिः ॥ न चायमसिद्धा हेतुः । कायव्यतिरिक्तदेहे तद्गुणानां पुद्गला

- दीनां वादिना प्रतिपादिना ज्ञानभ्युपगमात् । तथा च यः
 भीषर । सयगतस्वेष्ट्यात्मना देहमदश्च ज्ञातृत्वं नाम्यस्य प्री-
 रस्यापभागायननत्वात् अन्यथा तस्य वयमर्थात् इति । अथास्त्व-
 २ दृष्टमात्मना विधुषणम् । तस्य सर्वोत्पत्तिमतां निमित्तं सवर्ण्यप-
 च । कथमनरथा द्रोणात्तत्तादिष्वपि प्रतिनियतद्वयवर्तिपुरुषोपभा-
 ग्यानि क्लृप्तकर्मचन्दनाङ्गनाडीनि तेनात्पाद्यन्त । गुणश्च गुणि-
 विहाय न वर्तते । अतानुमीयत सवर्गत आन्मति । नैवम् । अ-
 तस्य सर्वगतत्वसाधने प्रमाणाभावात् । अथास्त्येष प्रमाणं बदे
 ४० कद्वम्बचर्नं शयास्तिपगुणमर्नं चादृष्टकारितमिति चेन्न । तयो-
 म्नास्त्वभावत्वादेव तस्मिन्दहनस्य दहनशक्तिवत् । साप्यदृष्टका-
 रिता च तर्हि जगज्जगद्विघ्नीशूषणेपि तत्रैव सूक्ष्मारापय-
 किमीश्वरकल्पनया । तन्मायमसिद्धो ह्युः ॥ नवानैकान्तिकः ।
 साध्यसाधनयोभ्यासिग्रहणन अभिधारामावात् ॥ नापि सिद्धः ।
 ४१ अत्यन्तं विपक्षम्याहृतत्वात् । आरमगुणाच्च बुद्ध्यादयः प्रीर-
 एषापक्षम्यन्ते ततो गुणिनापि तत्रैव माप्यम् ॥ इति सिद्धः काम-
 प्रमाण आत्मा ॥ अन्यच्च । त्वमा आत्मनां बहुत्वमिष्यत । नानात्वानो-
 भ्यवत्त्वात् इति वचनात् । ते च व्यापकाः । तत्तत्तपो मदीपममा-
 मण्डत्वानामिव परस्परानुबेधे तत्राभितशुभाशुभकर्मणामपि पर-
 ४२ स्पर्तं संकरः स्यात् । तत्राचैकस्य शुभकर्मणा अन्यः सुखी भवे-
 दितरस्याशुभकर्मणा अन्यो दुःखीत्यसमग्रसमापद्येत । अन्यच्च
 एकस्यैवात्मनः स्वोपात्तशुभकर्मविपाकेन सुखित्वं परापार्जिता-
 शुभकर्मविपाकसंबन्धेन च दुःखित्वमिति युगपत्सुखदुःखसंभवन-
 मसङ्गः ॥ भव स्वापद्वयभोगायतनमाश्रित्यैव शुभाशुभयोर्मोहं तर्हि
 ४३ स्वोपार्जितमप्यदृष्ट कर्षं भोगायतनाद्वादिनिष्कम्पं बदेकद्वम्बद

- नान्निर्गं करातीति चिन्त्यमवत् ॥ आत्मनां च सर्वगतत्वं एवैकस्य
 छष्टिकर्तृत्वमसङ्ग । सर्वगतत्वेनैकान्तरानुपवेशस्य सभावनीय
 त्वात् । ईश्वरस्य वा तदन्तरानुपवेश तस्याप्यकर्तृत्वापत्तिः । न हि
 सौरनीरयोरन्यान्यसम्बन्धे एकतरस्य पानादिक्रिया अन्यतरस्य न
 60 मवतीति पुच्छं वक्तुम् ॥ किञ्च आत्मनः सर्वगतत्वं नरनारकादि
 पर्पायाणां युगपदनुभवानुपपन्नः । अयं योगायतनाभ्युपगमाभावात्
 द्वाप इति चेत् ननु स योगायतनं सर्वात्मनाबष्ट्रीपादकदेशन
 वा । सर्वान्मना चदस्यदभिमताङ्गीकारः । एकदश्चन वत् सावय
 वत्वमसङ्ग । परिपूर्णयोगाभावाच्च ॥ अथात्मनो व्यापकत्वाभावे
 6 दिग्देशात्तत्त्वर्तिपरमाणुभिर्युगपत्सयोगाभावादाद्यकर्माभावात् तद-
 भावादन्त्यसंयोगस्य तन्निमित्तशरीरस्य तेन तत्संबन्धस्य चामा
 वातनुपायसिद्धिर्भवदा सर्वेषां मोक्ष स्यात् । नैवम् । यथेन
 संयुक्तं तद्देश स प्रत्युपसर्पतीति नियमासम्भवात् । अयस्कान्तप्रत्य
 यसस्तनासंयुक्तस्याप्याकपणापसन्धः । अथासंयुक्तस्याप्याकपणे
 70 तच्छरीरारम्भं प्रत्यकमुसीमृतानां विभूतनादरविबरवर्तिपरमाणू
 नाह्वयसर्पणमसङ्गान्न जाने तच्छरीरं कियत्प्रमाणं स्यादिति चत्
 संयुक्तस्याप्याकपणे कथं स एव दोषा न भवेत् । आत्मना व्यापक-
 त्वेन सकृदपरमाणूनां तेन संयोगात् । अथ तद्भावाविशेषः ११११११
 द्विबलितशरीरान्पादनानुगुणा नियता एव परमाणव उपसपन्ति ।
 7 तदितरत्रापि तुल्यम् ॥ अथास्तु यथाकथञ्चिच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः तथापि
 सावयव शरीरं प्रत्ययवयवमनुमविश्रयात्मा सावयव स्यात् । तथा
 चाम्य पटादिवत् कायत्वमसङ्ग । कार्यत्वे चामौ विजातीयं स
 , जातायवाकारणरारम्भेतान सावद्विजातीयं भेषादनारम्भकत्वात् ।
 न हि तन्नवाप्यमारमत्तं न च सजातीयं । यत् आत्मत्वाभिर्षं

- 80 पादेवैतेषां कारणानां सप्राप्तीयत्वम् । पार्थिवान्निपरमाणूनां विभाती
यत्वात् । तथा चान्यमिरात्मा आरभ्यत इत्यापातम् । तच्चायुक्तम् । एकत्र
शरीरेऽनेकात्मनामास्थारम्भकानामसंभवात् । संभवे वा मत्तिसंघा
नानुपपत्तिः । नष्टन्येन दृष्टमप्यः मत्तिसंघातुमर्हति । अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।
तदारभ्यत्वे चास्य घटवदवयवक्रियातो विभागात्संयोगविनाशा
85 द्विनाशः स्यात् । तस्माद्विषापक एवात्मा युज्यते । कायप्रमाणता
यामुक्तदोषसंज्ञायात् । इति चेन्न । सावयवत्वकार्यत्वया कार्यविदा
त्मन्यभ्युपगमात् । तत्र सावयवत्वं तावदसंभवेयमदेष्टारम्भकत्वम् ।
तथा च द्रव्यालङ्कारकारौ । आकाशापि सदेष्टः सकृत्संभूतो
भिसंभन्वाइत्वात् इति । यद्यप्यवयवमदेष्टयोर्योग्यहस्त्पादिषु
90 मेदोस्ति तथापि नाय मूलेमेतिका चिन्ता । मदेष्टेऽप्यवयवमवयव
हारात् । कायत्वं तु बह्वयमः ॥ नन्वात्मना कार्यत्वे पदादिभू
प्राक्प्रसिद्धसमानभातीवावयवारभ्यस्त्वमसक्तिः । अवयवा तत्रय
विनमारभन्तं यथा तन्तवः पत्रमिति चेन्न वाच्यम् । न खलु
पत्रदावपि कार्ये प्राक्प्रसिद्धसमानभातीयरूपास्तपोगात्मत्व दृष्टम् ।
95 कुम्भकारादिभ्यामाराम्भितान्मृत्पिण्डारम्भमवयव पृष्ठपुष्पोदराया
कारस्यास्योत्पत्तिप्रतीतिः । द्रव्यस्य हि पूर्वाकारपरिस्थामन उत्तरा
कारपरिणामः कायत्वम् । तत्र बहिरिवाभ्यन्तरप्यनुभूयत एव । तन्मा
स्यापि म्यात्काय । न च पदादौ स्थावयवसंयोगपूर्वककायत्वा
पक्षमात् सर्वत्र तथामात्रा युक्तः । काष्ठे लोहस्येत्त्वोपलम्भाद्
100 वसेवितथामानप्रसङ्गात् । प्रमाणवापनसुमयवत्तुल्यम् । न चात्म-
संगकार्यभ्यामभ्युपगमप्यात्मना भनितस्यानुपपत्त्याप्रतिसन्धानाभावात्
तुपपद्यते । कार्यविनाशस्य सत्यस्याप्यवयवान्त्वात् । मत्तिसं
स्थान हि यमहमन्तं तमर्हं म्यामीत्यादिभ्यम् । तथैकात्मनित्यत्वं
कथमुपपद्यत । अत्रस्थापनात् । अन्या अनुपपत्त्या मया च

- 103 स्मरणावस्था । अवस्थामेदे चावस्थावतोपि भदादेकरूपस्य
 सतेः कर्षयितुं निवृत्त्य युक्त्यापात कन चायताम् ॥ अथात्मन
 शरीरपरिमाणस्य मूर्तत्वानुपपत्त्या शरीरेणुमवेष्टा न स्यात् । मूर्ते मूर्त
 स्यानुमवेष्टाविरोधात् । ततो निरा मकमथास्मिन्न शरीर प्राप्तातीति
 चेद् किमिदं मूर्तत्वं नाम । असर्गगतद्रव्यपरिमाणत्वं रूपादिमत्त्वं
 110 वा । तत्र नाथ पयो दापाय । समनत्वात् । द्वितीयस्य युक्तः ।
 व्याप्त्यभावात् । नहि यदसर्गगतं तन्नियमेन रूपादिमतिरूपिना
 भावोति । मनसोऽसर्गगतत्वेपि यथन्यते तदसम्भवात् । आका
 शकालदिगात्मना सर्गगतत्वं सर्वसंयोगिसमानदृष्टत्वं वेत्युक्त-
 त्वान्मनसो वैशम्यात्सर्गगतत्वमतिषेधनात् । अतां नात्मन शरीरऽ
 115 नुमवेष्टानुपपत्तिर्येन निरात्मकं तत् स्यात् । असर्गगतद्रव्यपरिमाण
 त्वममूर्तत्वस्य मनोव्यवस्थेयमतिरूपकत्वात् । रूपादिमत्त्वव्यवस्थ-
 मूर्तत्वोपेतस्यापि जलादवांशुपादाधनुमवशो न निषिध्यत आत्म
 नस्तु तद्वदितस्यापि तत्रासौ प्रतिषिध्यत इति महश्चिन्म ॥ अथा
 त्मनः क्वाप्यवमाणत्वे बालशरीरपरिमाणस्य सतां युवशरीरपरि
 120 माणम्बीकारः कथं स्यात् । किं तत्परिमाणपरित्यागात् तदपरित्या
 गाद्वा । परित्यागाच्च तदा शरीरवत्तस्यानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्पर-
 त्योक्तप्रभावानुपपत्तिः । अथापरित्यागात् तन्न । पूर्वपरिमाणापरित्याग
 शरीरवत्तस्योत्तरपरिमाणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । तदयुक्तम् । युवशरीरपरि
 माणावस्थापामात्मनो बालशरीरपरिमाणपरित्याग सत्तया विना ना
 1 मंभवात् । विफलावस्थास्यापि सपत् । नति कथं परमाकांक्षा
 नुपपन्न । पर्याप्तस्वभावानित्यत्वमपि न्ययना नित्यत्वात् ॥ अथा
 त्मनः क्वाप्यवमाणत्वे तत्त्वण्डने त्वण्डनमसद् नति चत्त कः किमाह
 शरीरस्य त्वण्डने कथं चित्तस्त्वण्डनमप्यष्टम्बात् । शरीरमंभवात्तम
 स्या हि कतिपयात्ममदेष्टानां त्वण्डनशरीरमदृष्टस्य आनात्मन

- १३० स्वण्डनम् । तथात्र विद्यत एव । अन्यथा शरीरात्पृथग्भूताव्यवस्थं
 कम्पायमम्बिर्न स्यात् । न च स्वण्डितावयवानुपनिष्टस्यास्पन्दे
 भ्रस्य पृथगात्मस्वमसङ्गः । तत्रैवानुपबध्नात् । न चैकम सत्त्वानेऽनेके
 आत्मानः । अनेकावयवमिति भासिद्धानानामकममाभाधारतया प्रतिमा
 साभास्यसङ्गात् । शरीरान्तरव्यवस्थितानकज्ञानावसेयावसेवसंविधि
 १३५ वत् । कथं स्वण्डितावयवयाः संपृष्टं पश्चादिति चेत् एकान्तेन
 छेदान्म्युपगमात् । पश्चनास्तन्तुवच्छ्रुत्वापि स्वीकारात् ।
 तथाभूतादृष्टवद्वाच्यत्वं न मनसि न्दमेवति तनुपरिमाण एवात्मास्त्री
 कर्तव्यो न व्यापकः । तथा चात्मा व्यापकः न भवति । चेतनत्वात् ।
 यत्तु व्यापकं न तत्त्वत्वं यथा व्यापः । चेतनमात्मा । तस्मात् व्यापकः ।
 १४० अव्यापकत्वं चास्य तत्रैवापस्तम्भमानगुणत्वेन मिद्धा कायममाण
 ना । वस्तुनः शुभमयसाध्यकवस्तिस्मृत्वा तद्व्यापामाहृतानामपि
 चतुर्दशरज्जात्मकसाकम्पापित्वनात्मन सर्वव्यापकत्वं तत्त्वादाधि-
 र्कमिति न तेन व्यभिचारः । स्यान्नात्मनः कृत्वावगुण्डितानां च
 नदप्रविमीपिकाभ्या अपभिति काव्यार्थः ॥ • ॥

वस्तुपिकनेयाधिक्याः प्रायः समानतः बत्वादीन् न्यमत विवे
 योगमतमपि शिष्टमवावसेमम् । पञ्चार्थेषु च तयारपि न तुल्या
 प्रतिपत्तिरिति साधनमलपात्रमतिपात्रितपदाधानां सर्वेषां चतुर्षु
 पुरुषार्थ प्रत्यसापकतमम्बे वाच्यपि तदन्तःपातिनां छलप्रानि-
 निवृत्त्यर्थानां पतापन्यामनिगममात्रम्यतया अत्यन्तमनुपादे
 यन्नात् नदपदं नदातुर्बैराग्यमुपहसन्नाह ।

स्ययविश्रादग्रहिले वितण्डा

पाण्डित्यकण्डूलमुखे जनेऽस्मिन् ।

मायोपदेशात्परमर्म मिन्द

अहो विरक्तो मुनिरन्यदीय ॥ १० ॥

- अन्य अभिज्ञातत्वाभासारतयाऽनुपादेयनामान परे । तपामय
शास्त्रसूत्रेण संबन्धी अन्यदीय । मुनिः असपादश्रयिः । अहो विरक्तः
अहो वैराम्यवान् । अहो इत्युपहासगममाश्रय सूचयति । अन्य
१० दीय इत्यत्र ईयकारके इति दोषः । किं कुवमित्याह परमर्म
मिन्दन् । आतापेकवचनप्रयोगात् परमर्माणि व्यथयन् । बहु
भिरात्मप्रदेशैरभिष्टिता देहावयवा मर्माणीति पारिभाषिकी संज्ञा ।
तत उपचारात्साध्यस्वतत्त्वसाधनाभ्यामिचारितया माणयूतं साध-
नोपन्यासापि मर्मैव मर्म । कस्यास्तमिन्दन् । मायोपदेशाद्धो ।
१५ मायापरवचनम् । तस्या उपद्रष्टृशङ्कजातिनिग्रहस्यानसृष्टणपदाय
‘सृष्टमरूपपण्दरारण क्षिप्येभ्य मतिपादन तस्मात् । गुणादस्त्रियां न
वा इत्यनेन इत्तां तृतीयाप्रसङ्गे पक्षणी । कस्मिन्निपये मायामय
मुपद्रष्टृवान् इत्याह । अस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षोपलक्ष्यमाणे जने तस्मात्-
विमर्शवहिर्मुक्ततया प्राकृतमाये लोके । कथयूत । स्वयमात्मना
२० परोपदेशनिरपेक्षमेव । विवादग्रहिष्ठ । विरक्तः परस्परकृतीकृत
पक्षाभिसेपदलो वादो वचनोपन्यासा विवाद । तथा च मनवान्
हरिभद्राचारिः ।

सम्प्रिख्यास्यमिना तु स्याद् दुःस्थितनामहात्मना ।

उक्तजातिमनानो य स विवाद इति स्पष्ट ॥

- २५ तत्र ग्रहिष्ठ इव ग्रहणीत इय विवादग्रहिष्ठ । तत्र यथा ग्रहा
वपस्मारपरवच्च पुरुषो यत्किंचनप्रज्ञापी स्यादेवमयमपि जन
इति भाषः । तथा विवक्ष्य मतिपक्षस्थापनादीन वाक्यम् । विव
वक्ष्यते आह्वन्यतेऽनया मतिपक्षस्थापनमिति व्युत्पत्ते । अग्न्युत्पत्त्य

- परं यो न व्यापयति स वनण्डक इत्युच्यते इति व्यापवार्ति-
 30 कम् । मस्तुनस्तु अपराधुष्टनत्वात्तत्वावधारं यस्त्वर्थं विवक्षा ।
 तत्र यत्पाण्डित्यमधिकम् कौशलं तत्र कण्डूस्त्वमिव कम्बुर्मुने
 म्पन्नं यस्य स तथा तस्मिन् । कण्डूः गच्छू । कण्डूरस्याप्तीति
 कण्डूः । मिथ्यादिस्वान्मन्मर्थ्यायाः समत्वस्य । यथा किञ्चान्नन्त्यप्र-
 कृमिद्वन्द्वजनिता कण्डूति निराद्युपचारयन्तुर्गो व्याकुर्वता
 35 कस्यपि एवं तद्वृत्त्यपि विवक्षापाण्डित्यनासंपदप्रमयापवा-
 पन्माकलपत्कण्डूस्त्वमित्युपपन्नम् । एव एव स्वरसत् एव स्वत्वा
 मिमतस्य व्यापनाविमंशुनो वतण्डिकमाका । तत्र च तत्परमप्रभु-
 पुरुषविशेषपरिकल्पितपरवचनमयुरवयवोपदेशवत्सहाय सम-
 गति तदा स्वत एव उवासाकम्पापजटिले प्रवसति हुताशन इव
 40 कृतो घृताहुतिमक्षयति । तस्य मवायिनन्दिमिवातिभिरेवाहसो
 पदसदानमपि तस्य मुनः कारुणिकस्वकोत्पारापितम् । तथा
 चाहुः ।

दुःशिक्षितकृतकर्मजगताधामिमाननाः ।

द्वरपाः किमन्यथा ननु विवक्षाद्वयमग्नित्वाः ॥

4 गतानुगतिको काकः कुमार्गं तत्प्रवारित ।

मा गादिति छम्पादीनि प्राह काकणिका मुनिः ॥

कारुणिकत्वं च वराग्याध मिद्यत । तदा युक्तमुक्तम् अहा
 विरक्त इति स्तुतिकारणापशमपन्नम् ॥ अथ माधोपदम्भादि-
 तिमन्नासूर्तं विन्यस्य । अक्षपादयत किञ्च पोदस्य पदार्थाः ।

60 प्रमाणप्रमयसंक्षयप्रमाणनदृष्टान्मिथ्याम्नावयवतन्निष्पन्नानामपि
 विवक्षाहस्यामासल्लभ्यानिनिशङ्कस्यानामां तत्त्वप्रामाण्यः प्र-
 साभिमत इति वचनात् । न चेतेषां व्यस्तानां सदस्तानां वा

अधिगमो निःश्रेयसायामिहेतुः । न ह्येकैर्नैव क्रियाविरहितेन ज्ञान
 माश्रयेण मुक्तिमुक्तिमयी । असमग्रसामग्रीकत्वात् । विघटितैकचक्र-
 ५ रयेन मनीषितनगरमाश्रितम् । न च बाध्य न सल्लु यय क्रिया
 प्रतिसिद्धिपामः किंतु तत्त्वज्ञानपूर्विकाया एव तस्या मुक्तिहेतुत्व-
 मिति ज्ञापनाय तत्त्वज्ञानाभिःश्रेयसाधिगम इति श्रूम इति । न
 ह्यपीपां संहते अपि ज्ञानक्रिये मुक्तिमाप्तिहेतुभूत । पितयत्वा
 च त्वज्ञानक्रियया । न च वितयत्वमसिद्धम् । विचार्यमाणानां पोह
 १० ज्ञानामपि तत्त्वामासत्वात् । तथा हि । तैः प्रमाणस्य तावच्छ्र-
 णमित्येव सूत्रितम् अर्थोपलब्धिहेतु प्रमाणमिति । एतच्च न विचार
 सहम् । यतोऽर्थोपलब्धौ हेतुत्वं यदि निमित्तत्वमात्रं तत्सर्वं
 कारकसाधारणमिति कर्तृकर्मादेरपि प्रमाणत्वमसङ्गः । अथ कर्तृ-
 कर्मादिविस्मरण हेतुशब्देन करणमेव विवक्षितं तर्हि तत्त्वज्ञानमेव
 १५ युक्तं न चेन्द्रियसमिकर्षणादि । यस्मिन् हि सत्यर्थे उपलब्धौ भवति
 स तत्करणम् । न चेन्द्रियसमिकर्षणसामान्यादौ सत्यपि ज्ञानामावे-
 र्थोपलब्धम् । साधकत्वम हि करणम् । अभ्यवहितफलं तद्विध्यते । व्य-
 हितफलस्यापि करणत्वं दुग्धभोजनादेरपि तयामसङ्गः । तन्न
 ज्ञानादन्यत्र प्रमाणत्वम् । अन्यत्रोपचारात् । यदपि न्यायभूषणसूत्र-
 २० कारेणोक्तं सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणमिति तत्रापि साधनप्रवृत्त्या
 स्कर्तृकर्मनिरासन करणस्यैव प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यति । तथाप्यव्यव-
 हितफलत्वेन साधकत्वमस्य ज्ञानस्यैवेति न तत्सम्यगुल्लक्षणम् ।
 स्वपरम्परसाधि ज्ञान प्रमाणम् इति तु तावन्निकं सुलक्षणम् ॥

प्रमेयमपि तैरात्मसरीरेन्द्रियार्थयुद्धिमनःमहच्चिदोपदेस्यमावफल
 २५ दुःस्वापरगमेदाद् द्वादशविधमुक्तम् । तन्न न सम्यक् ॥ यतः शरीरे
 न्द्रिययुद्धिमनःमहच्चिदोपफलदुःस्वानामात्मन्यवगत्यर्थादो युक्तः ।
 संसारिण आत्मनः कथंविधदविष्यग्युतत्वात् । आत्मा च
 ॥ [स्वयम्]

प्रमेय एव न भवति । तस्य प्रमातृत्वात् ॥ इन्द्रियबुद्धिमनसां तु कर
णत्वात्प्रमेयत्वाभावात् ॥ दापास्तु रागद्वेषमोहास्ते च मनुष्येन पूषणम्
५० वितुमहन्ति । शक्यमनकायव्यापारस्य शुभाशुभकर्मस्य विद्यति
विषस्य तन्मते महत्विषयव्याप्यत्वात् । रागादिदोषाणां च मनो
व्यापारात्मकत्वात् ॥ दुःखस्य घण्यादीनामिन्द्रियार्थानां च कर्म
एवान्तर्भावः । महत्विषयमभिर्तु सुखदुःखात्मकं सुखं कर्म तस्मा
त्तु गौणम् इति ज्ञेयन्तवचनात् ॥ मत्प्रमादपवगयोः पुनरात्मन
५५ एव परिणामान्तरापत्तिरूपत्वाच्च पार्यवयमात्मनः सकाशादुचितम् ॥
तदेवं द्वादशविधं प्रमेयमिति वाग्विस्तरमाश्रम् । द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं
वस्तु प्रमेयम् इति तु समीचीनं कृतञ्च । सर्वसंग्राहकत्वात् ॥
एवं संज्ञयादीनामपि तद्व्यापारसत्त्वं प्रेक्षावद्विरुद्धेक्षणाय । अत्र
तु मतीतत्वाद् ग्रन्थगौरवमयाच्च न प्रपञ्चितम् । स्पष्टेण ह्यत्र
६० न्यायशास्त्रमप्यवधारणीयं तच्चावधार्यमाणं ग्रन्थान्तरवामवगाह्य
इत्यास्ताम् ॥

तदेवं प्रमाणादिषोडशपर्यायानामनिश्चितेऽपि तच्चाभासत्वे
मकटकपन्नाटकसूत्रपाराणां प्रमाणादेव छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां
मायापदेष्टादित्यपदेनोपसर्गः कृतः ॥ तत्र परस्य वदताऽप्यधिकृत्यो
१०० पपादनेन वचनविघातश्छलम् । तन्निघा । शत्रुर्लक्षं सामान्य
च्छलसूत्रपारच्छलं चेति । तत्र साधारणे चन्द्र प्रयुक्तं वक्तुरभिदे
तादर्थादर्शान्तरकल्पनया तन्निघेपो वाक्यछलम् । यदा नवकम्ब
सोऽयं भावक इति सूतनविषयस्य कथिते परः संख्यामाराप्य
निषप्रति कुतोऽस्य नव कम्बसा इति । संभावनयातिमसङ्गिनोपि
१०५ सामान्यस्योपन्यास हेतुत्वारोपणेन तन्निघेपो सामान्यच्छलम् ।
यदा अहो तु त्वम्बसौ ब्राह्मणो विद्याचरणसंपन्न इति ब्राह्मण
स्तुतिमसङ्गे कथिह्यति संभवति ब्राह्मण विद्याचरणसंपदिति

- तच्छब्दवाची व्याख्यानत्वस्य हेतुतामाराध्य निराकृर्बमभियुक्ते यदि
 व्याख्यान विधाचरणसंपद् भवति त्रास्यपि सा मनेद्वात्योपि व्याख्यान
 110 एवेति । आपचारिके प्रयोगे मुख्यमतिपथेन प्रत्यक्षस्याननुपचार
 एवम् । यथा यथाः क्रोशन्तीत्युक्तं परः प्रत्यक्षतिष्ठते कथमने
 तनाः यथाः क्रोशन्ति यथास्याः पुरुषाः क्रोशन्तीति ॥ तथा
 सम्प्रदायैतौ हेतुमास वा वादिना प्रयुक्ते छटिति तदोपतत्त्वा
 मतिमास हतुमतिविम्बनमार्थं किमपि प्रत्यक्षस्यानं जातिरूपणा
 115 मास इत्यर्थः । सा च बहुविधमतिमदा । साधर्म्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्यान
 भेदेन । यथा साधर्म्यवैषम्योन्कर्षापरकर्षणव्यावर्त्यविकल्पसाध्य-
 मात्म्यमातिप्रसङ्गमतिरिष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंज्ञप्रसरणाहेत्वर्थापक्षविश्ले
 षोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमा । तत्र साधर्म्येण
 प्रत्यक्षस्यानं साधर्म्यसमा जातिमवति । अनित्यः शब्दः कृतक
 120 त्वाद् घटवदिति प्रयोग कृत साधर्म्यप्रयोगेणैव प्रत्यक्षस्यानं नित्यः
 शब्दो निरवयवत्वात्काष्ठवत् । न चास्ति विश्वपेदुधेत्साधर्म्या
 कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दः न पुनराकाशसाधर्म्याभिरवयवत्वा
 भित्य इति । वैषम्येण प्रत्यक्षस्यानं वैषम्यसमा जातिर्यवति ।
 अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवदित्यर्थेव प्रयोग स एव
 125 मतिः । साधर्म्येण प्रयुज्यत नित्यः शब्दो निरवयवत्वाद्
 अनित्यं हि साधर्म्यं इष्टं यद्यदीति । न चास्ति विश्वे
 पदुधेत्साधर्म्यान् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दः न पुनस्त-
 द्वाधर्म्याभिरवयवत्वाभित्य इति । उक्तपापकर्षाम्या प्रत्यक्ष
 म्यानमुक्तपापकृपसम जाती भवतः । तत्रैव प्रयोग छान्तधर्म
 130 र्कयित्साध्यर्थाप्यापादयन्नुत्पत्तिसमा जाति प्रयुक्त । यदि घ-
 टन् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दः घटवत् मूर्तो भवतु न धन्मूर्तो
 घटवदनित्यापि माभूदिति शब्दः यमाभरात्कृपमापादयति ।

- अपरर्पेस्तु यत् कृतम् सप्तप्रायणां ह्यर्चं धर्मोप्यस्तु नो
 चेद् यद्वदन्तित्योपि माभूदिति शब्द आचरणत्वधर्मपरर्पणीति ।
 123 इत्येतावत्स्रो दिव्याप्रदर्शनार्थं मातय चत्ता । एवं क्षपा अपि
 विपतिरसपादश्चास्वादश्चयाः । अत्र तु अनुपयागित्वाप्त सिम्बि
 ताः॥ तत्र विपतिपतिरतिपतिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् । तत्र विपतिपति
 साधनामासे साधनबुद्धिर्दूषणायाम् च दूषणबुद्धिरिति । अतिप
 तिः साधनस्यादूषणं दूषणस्य चानुदरणम् । तत्र निग्रहस्थानं
 140 ह्यविच्छतिविषयम् । यथा । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञा
 विरापाः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः हेत्वन्तरम् अयान्तरम् निरवक्रमम् अविज्ञा
 तार्थम् अपावकम् अमातकामम् न्यूनम् अधिकम् पुनरुक्तम् अननु
 मापणम् अज्ञानम् अमतिमा विज्ञपः यतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयाग्यापेक्षणं
 निरनुयाग्यानुयोगः अपसिद्धान्तः इत्याभासाश्च । तत्र हेतावनैका
 148 न्तिकीकृते मतिच्छान्तधर्म स्वच्छान्तम्युपगच्छताः प्रतिज्ञाहानि
 नाम निग्रहस्थानम् । यथा अनित्या शब्द एन्द्रियकत्वाद् पञ्चद्विति
 प्रतिज्ञासाधनाय बाधो बहन् परेण सामान्यमैन्द्रियकमपि नित्यं
 ह्यमिति हेतावनैकान्तिकीकृते यथैव श्रूयात् सामान्यबहदोपि
 नित्यो भवन्ति स एव सुबाणः शब्दानित्यत्वप्रतिज्ञां जघात् ।
 150 प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेध परेण कृत तत्रैव धर्मिणि धर्मान्तरं साधनी
 यमभिदधतः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । अनित्याः
 शब्द एन्द्रियकत्वावित्युक्ते तथैव सामान्येन धर्मिचारं चादित
 यदि श्रूयात् युक्तं सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं नित्यं तद्वि सप्तगतम् अमप
 गतस्तु शब्दः इति तद्वि शब्द अनित्यत्वसप्तप्रायणपूर्वप्रतिज्ञातः प्रति
 15 ज्ञान्तरमसप्तगतः शब्द इति निग्रहस्थानम् । अनया विद्या श्रेया
 ध्यपि विवक्षितार्थानि । "ह तु न सिंसितानि । पूर्ववद्वारेण ॥ इत्यर्थं
 मायाशब्देनात्र शब्दादिष्वर्थसूचितम् । तत्रैव परब्रह्मनाम्नान्यपि

छसजातिनिग्रहस्यानानि तत्स्वरूपतयोपदिष्टतोऽसंपादोर्पेवराग्य
 व्यावर्जनं तमसा प्रकाशात्मकस्वप्नम्यापनमिष कथमिष नोप
 160 हसनीयमिति काव्यार्थः ॥ १० ॥

अधुना मीमांसकमत्रामिमं वेदविहितहिंसाया भर्महेतुत्वमुप
 पत्तिपुरसरं निरस्यमाह ।

न धर्महेतुर्विहितापि हिंसा
 नोऽष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च ।
 स्वपुत्रघाताद्युपतित्वलिप्ता
 सत्रह्यचारि स्फुरित परेषाम् ॥ ११ ॥

इह स्वस्वनिर्माणमतिपक्षधूममार्गाश्रिता जमिनीया इत्यमा
 पस्यते । या हिंसा गान्धर्व्यसन्नितया वा क्रियते सैवापमानं
 6 धर्महेतुः प्रमादसंपादितत्वात् घातिकात्कुम्भकाग्नीनामिष । यद्
 विहिता तु हिंसा मत्स्यत धर्महेतुः देवतातिथिपितृणां मीतिसंपाद
 कत्वात् तवाधिपपूजापचारयत् । न च तमीतिसंपादकत्वं
 मसिद्धम् । कारीरीममृत्तियज्ञानां स्वसाध्ये वृष्ट्यादिकम् यः
 तत्स्वभ्यमिषारः स तस्मीणितवधताविधेयानुग्रहहेतुकः । एवं
 10 विपुरार्णवयणिगच्छगमजाह्नमहामान्तररात्र्यधीकृतिरपि तन्नुष्-
 मितव्रतमसादर्मपाया । अतिथिमीतिस्तु मधुपकसेस्कारादि
 समाम्बाटना मत्पक्षापमर्त्यम् । पितृणामपि तत्तदुपपादितव्यादा
 दिविधानन मीणितानां स्वसंतानवृद्धिविधानं साप्तान्देव वीक्ष्यते ।
 मागमयाव प्रमाणम् । स च दधमीत्यर्थमध्वमप्रणाममनरमया
 13 दिविधानाविधायकः प्रणीत एव । अतिथिविषयस्तु महासे वा
 महामं वा श्रोत्रियाय मरुत्पयत् इत्यादि । पितृमीत्यर्थस्तु-

ह्रीं यामौ यत्स्पर्मासनं श्रीन्मामान् हारिणेन तु ।

मौरप्रणाथ चतुरां प्राङ्मुनेह पथं तु ॥

- इत्यादिः । एवं पराभिमार्य इति सम्पार्याचार्य भविष्यते न
 20 धर्मेत्यादिः ॥ विहितापि बद्धमतिपादितापि । आम्नां तापविविदिता
 हिंसा प्राणिप्राणव्यपरापणकपा । न धर्महतुः न धर्मानुबन्धनिषण्ण
 नम् । यथाऽत्र मरु एव स्वयचनविराधः । तथाहि । हिंसा बद्धमादु
 क्तवम् । धर्महतुश्च हिंसा कथम् । अथर्ता धर्मसर्वस्वं श्रुत्वा यथा
 बधार्पतामिस्मादिः । न हि भवति माता च बध्या चति । हिंसा
 30 कारणं धर्मस्तु तत्कार्यमिति पराभिमार्य । मर्यादं निरपायः ।
 यथा यद्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविषयं तत्तस्य कायम् । यथा
 मृत्पिण्डादर्थगतिः । न च धर्मो हिंसात् एव भवतीति प्राप्तीति
 कम् । तपोविधानवानध्यानाग्नीनां तदकारणत्वमसद्वाद् । अथ
 न धर्मं सामान्येन हिंसां धर्महतुं श्रुतः किं तु विशिष्टामथ
 30 विशिष्टा च सच या बद्धविहितति चेत् ननु तस्या धर्महतुत्वं किं
 बध्यजीवानां मरणमाचन मरणपि तपाभावेऽध्यानाभावात्प्लुगाति
 म्नामन वा । नाथा यथा । प्राणत्यागस्य तेषां साक्षात्वेत्यमा
 णत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । परधत्तादृशीनां दुर्मेसतपार्थध्यानाभावस्य
 बाह्यमात्रत्वात् । अन्युत हा कष्टम् अस्ति न कापि कावचिक
 35 धरणापि स्वभाषया विरसमारसम्भु तपु बद्धनैवेत्यनपनतरम्भवा
 दीनां मिद्वानां वर्धनान् । दुष्प्यानस्य स्पष्टमेव निष्टङ्क्यमानत्वात् ॥
 अथेत्पमाधसीयाः यथा अयःपिण्डा गुरुतया यज्जनात्मकापि
 तनुतरपत्राटिकरणन संस्कृताः सम अमापरि पुत्रत यथा च
 मारणात्मकमपि विषं मन्त्रात्रिसंस्कारविशिष्टं सत् सुणाय जायत
 40 यथा वा तदनस्वभाषोप्यधिः सम्पादियमात्रमनिहतमक्तिः
 सम हि मरुहति एवं मन्त्रात्रिविधिसंस्कारात् सत्

- वेदमिहिता हिंसा दोषपोषाय । न च तस्याः कृत्स्नि
 तत्त्वं शङ्कनीयं तत्कारिणां याज्ञिकानां शोके पूज्यत्वदर्शनादिति ।
 तदेतच्च दक्षाणां समते शोद्धम् । अपम्येण दृष्टान्तानामसाभक्तमत्वा
 45 त् । अयापिष्ठादया हि पश्वादिमानान्तरापन्नाः सन्तः सस्मिन्नतरणा
 दिभ्यासमर्थाः । नच वैदिकमन्त्रसंस्कारविधिनापि विश्वस्यमानानां
 पशूनां काचिद्वेदनास्तुत्यादादिरूपा भावान्तरापत्तिः प्रतीयते । अप
 तेषां घटानन्तरं देवतापधिमार्धान्तरमस्त्यवति चेत्किमत्र प्रमाणम् ।
 न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तस्य संबद्धवर्तमानायेत्याहकत्वात् । संबद्ध
 50 वतमानं च गृह्यते चक्षुरादिना इति वचनात् । नाप्यनुमानम् ।
 तत्प्रतिबद्धसिद्धाज्जुपसम्भवे । नाप्यागमः । तस्याद्यापि विवादास्पद
 त्वात् । अर्थापस्युपमानयास्तच्चनुमानान्तर्गततया तदूपणेनैव गता
 र्थत्वम् । अत्र भवतामपि जिनायतनादिविधानं परिणामविशेषा
 त्पुमिभ्यादिमन्तुजातघातनमपि यथा पुष्पाव कल्पत इति कल्पना
 55 तथास्माकमपि किं नप्यते । वेदास्तविधिविधानरूपस्य परि
 णामविशेषस्य निर्विकल्पं तथापि भावात् । नैवम् । परिणामविशे
 पोपि स एव शुभफलो यवानन्योपायत्वेन यतनपापकृष्टप्रतनु
 चैतन्यानां पृथिव्यादिजीवानां भवपि स्वल्पपुण्यव्ययेनापरिमित
 मुकृतसंप्राप्तिः न पुनरितरः । भवत्पक्षे तु सत्स्वपि तत्तत्पशुविस्मृति
 60 पुराणेतिहासप्रतिपादितपु यमनियमादिषु स्वर्गावाप्त्युपायेषु तांस्ता
 न्द्वान्नुद्दिश्य प्रतिप्रतीकं कर्तनकथ्यनया कान्दिदीकान्कृपण-
 पक्षेन्द्रियाम् सौनिराधिकं मारयतां कृत्स्नमुकृतम्वयेन दुर्गति
 मेवानुमुक्षयतां दुःखः शुभपरिणामविशेषः । एवं च यं कथनं
 पदार्थं किञ्चित्साध्यम्यद्वारणैव दृष्टान्तीकुर्यतां भवतामतिप्रसङ्गः
 65 संगच्छत । न च जिनायतनविधापनार्हा पृथिव्यादिजीववर्गेपि न
 गुणः । तथाहि तच्छेनादृष्टान्तगागितया मय्यानां वापिछामः पूजा

विभ्रयविमोहनादिना च मनश्चसाद* ततः समाधिःततश्च क्रयण
निभ्रयसमाप्तिरिति । तथा च मगवान्यव्यभिचीकारः ।

पुडपाइयाण जइयि हु हाइ विणासो जिणास्यार्हितो ।

70 तद्विसया वि मुदिहिस्स णियममा अत्थि अणुर्कपा ॥ १ ॥

पर्याहिता धुद्धा विरया रक्त्वेति अण पुडपाई ।

इहो निम्बाणगया अवाहिया आभवमिमाणं ॥२॥

रोगिसिरावेहो इव सुविज्झाकिरिया य सुप्पठत्तामा ।

परिणाममुंदरविषय विद्धा मे बाहमाग वि ॥ ३ ॥

75 इति । वैदिकयजुषिषाने तु न केचित्पुण्यार्मनानुगुणं पुणं पश्यामः ।

अथ विमेभ्य* पुरोडाशादिष्वदानेन पुण्यानुबन्धी गुणोस्त्येवेति

चेत् न । पवित्रमुपर्णादिष्वदानमात्रेण पुण्यापार्जनसंभवात् ।

कृपुणपशुगणव्यपरोपणसमुत्सर्गमासदानं केवलं निपूणत्वमेव

व्यनक्ति । अथ न यदानमार्थं पशुव्यक्रियाया फलं

80 किं तु भूत्यादिकम् । यदाह श्रुतिः श्वेतं वायव्यमन

मानमेत श्रुतिक्रमः इत्यादि । एतदपि व्यभिचारविशेषग्रस्तत्वा-

दप्रमाणमेव । भूतेर्भाषयिक्तान्तररपि साध्यत्वात् । अथ तत्र सन्ने

हन्पमानानां छागादीनां भेत्यमङ्गतिभासिभ्योस्त्वबोपकार इति

चेत् बाह्यमात्रमेतत् । प्रमाणाभावात् । न हि तं निहताः पशवः

85 संगतिस्त्राभवादि तमनसः कस्मैषिदागत्य तथाभूतमात्मानं कथ

यन्ति । अथास्त्वागमास्यं प्रमाणम् । यथा

औषध्याः पशवो वृक्षास्तिर्यग्वाः पशिनस्तथा ।

यद्वार्थं निघर्तं प्राप्ताः प्राप्नुवन्त्युष्मिर्तं पुनः ॥

इत्यादि । नैबम् । तस्य पौषपयापौषपयविकस्याम्यां मिरा-

90 करिष्यमाणत्वात् । न च शीतेन विधिना पशुविश्वमनविधायिना

स्पर्मावाप्तिरुपकार इति बाध्यम् । यदि हि हिंसयापि स्वर्गप्राप्तिः

स्याचर्हि शर्वं पिहितं मरकपुरमसौन्यः । क्षौनिकादीनामपि
स्वर्गमाप्तिमसद्वात् । तथा च पठन्ति पारमर्षाः ।

युपं छित्वा परान् हन्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्मम् ।

95 यद्येष गम्यते स्वर्गे नरके भेन गम्यते ॥

किंच अपरिचितास्पृष्टैस्तन्यानुपकारिपशुर्हिसनेनापि त्रिविध
पदवीमाप्तिस्तदा परिचितस्पृष्टैस्तन्यपरमोपकारिमातापिनादिभ्या
पादनेन यज्ञकारिणामधिकतरपदमाप्तिं प्रसज्यते । अयं अचिन्त्यो
हि मणिमन्त्रापचीनां मभाषः इति वचनाद्वैदिकमन्त्राणामचिन्त्य
100 मभाषत्वात् तत्संस्कृतपशुवध संभवत्प्रेष स्वर्गमाप्तिरिति चेत् न ।

इह लोके विवाहगमाधानजातकमादिषु तन्मन्त्राणां व्यभिचारो
पलम्भादृष्टः स्वगादानपि तद्व्यभिचारोऽनुमीयते । इत्यन्ते हि
वेदाक्तमन्त्रसंस्कारविशिष्टेभ्योपि विवाहादिभ्योनन्तरं वैषय्या
स्वायुष्कतादाग्न्यायुपद्रवविधुराः पराधताः । अपरं च मन्त्रसंस्कारं
105 विना कृतेभ्योपि तेभ्योनन्तरं तद्विपरीताः । अयं तत्र क्रियावैगुण्यं
विसबाद्देशुरिति चेत् न । संशयानिवृत्तेः । किं तत्र क्रियावैगु
ण्याफलं विसबाद् किं वा मन्त्राणामसामर्थ्यादिति न निश्चयः ।
तेषां कवनानिनामावासिद्धः । अयं यथा युष्मन्मते आरामाबोहि
सामं समादिवरमुच्यते दिव्य इत्यादीनां वाक्यानां लोकान्तर

110 एव फलमिष्यत एवमस्मद्भिमतवेदवाक्यानामपि नेह मन्त्रनि
फलमिति किं न प्रतिपद्यत । ततश्च विवाहादीनापलम्भावकाशः
इति चेत् महा वचनवधिषी । यथा वर्तमानजन्मनि विवाहादिषु
मयुर्तमन्त्रसंस्काररागाभिनि जन्मनि तत्फलममरं द्वितीयादिजन्मा
न्तरं प्रपि विवाहादीनामेव मनुजिषमाणां पुण्यवस्तुत्वाद्भीकारनन्त

115 मवानुसंधानं प्रसज्यत । एवं च न कदाचन संसारस्य परिसमाप्तिः ।
तथा च न कस्यचिद्व्यवगमाप्तिः इति मार्त्तं मरुदभिमतवदस्याप्येव

सितसंसारबल्लरीमूलकन्दस्वम् । आरोग्यादिमार्घना तु मसत्यावृषा-
 भापापरिणामविशुद्धिकारणत्वात् दोषाय । तत्र हि भावारोग्या-
 दिकमेव निवर्तितम् । तत्र चातुर्गतिकसंसारलक्षणभावरोगपरिसर-
 120 स्वस्वत्वादुत्तमफलम् । तद्विषया च मार्घना कथमिव विवेकिना
 मनादरणीया । न च तद्व्यन्यपरिणामविशुद्धेस्तत्फलं न प्राप्यते ।
 सत्त्वादिनां भावशुद्धेरपवर्गफलसंपादनऽविप्रतिपत्तरिति । न च
 वेदनिवेदिता हिंसा न कुस्मिता । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानसंपन्नैरर्थ-
 मार्गप्रपञ्चैर्बेदान्तवादिभिश्च गहितत्वात् । तथा च तत्त्वदर्शिनः
 125 पठन्ति ।

देवोपहारभ्यामेन यद्व्याजेन येववा ।

प्रन्ति जन्तून् गतपूजा पोरं ते यान्ति दुर्गतिम् ॥

वेदान्तिका अप्याहुः ।

अन्यं तमसि मज्जामः पशुमिहं यमायहे ।

हिंसा माम मवेद्धर्मो न शूता न भविष्यति ॥

130

तत्रा अभिमायेतस्याद्विसाकृतावनसा ह्यवतु । छान्दसत्वान्मो-
 चयतु इत्यर्थः । इति । व्यासेनाप्युक्तम् ।

ज्ञानपाप्मपरिसिते ब्रह्मचर्यदयाम्भसि ।

ज्ञात्वाविषिमसं गीर्ये पापपङ्कपहागिणि ॥ १ ॥

ध्यानाग्ना जीवकुण्डलं दमयास्तनीपिते ।

असत्कमसमिन्नेपरमिहारं कुरुतमम् ॥ २ ॥

कपायपशुमिर्दुष्टमरामावनामरु ।

दमम-ब्रह्मयज्ञं विपदि विहितं पुनै ॥ ३ ॥

प्राप्तिपाताय या धममीदृते सूदमानसः ।

स ब्रह्मणि मुपावृष्टिं कृष्णादिबुलकोटरात् ॥ ४ ॥

140

इत्यादि ॥ यच्च याज्ञिकानां लोकपूज्यत्वोपसम्मादित्युक्तं तद-
 प्यसारम् । अथवा एव हि पूजयन्ति तान् न तु निषिक्तमुदयम् ।
 अथवा पूज्यता तु न प्रमाणम् । तस्याः सारमयान्तिष्वप्युपसम्मात् ॥
 यदप्यमिहितं तेष्वतिथिपितृप्रीतिसंपादकत्वाद्दन्तिमिहिता हि सा
 145 न दापायेति तदपि विवक्ष्यम् । यथा देवानां संकल्पमाप्नोषता
 मिमताहारपुष्करसास्वादमुदितानां वैकिण्वरीरत्वाद् युष्मदा
 बर्जितवृक्षपुष्पितपशुमांसाद्याहतिगृहीताविच्छेद दुःसंमथा । औदा
 रिकवरीरिणामथ तदुपात्तनयाग्यत्वात् । प्रक्षेपाहारस्वीकारे च
 देवानां मन्त्रमयदेहत्वात्पुण्यगमनाय । न च तेषां मन्त्रमयदेहत्वं
 150 भवत्पक्षे न सिद्धम् । अतुर्म्यन्तपत्रमथ दत्तता इति जैमिनिवचन
 प्रामाण्यात् । तथा च मुगन्त्रम् ।

अथतरत्वं युगपद्विभक्त्यपु यष्टुषु ।

न सा प्रयाति सान्निध्यं मूर्तत्वात्स्मदादिवत् ॥

इति । सेति देवता । ह्यमानस्य च वस्तुनां भस्मीभावाभापस
 155 म्माद्युपयोगजानिता दधानां प्रीतिः प्रसापमात्रम् । अपि च
 यार्यं प्रेताग्निः स अयस्त्रिंशत्कान्दिदधतानां सुखम् । अग्निमुत्ता
 वै दधा इति श्रुतेः । ततश्चापममध्यमापमदधानामकैर्नैव मुत्तेन
 मुञ्जानानामन्यान्छिष्टवृत्तिमसङ्गाः । तथा चैते तुरुष्केभ्योप्य
 तिरेग्यन्त । तपि तावदकर्मणाममे मुञ्जत न पुनरकैर्नैव
 160 वदनेन । किं च । एकस्मिन् यष्टुपि पदनवाहुर्यं कपन श्रूयते
 यत्पुनरनेकवरीरप्लवकं सुगमिति महन्मथयम् । सर्वेषां च दधा
 नामकस्मिन्नेव सुगङ्गीकृत यथा कनषित्का न्च पूजान्तिना-
 रादान्यथ निन्दादिना विरादन्तर्धकैर्नैव सुगन् युगपदनुग्रह
 निग्रहवात्पाचारणसंस्कारं प्रमथयत । अन्यथा । सुप्तं दहस्य
 165 नवमा भागस्यदपि येषां ग्राह्यमर्कं तथामकैरुद्धा यकसद्वदाहा

- त्यक्तं निवृत्तमस्मीरणपथमितमत्र संभाव्यत इत्यममति
 पथमा ॥ यथ कारीरीयशान्तिं वृष्ट्यादिफलमप्यभिधारस्तन्वी
 णितदेवतानुग्रहेणुक्तं वा माप्यनैरान्तरा । कपिद प्यभि
 धारस्यापि दग्धनात् । यथापि न प्यभिधारस्तथापि न तदा
 170 दितादुतिमात्रमन्त्या तदनुग्रहः । किं तु न न्यताविश्रुपातिशय
 शान्तिं स्वारन्ननिषेधितं पूजापथारं यथा स्वस्थानावस्थितः सन्
 जानीत तदा तत्कृतोऽं मति मसमभयनादुत्तिष्ठन्कार्याणीच्छाव
 षात्साधयति । अनुपयागादिना पुनरनानाना जानानापि वा
 पूजाकृतुरमाग्यसहस्रं सभ साधयति । द्रव्यसेवकात्ममायादि
 175 सहकारिसाधिव्यापसत्त्वर कार्यात्पादम्योपपत्त्यात् । स च पूजा
 पथारः पशुविश्वमनम्यनिरिक्तं मकारान्तंरपि मुकुरस्तत्किमनया
 पार्पकस्यार्धानिक्तव्या । यथ उगसजाह्नसहोमात्परराष्ट्र-
 वशीकृतिसिद्ध्या देव्याः परितापानुमानं तथ का क्रिमाह । कासा-
 पितृद्वन्द्वशानां तर्धन मत्पद्मीकारात् । कवसं तयापि तद्वस्तु
 180 दर्शनवान्निनव परितापो न पुनस्तद्वस्तु । निम्बपत्रकुरु-
 र्धसपुमांशादीनां हृयमामद्रव्यादीनामपि तद्वोच्यत्वमसद्वात् ।
 परमार्थतस्तु तत्तत्सहकारिसमवधानमपिबागपदानां मक्तिरेव
 तत्तत्कलं जनयति अवेतन चिन्तामप्याश्रया तदादशनात् । अति-
 धीनां तु मीतिः संस्कारसंप्रपकाभादिनापि साध्या । तदर्थं
 185 महोत्तमहागादिप्रकल्पनं निर्विकृतमत्र ख्यापयति । पित्रुणां
 पुनः मीतिरनेकान्तिकी आद्याविधिधानेनापि भूयसां संतानमुद्-
 रज्जुपलम्भेः । तद्विधानेपि च केषांचिद्वैयर्थ्यकरागादीनामिव
 सुतरां तद्वचनात् । ततश्च आद्यादिविधानं सुम्पजनविधतारण-
 मानकमेष । ये हि लोकान्तरं माप्तास्त तावत्स्वकृतकमानुसारं
 190 सुरमारकादिगतिषु सुखमसुर्यं वा बुद्धानां पथासत ते कपयिष

तनयादिभिरावर्जितं पिण्डमुपभाक्तुं स्पृह्यास्रयोपि स्युः । तथा
च युष्मद्युनिन पठन्ति ।

मृतानामपि अन्तूनां आर्द्धं चेष्टृतिस्मरणम् ।

तन्निर्वाणमनीयस्य स्नानं संवर्द्धयेच्छिष्याम् ॥

- 185 इति कर्षं आर्द्धविमानाद्यर्जितं पुण्यं तपां समीपमुर्पेतु । तदन्य
कृतत्वात् तस्य जडत्वात् निवहरणत्वाच्च । अयं तेषामुपशानेन आर्द्धा
द्विषियानेपि पुण्यं दानुरेव तनयादाः स्यादिति चेन्न । तेन तज्जन्य
पुण्यस्य स्वाभ्यवसायादुच्चारितत्वात् । एवं च तत्पुण्यं नैवतर
स्यापि इति विचार्य एव विस्तीर्णं शिष्टकुशात्तन । किं तु पापानु
200 बन्धिपुण्यत्वात् तन्मृतः पापमव । अयं विमापमुक्तं तस्य उपतिष्ठत
इति चेत् क इवेतन्मत्पेतु । विमाणाभव मेदुरादरसादन्ननात् । तद्वपुषि
च तपां संक्रमः श्रद्धातुमपि न शक्यते । भाग्यनाबन्धरे तत्संक्रम
लिङ्गस्य कस्याप्यनवलाकनात् । विमाणामेव च सृष्टं साक्षात्कर
णात् । यदि परं त एव स्थूलकवर्मेराकुम्भतरमतिगाद्वर्धाद्भक्षयन्त
205 मेतमापा इति मुपेव आर्द्धाद्विषियानम् । यदपि गयाआर्द्धाद्विषियान
मुपकम्पत तदपि भाग्यविमलस्य कविमद्भक्षानिष्पन्नरादिकृममव
निधयम् ॥ यदप्युदितम् आगमधाम्न ममाणमिति तदप्यममाणम् ।
स हि पारुषया वा स्यात्पारुषया वा । पारुषयमेव मवेद्वृत्तं तदि
वरकृतो वा । आपपस युष्मन्मतस्याहति । तथा च भवन्तिद्वान्तः ।

210 अतीन्द्रियाणामथानां सासादृष्टा न विद्यते ।

निन्धया वदयान्यभ्या यथायत्नविनिधयः ॥

द्वितीयपक्षे तु तत्र आपवन्तृकस्वनानादयासमसङ्गाः । अपौरुषेय
धेन । ममवस्यव स्वरूपनिराकरणात् तुरङ्गमृद्वृद्धम् । तथा
तुष्टिषणनमुन्यत इति भूमि पुरुषक्रियानुगत रूपयस्य पतन्क्रिया

215 भाषं कर्षं भविनुमहति । नवतत्त्वयमं कश्चिदप्यनदप्यम्यत ।

उपसङ्गान्पयइष्यवत्तत्रङ्कासंभवात् । तस्माद्वचनं तत्पौरुषेय
मेव वर्णात्मकत्वात् कुमारसंभवादिपचनवत् । वचनात्मकम् वदः ।
तदा बाहुः ।

220

तान्वादिजन्या ननु वणपगो
वर्णात्मको वः इति स्फुटं च ।
पुंसश्च तान्वादि तनः कुर्य स्या
वर्णरूपयापमिति प्रतीतिः ॥

इति श्रुतरपौरुषयस्वरुरीकृत्यापि तावद्वचनिरपि तन्पुंस्यास्मान्
पौरुषयमवाङ्गीक्रियते । अन्यथाधिहारं शुद्ध्यास्त्वंगदाम इत्यत्र
225 एवमासं भक्तपत्रिति किं नाशः । नियामकमावात् । ततो वरं
सूत्रमपि पौरुषयमभ्युपगतम् । अस्तु वा अपौरुषया तथापि
तस्य न प्रामाण्यम् । आत्तपुरुषापीना हि वार्त्ता प्रमाणतति ।
एवं च तस्याप्रामाण्यं तदुक्तस्त्रनुपातिस्मृतिमतिपादितश्च हिंसा-
त्मका यागश्राद्धादिविधिः प्रामाण्यविधुर एवति ॥ अथ यार्य
230 न हिंस्याद् सवयूतानि इत्यादिना हिंसानिषेधः स आत्सर्गिको
मागः । सामान्यतां विधिरित्यर्थः । ततश्चापवादनात्सगस्य बाधित
त्वाच्च आता हिंसाविधिर्त्रोपायः । उस्मगापवात्पारपवादा विधिर्ष
स्त्रीयानिति न्यायात् । यद्वतामपि हि न स्वस्वकान्तन हिंसानि
पेधः । तत्तत्कारणजात पृथिव्यादिमतिसवनानामनुष्ठानात् । गच्छाना
235 वसंस्तर आषाढमात्रिग्रहणमणनाथ । अपवादपदं च पादिकी
हिमा दवतात्रिमीतः पुष्टाम्बनत्वात्रिति परमाद्वच्य स्तुतिकार
माह । भास्सुष्टमिम्यादि । अन्याधमिति मध्यवर्ति पदं दयस्कृ-
मजिन्यायनोभयवापि मन्वन्धनीयम् । अन्याधपुष्टमृष्टम् अन्यस्यै
वापाय मयुक्तम् । उन्सगवात्तयमम्याधमयुक्तं वार्येन नापोयते
240 नाववात्मावगीक्रियत । यमराधमाभित्य श्राद्ध उन्सगाः यदवते

तमेवाश्रित्यापवादोपि प्रवर्तते । तयोर्निम्नोभतादिष्वपहारमत्पर
 स्परसापेक्षत्वेनैकार्थसाधनविषयत्वात् । यथा जैनानां संयमपरि
 पासन्नार्थं नवकोटिमिश्रुद्राहारग्रहणमुत्सर्गः तथाविषदम्पक्षेवकाळ-
 यावापस्तु च निषेधितस्य गत्यन्तराभावं पञ्चकादियतनयाऽपे
 245 षीयादिग्रहणमपवादः सापि च संयमपरिपासन्नार्थमव । न च
 मरणैकस्मरणस्य गत्यन्तराभावोऽसिद्ध इति बाध्यम् ।

सव्यस्यसर्जयं संजयाभो अप्पाणमेव रविमञ्जरा ।

सुखं अवायाभो पुणो विसोही नयाऽभिरई ॥

इत्यागमात् । तथा आयुर्वेदपि यमवैकं रागमधिकृत्य कस्यांचिद्
 250 वस्यायां किंचिदस्त्वप्यं तदवावस्यान्तरे तत्रैव राग पथ्यम् ।

उत्पद्यते हि सावस्या वेदकासावया मति ।

वस्यामकार्यं कार्यं स्यात्कर्म कार्यं तु वनयत् ॥

इति वचनात् । यथा वसवदादेर्ज्वरिणो सङ्घर्षं क्षीणपातोस्तु
 तद्विपर्ययः । एवं वेदाद्यपेक्षया ज्वरिणोपि कषिपानादि बाध्यम् ।

255 तथा च वेदाः ।

काळाविराषि निर्विष्टं चरदां सङ्घर्षं हितम् ।

ऋतेऽनिम्नममकापद्योक्तकामकृतचरान् ॥

एवं च या पूर्वमभूत्परिहारा यत्र तत्रैवावस्यान्तरं तस्यैव परिभागाः ।

स नन्वभूयोरपि तस्यैव रागस्य श्रमनाथः । इति सिद्धमेकविषय

260 त्वमुत्सर्गोपवादयारिति ॥ यवतां चात्सर्गोन्त्यार्थोऽपवादश्चान्यार्थः ।

न हि स्यात्समयूतानि इत्युन्मगो हि दुर्गोतिनिषेधार्थं अपवादस्तु

वेदिकईसाविषिर्बतातिविषिनृमीतिसंपादनाथः । अतश्च परस्पर

निरपेक्षत्वे कथमुत्सर्गोपवादं बाध्यते । तुल्यवचनोर्विरोध इति

म्यायात् । मिमांस्यस्यपि नन तद्व्यापनेन्मिसद्वाद् । न च बाध्यं

365 वैदिकहिंसाविपरिपि स्वर्गहेतुतया दुर्गतिनिषेधार्थं एवैति तस्यो-
क्त्युक्त्या स्वर्गहेतुत्वनिरुद्धनात् । तन्तरणापि च प्रकारान्तरैरपि
तत्सिद्धिमापादयन्तरामास अपवादपक्षकसीकाराः ॥ न च ययमेव
यागविधेः दुर्गतिहेतुत्वं भाङ्गीकुर्महे किं तु भवादाप्ता अपि । यदाह
व्यासमहर्षिः ।

370 पूजया विपुलं राज्यमग्निकार्येण संपदः ।

तया पापविशुद्धयर्थं ज्ञानं ध्यानं च मुक्तिदम् ॥

अथान्निष्ठापयन्वाप्यस्य यागादिविधेस्वाधान्तरैरपि अभ्यासा
संपदामेव हेतुत्वं यदभावापस्तस्य दुर्गतिहेतुत्वमप्युक्तद्वयित
वानेव । तथा च स एव यागान्निहार्त्तं ज्ञानपाप्मीत्यादिश्लोकेऽ
375 स्थापितवान् । तत्रैवं स्थित तर्पा वादिनां चेष्टाश्रमयो इत्यपि
स्वयमेत्यादि । परेषां भक्तप्रणीतपञ्चनपराद्वस्तुत्वानाम् । स्फुरितं
केचित्तदास्वयुपपाठाश्रुपतिव्यसिप्यासप्रत्यचारि मिममुतनिपातनेन
राज्यमाप्तिमनोरथसंयत्तम् । यथा किञ्च कथितविपक्षिस्तुर्याः पक्षपा-
द्वयतया निजमङ्गलं व्यापाद्य राज्यमियं प्राप्नुमीदृत् न च तस्य
380 तत्प्राप्तापि पुनरातपात्तककल्पपङ्कजं कथिदपयाति एवं वेदवि-
हितहिंसया वेदताद्विपीतिसिद्धावपि हिंसासमुत्थं दुष्कृतं न तद्वत्
पराहन्त्यत । अथ च सिप्सासुहृद् मयुजानां प्युतिकारां ज्ञापयति यथा
तस्य दुर्गमयस्यासंयत्ताद्यप्येणा निर्मुञ्चितसत्कर्मणो राज्यमाप्तौ
कर्म सपीदामात्रमेव न पुनस्तत्सिद्धिः एवं तर्पा दुषादिनां
385 यदविहितहिंसामनुविष्टतामपि यदतादिपरितापण यनाराग्यमेव ।
न पुनस्तपाश्रमप्रनपूयत्वमिन्द्रादिभिर्वाकसां च वृत्तिः ।
मासुक्त्युक्त्या निराकृतव्यात् ॥ इति व्यासः ॥ ११ ॥

संमतं निम्नपरोक्षज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसकमेवमहानामेकात्म
समवायिज्ञानान्तरमेवज्ञानवादिनां च यौगानां मतं विकृत्यमाह ।

स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव बोध

प्रकाशते नार्थकयान्यथा तु ॥

परे परेभ्यो भयसस्तथापि

प्रपेदिरे ज्ञानमनात्मनिष्ठम् ॥ १२ ॥

बोधो ज्ञानम् । स च स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव प्रकाशते ।
स्वस्यात्मस्वरूपस्वार्थस्य च पदार्थस्य यावबोधः परिच्छेदः तत्र क्षम
एव समर्थ एव प्रतिमासत इत्ययोग्यवच्छेदः । प्रकाशत इति
क्रियावबोधस्य प्रकाशरूपत्वसिद्धेः सर्वप्रकाशानां स्वार्थ
प्रकाशकत्वन बोधस्यापि तत्सिद्धिः । विपर्यय वृण्वमाह । नार्थ
कयान्यथा तु इति । अन्ययेति अर्थप्रकाशनप्रविवादात् ज्ञानस्य
स्वसंबिधितत्त्वानभ्युपगमेयकथं न स्यात् । अर्थकया पदार्थ
संबन्धिनी वार्ता । सदसद्रूपात्मकं स्वरूपमिति यावत् । तुत्रां
वधारणे । भिन्नक्रमश्च । स चार्थकयया सह यावजित एव ।
यदि हि ज्ञानं स्वसंबिधितं नेष्यते तदा तेनात्मज्ञानाय ज्ञानान्त
रमपेक्षणीयं तेनाप्यपरमित्पाद्यनवस्था । तदा ज्ञानं तावत्स्वावबो
ध्यतामनम् । अयंस्तु भट्टतया स्वरूपज्ञापनासमर्थ इति को
नामार्थस्य कथामपि कथयेत् । तथापि एवं ज्ञानस्य स्वसंबिधितत्त्व
मुक्त्या घटमानेपि । परे तीथान्तरिमाः । ज्ञानं कर्मतापमम् । अज्ञास्य
निष्ठम् न विद्यते आत्मनः स्वस्य निष्ठा निश्चया यस्य तदनास्य
निष्ठम् । अस्वसंबिधितमित्यर्थः । यपदिरे यपमाः । कुत इत्याह ।
परेभ्यो भयतः । परे पूर्वपक्षवादिनस्तभ्यः सकाशात् ज्ञानस्य स्वसं
बिधितत्वं नोपपद्यते स्वात्मनि क्रियाविराधादित्युपायम्भसंभा
वनासंभवं यद्वयं तस्मात् तदाभित्येत्यथा ॥

इत्थमसरगमनिका विधाय भाषार्थः प्रपञ्च्यते ॥ महास्थावदिव
 बवन्ति । यद् ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं न भवति । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् ।
 न हि मुक्षिसितापि नटबहुः स्वस्कन्धमधिराहुं पशुः । न च मुक्षीष्णा
 25 प्यसिभारा स्वं छेत्तुमाहितव्यापारा । ततश्च परोक्षमेव ज्ञान
 मिति ॥ तद्वत्तमं सम्यक् । यतः क्रियुत्पत्तिः स्वात्मनि विरुध्यते
 इति वा । यद्युत्पत्तिः सा विरुध्यताम् । न हि वयमपि ज्ञानमात्मान् ,
 1 मुत्पादयतीति मन्यामहे । अथ इति । नेयमात्मनि विरुद्धा । तदात्म
 नैव ज्ञानस्य स्वहेतुस्य उत्पादात् मकाशात्मनेव मदीपात्माकस्य ।
 30 अथ मकाशात्मैव मदीपात्माक उत्पन्न इति परमकाशकास्तु
 आत्मानमप्येतावन्मात्रेणैव मकाशयतीति कार्यं याव इति चेत्
 तत्किं तेन बराकेणामकाशित्वेनैव स्वातन्त्र्यम् आलोकान्तरादास्य
 मकाशेन भवितव्यम् । मयमं प्रत्यक्षबाधः । द्वितीयेपि सैवान्न
 स्थापयिष्ये ॥ अथ नासौ स्वमपश्य कर्मतया चकान्तीत्यस्वमका
 35 शकाः स्वीक्रियते । आत्मानं न मकाशयतीत्यर्थः । मकाशयतयो
 त्यभत्वात्स्वयं मकाशयत एव इति चेत् धिरं वीर । न हि वयमपि ज्ञानं
 कर्मतयैव प्रतिभाममानं स्वसंबन्धं शूमाः । ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रतिभासत
 इत्यादायकर्मकस्य तस्य चकासनात् । यथा तु ज्ञानं स्वं जाना
 मीति कर्मतयापि तद्भावि तया मदीपाः स्वं मकाशयतीत्ययमपि
 40 कर्मतया भवित एव । यस्तु स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधो दोष
 उद्भाषितः साऽप्युक्तः । अनुभवसिद्धेर्धै विरोधासिद्धेः । यद्यहं
 जानामीत्यादां कर्तृरूपवद्भूतेरप्यवभासयामत्वात् । न चामस्य
 सोपलम्भस्मार्षदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति । न च ज्ञानान्तरादुपलम्भसंभवा
 वना । तस्याप्यनुपलम्भस्य मस्तुतोपलम्भमस्यसीकाराभावात् ।
 4 उपलम्भान्तरसंभावनं चानवस्था । अर्थोपलम्भात्तस्योपलम्भे
 न्यान्यामपदापः ॥ अथायमाकृत्यन्यथा भाषयते यदि ज्ञानं

- न स्यादित्यर्थापत्त्या तदुपलम्भ इति चेन्न । तस्या अपि ज्ञापकत्वेना
 ज्ञाताया ज्ञापकत्वायोगात् । अर्थापत्त्यन्तराद्यज्ञानेऽनवस्येतेरेतराभय
 दोषापत्तेस्तदवस्था परिभन । तस्माद्युक्त्यनुसृतयेव स्वीनुसृतयापि
 50 ज्ञानस्य प्रतिमासात्त्वसंनिधित्वम् ॥ नन्वनुसृतेरनुभाष्यत्वे घटा
 दिवदननुभूतित्वमसङ्गः । प्रयोगस्तु ज्ञानमनुभयस्यमप्यनुभूतिर्न
 भवति अनुभाष्यत्वाद् । यच्चत् अनुभाष्य च भवद्विरिप्यते ज्ञानम् ।
 स्वसंबन्धत्वात् । नैवम् । ज्ञातृज्ञातृत्वेनानुभूतेरनुभूतित्वेनैवानु
 भवात् । न चानुसृतेरनुभाष्यत्वं दोषः । अर्थापेक्षया अनुभूतित्वात् स्वापे-
 55 क्षया चानुभाष्यत्वात् । स्वपितृपुत्रापत्यैकस्य पुत्रत्वपितृत्ववद्विरोधा
 यावात् ॥ अनुमानाच्च स्वसंबन्धमसिद्धिः । तथाहि । ज्ञानं स्वयं
 प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् । संबन्धनस्य
 प्रकाश्यत्वात्प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धमिति चेन्न । अज्ञाननिरासादिद्वारेण
 प्रकाशकत्वापपत्तेः । ननु नेत्रादयः प्रकाशका अपि स्वं न
 60 प्रकाशयन्तीति प्रकाशकत्वोत्तारनैकान्तिकतेति चेत् नाम नेत्रादि
 भिरनैकान्तिकता । तर्पा सन्त्युपयागलक्षणभावेन्द्रियरूपाणामेव
 प्रकाशकत्वात् ॥ भाषान्द्रियाणां च स्वसंबन्धनरूपतैवति न व्यभि
 चारः । तथा संबन्ध स्वप्रकाशा । अर्थमतीतित्वात् । यः स्वप्रकाशो न
 भवति नासाधर्मणीतियया यः ॥ तदेवं मिद्वेपि प्रत्यक्षानु
 65 मानाभ्यां ज्ञानस्य स्वसंनिधित्वं सत्संप्रयागे इन्द्रियबुद्धिमन्मत्तलक्षण
 ज्ञानं तत्तावमाकृत्यं तस्मादद्यापि तया प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्यापलम्भ
 इत्यवस्था विपुटीमस्यलक्षणना भट्टानां प्रयासपञ्च ॥

योगास्त्वाहुः । ज्ञानं स्थान्यप्रकाशम् । ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमे
 यत्वाद् । यच्चत् । समुत्पत्तेर्हि ज्ञानमेकात्म्यसमयतानन्तरोद्भवप्यु
 70 मानसप्रत्ययेणैव व्यस्येन न पुनः स्वजननैवमनवस्था । अर्थापत्त्यापि
 विज्ञानात्पादमावर्णयामिदं प्रमातुः बुद्ध्यायस्थान् । अपरज्ञान

मित्रासायां तु तत्रापि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यत एवेति ॥ तदुक्तम् । पक्षस्य
 मत्पुत्रमानवापितत्वेन हेतोः काष्ठास्ययापदिष्टत्वात् । तथा हि ।
 विषादास्पदं ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं ज्ञानत्वात् ईश्वरज्ञानवत् । न चार्थ-
 7 वाप्यमतीतो दृष्टान्तः । पुत्रपत्येश्वरतया जनैरपि स्वीकृतत्वेन तज्ज्ञा-
 नस्य तेषां मसिद्धेः । अर्थविशेष्यभावेन तत्र हेतुः । समर्थविशेष-
 योपादानेनैव साध्यसिद्धेः । अग्निसिद्धौ धूमवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वादिति-
 वत् ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वादित्येतावतैव गतत्वात् । न हीश्वरज्ञानादन्य-
 त्वसंविदितममर्थं वा ज्ञानमस्ति यज्यवच्छेदाय ममेयत्वादिति
 80 क्रियेत । मय्यमते तदव्यञ्जानस्य सर्वस्य मय्यत्वात् । अयोजककार्य-
 हेतुः । सोपाधित्वात् । साधनाभ्यापकाः साध्येन समभ्यासिश्च
 स्वसूपाधिरभिधीयते । तत्पुत्रत्वादिना ध्यामत्वे साध्ये छाकाद्या-
 हारपरिणामवत् । उपाधिश्चात्र जडत्वम् । तथा हि ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे
 ममेयत्वे च सत्यपि यदेव जडं स्वस्मादि तदेव स्वस्मादन्येन मया
 90 श्यते । स्वमकाशे परस्परमेतित्वं हि जडस्य सप्तमम् । न च ज्ञानं
 जडस्वरूपम् । अतः साधनाभ्यापकत्वं जडत्वस्य । साध्येन समभ्या-
 सिक्तत्वं चास्य स्पष्टमेव । जाड्यं विहाय स्वमकाशाभावस्य तं च
 त्यक्त्वा जाड्यस्य कश्चिदप्यद्वयनादिति ॥ वक्ष्योक्तं समुत्पन्नं हि
 ज्ञानमेकत्वसमवेतेत्यादि तदव्यसत्यम् । इत्थमर्थज्ञानतज्ज्ञानयो-
 90 क्त्यधमानयोः क्रमासुपलसणात् । आशुत्पादात्मनोपलसण-
 मुत्पन्नपञ्चतम्यतिभेदवदिति चेत् तत्र मित्रासायपरित्यक्तज्ञान-
 स्योत्पादमतिपादनात् । न च ज्ञानानां मित्रासासमुत्पाद्यत्वं पठते ।
 अग्निज्ञासितेष्वपि योग्यक्षेत्रेषु विषयेषु तदुत्पादमतीतेः । न चार्थ-
 ज्ञानमयोम्यद्वयम् । आत्मसमवेतस्यास्य समुत्पादादुदति मित्रासाय-
 1 न्तरेणीवायज्ञाने ज्ञानोत्पादमसङ्गः । अयोत्यधर्मा नामेदं को-
 दाप इति चत् तत्र । मन्वेवमत्र तज्ज्ञानज्ञानेप्यपरज्ञानात्पादमसङ्गः

तत्रापि धैर्येणायमित्यपरापरज्ञानोत्पादपरंपरायामेवात्मनो व्यापा
 राय विषयान्तरसंचारः स्यादिति ॥ तस्माद्यज्ज्ञानं तदात्म
 योर्धं मत्स्यनपेक्षितज्ञानान्तरव्यापारम् । यथा गोचरान्तरग्राहि
 100 ज्ञानात्माग्भाविगोचरान्तरग्राहिपारावारिज्ञानमत्र यस्यान्त्यज्ञानम् ।
 ज्ञानं च विषयाध्यासितं व्यादिज्ञानमिति न ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानान्तर
 द्वेयता युक्तिं सहत इति काव्यार्थः ॥ १२ ॥

अथ ये ब्रह्माद्वैतवादिनोऽविद्याभरणयामयावद्वात्मविभास
 मानत्वेन विद्वन्वयवर्तिवस्तुमप्यमपारमार्थिक समर्पयन्ते तन्मत्र
 मुपहसन्माह ।

माया सती चेद्वद्वयतत्त्वसिद्धि

रयासती हन्त कुतः प्रपञ्चः ।

मायैव चेदर्थसहा च तर्कि

माता च वन्द्या च भवत्परेषाम् ॥ १३ ॥

वैर्वादिभिस्तात्त्विकात्मग्रन्थम्यतिरिक्ता या माया अविद्या
 १ मप्यवद्वयः परिकल्पिता सा सद्रूपाऽसद्रूपा वा द्वयी गतिः । सती
 सद्रूपा चेत्तदा द्वयतत्त्वसिद्धिः । द्वावयवौ यस्य तद्वद्वयं तथाविधं
 यत्तत्त्वं परमायेस्वस्य सिद्धिः । अयमयः । एष तावच्चद्वयमिते ता
 त्विरूमात्मग्रन्थ द्वितीया च माया तत्त्वरूपा मद्रूपतया द्वीक्रियमा
 णत्वात् । तथा चार्द्धवशात्स्य मूल निहितः कुठारः । अयति
 10 पक्षान्तरप्राप्तने । यदि अमली गगनाम्भाजबद्धल्लुरूपा सा माया
 ततः । हन्तत्युपदर्शने आधये वा । कुतः प्रपञ्चः । अयं निवृत्तनादर
 विवरविवर्तिपञ्चायसावरूपमप्यत्र कुतः । न कुतापि संमनीत्यर्थः ।
 मायाया अवल्लुम्बनाम्युपगमात् अवल्लुम्बतुरङ्गमृद्वस्यैव सर्वोपा

- स्यादिरहितस्य साक्षात्क्रियमाणे ह्यविनर्तजननेऽसमर्थत्वात् ।
 15 कित्तेन्द्रनासादौ मृगतृष्णादौ वा मायोपदर्शितावानामवक्रियाया-
 मसामर्थ्यं दृष्टम् । अत्र तु तदुपलम्भात्कथं मायाभ्यपदेशः श्रद्धीय-
 ताम् । अथ मायापि भविष्यति अवक्रियासमर्थपदार्थोपदर्शन-
 समा च भविष्यति इति चेदर्थि स्ववचनविरोधः । न हि भवति
 माता च बन्ध्या चेति । एनमेवार्थं हृदि निधायोत्तरार्थमाह ।
 20 मायैव चेदित्यादि । अप्रैवकारोऽप्यर्थः । भविष्यत्समुच्चयायः । अग्रेतन-
 चकारम् तथा । इमयोश्च समुच्चयार्थयोयागपधोतकत्वं प्रतीतिमेव ।
 यथा रघुवंशे ते च मापुरदन्वन्तं पुपुष वादिपूरुषः इति । तदर्थं
 वाक्यार्थो माया च भविष्यति अर्थसहा च भविष्यति । अर्थसहा
 अवक्रियासमर्थपदार्थोपदर्शनसमा । चेच्छब्दोत्र याज्यते इति चत् ।
 25 एवं परमाशङ्क्य तस्य स्ववचनविरोधमुद्गाढयति । तर्हि भवत्परेषां
 माता च बन्ध्या च । किमिति संयाचने । संयाच्यते एतत् भवतो
 ये परे प्रतिपत्तास्तेषां भवत्परेषां भवद्वयविरिक्तानां भवदाज्ञापुत्र-
 ग्भूतत्वेन तेषां बादिनां यन्माता च भविष्यति बन्ध्या च भवि-
 30 प्यतीत्युपहासः । माता हि प्रसववर्मिणी जनित्वाप्यते । बन्ध्या च
 तद्विपरीता । तत्र च बन्ध्या चत्कर्त्तुं माता माता चत्कर्त्तुं बन्ध्या ।
 तदेवं मायामा अवास्तव्या अप्यर्थसहस्येद्वीक्रियमाणे प्रस्तुतवाक्य-
 वत्स्पष्ट एव स्ववचनविरोधः । इति समासार्थः ॥

व्यासार्थस्तथयम् । ते बादिन इदं भविष्यन्ति । वाचिकमात्मवै-
 वासि ।

- 25 सर्वं स्पष्टिर्द्वं ब्रह्म नह मानास्ति किञ्चन ।

आरुर्ध्वं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन ॥

इति समाप्तम् । अर्थं तु मप्यथो मिथ्याक्याः प्रतीयमानत्वात् यदेवं
 तदेवं यथा शुक्तिशूकरे कलपीतं तथा कार्यं तस्याक्षया । तदेव
 तम् । तथाहि । मिथ्याक्यत्वं तौ कीदृग्निमित्तं किमत्यन्ता

४० सत्त्वम् चतान्यस्यान्याकारतया प्रतीतत्वम् आहोस्मिदनिर्वाच्यत्वम् ।
प्रथमपक्षेऽसत्त्व्यातिप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये विपरीतस्यातिस्वीकृतिः ।
तृतीय तु किमिदमनिर्वाच्यत्वम् । निःस्वभावत्वं चेन्निसः प्रति
पेक्षार्थत्वे स्वभावग्रन्थस्यापि भाषाभाष्यारन्यतरार्थत्वेऽसत्त्व्यातिस
त्त्व्यात्यभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः । भाष्यप्रतिपक्षेऽसत्त्व्यातिरभावप्रतिपक्षे

४१ सत्त्व्यातिरिति । प्रतीत्यगोचरत्वं निःस्वभावत्वमिति चेदत्र विरोधः ।
स प्रपञ्चो हि न प्रतीयते चत्कर्यं धर्मितयापात्तः कथं च प्रतीयमा
नत्वं हेतुतयोपात्तं तथोपादाने वा कथं न प्रतीयत । यथा प्रती
यते न तथेति चत् तर्हि विपरीतस्यातिरियमभ्युपगता स्यात् । किं
चेयमनिर्वाच्यता प्रपञ्चस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधिता घटोपमित्याद्याकारं हि
४२ प्रत्यक्षं प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यतामेव व्यबस्यति । घटादिप्रतिनियतपदार्थ
परिच्छेदात्मनस्तस्योत्पादात् । इतरेतरविषिक्तवस्तुनामेव च प्रपञ्च
द्वयबाध्यत्वात् । अयं प्रत्यक्षस्य विषायकत्वात्कथं प्रतिपक्षे सामर्थ्यम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं हि इदमिति वस्तुस्वरूपं गृह्णाति नान्यत्वरूपं प्रतिपेक्षति ।

आहुर्विधात् प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धं विषयितः ।

४३ नैकत्वं आगमस्तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रबाध्यते ॥

इति वचनात् इति धम । अन्यरूपनिषमन्तरण तत्त्वरूपपरि
च्छेदस्याप्यमपेक्षेः । पीतादिष्वनच्छिन्नं हि नीलं नीलमिति गृहीतं
भवति नान्यथा । कनकवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपक्षरथान्यप्रतिपक्षप्रतिपक्षि
रूपत्वात् । मृण्मयमग्रहण घटमानग्रहणवत् । तस्मादप्या प्रत्यक्षं

४४ विषायकं प्रतिपक्षं तथा निषेधकमपि प्रतिपक्षव्यम् । अपि च
विषायकमयं प्रत्यक्षमित्याद्रीकृतं यथा प्रत्यक्षेण विषया विधीयते
तथा हि नाविषयापीनि । तथा च ईतापक्षिः । तन्मयं मृण्मयस्यैव
मपयः । तदमी वादिनाऽविषयाविषयन मन्यान् प्रत्यक्षात्प्रनियन्तो
पि न निषयकं तदिति सुवाणाः कथं नोन्यथा इति सिद्धं प्रत्यक्ष

- ६५ बाधितः पक्ष इति ॥ अनुमानबाधितश्च । अपञ्चो मिथ्या न
 यवति असद्विज्ञानत्वात् आत्मयत् । प्रतीयमानत्वं च हेतुर्भासात्मना
 व्यभिचारी । स हि प्रतीयते न च मिथ्या । अप्रतीयमानत्वे स्वस्य
 तद्विषयवचसापमहत्तेर्मूकतैष तेषां भेदसी । साध्यविकल्पश्च दृष्टान्तः ।
 शुक्तिशकलकष्ठपीतेषु प्रपञ्चान्तर्गतत्वेन अनिर्बचनीयतायाः
 ७० साध्यमानत्वात् । किं चेदनुमानं प्रपञ्चाद्विभक्तमिदं वा । यदि भिन्नं
 तर्हि सत्यमसत्यं वा । यदि सत्यं तद्वेषेण प्रपञ्चस्यापि सत्यत्वं
 स्यात् । अद्वैतवादमाहारे स्वविधातात् । अथासत्यं तर्हि न किञ्चिदेन
 साधयितुं शक्यम् । अवस्तुत्वात् । अमिदं चेत्प्रपञ्चस्वभावतया
 तस्यापि मिथ्याक्यत्वापत्तिः । मिथ्याक्यं च तत्कथं स्वसाध्य
 ७५ साधनायाक्यम् ॥ एवं च प्रपञ्चस्यापि मिथ्याक्यत्वासिद्धेः
 कथं परमब्रह्मस्तान्त्रिकत्वं स्याद्यतो वार्यार्थमात्रं भवेदिति ॥
 अथवा प्रपञ्चान्तरेण सन्मात्रलक्षणस्य परमब्रह्मणा
 साधनं रूपं चोपन्यस्यते । ननु परमब्रह्मण्येकस्य परमार्थस्यो
 विधिक्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्प्रमाणविषयत्वम् । अपरस्य द्वितीयस्य
 ८० कस्यचिदप्यभावात् । तथा हि । प्रत्यक्षं तद्वेषेकमस्ति । प्रत्यक्षं द्विधा
 मिद्यते । निर्बिकल्पकसविकल्पकमेवात् । तत्र च निर्बिकल्पकमस्य
 सास्तन्मात्रविषयाद्यस्यैकस्यैव सिद्धिः । तथाचोक्तम् ।

अस्ति ब्रह्मलोकनाश्रयं प्रथमं निर्बिकल्पकम् ।

बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ।

- ८५ न च विधिक्यपरस्परव्यावृत्तिरप्यप्यस्त एव प्रतीयत इति
 द्वैतसिद्धिः । तस्य निषेधाविषयत्वात् । आशुर्बिधातु प्रत्यक्षं च निषेद्ध
 इत्यादिबचनात् । यत्र सविकल्पकमस्यैव धर्पद्वयदिभेदसाधकं तद्व
 वि सत्ताक्येणान्वितामार्गतेषां प्रपञ्चकत्वात् सत्ताद्वैतस्यैव साधकम् ।
 सत्तायाश्च परमब्रह्मकत्वात् । तदुक्तं यद्वैतं तद्वस्तुजं क्यमिति ॥

- १० अनुमानादपि तत्सद्भाषा विभाष्यत एव । तथा हि विधिरेव तत्त्वम् ।
प्रमेयत्वात् । यतः प्रमाणविषयभूतोऽर्थः प्रमेयः । प्रमाणानां च प्रत्य
क्षानुमानागमोपमानार्यापत्तिसंज्ञकानां भावविषयत्वेनैव प्रवृत्तेः ।
तथा शोक्तम् ।

प्रत्यक्षाद्यवतार स्यान्नाभांश्चो गृह्यते यदा ।

- ११ व्यापारस्वरूपद्रव्यत्वेनमावांश्चे जिघृक्षित ॥

- यथाभावाभ्यर्थं प्रमाणं तस्य प्रामाण्याभावाच्च तत्प्रमाणम् । तद्वि
षयस्य कस्यचित्प्रत्यभावात् । यस्तु प्रमाणपञ्चकविषयः स तु विधि
रेव । तेनैव च प्रमेयत्वस्य व्याप्तित्वात् । सिद्धं प्रमेयत्वेन विधिरेव
तत्त्वम् । यत्तु न विधिरूपं तन्न प्रमेयम् यथा स्वरूपिणाम् । प्रमेयं चेत्
१०० निश्चिच्छं वस्तुतत्त्वम् । तस्माद्विधिरूपमेव । अतो वा तत्सिद्धिः । प्रामा
ण्यमप्यः पदार्थाः प्रतिमासान्तःप्रविष्टाः । प्रतिमासमानत्वात् । यस्य
विभासते तत्प्रतिमासान्तःप्रविष्टं यथा प्रतिमासस्वरूपम् । प्रति
भासन्ते च प्रायारामप्यः पदार्थाः । तस्मात्प्रतिमासान्तःप्रविष्टाः ॥
आगमादपि परमब्रह्मण एव प्रतिपादकः समुपलभ्यते । पुरुष एवेत्
१०६ सर्वं यद्वर्त यच्च भाव्य ज्ञातृत्वन्त्यस्येष्टानो यदभनातिराहति । यन्ने
भति सर्वमति । यद्वर्त यदन्तिक । यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य यद्वर्त सर्वं
स्यास्य बाह्यतः । इत्यादिः । श्रान्त्यो मन्तव्यो निश्चिष्यासितव्यः
अनुमन्तव्य इत्यान्वित्रवाक्यैरपि तत्सिद्धः । कृत्रिमेणाप्यागमेन
तस्यैव प्रतिपादनात् । वर्तं च ।

- ११० सर्वं च स्वस्मिन् प्रवृत्तं नह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।

आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन ॥

इति प्रमाणतत्त्वस्यैव सिद्धः ॥ परमपुरुष एक एव तत्त्वम् । सकल-
मेष्टानां तद्विषयत्वात् । तथा हि सर्वं भाषा यथाविवर्तः । सर्वकस्ये-
षान्वितत्वात् । यद्यप्येषान्वितं तत्त्वमप्यनेन यथा घटपटीश्वराभो

115 दधनान्या मृदूपणकेनान्विता मृद्विभर्ताः । सर्वैकरूपणान्वितं च सकलं वस्तु । इति सिद्धं प्रकाशिवर्तस्य निस्त्रिसंभेदानामिति ॥

तद्वत्सर्वं मदिरारसाम्बादगङ्गदोहवितमिधामासत । विधारासह
त्वात्तमर्षे हि वस्तु प्रमाणसिद्धं न तु बाह्यमात्रेणाद्वैतमते च प्रमाण
मव नास्ति । तत्सद्भावे द्वयमसङ्गात् । अद्वैतसाधकस्य प्रमाणस्य द्विती-
120 यस्य सद्भावात् । अथ मर्षं लोकाप्रत्यायनाय तदपेक्षया प्रमाणमप्य-
भ्युपगम्यते । तदसत् । त्वन्यते लोकस्यैवासंभवात् । एकस्यैव नित्य
निर्देशस्य परब्रह्मण एव सत्त्वात् ॥ अवास्तु यथाकर्षवित्प्रमाणमपि ।
तर्लिक प्रत्यक्षमनुमानयागमो वा तत्साधकं प्रमाणमुररीक्रियते ।
न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तस्य समस्तवस्तुमातगतमेव स्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् ।

125 आबालगोपालं तत्स्यैव प्रतिभासनात् । यच्च निर्बिद्ध्यक्तं प्रत्यक्ष
तदाक्षेदकमित्युक्तं तदपि न सम्पद्य । तस्य प्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात् ।
सर्वस्यापि प्रमाणतत्त्वस्य व्यवसायात्मकस्यैव विसंघादकत्वेन प्रामा-
ण्योपपत्तेः । सविद्वत्त्वेन तु प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणभूतनरूपस्यैव विधिरूप-
स्य परब्रह्मणः स्वप्नेष्यप्रतिभासनात् । तदभ्युक्तम् आहुर्विधात् प्रत्यक्ष
130 मित्यादि तदपि न पश्यम् । प्रत्यक्षेण अनुबृक्षम्यापृचाकारात्मक
वस्तुन एव प्रकाशनात् । एतच्च भागेव क्षुण्णम् । न अनुस्यूतमकम्
स्वच्छं सत्तामात्रं विधेपनिरपेक्ष सामान्यं प्रतिभासते यत्र चर्द्द्वैतं
सङ्गमणो रूपमित्याहुक्तं शोभेत् । विधेपनिरपेक्षस्य अवरविपाण
वद्वप्रतिभासनात् । तदुक्तम् ।

135 निर्बिधेपं हि सामान्यं यथेत्स्वरविपाणवत् ।

सामान्यरहितस्यैव विधेपास्तद्वैतेन हि ॥

ततः सिद्धं सामान्यविधेपात्यन्त्यै प्रमाणविषये क्व एवकस्य
परब्रह्मणः प्रमाणविषयत्वम् ॥ यच्च मयपस्याप्तित्वादित्यनुमानमुक्ते
तदभ्येतनैवापान्ने चोद्विष्यम् । पश्यस्य प्रत्यक्षवाधितत्वेन हेतोः काष्ठा

- 40 स्यापदिष्टत्वात् । यच्च तत्सिद्धौ प्रतिभासमानत्वं साधनमुक्तं तदपि
साधनायासत्वेन न प्रकृतसाध्यमाधनायासम् । प्रतिभासमानत्वं
हि निम्निसमाधानां स्वतः परतो ना । न तावत्स्वतः । घटपटमुकु-
टश्चक्रद्वयीनां स्वतः प्रतिभासमानत्वेनासिद्धे । परतः प्रतिभासमा-
नत्वं च परं विना नापपद्यत इति । यच्च परमव्यवहिनर्तयतिस्त्वमस्ति
145 सभेदानामित्युक्तं तदप्यन्वयप्रतीयमानद्वयाविनामानित्वेन पुरुषा-
द्वैतं प्रतिबध्नात्येव । न च यद्वयीनां चैतन्यान्वयोप्यस्ति । सृष्टाद्य-
न्वयस्यैव तत्र दर्शनात् । ततो न किञ्चिदेतदपि । अतोऽनुमानादपि न
तत्सिद्धिः । किं च पक्षे हेतुदृष्टान्ता अनुमानापायभूताः परस्परं भिन्ना
अभिन्ना वा । भेदे द्वैतसिद्धिः । अयेदे त्वेकरूपतापत्तिः । तत्कथमे-
150 तेभ्यानुमानमात्मानमासादयति । यन्त्रि च हेतुमन्तरणापि साध्य-
सिद्धिः स्यात्तर्हि द्वैतस्यापि बाध्याप्रतः कथं न सिद्धिः । तदुक्तम् ।

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिभेदं द्वैत स्यादतुसाध्ययोः ।

इतुना चेद्विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं बाध्याप्रता न किम् ॥

- पुरुष एवेदं सबभित्यादः सर्वं वै स्वस्विद्व प्रच्छेत्पात्रेऽन्वागमा
15 इति न तत्सिद्धिः । तस्यापि द्वैताविनाभाषित्वेन अद्वैतं प्रति-
भामाप्स्यासंभवात् । बाध्यबाधकमावसगणस्य द्वैतस्यैव तत्रापि
दर्शनात् । तदुक्तम् ।

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं विरुध्यत ।

विद्याऽविद्याद्वयं न स्याद्व्यवसायद्वयं तथा ॥

- 160 ततः कथमागमादपि तत्सिद्धिः ॥ तता न पुरुषाद्वैतलक्षणप्रकथेव
प्रमाणस्य विषयाः । इति सुष्यनस्थितः प्रपञ्चः । इति
कथ्यार्थः ॥ १३ ॥

अथ स्वाभिमतसामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकवाच्यवाचकभावसम
येनपुरःसरं तीर्तान्तरीयमकस्मिततदेकान्तगोचरवाच्यवाचकभाव
निरासद्वारेण तेषां प्रतिभाषिभवाभावमाह ।

अनेकमेकात्मकमेव वाच्य * 5

द्वयात्मकं वाचकमप्यवश्यम् ।

अतोऽन्यथा वाचकवान्यस्तस्य—

वतावकानां प्रतिभाप्रमादः ॥ १४ ॥

वाच्यमभिधेयं चेतनमचेतनं वस्तु । एवकारस्याप्यर्थत्वात् । सा
6 मान्यरूपतया एकात्मकमपि व्यक्तिभेदेनानेकम् अनेकरूपम् । अथ
वाज्जेकरूपमप्येकात्मकमन्योन्यसंबन्धितत्वात् इत्यपि व्याख्याने
न दोषः । तथा वाचकमभिधायकं शब्दकर्म तदप्यवश्यं निदिष्टं
द्वयात्मकम् । सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकत्वात् । एकानेकारमकमित्यर्थः ।
उभयत्र वाच्यमिदं स्वेप्यव्यक्तत्वात् । अस्यमितिपदं
10 वाच्यवाचकयोरप्येकानेकात्मकत्वं निश्चिन्तयेदकान्तं व्यव
स्थिनति । अत उपदर्शितप्रकारदन्यथा सामान्यविशेषैकान्तरूपेण
प्रकारेण । वाचकवाच्यश्रौ वाच्यवाचकभावकल्पनायां । अथाह
कानाम् अत्वदीयानाम् अन्ययुष्यानाम् । प्रतिभाप्रमादः प्रज्ञारस
सितम् । इत्यस्यार्थः ॥ अथ चात्यस्वरत्वेन वाच्यपदस्य मागुनिपाते
12 प्राप्तेऽपि पदादौ वाचकग्रहणं तस्याधोर्ध्वमतिपादनस्य शब्दाधीनत्वेन
वाचकस्मार्प्यत्वज्ञापनार्थम् । तथा च आदिश्रुतिः ।

न सोऽस्ति मत्स्या लोके या शब्दानुगमाहते ।

अनुविद्यमिष इमं सः शब्दः भासते ॥

इति ॥

20 भावावस्थेयत्वात् एक तीर्थिकाः सामान्यरूपमेव वाच्यतया अभ्युपग-

प्छन्ति । ते च द्रव्यास्तिकनयानुपातिनो मीमांसकमेदा अद्वैतवादिनः
 सांग्रव्याध । केचिच्च विशेषरूपमेव बाध्यं निर्बन्धन्ति । ते च पर्यायास्ति
 कनयानुसारिण सौगताः । अपरे च परस्परनिरपेक्षपदार्थपृथग्भूत
 सामान्यविशेषयुक्तं वस्तु बाध्यत्वेन निश्चिन्त्यते । ते च नैगमनयानुगा
 25 मिनः काणादा आक्षेपात् । एतच्च पक्षत्रयमपि किञ्चिच्चर्ष्यते ॥ तथा
 हि संग्रहनपावसम्बिन्दो वादिनाः प्रविपादयन्ति सामान्यमेव तत्त्वम् ।
 ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामवक्षेणात् । तथा सर्वमङ्कम् । अभिप्रेषेण
 सद्विज्ञानामिमानानुवृत्तिरिहानुमितसत्ताकत्वात् । तथा द्रव्य
 त्वमेव तत्त्वम् । ततोऽप्यन्तरभूतानां यर्मापर्माकाशकासपुद्गलजीवद्र
 30 व्याणामनुपलब्धेः । किं च येः सामान्यात्पृथग्भूता अन्यान्यव्याह
 र्यात्मका विशेषाः कल्प्यन्ते तेषु विशेषतः विद्यते न वा । ना चेभिः
 स्वभावतामसङ्गः । स्वरूपस्यैवाभावात् । अस्ति चेच्छि तदत्र सामा
 न्यम् । यतः समानानां भावः सामान्यम् । विशेषरूपतया च सर्वेषां
 तेषामभिप्रेषणं प्रतीतिः सिद्धव । अपि च विशेषाणां व्यावृत्तिमत्त्य
 35 हेतुत्वं सङ्गम् । व्यावृत्तिमत्त्य एव विचार्यमाणो न भवति । व्यावृत्ति
 र्हि विवक्षितपदार्थे इतरपदार्थमतिषेधः । विवक्षितपदार्थस्य स्वस्वरूप
 व्यवस्थापनमात्रपर्यवसायी कथं पदार्थान्तरमतिषेधं प्रगल्भते । न च
 स्वरूपसम्बन्धन्यत्र किमपि यत्र तमिषेधं प्रवर्तते । तत्र च व्याह
 रौ क्रियमाणायां स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तविश्वत्रयवर्तिनोऽतीववर्तमाना
 40 नागताः पदार्थास्तस्माद्व्यावर्तनीयाः । ते च नाज्ञातस्वरूपा व्याव
 र्तेयिर्तुं शक्याः । ततश्चैकस्यापि विशेषस्य परिज्ञाने प्रमादुः सर्वज्ञत्वं
 स्यात् । न चैतत्प्रातीतिकं यौक्तिकं वा । व्यावृत्तिश्च निषेधः । स
 चाभावरूपत्वाद्युच्छः कथं प्रतीतिगापरमञ्जलि । तदुच्यते । तथा
 यस्या व्यावृत्तिस्तु असद्रूपा सद्रूपा वा । असद्रूपाश्चेच्छि स्वराविभागा
 45 त्किं न व्यावृत्तिः । सद्रूपाश्चेत्सामान्यमेव । या चेयं व्यावृत्तिरिच्छेयः

क्रियते सा सधोऽपि विप्रपञ्च्यति पञ्च अनका वा । अनका एतस्या
 अपि विशेषन्यायाः । अनकरूपत्वेन कनीषितत्वादिशेषाणाम् । ततश्च
 तस्या अपि विप्रपञ्चान्ययानुपपत्तयः स्यान्त्या मायम् । व्यावृत्तरपि
 च व्यावृत्तौ विशेषाणामभार एव स्यात् । तस्मिन् रूपभूताया व्यावृत्त
 ६० प्रतिपिदत्वात् । अनवस्थापानाथ । पञ्चा यस्मान्मान्यमेव संज्ञा त
 र्ण प्रतिपत्तं स्यात् । अनुवृत्तिमत्ययत्नतणाध्यमिचारात् । किं यामी
 विशपाः सामान्यादयिषा अभिप्राया । यिषा च मन्त्रद्वयमत्रागानु
 कारा । अभिप्राया चेतद्वय तत्सवरूपवत् । इति सामान्यरूपान्तवादः ॥
 पयापनयान्त्रयिनस्तु भाषते । विविक्ताः सणस्यिणा विप्रपा एव
 ६० परमावः । ततो विप्रगुदृतस्य सामान्यस्यापनीयमानत्वात् । न हि
 गवादिष्यत्पनुमब्रूयते धर्ममस्यानात्मरूप्यत्किरूपमपहायान्य
 त्किञ्चिद्वदन्नुपाधि प्रतिभासत । तादृशस्यानुमब्रूयमानत्वात् । तथा च
 पठन्ति ।

एतामु पञ्चत्ववमासिनीषु मत्यतगाये स्फुटमङ्गुलीषु ।

६० साधारणं रूपमवेक्षत या शृङ्गं विरम्यात्मन इक्षते सा ॥

एकाकारपरामर्शमव्ययस्तु स्वदेतुवचनक्रिय एवात्ययत इति म
 तेन सामान्यसाधनं न्याय्यम् । किं च यद्विषयं सामान्यं परिकल्प्यते
 तदेकमनकं वा । एकमपि सर्वगतमसर्वगतं वा । सर्वगतं च त्वेकं न
 व्यत्यन्तरात्पूपमव्ययम् । 'सर्वगतैकस्याभ्युपगमं च तस्य यथा
 ६० गोत्वं सामान्यं गोव्यक्तीः शोडीकरोति एवं किं न पृथग्प्रादिष्य
 कीरपि । अभिप्रायात् । असर्वगतं योद्विशेषरूपापत्तिरभ्युपगमवाच्यः ।
 अमानेकस्य गात्वात्त्वत्पटत्वपटत्वादिवैयर्थ्यात् तर्हि विप्रपा
 एव स्वीकृताः । अन्यान्यव्यावृत्तिरहितत्वात् । न हि यत्रोत्वं तद्वद्वत्त्वा
 त्यक्तमिति । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं च यस्तुना कस्यम् । तच्च विशेषपक्षे

- 70 स्फुटं प्रतीयते । न हि सामान्यन काचिद्व्यक्रिया क्रियते । तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात्सार्हदोहादिकास्वर्षभियास्तु विधेपाणामेषोपयोगात् । तथेदं सामान्यं विधेपेभ्यो भिन्नमभिर्भा । मिर्भं चेद्वस्तु । विधेप विधेपेणार्थक्रियाकारित्वामावात् । अभिर्भं चेद्विधेपा एव तत्स्वरूपम् । इति विधेपेकान्तवादाः ॥ न गमनयानुगामिनस्त्वाहुः ।
- 75 स्वतन्त्रो सामान्यविधेपो । सर्वत्र प्रमाणन प्रतीतत्वात् । तथा हि सामान्यविधेपावत्यन्तं भिन्नं । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वात् । यावेवं तावत् यथा पाथापावर्का । तथा चेतो । तस्माच्चथा । सामान्यं हि गोत्वादि सर्वगतं तद्विपरीताय क्षणलशावच्छेयादयो विधेपाः । ततः क्वमपार्मन्थ युक्तम् । न सामान्यात्पृथग्विशेषस्योपसम्भ इति चेत्
- 80 कथं तर्हि तस्यापसम्भ इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यव्याप्तस्यति चेत् न तर्हि स विश्वोपसम्भः । सामान्यस्यापि तेन ग्रहणात् । ततश्च तेन वापेन विविक्तविधेपग्रहणामावात् तद्वाचकं ध्वनिं तत्साध्य च व्यवहारं न भवत्यस्यमावा । न चेतस्ति । विश्वपाभिधानव्यवहारया महति दधनात् । तस्माद्विश्वमभिलपता तत्र च व्यवहार भवत्येता तद्वा
- 85 इको योषा विविक्ताभ्युपगन्तव्याः । एवं सामान्यस्थानं विश्वपञ्चदं विश्वस्थानं च सामान्यपञ्चदं प्रयुज्जानेन सामान्यपि तद्वाइके वापा विविक्ताङ्गीकृतव्यं । तस्मात्स्वस्वग्राहिणि ज्ञाने पृथक्प्रति मासमानत्वाद्वावपीतरतरविश्वकसिनौ । ततो न सामान्यविधेपा त्यक्तं वस्तुनो गन्ते । इति स्वतन्त्रसामान्यविश्वपवादः ॥
- 90 तदेतत्पञ्चममपि न समते सादृश्यममाणवाधितत्वात् । सामान्य विश्वोपमयात्मकम्यैव वस्तुनो निर्दिगानमनुभूयमानत्वात् । वस्तुना हि लक्षणमयक्रियाकारित्वम् । त लक्षणकान्तवाद् एवाविकर्त्तृ कस्य न्ति परीक्षता । तथा हि यथा गौरित्युक्त पुरककुन्तात्मासादृश्यमभि राणावयववर्षमेष वस्तुव्यरूप सन्न्यस्यनुयायि प्रतीयत तथा महि

- ७५ प्यादिष्याद्विरपि प्रतीयत । यथापि च द्रवसा गौरित्युच्यत तत्रापि यथा विशेषप्रतिभासस्तथा गात्वप्रतिभासोपि स्फुट एव । द्रवदृष्टि-
केवलनिष्ठेषणाधारणपि अयात्प्रकरणाद्वा गात्वमनुवर्तन । अपि च
द्रवस्त्वमपि नानाक्यम् । तथा दर्शनात् । ततो यत्रा द्रवमस्युक्तं यत्र
हीकृतसकलद्रवमसामान्यं विवक्षितगोच्यक्तिगतयेव द्रवस्त्वमप्यत्र
१०० स्याप्यते । तत्रवमावाप्तगोपासं प्रतीतिप्रसिद्धेपि वस्तुनः सामान्य
विशेषात्प्रकृतं तदुभयेकान्तपादः प्रकाशमात्रम् । न हि क्वचित्कदा-
चित्केनचित्सामान्यं विशेषविनाकुलमनुपपत्ते विशेषा वा तद्विमा-
कृताः । केवलं दुर्नयमापितमतिप्यामोहबद्धादक्यपक्षप्या अन्यतर-
वस्थापयन्ति बाधिकाः । सोऽयमन्यगमन्यायः ॥ अपि च तत्रैकान्त-
१०५ पक्षोपनिपातिनः मायुक्ता ढोपास्तेपि अनेकान्तवादमयम् । दूरदर्श-
रितत्वाभोऽभूतिवृत्तमपि समाः ॥ स्वतन्त्रसामान्याविशेषमादिनस्त्वेवं
प्रतिज्ञेय्याः । सामान्यं प्रतिष्यक्ति कर्षणचिद्विज्ञम् । कर्षणचिद्विज्ञम् ।
कर्षणचिद्विज्ञात्मकत्वात् । विसदृशपरिणामवत् । यथैव हि कानिद्व्य-
क्तिरूपसामान्यावृत्त्यन्तराद्विशिष्टा विसदृशपरिणामदर्शनादव-
११० तिष्ठते तथा सदृशपरिणामात्मकमाधान्यदर्शनात्मकानेति तेन समा-
नो गौरयम् । सोऽयमन्यगमन्याय इति प्रतीतः । न चास्य व्यक्तिस्वरूपाद-
मिद्वन्वात्सामान्यक्यताभ्याघातः । यथा रूपादीनामपि व्यक्तिस्वरू-
पादभिन्नत्वमस्ति न चैतेषां शुण्यरूपाताभ्याघातः । कर्षणचिद्विज्ञातिरेकस्तु
क्यादीनामपि सदृशपरिणामस्याप्यस्यैव । पृथग्यपदेशादियत्त्वात् ।
११५ विशेषा अपि नैकान्तेन सामान्यात्पृथग्यभिन्नमस्ति । यतो यदि सा-
मान्यं सर्वगतं सिद्धं यत्तत् तदा तेषामसर्वगतत्वेन ततो विरुद्धप्रमा-
ण्यासाः स्यात् । न च तस्य तत्सिद्धम् । मायुक्त्युक्त्या निराकृतत्वात् ।
सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां च कर्षणचिद्विज्ञातिरेकानेकक्य
तथा व्यवस्थितत्वात् । ।

१२० नेकमिष्यते सामान्यास्तु विज्ञेयाणामप्यतिरेकात्तेष्वेकस्या इति ॥

एकत्वं च सामान्यस्य संग्रहनयार्पणात्सर्षभ विज्ञेयम् । प्रमाण्यार्पणा
तस्य कथंचिद्विरुद्धप्रमाध्यासितत्वम् । सहस्रपरिणामरूपस्य विसह
स्रपरिणामवत् कथंचित्प्रतिव्यक्ति भेदात् । एवं चासिद्धं सामान्यवि-
ज्ञेययोः सध्याविरुद्धप्रमाध्यासितत्वम् । कथंचिद्विरुद्धप्रमाध्यासित

१२५ त्वं चेद्विप्रसितं तदास्मत्कृतामरेष्टाः । कथंचिद्विरुद्धप्रमाध्यासस्य कथं-
चिद्वेदाभिनाभूतत्वात् । पायःपावकदृष्टान्तोपि साध्यसाधनविकलः ।
तयोरेपि कथंचिदेव विरुद्धप्रमाध्यासितत्वं न भिन्नत्वेन च स्वीकर-
णात् । पयस्त्वपावकस्थानिना हि तयोर्विरुद्धप्रमाध्यासा भेदश्च । द्रव्य
त्वादिना पुनस्तद्वैपरीत्यमिति । तथा च कथं न सामान्यविज्ञेयपरम
१३० कत्वं वस्तुनो घन्त इति ॥ तदा सुपुक्तं वाच्यमेकयनेकस्यामिति ॥

एवं वाचकमपि शब्दाख्यं द्रव्यात्मकम् सामान्यविज्ञेयात्मकम् ।
सर्षभशब्दव्यक्तिष्वनुयायि शब्दस्वमेकं शाङ्गशाङ्गतीममन्दोदाघान्तु-
दात्तस्वरितादिविज्ञेयभेदादनेकम् । शब्दस्य हि सामान्यविज्ञेयात्म-
कत्वं पौत्रलिकताद्वयकमेव । तथाहि पौत्रलिकाः शब्दः । इन्द्रियार्थ

१३५ त्वात् । रूपादिषु । यथास्य पौत्रलिकत्वनिषेधाय स्पष्टशून्याश्रयत्वात्
अतिनिषिद्धमद्वेष्टे यन्ननिर्गमयोरप्रतिपातात् पूर्वं पञ्चाशाययवानुप-
सम्भेः सूक्ष्मसूत्रद्रव्यान्तरामेरकत्वात् गगनगुणत्वाच्चेति पञ्चहेतवो
पौत्रैक्यन्यस्तास्ते हेत्वाभासाः । तथा हि शब्दपर्यायस्याश्रयो भाषा
वर्गणा न पुनराकाशम् । तत्र च स्पष्टो निर्णयित एव । यदा शब्द-

१४० श्रयाः स्पर्शवान् । अनुवातप्रतिवातयोर्विमकुलनिकटधरीरिणोपलभ्य
मानानुपलभ्यमानेन्द्रियार्थत्वात् । तथाविधगन्धाधारद्रव्यपरमाणु
वत् । इत्यसिद्धः प्रथमः । द्वितीयस्तु गन्धद्रव्येण व्यभिचारादनेका
न्तिकः । वर्त्यमाननात्मकस्तूरिकादिगन्धद्रव्यं हि पिहितद्वारापवरक
स्यान्तर्विनति बहिष्च निर्याति न चापौत्रलिकम् । अथ तत्र सूक्ष्मरध-

- 145 संभवाभाविनिविदस्वयतस्तत्र तस्यबेदानिच्छमौ । कथमन्ययोदा-
 दितद्वारायस्यायामिष न तदेकाण्यस्यम् । सवया नीरत्रे तु मदेष्टे
 न तयोः संभव इति चेत् तर्हि अन्वयेतत्समानमित्यसिद्धो हेतुः ।
 वृतीयस्तु तद्विल्लोकोन्मादिभिरनैकान्तिकः । अतुषोपि तमेव । गन्ध-
 द्रव्यविशेषमस्मरजाभूमादिभिर्व्यापिचारात् । न हि गन्धद्रव्यादिक
 150 यपि नासायां निविद्यमानं तद्विरदारश्रेणादिब्रह्मधुमेरकं दृश्यते ।
 पञ्चमः पुनरसिद्धः । तथाहि न गगनगुणः क्षुद्रः । अस्मदादिवत्यस्य
 त्वात् । क्वादिषत् । इति सिद्धः पौंड्रसिद्धात्वात्सामान्यविशेषात्मकः
 क्षुद्र इति ॥ न च वाच्यम् आत्मन्यपाङ्गलिकेपि कथं सामान्यविशेषा-
 त्मकत्वं निर्विवादमनुययत् इति । यतः संसायात्मनः प्रतिमदेष्टम-
 155 नन्तानन्तकर्मपरयाश्रुतिः सह बहितापितपनकुडितनिर्विभाग
 पिण्डीवृत्तचूचीकलापवत् लोभीभावमापन्नस्य कथंयित्वाद्भूमिकत्वा-
 न्यनुज्ञानादिति । यद्यपि त्मादाश्चादिनां पौंड्रसिद्धमपौंड्रसिद्धं
 च सर्वं वस्तु सामान्यविशेषात्मकं तथाप्यपौंड्रलिकेषु धर्माधर्मा-
 काक्षकासु तदात्मकत्वमर्थान्ध्र्यां न तथापतीनिविषयमायातीति
 160 पौंड्रलिकेषु पुनस्तत्साध्यमानं तथां शुभदानमित्यस्तुतमपि
 क्षुद्रस्य पौंड्रसिद्धत्वमत्र सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वसाधनायोप्य-
 स्तमिति । अत्रापि नित्यक्षुद्रादिसंमतः क्षुद्रकत्वंकान्तोऽनित्य
 क्षुद्राद्यमिमतः गन्धानकत्वंकान्तश्च मान्दित्यदिना प्रतिश्लेष्यः ।
 अथवा वाच्यस्य धराद्वैतस्य सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वे तत्राचरुस्य
 165 ध्वनरपि तत्रम् । क्षुद्रार्थयोः कथंयित्वादात्म्याभ्युपगमात् । यदाहु
 भद्रबाहुस्वामिपादाः ।

अभिहारं अभिदेयात् हाइ मिण्णं अमिण्णं च ।

सुरमग्गिपोयगुचारणम्मि अम्हा उ वयणसवणार्ण ॥

नदि छम्भो मणि वाहा न पूरणं तेण धिअं तु ।

- 170 अन्धा य मोयगुधारणम्भि तत्थेम पञ्चमो होइ ॥
न य होइ स अमत्थे तेण अभिन्नं तदत्थामो ।

एतेन

विकल्पयोनयः श्रद्धा विकल्पाः श्रद्धयानयः ।
कार्यकारणता तपो नार्थं श्रद्धाः स्पृष्टन्त्यपि ॥

- 175 इति मत्स्युक्तम् । अर्थाभिधानमत्ययास्तुत्यनामधेया इति वच
नात् । श्रद्धास्य वस्तुदेव तत्त्वं यदभिप्रेयं यायात्म्येनासौ मति
पादयति । स च तत्तयाप्रतिपादयन् वाच्यस्वरूपपरिणामपरिणत
एव वक्तुं शक्नो नान्यथा । अतिमसद्भात् । यदभिधानकालं पद्या
भिधानस्य प्राप्तेरिति ॥

- 180 अथवा भङ्गयन्तरेण सकर्म काव्यमिदं व्याख्यायत ।
वाच्यं वस्तु पदान्तिकम् । एकान्तरुमन एकरूपमेव सत् अनेकम् अने
करूपम् । अयमयः । प्रमाता तावत्प्रमेयं सक्षणेन निश्चिनोति ।
तच्च सजातीयविजातीयव्यवच्छेदादात्मसारं कथ्यते । यथा घ्नस्य
सजातीया सुन्मयपत्न्या विजातीयाश्च पट्टादयः । तेषां व्यवच्छेद
185 स्तद्वचनम् । पृषुपुत्रोदरायाकारं कम्बुग्रीवा जम्भारणादिक्रिया
समर्थः पद्मायैवेष्टया घ्न इत्युच्यते । तेषां च सजातीयानां स्वरूपं
तत्र बुद्धपारोक्ष्यं व्यवच्छिद्यते । अन्यथा प्रतिनियततत्त्वरूप
परिच्छेदानुपपत्तं । सब्रमावानां हि भाषामावात्मकं स्वरूपम् ।
एकान्तभावात्मकत्वे वस्तुनो वैस्वरूप्यं स्यात् । एकान्ताभावाय
190 कल्पे च निःस्वभावात्ता स्यात् । तस्मात्स्वरूपेण सत्त्वात्पररूपेण
चासत्त्वाद्भाषामावात्मकं वस्तु । यद्वाह ।

सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च ।

अन्यथा सप्तसर्वं स्यात्स्वरूपस्याप्यसौमवः ॥

तदर्थं कस्मिन् घ्नं सर्वेषां घ्नव्यतिरिक्तपदार्थानामभावरूपेण वृत्तेर

- 19 नकारमकृत्स्नं घटस्य रूपपादम् । एवं चैकस्मिन्मर्मे ज्ञात सर्वेषाम
र्यानां ज्ञानम् । सनपञ्चाधपरिच्छदमन्तरण तन्निपचात्मन एकस्य
वस्तुनो विविक्ततया परिच्छिन्नार्सयथात्मागमाप्यमेव व्यवस्थितः ।

जे एगं जाणइ से सत्त्वं जाणइ । जे सत्त्वं जाणइ स एगं जाणइ ।

तथा

- 200 एका भाषाः सवेषा येन दृष्टं सर्वे भावाः सवेषा तेन दृष्टा ।
सर्वे भावाः सवेषा येन दृष्टा एको भाषाः सवेषा तेन दृष्टा ॥
य तु सागताः परासत्त्वं नाद्वीकृते तेषां पट्यदेः सपारमकृत्स्न
मसद्भावाः यथा घटस्य स्वरूपादिनापि सत्त्वं तथा यदि पररू-
पादिनापि स्यात् तथा च सति स्वरूपादिसत्त्ववत्पररूपादिसत्त्वम
205 सत्त्वेः कथं न सत्त्वात्मकत्वं मवेत् । परामत्त्वन तु प्रतिनियतोऽस्ती
मिष्यति । अयं न नाम नास्ति परासत्त्वं किं तु स्वसत्त्वमव तद्वि-
ति चेत् अहं चैवगृही । न गत्यु यद्य सत्त्वं तद्वत्सत्त्वं भवितुमर्हति ।
विभिन्नविपक्षरूपतया निरुद्धवर्माप्याप्तनानाधर्मेयायोगात् । अयं
युष्मत्पक्षेऽप्येवं विरापस्तत्रयस्य एवति चत् अहं वाचाटता दधानां
210 विपक्षस्य । न हि वयं येनैव मकारण सत्त्वं तेनैवासत्त्वं येनैवासत्त्वं
तेनैव सत्त्वमभ्युपगमं किं तु स्वकपत्रम्यसंयत्कालमात्रैः सत्त्वं पर
कपत्रम्यसंयत्कालमात्रैस्तत्त्वसत्त्वम् तत्रा चर विरापावकाष्ठ ॥ योगास्तु
मगरमन्ते सवेषापृथग्भूतपरस्परभावाभ्युपगममाप्रेर्णव पदार्थ
प्रतिनियमसिद्धः किं तेषामसत्त्वात्मकत्वकल्पनयति । तदसत् । यदा
215 हि पटाधभावकपो यत्रो न भवति तत्रा पटो घट्यादिरव स्यात् यथा
च घट्याभावाद्भिन्नत्वात् घटस्य घटरूपता तथा पट्यादिरपि स्यात् ।
घट्याभावाद्भिन्नत्वादेव । इत्यलं विस्तरण ॥ एवं वाचकमपि तद्वत्कृत्
इयात्मकम् । एकात्मकमपि सत्त्वमकृमिष्यर्थः । यथाकृन्त्यापन शब्द
स्यापि भाषाभावात्मकत्वात् । अयं वा एकविषयस्यापि वाचक

- २२० स्यानेकपिपयस्त्रोपपत्तेः । यथा किञ्च घटशब्दः संकेतमश्वत्थपु
 पुष्पोदराधाकारवति पदार्थे भवति तेषां वाचकतया तत्रा देशकाला
 यपेक्षया तद्वशादेव पदार्थान्तरं न्यपि च तत्रा भवतिमानः केन
 वार्यते । भवन्ति हि वक्तारो योगिनः शरीरं प्रति घट इति । संके
 तानां पुरुषेच्छाधीनतया अनियतत्वात् । तथा चौरशब्दोऽन्यत्र तस्करे
 २२६ कदापि दासिणात्यानामोदने असिद्धः । यथा च कुमारशब्दः पूर्वं
 देशे आश्विनमासे कदा । एवं कर्कटशब्दादप्यपि तत्पक्षेऽपेक्षया
 योन्यादिवाचका ज्ञेयाः । कालापेक्षया पुनर्यथा जैनानां प्राय
 श्चित्तविधौ वृत्तिश्रद्धासंज्ञननादिमति प्राचीनकाले पद्मगुरुशब्देन
 श्वतमश्वीत्यधिकमुपपातानामुच्यते स्म सांप्रतकाले तु तद्विपरीते
 २३० तेनैव पद्मगुरुशब्देनोपपातप्रयमेव संकेत्यते जीतकल्पव्यवहारा
 नुसारात् । आश्वापेक्षया तु यथा पुराणेषु द्वादशीशब्दनैकादशी
 त्रिपुरार्जवे चालिशब्देन मदिराभिपक्तं मैथुनशब्देन मधुस
 पिपोर्ग्रहणमित्यादि । न चैवं सङ्केतस्यैवार्थमत्यायने प्राधान्यम् ।
 ✓ स्वामाधिकसामर्थ्यसाधिम्यादेव तस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तेः । सर्वशब्दानां
 २३६ सर्वार्थमत्यायनशक्तियुक्तत्वाद्यत्र च देशकालादी पदार्थमतिपादन
 शक्तिसंस्कारी सङ्केतस्तत्र समर्थं प्रतिपादयति । तथा च निर्मित
 दुर्गमपरमवादाः श्रीदेवशूरिपादाः । स्वामाधिकसामर्थ्यसमया
 भ्यामर्थबोधनिबन्धनं शब्दः । अत्र शक्तिपदार्थसमर्थने ग्रन्थान्तरा
 दवसेयम् ॥ अतोऽन्येत्यादि उत्तरार्द्धे पूरयत् । प्रतिभाषमादस्तु तपां
 २४० सत्रसदेकान्ते वाक्यस्य प्रतिनियतार्थपिपयस्त्रे च वाचकस्याक्त
 युक्त्या दापसद्भावात् व्यवहारानुपपत्तः ॥ तदर्थं समुदायायः ।
 सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्य भाषामावात्मकस्य च वस्तुनः सामान्यविशे
 षात्मकं भाषामावात्मकम् अनिर्वाचकं इति । अन्यथा प्रकारान्तरे
 पुनर्वाच्यत्वात्कामावश्यवस्थामातिष्ठमानानां प्रतिभैव ममापति न

मीत्यभीतिविषादात्मकानां साधनोपपृथग्गौरवधर्माणां परस्पर
 रोपकारिणां त्रयाणां गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था
 मकृतिः । प्रधानमभ्यक्तमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । तथानादिमध्यान्तमनवयवं
 35 साधारणमब्रह्मस्पर्शमकपरसमगन्धमव्ययम् । प्रधानादुद्दिमेहदि
 त्यपरपर्यायोत्पद्यते । योऽयमध्यवसायो गवादिषु प्रतिपत्तिः एवमेतत्
 नात्मया गौरेवार्थं नाश्वः स्वापुरेण नार्यं पुरुष इत्येवा बुद्धिः । त
 स्यात्स्वष्टौ क्वाणि धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यक्याणि चत्वारि सात्त्विकानि
 अर्धमादीनि तु तत्प्रतिपत्तयूतानि चत्वारि तामसानि । बुद्धेर
 40 ईकारः । स चाभिमानात्मकः । अहं ब्रह्मेऽहं स्वर्गेऽहं कर्मेऽहं मन्येऽ-
 हं रसेऽहं स्वामी अहमीश्वरः असौ मया हतः सत्त्वोहमहं हनि
 प्यामि इत्यादिसत्यवक्यं । तस्मात्प्रवृत्तन्मात्राणि ब्रह्मन्मात्रादी
 न्यविशेषक्याणि सूक्ष्मपर्यायवाच्यानि । ब्रह्मन्मात्रादि ब्रह्म
 एवोपसम्यक्ते न पुनरुदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितकम्पितवद्भादिभेदाः । प
 45 द्भादयः ब्रह्मविशेषादुपसम्यन्ते । एवं स्पर्शकपरसगन्धतन्मात्रे
 प्यपि योजनीयमिति । तत् एव बाह्यद्वारादेकद्वारेन्द्रियाणि च । तत्र
 चक्षुः श्रोत्रं घ्राणं रसनं त्वगिति पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि बाह्यानि पाद
 पायूपस्थाः पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि एकादशं मन इति । पञ्चतन्मात्रे-
 न्यश्च पञ्चमहायूतानि उत्पद्यन्ते । तद्यथा ब्रह्मन्मात्रादाकाशं
 50 ब्रह्मगुणं ब्रह्मन्मात्रसहितास्पर्शतन्मात्रादापुः ब्रह्मस्पर्शगुणः
 ब्रह्मस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहिताद्रूपतन्मात्रादेजः ब्रह्मस्पर्शरूपगुणं ब्रह्म
 स्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रसहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः ब्रह्मस्पर्शकपरसगुणः । ब्रह्म
 स्पर्शकपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्रन्ध्रतन्मात्रात् ब्रह्मस्पर्शकपरसगन्धगुणः
 पृथ्वी जायत इति । पुरुषस्तु—

85 अमूर्तधेतनो भोगी नित्यः सवेगतोऽक्रियाः ।

अकर्ता मिरुणः सूक्ष्म आत्मा कापिच्छर्द्धने ॥

इति । अपपद्वत् मकृतिपुरुषयोः सयोगः । चिच्छक्तिश्च
 विषयपरिच्छेदशून्या । यत् इन्द्रियद्वारेण सुखदुःखादयो विषया
 बुद्धौ प्रतिसंक्रामन्ति बुद्धिश्चोभयसुखदर्पणाकारा ततस्तस्यां चैत
 १० न्यशक्तिः प्रतिबिम्बते । ततः सुखम् इदं दुःखम् इदम् इत्युपधारः । आत्मा
 हि स्वं बुद्धेरभ्यतिरिक्तमभिमन्यते । आह च पतञ्जलिः । बुद्धोपि
 पुरुषः मत्परं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक
 इव प्रतिभासते इति । मुख्यतस्तु बुद्धेरव विषयपरिच्छेदः । तथा
 च वाचस्पतिः । सर्वो व्यवहृता आलोच्य नन्वहमप्रापिकृत इत्य
 १५ मिमत्सु कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेति अभ्यवस्यति ततश्च प्रवर्त्तत इति श्लोकतः
 सिद्धम् । तत्र कर्तव्यमिति चोप निष्पन्नमिति सभिधानापन्न
 चैतन्याया बुद्धेः सोध्यवसायो बुद्धेरसाधारणा व्यापार इति ।
 चिच्छक्तिसभिधानावाचतनापि बुद्धिभेदानवतीवामासते । बाद
 महार्वाच्याह । बुद्धिदर्पणसंक्रान्तमर्थमतिबिम्बकं द्वितीयदर्पणकल्पे
 २० पुंस्त्यप्यारोहति तदव भाकृत्वमस्य नत्वात्मनो विकारापत्तिः
 इति । तथा चासुरिः ।

विमिक्ते इन्परिणता बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते ।

प्रतिबिम्बादयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसाम्भसि ॥

विन्ध्यवासी त्वेवं भागमाश्रये ।

२५ पुरुषाऽनिकृतारमैव स्थनिर्मासमपेतनम् ।

मनः करोति सानिध्यादुपाधिः स्पष्टिकं यथा ॥

न च वक्तव्यं पुरुषभेदशून्योऽपरिणामी कथमस्य मोक्षः । मुने-
 र्बन्धनविशेषपापत्वात्संसासनरुद्धकर्मोद्भवानां च बन्धनसमाप्ता
 तानां पुरुषपरिणामिन्यसंप्रदात् । अत एव नास्य मेस्यमाणा
 ३० परनामा संसारोऽस्ति निष्क्रियत्वादिति । यथा मकृतिरेव माना
 पुरुषाभ्या सती वध्यत संसरति मुख्यत च न पुरुष इति वचनं
 ११ [२५३]

मोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषे उपपद्यन्ते । यथा जयपराजयो मृत्युगतावपि
स्वामिन्पुपघर्षेते तत्फलस्य कोष्ठमपरेः स्वामिनि संबन्धात्
तथा मोक्षापघर्षयोः प्रकृतिमतयोरपि विभेदाग्रहाद्युपे संबन्ध

४५ इति ॥

तदेतदस्मिन्मासमासम् । चिच्छक्तिश्च विषयपरिच्छेदरूपा
चेति परस्परविरुद्धं च । चित्ती संज्ञाने । चेतनं चित्तत पा-
नयेति चित् । सा चेत्यपरपरिच्छेदात्मिका नेप्यते तदा चिच्छ-
क्तिरेव सा न स्यात् । पठयत् । न चामूर्त्तयाविच्छक्तेर्बुद्धौ प्रतिवि-
५० म्बोदयो युक्तः । तस्य मूर्त्तपरमत्वात् । न च तथा परिणाममन्तरेण
प्रतिसंक्रमोपि युक्तः । कर्षचित्सक्रियाकृताभ्यातिरेकेण प्रकृत्यु-
पधानेप्यन्यथात्वनुपपत्तेः । अप्युत्पत्ताधीनरूपस्य च सुखदुःखा-
दिमोगम्यपदेष्टानर्हत्वात् । तत्प्यये च प्राक्तनरूपस्याग्नोघरक्या
प्यासितवया सक्रियत्वापत्तिः । स्फुटिकादावपि तथा परिणामनैव
५५ प्रतिविम्बोदयसमर्पणात् । अन्यथा कश्चमन्त्रोपसृष्टौ न प्रतिविम्बाः ।
तथा परिणामान्युपगमे च बलाद्व्यापारं चिच्छक्तेः कर्तृत्वं
साक्षाद्भाक्त्वं च । अथ अपरिणामिनी मोक्षसक्तिरमनिसंक्रमा च
परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रातेव तद्विषयानुभवतीति पतञ्जलिप्रवचना
दौपचारिक एवार्थं प्रतिसंक्रम इति चेत् तर्हि उपचारस्तत्त्वचिन्ता
१०० यामनुपयोगीति मेक्षावतामनुपादेय एवायम् । तथा च प्रतिपादिम
तीतं सुखदुःखादिसंवेदनं निराश्रयमयस्यात् । न चर्द्ध बुद्धेरुपपत्तम् ।
तस्या जडत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । अत एव जडा च बुद्धिरित्यपि विरुद्धम् ।
न हि जडम्यस्याया बुद्धौ विषयाध्यवसायाः साध्यमानाः साधीय
स्तां दधाति । मनुस्मृत्येवनापि बुद्धिचिच्छक्तिसानिध्याद्येवनापत्ती-
१०५ बावमासत इति । सत्यवृत्तमयुक्तं वृत्तम् । न हि चैतन्यवति पुरुषादौ
प्रतिसंक्रान्त दर्पणस्य चतन्यापत्तिर्येतन्यापत्तयोरपरावर्तिस्वभावा

पूर्वेर्दाक्षिणः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तिकारी कामोपहतमना
बध्यत इति ।

इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठे नान्यच्छ्रेयो येमिनश्चान्ति मूढाः ।

133 नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेन यूत्वा इमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विभन्ति ॥

इति वचनात् । स त्रिभिषोपि कल्पनामात्रम् । कथंविन्मिथ्यात्रार्थं
नाविरतिमयादकवाययोगेभ्योऽभिन्नस्वरूपत्वेन कथं च न हेतुज्वेना-
न्तर्मावात् । बन्धसिद्धौ च सिद्धस्त्वस्यैव निर्वाणः संसारः । वचनो
समोद्देशैकाधिकरणत्वात् एव वदः स एव मुख्यत इति पुरुष
140 स्यैव मोक्षः । आवासात्पापार्थं त्वयामतीतः । प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शना
त्प्रवृत्तेरपरतार्या प्रकृता पुरुषस्य न्यक्ष्येणावस्थानं मोक्ष इति चेत् न ।
प्रवृत्तिस्वभावाया प्रवृत्तेरौदासीन्यायोगात् । अथ पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना
तस्याः प्रवृत्तिः । विवेकस्यातिथिः पुरुषार्थः । तस्यां जात्रायां निव-
र्तते । कृतक्यत्वात् ।

145 रक्षस्य दर्शयित्वा निर्वर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तत्वात्मानं यन्नाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥

इति वचना । इति चेत् न वच् । तस्या वचननाया विमृश्यस्मरि
त्वाभावात् । यद्यपि कृतेपि शब्दाद्युपलब्धं पुनस्तदर्थं प्रवर्त्तने
तथा विवेकस्यात्ता कृतायामपि पुनस्तदर्थं प्रवर्त्तिष्यते । प्रवृत्ति

150 लक्षणस्य स्वभावस्यामपेक्षत्वात् । न तं हीष्टान्तस्तु स्वष्टविधातकारी ।
यथा हि नर्तकी नृत्ये पारिपन्थ्या दर्शयित्वा निवृत्तापि पुन-
स्तस्तद्वृत्त्यात्मवत्तत तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषायात्मानं दर्शयित्वा
निवृत्तापि पुनः कथं न प्रवर्ततामिति । तस्मात्प्रकृत्यन्यत्वे पुन्य-
स्यैव मास इति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥ एवमन्यामामपि तरुण्यनानां

155 त्वयामोहमहामोहतामिमाम्बतामिष्यमशान्यमेषादिघामितारागद्वेषा-
मिनिबन्धना विपर्ययः । प्राप्तामापस्यसौम्येन्द्रगान्धर्वपसरास

मपैगाचमेदादृविषो नैव सर्गः । पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपम्यापरमे
 दात्यबविषस्तैयम्यानः । आश्वत्थान्ताघनान्तरमेदाविषस्यैव चैक
 विषो मानुष इति चतुर्दशधा मृतमगः । वापिर्यकुर्द्विगान्यत्वम ७८
 १८० ताऽभिद्रवामृकनाकांण्यपक्षुस्वर्लभ्यादावर्तमत्ततामर्पसांशेन्द्रियव
 पशुहिनवक्रचिपययमिच्छपृकचिपययलक्षणसप्तदशपुद्गिवचमेदाद्
 द्वाविंशतिधा शक्तिः । प्रकृत्युपादानकालमागाह्याः अम्भःसन्निभौ
 घट्टद्व्यपरपयायनाभ्याश्चतस्र आध्यामिरयः । जम्बूदिचिपयोपर
 तयमानंनरक्षणक्षयमोगहिंमात्रोपदक्षनहनुमन्यान् पञ्च भाषास्तु
 १८५ दृयः । ताश्च पारमुपारपारापारानुत्तमाम्भउत्तमाम्भअम्भद्व्यपदृश्याः ।
 इति नवधा वृष्टिः । अथो दुःस्वविषाता इति सुख्यास्तिमः सिद्धयः
 प्रमोन्मुदितमोडमानाम्भ्या । तथाध्ययनं वृष्ट उडः सुहृत्प्राप्ति
 र्नानमिति दुःस्वविषातापायतया गांण्यः पञ्च तारमुतास्तार
 ताररम्यकसन्नामुन्तितासया । इत्येवमष्टधा सिद्धिः । पृतिश्रद्धामुन्व
 १९० विचिन्तिपाविद्भिमिमेदात्म्यश्च कथयानयः । इत्यादीनां संवरमति
 सवरानीनां च तत्त्वकामृतीर्गाहपात्राध्यात्रिमिदानां विरुद्धम्बमु
 द्वायनीयमिति काव्यायः ॥ १५ ॥

इदानीं य प्रमाणात्कालनाभिर्मे प्रमाणपक्षमाहुः य च बागाय
 यतिपण घानादृतमशाम्नीति सुखं तन्मतस्य विधायमाणन्व
 विप्ररास्त्रापाह ।

न तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभावो

हेतो गिलीने न फलस्य भावः ।

न सविष्टद्वैतपथेऽथसवि

द्विद्वनशीर्ण सुगतेन्द्रजालम् ॥ १६ ॥

बौद्धाः किञ्च प्रमाणात्तत्फलमेकान्तेनाभिर्भं मन्यन्ते । तथा च
 5 तत्सिद्धान्तः । समयत्र तदेव ज्ञानं प्रमाणं फलम् । अधिगमरूपत्वात् ।
 समयेति मत्पक्षेऽनुमाने च तदेव ज्ञानं मत्पक्षानुमानसङ्गर्षं फलं
 कार्यम् । इति । अधिगमरूपत्वात् इति परिच्छेदरूपत्वात् । तथा
 हि परिच्छेदरूपमयं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । न च परिच्छेदाद्वैतऽप्यज्ञानफ-
 लम् । अधिभाषिकरणत्वात् । इति संबन्धो न मत्पक्षानुमानाभ्यां
 10 भिन्नं फलमस्तीति ॥ एतच्च न समीचीनं यथा यद्यस्मादेकान्तेनाभिर्भं
 तत्तत्तत् सर्ववोत्पद्यते यथा घटेन घटत्वम् । तच्च प्रमाणफलयोः कार्य-
 कारणभाषोऽभ्युपगम्यते । प्रमाणं कारणं फलं कार्यमिति । स
 चैकान्तामेवे न घटते । न हि युगपदुत्पद्यमानयोस्तयोः सम्पत्तर-
 गादिपात्रयोरिव कार्यकारणभाषो युक्तः । निषत्तमात्मक्यापित्वा
 15 त्कारणस्य । नियतोत्तरकालभावितात्कार्यस्य । एतच्चेबाह न
 तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभाव इति । फलं कार्यं हेतुः कारणं तयोर्भाषः
 स्वस्मै कार्यकारणभाषः । स तुल्यकालः समानकालो न युज्यत
 इत्यर्थः । अथ सन्नान्तरितत्वात्तयोः क्रमभाविर्त्वं भविष्यतीत्या-
 चङ्ग्याह । इतौ विलीनं न फलमस्य भाष इति । इतो कारणं
 20 प्रमाणसङ्गते विलीने सङ्गिष्ठत्वादुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमव निरन्वयं विनष्ट
 फलमस्य प्रमाणकायस्य न भाषः सत्ता । निष्कृष्टत्वात् । विद्यमान
 हि फलहेतावस्येदं फलमिति मतीयत नाम्यथा । अतिममद्वात् । किं
 च हेतुफलभावः संबन्धः स च द्विष्ट एव स्यात् । न चानयोः क्षण
 सयकृतीक्षितो मवान्संपन्त्यं समये । ततः फलमयं हेतुः इदं फलमिति
 25 मतिनिवृत्ता मतीतिः । एकस्य ग्रहणेऽन्यस्याग्रहणं तत्संभवात् ।

द्विष्टसंबन्धमभिहितं न रूपमवचनात् ।

इया स्वरूपग्रहणं मति मयन्मवदन्म् ॥

इति वचनात् । यद्यपि धर्मोत्तरणाऽप्यसाम्यमस्य प्रमाणं तद्वद्वा

- व्येप्रतीतिसिद्धिरिति न्यायविन्दुसूत्रे विवृण्वता यणितं नील
 20 निर्मासं हि विज्ञानं यतस्तस्यासीमस्य प्रतीतिरवसीयते यम्यो
 हि चक्षुरादिभ्या ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तद्वशात्तज्ज्ञानं नीलस्य संवे
 दनं प्रक्यतेऽवस्थापयितुम् नीलसत्त्वं मनुभूयमानं नीलस्य संवे
 दनमपस्याप्यते न / चात्र मन्यमनकमात्रनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधन
 भावा यनैकस्मिन्वस्तुनि विरोधा स्यात् अपि तु व्यवस्थाप्य
 35 व्यवस्थापकमात्रेण तत एकस्य वस्तुनः किञ्चिदूर्ध्व प्रमाण किञ्चि
 त्प्रमाणफलं न विवृण्वते व्यवस्थापनहेतुर्हि सारूप्यं तस्य ज्ञान
 स्य व्यवस्थाप्यं च नीलसंवेदनरूपमित्यादि तदप्यसारम् । एकस्य
 निर्देशस्य ज्ञानसंज्ञनस्य व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकत्वसंज्ञनस्वभाव
 द्रव्यायागात् । व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावस्यापि च संभवत्वेन
 40 द्विविधत्वात् एकस्मिन्संभवात् । किं चार्थसारूप्यमर्थाकारता तच्च
 निश्चयरूपमनिश्चयरूपं वा । निश्चयरूपं च तद्वच्च व्यवस्थापकमस्तु ।
 किमुभयकल्पनवा । अनिभितं चेत् स्वयमव्यवस्थितं कथं नीला
 दिसंवेदनव्यवस्थापन सपथम् । अपि च कथमर्थाकारता । किमर्थ
 ग्रहणपरिणामः आहोस्विद्वर्थाकारपारित्यम् । नाथः । सिद्धसा-
 45 धनात् । द्वितीयस्तु ज्ञानस्य ममेयाकारानुकरणाज्जडत्वापत्त्यादि
 दायाधातः । तत्र प्रमाणादकान्तं फलस्याभेदः साधीयान् ।
 संभवादादात्म्ये हि प्रमाणफलमर्थं व्यवस्था । तदावविराधात् ।
 न हि सारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणमधिगतिः फलमिति संभवादादात्म्ये
 सिद्धरति । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । ननु प्रमाणम्यासारूप्यम्याहृतिः
 50 सारूप्यम् अनधिगतिव्यावृत्तिरधिगतिरिति व्यावृत्तिभेदादकम्या
 पि प्रमाणफलमव्यवस्थिति चेत् नैवम् । स्वभावाद्यन्तरगान्य
 व्यावृत्तिभेदस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । कथं च प्रमाणस्य फलस्य भावमा
 नाप्यव्यवस्था प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थाप्रमाणान्तःफलान्तरव्या

- द्वयाप्यममाणन्वस्यापस्तस्य च व्यवस्था न भ्यात् । विनाती
 ॥ यादिव मनानीयादपि व्यावृत्तस्याद्विभुनः । तस्मात्प्रमाणार्थं
 कर्षेनिद्विधमवष्टेप्यम् । माप्यमाणनभायन मतीयमानत्वात् । यदि
 साध्यमाणनभायन मतीयने त परस्परं विधत् । यथा कुडाराच्छिदि
 शिष्य इति ॥ एवं यागाभिप्रायः प्रमाणात्कथमस्यकान्तभदापि निरा
 कृतव्यः । तस्यैकप्रमातृताशङ्क्येन प्रमाणात्कथमिदमेवमवस्थितम् ।
 ॥ प्रमाणतया परिणतस्यैवात्मनः कथतया परिणतिमतीतम् । यः प्रमि
 षीत स एवोपादत्त परिम्यगन्धुपल्लव इति सप्तव्यवहारिमिरस्य
 नितमनुभवात् । इतरथा स्वपरयोः प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थाविच्छेदः प्रस
 ज्यत इत्युक्तम् ॥

- अथवा पूर्वोक्तमिदमन्यथा व्याख्ययम् । सौमता निमित्तं
 ॥ प्रमाणयन्ति । सर्वे सत् क्षणिकम् । यथा सर्वं तावत् पट्यादिकं वस्तु
 मुद्रादिसंनिधानात् गच्छति इत्यतः तत्र येन स्वक्यणान्त्याव
 स्वायां पट्यादिकं विनश्यति तत्तत्स्वरूपमुत्पन्नमात्रस्य विधत्ते
 तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम् ।
 अथेव एव स्वभाषस्तस्य इतुता जाता यत्किञ्चनमपि काळ
 ॥ स्थित्वा विनश्यति । एवं तर्हि मुद्रादिसंनिधानेपि एव एव
 तस्य स्वभाष इति पुनरप्यनन तावन्तमेव काळं स्वावष्टेप्यम् इति
 मैवं विनश्यदिति । 'सोयमद्विस्तोषेणिजा प्रतिदिनं पनसिखितश्च
 स्तनदिनमणनन्यायः । तस्मात्क्षणद्वयस्यापिस्वनाप्युत्पत्तौ प्रथम-
 क्षणपत् द्वितीयेपि क्षणं क्षणद्वयस्यापिस्वात्पुनरपरक्षणद्वयमवतिष्ठे
 ॥ त । एवं तृतीयपि क्षणे तत्स्वभाषत्वाच्चैव विनश्येदिति । स्यादेतत् ।
 स्यापरमय तत्स्वभाषताजातं परं वक्ष्येन विरोधकेन मुद्रादिना
 विनाश्यत इति । तदसत् । कर्षं पुनरतद्विधत्ते । न च तद्विनश्य
 ति स्वावरत्वात् विनाशश्च तस्य विरोधिना वक्ष्येन कियत इति ।

- न तत्तत्प्रमाणमिति । जीवति च त्वदद्या मरण चास्य भव
 ५० तीति । अथ विनश्यति नहि कथमविनश्यत् तदस्तु
 रक्षताज्ञातमिति । न हि क्षियते चामरणधर्मो चेति युज्यत वक्तुम् ।
 तस्मान्निनश्यन्त्वं क्वाचित्पि नाशायामागन् हृष्टबाध नास्य
 नन्वरमप तदस्तु स्वप्नारूपजातमबाध्रीकृतम्यम् । तस्मादुत्पन्नमान
 मव विनश्यति । तथा च क्षणक्षयित्वे सिद्धे भवति । मयागस्त्ववम् ।
 ५५ यन्निनश्यत्वरूप तदुपक्षरनन्तरानवस्थापि यथात्यक्षणवर्तिन्यस्य
 स्वरूपम् विनश्यत्स्वरूप च स्थाविरुत्पन्नस्य इति स्वभाववदु ।
 यन्नि क्षणक्षयिणा भावा कथं नहि न पचायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्यात् ।
 तज्यत । निरन्तरमहदापरापरान्पातान्निधानुषायाय पूर्वक्षण
 पिनाशकम् एव तस्मिन् क्षणान्तरमुच्यत तेनाकारविनश्यत्वा
 ६० भावान्निवधानात्तत्तन्नाशेऽपि स एवायमित्यभेदाध्ययमायी
 प्रत्यय प्रमूयत । अत्यन्तभिन्नेष्वपि लूनपुनरुत्पन्नवृत्तकान्तरान्निपु
 हृष्ट एवायं स पचायमिति प्रत्ययस्यपेक्षापि किं न सभाष्यत ।
 तस्मात्सर्वं सन् क्षणिकमिति सिद्धम् ॥ अथ च पूर्वक्षणउपादानकारणं
 उपायक्षण उपायमिति पराभिप्रायमङ्गीकृत्याह न तुल्यकाल
 ७० श्रयादि । न विनश्यन्तिमुक्तावलीकृत्या निरन्त्यविनाशिनः पृथ
 क्षणा उपायक्षणान मनयन्तः किं स्वात्पचिदात् एव जनयन्ति
 उत क्षणान्तर । न तावन्नाथ । समकालभाविनापूरतिरूपपरिपा
 पात्तनापादयमायाभावात् । अत साधुत्वं न तन्त्यकालं फल
 हनुभाय इति । न च निर्नाय । तन्नीं निरन्त्यविनाशन पूर्वक्षणम्य न
 १०० एत्यादुत्तरक्षणजननकृत भवतिनापि । न तानुपायानस्यान्त्यविनाशः ।
 अतिरमद्वान् । न हि गुह्यप्याह न हता विन्नीन न फलम्य भाव इति ॥
 पचायम्भनया पादया मागवाहः । फलम्य पचायम्भनया हनु
 र्यादान तद्वय उपायानापादयभाय न्यथ ॥ यत्र क्षणिकम्या

पनाय मोक्षाकरणत्वेनानन्तरमेव प्रसूयितं तत् स्याद्वाच्यमात्रे निर-
 काशमेव । निरन्वयनाश्वपर्भ कर्त्तव्यमितिसदसाधनात् । प्रतिसर्गं पयाप-
 103 नाशस्यानकृन्तनादिभिरभ्युपगमात् । यदप्यभिहितं न श्वेतस्ते-
 भवति जीवति च देवदत्तो मरणं चास्य भवतीति तदपि संभवाद्भन
 स्याद्वाच्यमात्रेनोपलब्धिमावहति । यथा जीवन् प्राणधारणं मरणं वा
 पुद्गलिकस्य स्वतः जीवतोपि देवदत्तस्य प्रतिसर्गमायुदमित्यनाना-
 दीर्णानां स्यादुपपन्नमवमरणम् । न च वाच्यमन्त्यावस्यायामव कृ-
 110 त्वापुद्गलिकस्य तत्रैव मरणमप्यपदसा युक्तं नहि । तन्माद्यप्यव
 स्यायां न्यक्षेण तत्संभवाभावात् । तथापि प्रवृत्तिनामव तपां स्या-
 न पुनस्तन्मरण एव युगपन्मरणेणात् । नहि मिदं गम्यन्तरेभ्य प्रतिसर्गं
 मरणम् । इत्यर्थे नमः ॥

अथवाऽपरया व्याख्या । सांगतानां विचार्येन ज्ञानं जन्पन
 113 तत्र ज्ञानं तदत्र स्वात्मान्तरमयं गृह्णीति । नाकार्त्तं विषयं नहि
 ब्रह्मनात् । तत्रापि कार्त्तं ज्ञानं च व्यापयति । एतच्च न शक्यं ।
 एतादृशिनं ज्ञानस्य स्वकर्मणा तत्स्वरूपायै ज्ञानं मान्यते ।
 तस्य तदा व्यापयितव्यमन्त्यात् । एव च ज्ञानं ज्ञानं मन्यते

यत आह हेतौ इत्यादि । हेतौ अर्थरूपे ज्ञानकारणे निखीने क्षणिक
 स्वाभिरन्वयं विनष्टे न फलस्य ज्ञानलक्षणकार्यस्य भाव आत्म
 180 साम' स्यात् । जनकस्यैव घ्राणत्वे इन्द्रियाणामपि ग्राहत्वापत्ति । तेषाम
 पि ज्ञानजनकत्वात् । न चान्वयव्यतिरेकाम्यामयस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं
 ह्यम् । मृगतृष्णादौ जलामानेपि जलज्ञानोत्पादात् । अन्यथा तमह
 रसंभवात् । भ्रान्तं तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत् ननु भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तविचारः
 235 स्थिरीभूय क्रियतां त्वया । सामर्थं प्रतिपद्यस्व तानदनर्थमपि
 ज्ञानम् । अन्वयनार्थस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं ह्यममेति चत् न । न हि तद्वाच
 याबलक्षणोऽन्वय एव हेतुफलभावनिश्चयनिमित्तम् । अपि तु तदभा
 वेऽभावलक्षणा व्यतिरेकापि । स चोक्तयुक्त्या नास्त्येष । यागिनां
 पातीतानागतार्थग्रहणे किमर्थस्य निमित्तत्वम् । तयारसत्वात् ।

40 ण निहाणगया मग्गा पुंता णस्थि अणागए ।

णिब्बुया णव विद्वन्ति आरग्गे सरिसोपमा ॥

इति वचनात् । निमित्तत्वं चार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन संस्थान्तीता
 नागतत्वसतिः । न च प्रकाशदादात्मकाम एव प्रकाशकस्य प्रकाश
 कत्वम् । प्रतीपाद्यर्थादिभ्योऽनुत्पन्नस्यापि तत्प्रकाशकत्वात् । जनक
 45 स्यैव च ग्राहत्वाभ्युपगमे स्मृत्याहोः प्रमाणस्यापामाप्यमसङ्गः । त
 स्यादोमन्यत्वात् । न च स्मृतिर्न प्रमाणम् । अनुमानमात्रयूतत्वात्
 साध्यसाधनसंबन्धस्मरणपूर्वकत्वात्तस्य । जनकमय च द्वायं तन्
 स्वसंबन्धनस्य कथं ग्राहकत्वम् । तस्य हि ग्राह्यं स्वस्वमवान च तन
 तज्जन्यतः स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् । तस्मात्स्वसाध्यधीयमवयोप्यत्र
 180 दीपयारिषार्थज्ञानयोः प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावसमवाय ज्ञाननिमित्त
 त्वमर्थस्य । नन्वदोमन्यत्वे ज्ञानस्य कथं प्रतिनियतक्रमेणवस्या ।
 तदुत्पन्नितदाकारताभ्यां हि सोपपद्यते । तस्मादनुत्पन्नस्यातदाका

रस्य च ज्ञानस्य सवार्था प्रत्यभिज्ञेपात्संब्रह्मणं प्रसज्येत । नैवम् ।
 तदुत्पत्तिमन्तराणां व्यापारणसंयोगश्चमलक्षणया याम्यतमेव प्रतिनिय
 155 तावमकाशकत्वापपत्तेः । तदुत्पत्तावपि च योग्यतावश्यमेष्टव्या ।
 अन्ययाऽऽप्यपापसानिध्य तत्तदव्यासांनिध्यपि कृतश्रिद्वयार्थात् कस्य
 विदेव ज्ञानस्य जन्मेति कौतुह्यता-यं विभागः । तदाकारता
 त्वर्थाकारसंक्रान्त्या तावदनुपपत्त्या । अर्थस्य निराकारत्वमसद्भात् ।
 ज्ञानस्य साकारत्वमसद्भात् । अर्थेन च मूर्तेनामूर्तस्य ज्ञानस्य
 160 कीदृशं सादृश्यमित्यर्थविशेषब्रह्मणपरिणाम एव साभ्युपया । ततः
 अर्थेन घन्यत्वं नां न हि मुक्तायेकपताम् ।
 तस्मात्प्रमेयाभिगतेः प्रमाणं भेदकपता ॥

इति यत्किञ्चिदेतम् । अपि च व्यस्ते समस्ते चैत ब्रह्मणकारणं
 स्याताम् । यदि व्यस्ते तदा कपात्वाचक्षणा यत्रान्त्यक्षजस्य जस
 165 चन्द्रो वा नमश्चन्द्रस्य ग्राहकः प्राप्नोति । यथासंक्षेपं तदुत्पत्ति-
 स्तदाकारत्वाच्च । अयं समस्ते तर्हि यदापरक्षणः पूर्वघटक्षणस्य
 ग्राहकः प्रमनति । तयोक्तमप्यपि सद्भावात् । ज्ञानरूपत्वे सत्यते
 ब्रह्मणकारणमिति चत् तर्हि समानभावीयज्ञानस्य समनन्तरज्ञान
 ग्राहकत्वं प्रसज्यत । तयार्गेन्यजनरूपावसद्भावात् । तन्न योम्यता
 170 मन्तराणान्यद्ब्रह्मणकारणं पश्याम इति ॥

अथाचरार्द्धं व्याख्यातुमुपक्रम्यते । तत्र च बाधायनिरपरी
 ज्ञानार्द्धतमव यं बौद्धविशेषा मन्वत तेषां प्रतिसंषा-तन्मते चदम् ।
 प्राणप्राहकानि कलङ्कानि च निष्पपद्यं ज्ञानमार्थं परमार्थसत् ।
 बाधायस्तु विचारमयं न समते । तथाहि । कार्यं बाधार्थः ।
 175 किं परमाणुरूपः स्थूलवपनिरूपो वा । न तान्तरपरमाणुरूपः ।
 प्रमाणमाभावात् । प्रमाणं हि मत्प्रमाणनुयानं वा । न तावत्प्रत्यक्ष
 तत्सापननद्रूपम् । तदि यागिनां स्यान् अस्पृशादीनां वा ।

- नायम् । अन्यन्तविमृष्टतया श्रद्धामात्रगम्यत्नान् । न द्वितीयम् ।
 अनुभयवाधितत्वात् । न हि ययमय परमाणुरय परमाणुरिति
 १८० स्वप्रतिप्रताप । नन्वास्याकुम्भास्यामित्ययमत्र न सर्व मयदना
 दयान् । नाप्यनुमानेन सन्निधिः । अणूनामनीन्द्रियत्वेन स
 मह भविनाभाषस्य कापि सिद्ध गृहीतमत्रस्यत्वात् । किं चामी
 नित्या अनित्या या स्युः । नित्याश्च न्नयणाधेक्रियाकारिणा युग
 पदा । न क्रमण । स्वभावमन्तानित्य-वापत्तिः । न युगपद् । एकक्षण एव
 १९ इत्त्रापरिक्रियाकरणान् सणान्तरः स उभावात्स-वापत्तिः । अनित्या
 श्वत् क्षणिका कालान्तरस्यापिना वा । क्षणिकाश्च न्नद्वन्द्वानिर्दे
 तुना वा । निर्देतनाश्च न्नित्यं सत्त्वमय वा स्यात् । निरपस्तत्वात् ।
 अपस्ताना हि कालादित्यन्वम् । सहस्रकाश्च न्न किं तेषां स्युः किंचि
 स्कार्णं परमाणवा वा । न म्भूतम् । परमाणुरप्यस्य वाशयस्या
 १९ द्वीदृष्टत्वात् । न च परमाणवः । न हि सन्तोऽस्ततः सन्सता वा
 स्वकायाणि कृयुः । सन्तश्च न्नमित्यलक्षण एव सणान्तर वा ।
 नान्यत्तिलक्षण । तन्मानीमुत्पत्तिमात्रव्यवृत्तत्वात् । अय

भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारणं सैव चाख्यम् ।

- इति वचनान् भवनमव तपावपगपत्ता कारणमिति चत् एवं
 १९ तर्हि स्पाणया स्माणूनां नै च तपावृत्तान् स्युः । उभयत्र भवना
 रितापात् । न च सणान्तरः नष्टत्वात् । ज्यामन्तमन् नदुत्पात्तः ।
 तर्हि एकं स्वमसागमपहाय सन्त नदुत्पत्तिपसह । तदमत्रस्य
 मरदाऽविश्रपात् । मन्मपसह

य-यके वा भवतावा दृष्टामात्र यथ न सः ।

- ॥ इति वचमादिगपाद्यात् एव । तत्राणत्र सगिरा । नापि
 कालान्तरस्यापिना । क्षणिकमहसपागसन्तान् । किं चामी
 नियतरास्पापिनापि विमपक्रियापराश्रमुग्धास्त्रकारिणा वा ।

आये रगुप्यवदसत्वापत्तिः । अदम्बिकस्य विषसत्त्वं सट्टपमुप
यत्त्वं वा त कार्थं ह्युयुः । असत्त्वं चञ्चलाविषाणादरपि किं न
203 करणम् । सत्त्वं चत् सत्वापि करणजन्यस्या । तृतीयमदस्तु प्रान्त
द्विरापदुगंभः । तन्नापुल्याञ्च सप्तथा यन्त ॥

नापि स्पृशावयवविच्छेदः । एकपरमात्मसिद्धा कथमनकतन्त्रिदि ।
तदभावे च तत्त्ववयवः स्पृशावयवी बाध्याभम् । किं चायमनका
वयवापार इष्यते । त चावयवा यदि विराधिनः तर्हि नैकः
210 स्पृशावयवी । विच्छेदपरमाण्यासात् । अधिराधिनचत्प्रतीतिबाधः ।
एकस्मिन्नेव स्पृशावयविनिचलाचरकारकाह्वानादृतादिभिन्ना
वयवानामुपसम्भः । अपि चासां तपु बतमानः कात्स्न्येनैकद्वयन वा
यतेते । कात्स्न्येन ह्युच्चावेकस्मिन्नवयवपरिसमाप्तत्वाद्नेकावयव
ह्यवित्त्वं न स्यात् । प्रत्ययवयव कात्स्न्येन ह्यौ चावयवविद्वदुत्पापत्तः ।
215 एकद्वयन ह्यौ च तस्य निरवस्थाभ्युपगमबाधः । सांज्ञक्य वा तेष्व्वास्तव्ये
मिमा अमिमा वा । मिमन्वे पुनरप्यनकावयवेरेकस्य कात्स्न्यस्य
अविकल्पानतिक्रमादनवस्था । अमिमन्वे न कचिदंशः स्युः ।
इति नास्ति बाधोऽर्थः कश्चित् । किन्तु ज्ञानमेवेदं सर्वं नीलाघास्तरम्
मतिमाति । बाधार्थस्य जडत्वेन मतिमासायागात् । यथाकम् ।

220 स्वाकारबुद्धिजनका हस्या मन्त्रिपगोचराः ।
असङ्कारकारेणाप्युक्तम् ।

यदि संवेद्यत नीलं कर्षं बाधं तदुच्यते ।

न चेत्संवेद्यते नीलं कर्षं बाधं तदुच्यते ॥

यदि बाधोऽर्थो नास्ति ॥ विविधपयस्तर्क्यं यत्पटादिमतिमास इति
225 चेत् ननु मिरासम्भन यथापमनादिधितयनासनामवर्तिताः । नि
विषयत्वात् । आकाशकृच्छ्रानवत् स्वप्नज्ञानमद्वेति । अथ एवाकम्

- द्विः । यथा सन्ति परमाणवः स्यूमाद्यविनिष्पन्नानुपपत्तिरि
त्यन्तम्यासिः । न चाणुभ्यः स्यूमोत्पाद इत्येका तः । स्यूमादपि
- ८३० सुबपन्मात्रः स्यूमस्य पटाद्यः प्रादुभावविभाषनात् । आमाकाश
दरपुद्गलस्वफलीकारात् । यत्र पुनरणुभ्यस्त्वदुत्पत्तिस्तत्र तत्तत्का
लाविसामग्रीसम्यपक्षाक्रियावत्प्रादुर्भूतं संयागातिष्ठयमपश्ययम
वित्तैव । यत्रपि किं चायमनकाययवापार इत्यादि न्यगादि तत्रापि
कथंचिद्विराध्यनकाययवाविष्वग्भूतवृत्तिरमयम्यमिधीयत । तत्र च
- २६० पद्विराध्यनकाययवापारतायां विरुद्धमाध्यासनमभिहितं तत्कर्ष
चिदुपपत्तं एव तावत् । अययवात्मकस्य तस्यापि कथंचिदनकरूपत्वात् ।
यद्योपन्यस्तम् अपि चासौ तत्पु र्वर्तमानः कास्त्वेनैकदेशेन वा वर्तेत
त्यादि तत्रापि विरुद्धयानभ्युपगम एवाचरम् । अविष्वग्भावेना
ययविनाऽययवपु वृत्ते स्वीकारात् । किं च यदि वाग्राऽर्थो नास्ति
- २६ किमिदानीं नियताकारं प्रतीयते । नीलमवतिथि विज्ञानाकाराऽय
मिति चेत् न । ज्ञानाद्विद्युत्तस्य संवेदनात् । ज्ञानाधारस्व रवै नील-
मिति प्रतीतिः स्यात् न त्विदं नीलमिति । ज्ञानानां मत्परमाकार
भवात् कस्यचिद्भूमिति प्रतिभासः कस्यचिन्नीलमवतिथि चेत् न ।
नीलाद्याकारभद्भूमित्याकारस्य व्यपस्थितत्वाभावात् । तथा च यद्
- ३७० कनाहमिति प्रतीयते तन्वापरेण स्वमिति प्रतीयत । नीलाद्याकार
व्यपस्थितः सर्वरूप्यरूपतया ग्रहणात् । यस्मिन्तत्पूरादिमिन्नु
पपपि नीलान्त्रिकं पीतान्त्रितया गृह्यत तथापि तत्र न व्यभिचारः ।
तस्य भ्रान्तर्यात् । स्वयं स्वम्य संज्ञानेऽहमिति प्रतिभासन
इति चेत् ननु किं परस्यापि संवेदनमस्ति । कस्यन्यथा स्वमिच्छस्य
- ३७० प्रयागः । प्रतिपादिशब्दो द्वयं परमपक्षमाण एव भवते ।
स्वरूपस्यापि भ्रान्त्या भद्मतीतिरिति चेत् इन्त मत्पक्षेण
प्रतीता मत्तः कथं न वास्तवः । भ्रान्तं मत्पक्षमिति चेत् ननु क्व

- 280 एतत् । अनुमानेन ज्ञानार्थयोरभेदसिद्धिरिति चेत् किं तदनुमा-
नमिति पृच्छामः । यद्येन सह नियमेनोपलभ्यते तत्ततो न मिथ-
ते यथा सधन्नादसधन्तः । नियमेनोपलभ्यते च ज्ञानेन सहार्थः
इति व्यापकानुपलम्भिः । प्रतिषेध्यस्य ज्ञानार्थयोर्भेदस्य व्यापकः
सहोपलम्भनियमात्स्यानुपलम्भिः । मिथयोर्नीलपित्तयोर्गुणपदुपल-
285 म्भनियमाभावात् । इत्यनुमानेन तयोरभेदसिद्धिरिति चेत् न । संदि-
ग्धानैकान्तिकत्वेनास्यानुमानाभासत्वात् । ज्ञानं हि स्वपरसंवेदनम् ।
तत् परसंवेदनतामात्रेणैव नीलं गृह्णाति स्वसंवेदनतामात्रेणैव च
नीलबुद्धिम् । तदेवमनयोर्गुणपदग्रहणात्सहोपलम्भनियमोऽस्ति अ-
भेदश्च नास्ति इति सहोपलम्भनियमरूपस्य हेतोर्विपक्षाभावात्तेः
290 संदिग्धत्वात् । संदिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वम् । असिद्धश्च सहोपलम्भनि-
यमः । नीलमेतदिति बहिर्मुखतयाऽर्थानुसूयमाने तदानीमेषान्त-
रस्य नीलानुभवस्याननुमयात् इति कर्षं प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानेन ज्ञाना-
र्थयोरभेदसिद्ध्या भ्रान्तत्वम् । अपि च प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तत्वेनावा-
धितविषयत्वादननुमानस्यात्यक्षाद्यः कस्यास्योद्देशे ज्ञानमाने प्रत्यक्षस्य
295 भ्रान्तत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयदोषोऽपि दुर्निवारः । अर्थाभावे च नियत-
देशाधिकरणा मतीतिः क्लृप्ताः । न हि तत्र विवक्षितदेशेऽप्यमारोपपि-
तव्यो नान्यभेदस्तस्मिन् नियमे हेतुः । वासनानियमात्तद्वारोपनियम-
इति चेत् न । तस्या अपि तद्देशनियमकारणत्वाभावात् । सति धर्मसञ्ज्ञाने
यद्देशोऽर्धस्तद्देशोऽनुभवस्तद्देशा च तत्पूर्विका वासना । बाधार्था
300 भावे तु तस्याः किंकृतो देशनियमः । अयास्ति तद्वारोपनियमः ।
न च कारणविशेषमन्तरेण कार्यविशेषो पटते बाधभार्यो नास्ति
तेन वासनानामेष वैविध्यं तत्र हेतुः । इति चेत् तद्वासनावैविध्यं बो-
धाकारादन्यद्वगम्यदा । अनन्यत्वेत् बोधाकारस्यैकत्वात्कस्तासां पर-
स्परतो विरोधः । अन्यत्वेत् अर्थे काऽग्रहेण येन सर्वलोकाप्रतीतिरपह-
1५ [लघ्वत्]

किञ्च सेवकस्य विकल्पादपि कृपितो नृपतिः सर्वस्वमपहरति एवं
 तस्मिन्नात्मनोऽपि शून्यवादविकल्पं प्रमाणमात्रमङ्गीकृत्वाणस्य तस्मै
 सर्वस्वमूर्तं सम्पत्तादिस्वमपहरति । किं च स्वात्मोपदेशेनेन
 २० तेन वादिना शून्यवादः प्रकल्प्यते इति स्वीकृतमाममस्य प्रामाण्य-
 मिति कृतस्वस्य स्वपक्षसिद्धिः । प्रमाणाङ्गीकरणात् । किं च प्रमाणं
 प्रमेयं विना न भवतीति प्रमाणाङ्गीकरणे प्रमेयमपि विधीर्भम् ।
 ततमास्य सूक्तैश्च युक्ता न पुनः शून्यवादोऽप्यासाय तुण्डाग्रव-
 दम्बरम् । शून्यवादस्यापि प्रमेयत्वात् । अतः च स्पृष्टिष्वन्तु कृता
 ३० न्तवर्ण्यं च प्रयुञ्जानस्य घृतेरयमभिप्रायः । यद्यसौ शून्यवादी हरे
 प्रमाणस्य सर्वपाङ्गीकारः पावत्यमाणस्यैवमपि विषये तदा तस्मै
 कृतान्तो यमराजः कल्पेत् । तत्कोपो हि मरणफला । ततश्च स्वसि-
 द्धान्तविकल्पादसौ प्रमाणयन्निग्रहस्यानापमत्वाभ्युक्त एवेति । एवं
 सति अहो इत्युपहासप्रसङ्गायाम् तुल्यमसूयन्ति सुनेषु दोषानामि-
 ३० ष्कुर्वन्तीत्येवंशीलास्त्वदसूयिनः तस्मान्तरीयाः तैर्दृष्टं मत्प्रज्ञानव-
 द्भूता निरीक्षितम् अहो सुदृष्टं साधुदृष्टम् । विपरीतकल्पणयोपहासान्
 सम्पन्नदृष्टमित्यर्थः । अतासूयवादोऽस्वाच्छीकिकण्ठमात्रावपि वा
 हुक्कक्षणिम् । असूयाऽस्त्येषामित्यसूयिनः स्वप्यसूयिनः स्वदसू-
 यिनः इति मत्सर्वीयान्तं वा । स्वदसूयदृष्टमिति पाठेऽपि न किञ्चि-
 ३५ द्वाह । असूयकम्भस्योदन्तस्योदयनापीर्न्यायतारुपर्यपरिशुद्धपादौ
 मत्सरिणि प्रयागादिति ॥

इह शून्यवादिनामयमभिसंधिः । प्रमाणा प्रमेयं प्रमाणं यदि
 विरिति तत्त्वचतुष्टयं परपरिकल्पितमवस्थेव । विचारासहस्रात् ।
 तुरङ्गमुद्भवत् । तत्र प्रमाणा तावतात्मा तस्य च प्रमाणप्राप्तत्वा-
 ४० मावादमात्रः । तथा हि न मत्प्रत्येकं तद्विद्विद्विः । इन्द्रियगोचरा-
 तिक्रान्तत्वात् । यत्तु अहंकारमत्ययेन तस्य मानसप्रत्ययसत्त्वसाधनं

- तदप्यनैकान्तिकम् । तस्याहं गौरः इयामो वेत्यादौ स्त्रीराश्रय-
 तयाप्युपपत्तेः । किं च यद्ययमहंकारमत्यय आत्मगोचरः स्यात्तदा न
 कदाचित्कः स्यात् । आत्मनः सदा समिहितत्वात् । कदाचित्कं हि
 45 ज्ञानं कदाचित्कारणपूर्वकं दृष्टं यथा सौख्यमनीष्टानमिति । नाप्य-
 नुमानेन । अल्पमिषागिमिक्षाग्रहणात् । आगमानां च परस्परमि-
 षकार्यवादिनां नास्त्येव प्रामाण्यम् । तथा हि एकेन कथमपि कश्चि-
 दर्थो व्यवस्थापितोऽपि युक्ततरेणापरण स एवान्यथा व्यवस्थाप्यते ।
 स्वयमव्यवस्थितप्रामाण्यानां च तेषां कथमन्यव्यवस्थापने साम-
 50 ध्यम् । इति नास्ति प्रमाता ॥ मयेयं च बाह्योऽक्षः स भ्रान्तरमेव
 बाह्यार्थमतिज्ञेयसत्ते निर्वोदितः ॥ प्रमार्थं च स्वपरावभासिज्ञानम् ।
 तच्च मयेयामात्रे कस्य ग्राहकमस्तु । निर्दिपयत्वात् । किं चैतद्वर्षसम-
 काळं तन्निभकाळं वा तद्ग्राहकं कल्पेत् । आद्यपक्षे त्रिभुवनवर्ति-
 नोपि पदार्थास्तत्रावभासेरन् । समकाळत्वाभिप्रायात् । द्वितीये तु
 55 निराकारं साकारं वा तत्स्यात् । प्रथमे मतिनियतपदार्थपरिच्छेदा-
 न्नपक्षिः । द्वितीये तु किमयमाकारो व्यतिरिक्तोऽप्यतिरिक्तो वा
 ज्ञानात् । अव्यतिरेके ज्ञानमेवायं तथा च निराकारपक्षदोषः । व्यति-
 रेके यद्ययं चिद्रूपः तदानीमाकारोपि वेदकः स्यात् । तथा चायम-
 पि निराकारः साकारो वा तद्देवको भवेत् । इत्यावर्तनेनानवस्था ।
 60 अथाचिद्रूपः किमज्ञातो ज्ञाता वा तद्ज्ञापकः स्यात् । माघीने विकल्पे
 भेदस्येव भेदस्यापि तद्ज्ञापकोऽसौ स्यात् । तदुच्यते तु निराकारेण
 साकारेण वा ज्ञानेन तस्यापि ज्ञानं स्यात् । इत्याद्याहृत्तावनवस्यै
 वेति ॥ इत्थं प्रमाणाभावे तत्फलरूपा मयितिः कृतस्तनी । इति
 सर्वभूतैव परं तत्त्वमिति । तथा च पठन्ति ।
 65 यथा यथा विचार्यन्ते विधीर्यन्ते तथा तथा ।
 यदेतत्स्वयमर्थेभ्यो राक्षते तत्र के वपम् ॥

- इषवत् । इसादिगतेन इत्थादिना व्यभिचार इति चेत् न ।
 तेषामपि एकन्त्रियमनुत्वेन सात्म्यकत्वात् । यद्येषां कर्तृ स
 आत्मा । गृहपतिवत् । इक्षादीनां च सात्म्यकत्वमाधाराद्भादेव
 120 सेयम् । किञ्चिद्रूप्यते च । तथा भेद्यं मनः । अभिमतविषय
 संबन्धनिमित्तक्रियाप्रयत्नात् । दारकहस्तगतगोष्ठकवत् । यथास्य
 मरकः स आत्मा इति । तथा आत्मचेतनसेवज्ञप्रतिपुल्यादयः
 पर्याया न निर्दिष्टाः । पर्यायरथात् । घटकुट्टकलङ्कादिपर्यायवत् ।
 व्यतिरेक पृथगुक्तादि । यद्येषां विषयाः स आत्मा । तथा अस्त्यात्मा ।
 125 असमस्तपर्यायवाच्यत्वात् । यो यः साङ्केतिकगुणद्वपर्यायवाच्याः
 स सोऽस्तित्वं न व्यभिचरति । यथा पटादि । व्यतिरेके स्वरवि
 पाणनयोन्मोदहादयः । तथा सुखादीनि द्रव्याभितानि
 गुणत्वात् रूपवत् । योऽसौ गुणी स आत्मा । इत्यादिछिद्धानि ।
 तस्मादनुमानतोऽप्यात्मा सिद्धः ॥ आगमानां च येषां पूर्वोपर
 130 विरुद्धार्थत्वं तेषामप्राप्यमेव । पस्त्वाप्तमणीव आगमः ॥
 ममागमव । कपच्छेदतापकल्लणोपाधिषयविशुद्धत्वात् । कपादीनां
 च स्वस्य पुरस्ताद्वक्ष्यामः । न च बाध्यमाप्तः सीणसर्वज्ञो
 यः तथाविधं बाह्यत्वं कस्यापि नास्तीति । यतो रागादयः
 कस्यचिदस्त्वन्तर्मुचिष्यन्ते । अस्मदादिषु तदुच्छेदमकपापरूपै
 135 पञ्चमात् । सूर्याधारकमलक्ष्णवत् । तथा चाहुः ।

देष्टवो माश्रिमो भाषा दृष्टा निस्त्रिभुवनराः ।

येपपङ्कथादया यद्देवं रागादयो यताः ॥

- इति । यस्य च निरवयवतयैते विहीनाः स पञ्चाक्षो मगवान्
 सर्वज्ञः । अयानादित्वाद्वागादीनां कथं मलय इति चेत् । वपायतस्त-
 40 ज्ञावात् । अनादेरपि सुवर्णमलस्य सारस्युत्पाकादिना विषयोप
 सम्भात् । तद्वदयानादीनामपि रागादिदाषाणां प्रतिपन्नमूतरवयवा

म्यासेन विद्योपपत्तः । क्षीणदोषस्य च केवलज्ञानाध्यमिचारा-
 त्सर्पणत्वम् । तत्सिद्धिस्तु ज्ञानतारतम्यं कश्चिद्विद्वान्तं तारम्यत्वात्
 आकाशपरिमाणतारतम्यवत् । तथा सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः कस्य
 148 वित्यत्यस्ता अनुमेयत्वात् सिद्धिपरकम्भराधिकरणधूमध्वजवत् । एवं
 चन्द्रसूर्योपरागादिसूचकज्योतिर्ज्ञानाधिसंभादान्पयानुपपत्तिममृत-
 योपि हेतवो वाच्याः । तद्वचमाप्तेन सर्वविदा प्रणीत आगमा
 प्रमाणयेव । तद्वचमाप्यं हि प्रणायकदोषनिबन्धनम् ।

रागाद्वा द्वेषाद्वा मोहाद्वा वाच्यमुच्यते अनृतम् ।

150 यस्य तु नैव दोषास्तस्मान्नृतकारणं किं स्यात् ॥

इति वचनात् । प्रणेतुश्च निर्दोषत्वमुपपादितमवेति सिद्धं आग
 मादप्यात्मा । एगं आया इत्यादिवचनात् ॥ तदेवं प्रत्यक्षानु
 मानामयैः सिद्धः प्रमाता ॥

प्रयेयं चानन्तरमेव बाह्यार्थसाधने साधितम् । तत्सिद्धौ च
 155 प्रमाणं ज्ञानं प्रयेयाभावे कस्य ग्राहकमस्तु निर्विषयत्वादिति
 मत्तापमात्रम् । करणमन्तरेण क्रियासिद्धेरयोगात् । सबनादिषु
 तथादर्शनात् । यथात्र ममकाष्ठमित्याद्युक्तं तत्र विद्वत्पद्ममपि
 स्वीक्रियत एव । अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षं हि समकाष्ठार्थाकृत्तनकुत्तसम् ।
 स्मरणमतीतार्थस्य ग्राहकम् । शब्दानुमाने च वैकृतिकस्याप्यर्थस्य
 160 परिच्छेदके । निराकारं चैतद्वयमपि । न चातिमसद्गः स्वज्ञानावरण
 धीर्यान्तरावस्योपपन्नमविशेषवशाद्देवास्त्य नैयत्येन प्रवृत्ते । अपवि
 कस्यानामस्वीकार एव विरस्तारः ॥

प्रमित्वस्तु प्रमाणस्य फलं स्वर्गवेदनसिद्धेयं । न ह्यनुमयेष्युप
 देष्टापेक्षा । फलं च द्विषा । आनन्तर्यपारंपर्ययेदात् । तत्तानन्तर्येण
 165 सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञाननिवृत्तिः फलम् । पारंपर्येण केवलज्ञानस्य
 तावत् फलमौदासीन्यम् । शेषप्रमाणानां तु हानोपादानापेक्षा
 [16 स्थान]

बुद्धयः ॥ इति सुख्यस्थितं प्रमाणादिषुष्टयम् ॥

ततश्च

नासन्न सन्न सदुसन्न पाप्यनुययात्मकम् ।

270 चतुष्कोटिबिनिर्मुक्तं तत्प्रमाध्यात्मिका विदुः ॥

इत्युन्मत्तमापितम् ॥ किं चेदं प्रमाणादीनामवास्तवत्वं शुन्यवा
दिना वस्तुवृत्त्या तावदेष्टव्यम् । तथासौ प्रमाणादभिमन्यते न
प्रमाणाद्वा । न तावदप्रमाणात्तत्स्यार्कित्वात्करत्वात् । अत्र प्रमाणात् ।

तत्र । अवास्तवत्वाद्वाहकं प्रमाणं साधुतमसाधुतं वा स्यात् । यदि
175 साधुतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शुन्यवादस्य सिद्धिः । तथा
तदसिद्धौ च वास्तव एव समस्तोपि प्रमाणादिभ्यवहाराः प्राप्तः । अथ
तद्वाहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसाधुतम् । तर्हि सीमा प्रमाणादिभ्यवहारा
वास्तवत्वप्रतिष्ठा । तत्रैव व्यभिचारात् । त्वेवं पक्षद्वयपि इतो व्याघ्र
इतस्त्वदीति न्यत्येन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिबिरोधः ॥

180 इति काव्यार्थः ॥ १७ ॥

अधुना शणिकषादिम ऐहिकमुष्मिकभ्यवहारानुपपन्नार्थं
समर्पणमभिप्रेक्ष्यकारितं दर्शयन्वाह ।

कृतप्रणाशाकृतकर्मभोग

भयप्रमोक्षस्मृतिमङ्गदोषान् ।

उपेक्ष्य साक्षात् क्षणमङ्गमिच्छ-

न्नदो महासाहसिक परस्ते ॥ १८ ॥

कृतप्रणाशदोषमकृतकर्मभोगान्तेषु भयमङ्गदोषं प्रमोक्षमङ्गदोषं
स्मृतिमङ्गदोषमित्येतानां साक्षादित्यनुभवसिद्धान्तोपेक्ष्य अनाहत्या
साक्षात्क्षणमपि गगनिभीषिकामवसम्भमानः । क्षणमङ्गम् उदया

नन्तरविनाशरूपक्षणस्यपिनाम् । इच्छन् प्रतिपद्यमानः । त तत्र । परः
प्रतिपत्तं 'बनाशिक' सांगत इत्यर्थः । अहा महामाहसिक' । सहसा
अनिमर्त्तात्मकन कष्टेन वर्तते साहसिकः । भाषिनमनर्थमविभाष्य
यः मवर्तते स एवमुच्यते । महामासा साहसिकश्च महासाहसिकः
10 अस्यन्तमविमृश्य प्रवृत्तिकारी । इति मुकुटितार्थः ॥

विभृतायस्त्वयम् । षोडाशुद्धिखण्डपरमाश्रमवात्मानमामनन्ति
न पुनर्मात्तिकृत्तणमिकरानुस्यूतकसूत्रवत्तदन्वयिनमकमान्मते यन
ज्ञानखण्ड सदनुष्ठानमसदनुष्ठानं वा कृतं तस्य निगन्वयविनाशात्
तत्कलोपमोगः यस्य च कलोपमोगत्वेन तत्कर्म न कृतमिति या
15 व्यञ्जानखण्डस्य कृतप्रणाद्य स्वकृतकर्मकलोपमोगात् उत्तरमानस
णस्य चाकृतकर्ममोगः स्वयमकृतस्य कर्मणः पक्षोपमागादिति । अत्र
कर्मद्वयः उभयत्रापि भाज्यः । तेन कृतप्रणाद्य 'त्यस्य कृतकर्मप्रणाद्य
इत्यर्थो दृश्यः । अन्वाद्युवाच्याद्यत्यमुपस्थात् । तथा मवमङ्गदाप' । मव
आमवीमायसखण्ड' संसार' तस्य मङ्गा विन्याप' स एव दाप' तणिक
20 वादे प्रसज्यते । परमाकाशमायसखण्ड 'त्ययः । परमेष्ठिन' कस्य
चिदभावात् । परमेष्ठो हि पूवजन्मकृतकर्मानुभागेन भवति । तत्र
माचीनज्ञानखण्डानां निरन्वय भावात् कन नापोपसृज्यतां जन्मान्तरो
यत्र मासाकराद्येन यचितं तच्चित्तान्तर्ग मनिर्मपत्त यद्यदानीन्तनं
चित्त चित्तं च मरणकालमाप्ति इति मवपरंपरासिद्धय मयाणमुक्तं
25 तद्व्यर्थम् । चित्तखण्डानां निरवद्वेपनाशिनां चित्तान्तरमनिसंपाना
यागात् । द्वयोरवस्थितयोर्हि मनिसंपानमुपयानुगामिना कन
चित्स्थित्यते । यस्मानया मनिमपाना य तेन नाभ्युपगम्यते । स
यात्माऽन्यपी । न च मनिर्मपत्त इत्यस्य जनयतीत्यर्थः । कायवदु-
प्रसङ्गात् । तेन चाग्निनाऽप्य हनाः स्वभाववदुत्पन्नेनोक्तत्वात् ।
30 स्वभाववदुत्पन्न तादात्म्ये मनि भवति । मिमन्मायविनाय

चित्तचित्तान्तरयोः कृतस्तान्तात्म्यम् । युगपद्वादिनोश्च प्रतिसंभय
 प्रतिसंभयकृत्वाभावापत्तिः । युगपद्वैधित्यप्रतिष्ठेऽपि किमत्र
 नियामकं यद्वक्तुं प्रतिसंभयकाञ्चरम् प्रतिसंभय इति । अस्तु वा
 प्रतिसंभयस्य जननमयः । सोप्यनुपपत्तिः । तुल्यकालस्य हेतुफल
 ३५ भावस्याभावात् । मिश्रकालस्य च पूर्वचित्तक्षणस्य विनष्टत्वात्
 चक्षुरचित्तक्षणः कथमुपादानमन्तरेणात्पद्यताम् । इति यत्किंचिदेतत् ।
 तथा ममोत्पत्तिर्वापत्तिः । मरुपेणापुनर्वाचनं कर्मबन्धनान्मुक्तिः ममो
 त्पत्तिः तस्यापि भङ्गः प्राप्नोति । तन्मते तावदान्मैव नास्ति का देव्य
 सुखीमवनात् यतिष्यते । ज्ञानक्षणोपि संसारी कथमपरजान
 ४० क्षणमुत्तीमवनाय प्रविष्यते । न हि दुःखी हेतुदो यद्वच्चक्षुराय
 वेष्टमानो हृष्टः । क्षणस्य तु दुःखं स्वरसनासित्वाच्चनैव सार्धं दर्शयत् ।
 संतानस्तु न वास्तवः कश्चित् । वास्तवस्य तु आत्मान्मुपगम
 प्रसङ्गः । अपि च बौद्धा निमित्तवासनाच्छन्दे विगतविषयाकाराप-
 ष्टविशुद्धानोत्पादो मोक्ष इत्याहुस्तच्च न पठते । कारणमाभावे
 ४५ तदनुपपत्तेः । भावनाप्रचयो हि तस्य कारणमिष्यते । स च स्थिरैक
 भवमाभादिद्वेषानापायकः प्रतिलक्षणपूर्वबहुपलायमानो निरन्तर
 विनाशी गगनच्छङ्खानाम्पातप्रवनासादितप्ररूपो न स्फुट्यभिज्ञान-
 जनमाय ममवतीत्यनुपपत्तिरेव तस्य । समस्तचित्तक्षणानां स्वामावि-
 ष्याः सहस्रारम्भणश्चेत्तत्सहस्रारम्भं प्रत्यक्षकृत्वाकस्मादनुच्छे-
 ५० दात् । किं च समस्तचित्तक्षणाः पूर्वं स्वरसपरिनिर्वाणाः, अयम
 पूर्वो जातः संतानच्छन्दो न विद्यते बन्धमोक्षो र्विकाधिरर्णा
 त विषयभेदेन वर्तते तत्कस्यैव मुक्तिर्य एतदर्थं मयतते । अयं
 हि मोक्षप्रच्छन्दो बन्धनविच्छेदपयायः । मोक्षश्च तस्यैव पठते
 यो बद्धः । क्षणक्षणमात्रे स्वन्यः क्षणो बद्धः क्षणान्तरस्य
 ५५ मुक्तिरिति मोक्षमायः प्राप्नोति ॥ तथा सृष्टिमवदोषः । तथा

हि पूर्वबुद्धधानुभूतेष्वे नोत्तरबुद्धीनां स्मृतिः संभवति । ततोऽन्य-
त्वाद् । संतानान्तरबुद्धिषत् । न अन्यदृष्टार्थोऽन्येन स्मर्यते ।
अन्यथा एकं दृष्टार्थः सर्वः स्मर्येत । स्मरणाभावे च कौत-
स्कुती प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः । तस्याः स्मरणानुप्रयोगसंभवत्वात् ।
60 पदार्थभेदमनुबुद्धमाक्तनसंस्कारस्य हि प्रमातुं स एवायमित्या-
कारणयद्व्युत्पद्यते । अथ स्वादयं दोषो यद्यविज्ञेयेनान्यदृष्टमन्य-
स्मरतीत्युच्यते । किञ्चन्यत्वेपि कार्यकारणमात्रादयं च
स्मृतिः । भिन्नसंतानबुद्धीनां तु कार्यकारणमात्रा नास्ति तेन
संतानान्तराणां स्मृतिर्न भवति । न चैकसंतानिकीनामपि
65 बुद्धीनां कार्यकारणभावो नास्ति येन पूर्वबुद्धधनुभूतये
तदुत्तरबुद्धीनां स्मृतिर्न स्यात् । तदप्यनवदातम् । एवमपि अन्य-
त्वस्य तदवस्थत्वात् । न हि कार्यकारणमात्राभिधानेपि
तदपगतम् । भणिकत्वेन सवासं भिन्नत्वात् । न हि कार्यकारण-
मात्रात्स्मृतिरित्यन्योन्यमसिद्धास्ति दृष्टान्तः । अथ

70 यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आदिता कर्मवासना ।

फलं तत्रैव संपद्ये कर्मासे रक्ता यथा ॥

इति कर्मासरक्तादृष्टान्तास्तीति चेत् तदसाधीयः । साधन-
दूषणपारसंभवात् । तथा हि अन्यथायसंभवात् साधनम् । न हि
कार्यकारणमात्रो यत्र तत्र स्मृतिः कर्मासे रक्तावदित्यन्यः
75 संभवति । नापि यत्र न स्मृतिस्तत्र न कार्यकारणमात्र इति ध्वनि-
रेकास्ति । असिद्धत्वाद्यनुदावनाच्च न दूषणम् । न हि ततोऽन्यत्वा-
दित्यस्य हेतोः कर्मासे रक्तावदित्यनेन कथिष्यः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
किञ्च यद्यन्यत्रापि कार्यकारणमात्रेण स्मृतस्तत्परिनिर्मते तदा
निष्पानायादिबुद्धीनामपि कार्यकारणमात्रमन्त्रात्वेन स्मृत्यादि-
80 स्यात् । अथ नार्थमसद्व्यः एककर्मज्ञानत्वे सतीतिविशेषगादिनि चेत्

तदप्युक्तम् । भेदाभेदपक्षाभ्यां तस्योपक्षीणत्वात् । सणपरंपरावत्स
 स्याभेदे हि सणपरंपरेष सा । तथा च संतान इति न किंचिद्
 तिरिक्तमुक्तं स्यात् । भेद स्वपारमार्थिकः पारमार्थिको वाऽसौ स्यात् ।
 अपारमार्थिकत्वात् तद्वत् रूपणम् । अकिंचित्करत्वात् पारमार्थिक
 85 स्वे स्थितो वा स्यात् सणिको वा । सणिकत्वं संताननिर्बिम्बेष एषा
 यमिति क्रियेन स्वेनयितस्य स्तेनान्तरधरणस्वीकरणानुक्र
 णिना । स्थिरभेद आत्मैव संज्ञाभेदविरोधितः मतिपक्षा । इति न स्पृति
 र्घटते सणसपत्न्यादिनाम् । तदभावे चानुमानस्यानुत्पानमित्युक्तं
 मागेव । अपि च स्मृतेरभावे निहितमस्युन्मार्गणमत्यर्पणादि
 90 व्यवहारा विधीर्येयन् ।

इत्येकनयते कल्पे अक्षया म पुरुषो हता ।

तेन कर्मविपाकेन पादं विद्धोस्मि मित्तवः ॥

इति वचनस्य च का गतिः । एवमुत्पत्तिरुत्पादयति स्थितिः
 स्थापयति जरा जर्जरयति विनाशो नाशयति इति चतुःसणिकं
 95 वस्तु मतिमानामा अपि मतिशेष्या । सणचतुष्कानन्तरमपि
 निहितमस्युन्मार्गजादिव्यवहाराणां वर्धनात् । तदेवमनेकदोषापातेषि
 यः सणमङ्गमभिधेति तस्य महत् साहसमिति काव्यार्थः ॥१८॥

अथ ताद्यायताः सणसपत्ने सर्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तिं परैः
 सद्भावितामाकर्ण्येत्यं मतिपादयिष्यन्ति । यत्सर्वपक्षार्थानां सणिर
 त्वेपि वासनाबलव्यमन्यना ऐश्याप्यवसायेन एहिकामुष्मिक
 व्यवहारमनुष्ठेः कृतप्रणासादिदोषा निरवकाशा एवति । तदाकृतं
 १ परिहृतकामस्तत्कल्पितनासनायाः सणपरंपराया भेदाभेदानुमय-
 कल्पने पक्षत्रयेष्वप्यनुमानत्वं दृश्यन् । स्वाध्यायतदेदाभेदस्याद्वा-
 दमङ्गमपमानानपि वानङ्गीकारयितुमाह ।

सा वासना सा क्षणसततिश्च

नाभेदभेदानुभयैर्घटेते ।

ततस्तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोत-

न्धायात्वकुत्तानि परे श्रयन्तु ॥ १९ ॥

- सा वास्यपरिकल्पिता बुद्धितल्लुक्कावलीकल्पानां परस्परविषय
कस्मिन्नानां क्षणानामन्योन्यान्नुस्यूतमस्ययमनिका एकमप्रस्थानीया
10 संतानापरपर्याया वासना । वासनेति पूर्वज्ञानजनितानुचरज्ञाने
शक्तिमाहुः । सा च क्षणसततिस्त्वर्धनमसिद्धा महीपक्षिकावन्नव
नभोत्पद्यमानाऽपरापरसदृशक्षणपरंपरा । एते द्वे अपि अमेद
भेदानुभयैर्न घटेते ॥ न तावदभेदेन तादात्म्येन ते घटेते । तयार्हि
अमेदे वासना वा स्यात् क्षणपरंपरा वा । न इयम् । यद्धि यस्माद्
15 विभ्रं न तदा पृथगुपलभ्यते यथा पटात् घटस्वरूपम् । केवलायां
वासनायामन्ययिस्वीकारः । वास्माभावे च किं तथा वासनीयमस्तु ।
इति तस्या अपि न स्वरूपमवतिष्ठते । क्षणपरंपरामाज्ञाङ्गीकरणे
च मात्र एव दोषः ॥ न च भेदेन ते युज्येते । सा हि मित्रा वासना
क्षणिका स्यादक्षणिका वा । क्षणिका चेत् तर्हि क्षणेभ्यस्त्वस्याः
20 पृथक्स्वयं व्यर्थम् । अक्षणिका चेदन्वयिष्यदार्थाम्युपगमेनागम
बाधः । तथा च पदार्थान्तराणां क्षणिकत्वकल्पनामपासो व्यसन
मात्रम् ॥ अनुमपपक्षेणापि न घटेते । स हि कदाचिदेवं त्रूपाद्
नार्हं वासनायाः क्षणमेणितोऽमेवं प्रतिपद्ये न च भेद किं
स्वनुमपमिति । तदध्यनुचितम् । भेदाभेदयोर्विधिनिषेधरूपयोरैकतर
25 प्रतिषेधेऽन्यतरस्यावश्यं विधिभावाद्व्यतरपक्षाम्युपगमः । तत्र च
प्रागुक्त एव दोषः । अवशाऽनुमपकपत्वेऽवस्तुत्वमद्भः । भेदाभेद
रूपक्षणपक्षद्वयव्यतिरिक्तस्य मार्गान्तरस्यानस्तित्वात् । अनार्हतानां हि

प्यदोपः ॥ अत्र च समुद्रस्यानीयः संसारः । पौनसमानं
त्वच्छासनम् । कृपस्तम्भसंनिभः स्याद्वादः । पक्षिपातोपमा
३० यादिनाः । ते च स्वामिमत्पक्षमरूपणोद्भवेन मुक्तिसंज्ञतत्मा-
स्ये कृतमपत्ना अपि तस्मादिष्टार्थसिद्धिमपत्पन्थो म्यादृत्य स्या-
द्वादस्य कृपस्तम्भासङ्कृततापस्तीनष्टासनप्रवहणोपसंपन्नमेव यदि
शरणीकृतं तदा तेषां भषाणवाद्दिनिर्दिष्टमप्यमनारया सफलता
कल्पयति नापरयति काम्यार्थः ॥ १९ ॥

एवं क्रियावादिनां भाषाशुक्तानां कतिपयकृपप्रहर्निग्रहं विधाय
सामंतमक्रियावादिनां लौकिकतत्त्वानां मते सर्वाधर्मत्वादन्ते
उपन्यस्यन् तन्मतसूत्रस्य मत्पक्षममाणस्यानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरा-
नङ्गीकारेऽकिञ्चित्करत्वं दर्शनेन तेषां प्रज्ञायाः प्रमादमादर्शयति ।

विनानुमानेन पराभिसंधि

मत्संविदानस्य तु नास्तिकस्य ।

न साप्रतं वक्तुमपि ख्व चेष्टा

ख्व दृष्टमात्रं च हृद्वा प्रमादः ॥ २० ॥

६ मत्पक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति मन्यते चार्वाकाः । तत्र संन्यते ॥
अनु प्रमादः सिद्धसंन्यग्रहणस्मरणानन्तरं मीयते परिच्छिद्यते
वेद्यकालस्वभावविमर्शणार्थेनैव ज्ञानविषयेणेत्यनुमानः । प्रस्तावाद्
स्वार्थानुमानम् । तेनानुमानेन लैङ्गिकप्रमाणेन विना पराभिसंधि
पराभिप्रायम् मत्संविदानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानानस्यानुषङ्गः पूर्ववादिभ्यो
१० मेदघोतनायोः पूर्वेणां वादिनामास्तिकतया विमतिपक्षिस्थानेषु साह-
कृताः नास्तिकस्य तु वक्तुमपि नौचित्यं कुत एव तत्र सारं साह-
इति दुष्प्रश्नार्थः । नास्ति परलोका पुण्यं पापमिति वा मतिरस्य ।

- नास्तिकास्त्विकदैष्टिकम् इति निपातनाभास्तिकाः। तस्य नास्तिकस्य
 लोकायतिकस्य । अकृत्यमपि न सांप्रतम् बचनमप्युच्चारयितुं नो
 15 धितम् । ततस्तूष्णीभावं एवास्य श्रेयान् । दूरे मामाणिकपरिपदि
 प्रविश्य ममाणोपन्यामगोष्ठी । बचनं हि परमस्यायनाय प्रतिपाद्यते ।
 परेण चापदिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयमासी सतामयभेदबचनो भव
 स्युन्मद्यत् । ननु कथमिदं तूष्णीकर्तव्यस्य श्रेयसी यावता चेष्टानिष्ठे
 पादिना प्रतिपाद्यस्याभिप्रायमनुभाय सुकरमवानेन बचनोच्चारण
 20 नित्यासङ्ग्याह नव चेष्टा क्व ह्येवमार्थं च इति । केवेति ब्रुहदन्तरे ।
 चेष्टा इक्षितम् । परामिमायस्वरूपस्यानुभेयस्य सिद्धम् । क्व च ह्ये-
 वमार्थम् । दर्शने ह्येव । भावे क्तः । ह्येव ह्येवमार्थम् मत्पक्षमार्थम् । तस्य
 भिन्ननिरोपेक्षमवचित्वात् । अत एव दूरमन्तरमेतयो । न हि
 मत्पक्षेणातीन्त्रियाः परचेतोह्ययः परिज्ञातुं शक्याः । तस्यैन्द्रिय
 2 कत्वात् । मुख्यमसादादिचेष्टया तु सिद्धयुक्त्या परामिमायस्य
 निश्चये अनुमानममाणमनिच्छतोपि तस्य वक्ष्यादापतितम् । तथा
 हि । मद्बचनप्रवणायिमायवानर्थं पुरुषः । तादृगुत्तमसादादिचेष्टा
 ज्ञेयानुपपत्तेरिति । अतश्च इहा ममादः । इहा इति स्वेदे ।
 अहो तस्य ममादः प्रमत्तता यदनुसूयमानमप्यनुमानं मत्पक्ष
 30 मात्राङ्गीकारेणापहृते । अथ संपूर्वस्य चेत्तेरकर्मकत्वं एवात्मने
 पदम् अथ तु कर्मास्ति तत्कथमप्रधानम् । अत्रोच्यते । अथ
 संचित्तुं शक्तः संविदान इति कायम् । यथाऽशक्तिश्रीले इति
 शक्तो ध्यानविधानात् । ततश्चायमर्थः । अनुमानेन विना परामि
 सिद्धितं सम्पन्नादितुमशक्तस्येति । एवं परबुद्धिज्ञानान्यथानुपपत्त्या-
 35 यमनुमानं इठादङ्गीकारितः । तथा प्रकारान्तरेणाप्ययमङ्गीकार
 यितव्यः । तथा हि । 'वार्त्ताक' कायिज्ञानव्यक्तीः संवादिस्थेना
 व्यभिचारिणीरूपसम्पन्न्याय विसंवादिस्थेन व्यभिचारिणी पुनः

- यस्तुना मित्रेण वा भाष्यमभिधेन वा । तदुभयातीतस्य पन्थास्त-
 नन्वयमापत्वात् । एवं विकल्पनयेपि सणपरंपरावासनयोरनुपपत्तौ
 १० पारिषेप्याद्भेदामेदपक्ष एव कर्त्तृकरणीयाः । न च मत्वेक-
 यो भवेदोपा द्वयोर्भावे कर्षं न सा इति वधनादत्रापि
 दोषताद्वयस्त्वमिति बाध्यमुक्तुत्सर्पनरसिंहादिब्रज्यात्यन्तरत्वाद्
 नेकान्तपक्षस्य । नन्वाह्वानां वासनासणपरंपरयोरङ्गीकार एव
 नास्ति तत्कर्षं तदभ्ययभेदामेदविन्ता चरितार्था इति श्रमेव ।
 २० स्याद्वाद्वाग्मिनामपि हि प्रतिज्ञार्थं नवनवपर्यायपरंपरोत्पत्तिरभि-
 मर्तव्य । तथा च सणिकृत्वम् । अतीतानागतवर्तमानपर्यायपरंपरानु-
 संघायकं चान्वपि द्रव्यस्य तच्च वासनेतिसंज्ञान्तरभागपि अभिमर्तयेत् ।
 न खलु नामभवाद्वाद् कोपि कोपिदानाम् । सा च प्रतिज्ञोत्पत्ति-
 प्युपर्यायपरंपरा अन्वयिद्रव्यान् कर्षविशिष्टा कर्षविदभिन्ना । तथा
 ४० तदपि तस्याः स्याद्विज्ञे स्यादभिन्नम् । इति पृथक्प्रत्ययव्यपदेशविष-
 यत्वाद्भेदः । द्रव्यस्यैव च तथा तथा परिणमनाद्भेदः । एतच्च सक-
 लादेशविकलादेशव्याख्याने पुरस्तात्प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः ॥

- अपि च बीजमते वासनापि तावन्न पश्यते इति निर्विषया तत्र
 भेदादिविकल्पविन्ता । तद्वृत्तार्थं हि पूर्वज्ञानेनोचरत्त्वस्य वास्यता ।
 ४३ न चास्मिराणां विषयक्रास्यताऽप्योन्यासकक्षानां च तेषां वास्य-
 वासकभावो गुरुवत् । स्थिरस्य संवत्स्य च यन्त्रादयुगमदादिना
 वास्यत्वं दृष्टमिति । अथ पूर्वचित्तसहजाचेतनाविषयपात्पूर्ववृत्तिवि-
 शिष्टं चित्तद्वयपते सोऽस्यवृत्तिविशिष्टचित्तात्पादा वासना । तथा
 हि पूर्वचित्तं क्पादिविषयं मद्रूपिविज्ञानं यत् तत् पश्यिष्यम् । पथ
 १० क्पादिविज्ञानान्यविकल्पानि पश्यं च विकल्पविज्ञानम् । तत्र
 सह जातः समानकालव्यवहाराविशेषाऽङ्गारास्पदमात्मविज्ञानम् ।
 तस्मात्पूर्ववृत्तिविशिष्टचित्तात्पादा वासनेति । तदपि न । अस्मि

- रत्नादासकेनासंबन्धात् । यथासौ चेतनाविशेषः पूर्वचित्तसहभाषी
 स न वर्तमाने चेतस्युपकारं करोति । वर्तमानस्याश्रय्यापनेयो
 ५५ पनेयत्वेनाविषयात्वात् । तद्धि यथाभूतं जायते तथाभूतं विन-
 श्यतीति । नाप्यनागत उपकारं करोति । तेन सहासंबन्धत्वात् ।
 असंबन्धं च न मानयतीत्युक्तम् । तस्मात् सौगत्यमते वासनापि
 न घटते । अत्र च स्तुतिकारेणाभ्युपेत्यापि तामत्रयिदम्य
 स्थापनाय मेहामेदादिष्वर्चा विरचितेति भावनीयम् ॥
- ६० अयोधराध्यास्या । तत इति ॥ पक्षमयेपि दोषसद्भावात् त्वदु-
 क्तानि ममद्वचनानि भवाभेदस्याद्वादसंबादपूतानि परे कुतीर्ष्याः
 मकरणात्मापासुनवीया अभ्यन्तु आद्रियन्ताम् । अभ्योपमानमाह
 तदादर्शास्यादि । तर्हं न पश्यतीति तदादर्शो यः सकृन्तपोतः
 पक्षिणावकं तस्य न्यायः तदाहरणं तस्मात् । यथा किल
- ६५ कथमप्यपारपारावारान्तर्गतितं काकादिष्वनुनिश्चानको बहि-
 निर्निर्गमिपया ममहणरूपस्त्वभ्यादेस्त्वप्राप्तय सुखतयोद्गीन-
 समन्ताल्लक्षणवमभाबलोक्यस्तन्महद्वैव निर्वेदाद्विधातुत्य तदेष
 रूपस्त्वभ्यादिस्थानमाभ्ययते गत्यन्तरामानादेवं तेषि कुतीर्ष्याः
 मायुक्तपक्षत्रयेपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासाभ्यन्तस्त्वदुक्तमेव चतुर्थं यदा
- ७० येदपक्षमनिच्छयापि क्लीकुर्वाजास्त्वच्छासनमव मतिपद्यन्ताम् ।
 न हि स्वस्य बलविरुद्धतामाकल्य बलीयसा प्रभोः शरणा
 श्रयणं दोषपोषाय नीतिशास्त्रिनाम् । त्वदुक्तानीति बहुवचन
 सर्वेषामपि तत्त्वान्तरीयाणां परे पक्षेऽनेकान्तवादमतिपक्षिरेव
 यथावस्थितपदावमतिपादनोपपिक्तं नान्यदिति ज्ञापनायम् ।
- ७५ अनन्तधर्मात्मकस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुनः सधनयात्मकन स्यादादेन
 पिना यथावद्वहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । इतरयान्धगमन्यायेन पक्षत्र
 ग्राहितामसत्वात् ॥ अयमतीति वर्तमानान्तं केचित्पठन्ति तथा
 [१० स्पष्टम्]

प्यदोषः ॥ अथ च समुद्रस्वानीयः संसारः । पोतसमानं
त्वच्छासनम् । कूपस्तम्भसंनिधः स्याद्वादः । पक्षिपोतोपमा
२० पादिना । ते च स्वाधिमत्तपसप्ररूपजोद्भूयनेन मुक्तिसप्ततटमा-
सृपे कृतप्रपन्ता अपि तस्मादिष्टार्थसिद्धिमपश्यन्तो व्याहृत्य स्वा-
ह्वादस्य कूपस्तम्भासङ्कृततामकीनश्चासनप्रवहणोपसर्पणमेष यदि
चरणीकृत्यते तदा तेषां यवाजबाह्विर्निष्क्यणमनोरवः सफलतां
कलयति नापरयेति काम्यार्थः ॥ १९ ॥

एवं क्रियावादिनां प्राबाहुकानां कतिपयकुञ्जहनिग्रहं विधाय
सांमतमक्रियावादिनां लौकिकयतिकानां मत्तं सर्वाधमत्त्वादन्त
वपन्यस्यन् तन्मतगुरुस्य मत्स्यसप्तमाजस्यानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरा
नङ्गीकारेऽकिञ्चित्स्वरूपदर्शनेन तेषां प्रज्ञायाः प्रमादमादर्शयति ।

विनानुमानेन परामिसंधि

मसविद्वानस्य तु नास्तिकस्य ।

न साप्रतं वक्तुमपि क्व चेष्टा

क्व दृष्टमात्रं च इहा प्रमाद ॥ २० ॥

५ मत्स्यसमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति मन्यते चार्पाकाः । तत्र संनद्धते ॥
अतु पश्चाद् सिद्धमेव प्रमाणस्मरणानन्तरं मीयते परिच्छिद्यते
देशकालस्थमावधिप्रकृत्योर्धनेन ज्ञानविशेषेणत्यनुमानम् । मत्स्यावात्
स्वार्थानुमानम् । तेनानुमानेन वैदिकप्रमाणेन विना परामिसंधि
परामिप्राप्तम् असंविद्वानस्य सम्यग्मानानस्यानुग्रहः पूर्ववादिभ्यो
१० भेदघोवनार्थः पूर्वेषां वादिनामास्तिरुतया विमतिपक्षित्यानेषु सावः
कृतः नास्तिकस्य तु वक्तुमपि नौपिती कुत एव तन सह सोद्
इति दुष्यद्दर्शः । नास्ति परमोक्तं पुण्य पापमिति वा मतिरस्य ।

- नास्तिकास्तिकद्वैष्टिकम् इति निपातनाभास्तिकम् । तस्य नास्तिकस्य
 सौकायतिकस्य । यस्तुमपि न सांप्रतम् बचनमप्युच्चारयितुं नो
 10 पितम् । ततस्त्वर्णीभाष एवास्य श्रेयान् । दूरं ग्रामाणिकपरिपदि
 यमिष्य प्रमाणोपन्यामगोष्ठी । बचनं हि परमस्यायनाय प्रतिपाद्यते ।
 परेण चाप्रतिपत्तिस्ततमर्थं प्रतिपान्यभासौ सतामनभेयमचनो भव
 स्युन्मत्तपत् । ननु कथमिव त्वर्णीकर्तृवास्य श्रेयसी यावता चेष्टाभिधे
 पादिना प्रतिपाद्यस्याभिधायमनुमाय सुकरमेवानेन बचनोच्चारण
 20 नित्याश्चक्षुषाह क्व चेष्टा क्व दृष्टमात्रं च इति । क्वेति बृहदन्तरे ।
 चेष्टा इन्नितम् । परामिमायक्यस्यानुभेयस्य सिद्धम् । क्व च दृष्ट-
 मात्रम् । तर्ध्वनं दृष्टम् । यावे क्तः । दृष्टमेव दृष्टमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षमात्रम् । तस्य
 सिद्धानिरपेक्षमद्वैचित्वात् । अत एव दूरमन्तरमतयोः । न हि
 प्रत्यक्षेष्वातीन्द्रियाः परचेतोद्भवयः परिहर्तुं शक्याः । तस्यैन्द्रिय
 2 कृत्वात् । भुक्तप्रसादादिचेष्टया तु सिद्धपूतया परामिमायस्य
 निमित्ते अनुमानप्रमाणमनिच्छतोपि तस्य ब्रह्मादापदितम् । तथा
 हि । मद्बचनश्रवणाभिप्रायवाननयं पुरुषः । तादृग्भुक्तप्रसादादिचेष्टा
 अन्यवानुपपत्तेरिति । अतश्च इहा प्रमादः । इहा इति शब्दे ।
 अहा तस्य प्रमादः प्रमत्तता यदनुभूयमानमप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्ष-
 30 माशङ्कीकारणापहृते । अत्र संपूर्णस्य भेत्तेरकर्मकत्वं एवात्मने
 पदम् अत्र तु कर्मास्ति तत्कथमवानशः । अबोध्यते । अत्र
 संवेदितुं शक्यः संविज्ञान इति कायम् । वयःशक्तिद्वीष्ट इति
 श्रवतां ज्ञानविधानात् । ततश्चायमर्थः । अनुमानेन विना परामि
 संहितं सम्यग्बोधितुमशक्येति । एवं परबुद्धिज्ञानान्यवानुपपत्त्या-
 3 यमनुमानं इवाशङ्कीकारितः । तथा मकारान्तरेणाप्ययमङ्गीकार
 पितव्याः । तथा हि । आर्षाकः काभिज्ञानव्यक्तीः संवादिस्त्वेना
 व्यभिचारिणीरुपलब्ध्यान्यात्र विसंवादिस्त्वेन व्यभिचारिणीः पुनः

- कास्मान्तरे तादृशीतराणां ज्ञानभ्यक्तीनामवश्यं प्रमाणतेवरते
 व्यवस्थापयेत् । न च संनिहितायवसनात्प्रथमानं पूर्वापरपरामर्श
 ४० शून्यं प्रत्यक्षं पूर्वापरकासमाभिनीनां ज्ञानभ्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्या-
 प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं निमित्तमुपलक्षयितुं समते । न चार्थं स्वप्रती-
 तिगोचराणामपि ज्ञानभ्यक्तीनां परं प्रति प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा
 व्यवस्थापयितुं प्रभवति । तस्माद्यथाह्यज्ञानभ्यक्तिसाधर्म्यद्वारेण
 दानीन्तनज्ञानभ्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं परमति
 ४५ पादकं च प्रमाणान्तरमनुमानरूपमुपासीत । परस्लोकादिनिषेधश्च
 न प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण क्षयः कर्तुम् । संनिहितमात्रविषयत्वाच्चस्य ।
 परस्लोकादिकं चाप्रतिषिध्य नार्थं सुखमास्ते प्रमाणान्तरं च
 नेच्छतीति हिम्मेवाका ॥ किंच प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यथोभ्यभिचारोद्व
 प्रामाण्यम् । कथमितरथा स्नानपानावगाहनाद्यर्थक्रियाऽप्रमर्श
 ५० मरुमरीचिकानिचयशुम्बिनि असङ्गाने न प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च अर्थ-
 प्रतिबद्धसिद्धान्तद्वारा सङ्गमञ्जुतारनुमानागमयोरप्यर्थाभ्यभिचा-
 रादेव किं नेष्यते । व्यभिचारिणोरप्यनयोर्दर्शनादप्रामाण्यमिति
 चेत् । प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तिमिरादिवोपाभिनीबिनीनाद्युपगमावमन्वि
 नोऽप्रमाणस्य दर्शनात्सर्वत्रप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षमात्रं तद्विति
 ५५ चेत् इतरत्रापि तुल्यमेतदन्यत्र पक्षपातात् । एवं च प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण
 वस्तुव्यवस्थानुपपत्तः । तन्मूला जीवपुण्याशुप्यपरस्लोकनिषेधादि
 भादा अप्रमाणमेव ॥ एवं नास्ति क्वचिमतो भूतचिदादौपि निरा-
 कार्यः । तथा च द्रव्यासङ्काराकार उपपादयने । न चार्थं
 भूतधर्मः । सत्त्वगुणितत्वादिषु मयाङ्गेषु अभ्यादिमदप्रतिबद्धा
 ६० प्रत्यक्षमनुपलम्भात् । अनभिभ्यक्तावात्मसिद्धिः । कायारारपरि-
 षतेभ्यस्तभ्याः स प्रत्यक्ष इति चक्षुः कायपरिणामापि तन्मात्रमासी
 म कादाचित्कः । अभ्यवस्थात्मकः स्यात् । अहदुत्वे न वेदादि

- नियमः । मृतादपि च म्यात् । शोणितशुषाभिः सुप्तादावप्यस्ति ।
 न च सतस्तस्योत्पत्तिः । मूयोमूयः प्रसङ्गात् । अण्भात्मनश्च
 ६० प्रसिद्धमर्थविरिणाकारित्वं विरुध्येत । अमतः सकृन्प्रतिबिम्बस्य
 कथमुत्पत्तिः कर्तृत्वम् । अन्यस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् । तत्र भूतकाय
 सुपयोगः । कुतस्त्वं सुप्तात्यतस्य तदुत्पत्तिः । असंवेदनेन चेतन्य
 स्याभावात् । न । जाग्रदवस्थानुमूतस्य स्मरणात् । असंवेदनं तु
 निद्रापघातात् । कथं तर्हि कायविकृतौ चेतन्यविकृतिः । न कान्तः ।
 70 विप्रादिना कश्मलवपुषोपि बुद्धिशुद्धे । अधिकार च मानवविशेषतः
 प्रीत्यादिभेदद्वयनात् । शोकादिना बुद्धिविकृतौ कायविकारादर्शनात् ।
 परिणामिना विना च न कायोत्पत्तिः । न च भूतान्येव तथा
 परिणमन्ति । विनातीयत्वात् । काठिन्यादेरनुपलम्भात् । अणव एव
 द्विप्राद्यत्वरूपां स्थूलतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते तज्ज्ञात्वादि चापलम्ब्यतः ।
 75 तत्र भूतानां धर्मः फलं वा उपयोगः । तथा भर्ता मदासिपति
 तदस्य लक्षणम् । स चात्मा स्वविदितः । भूतानां तथाभावे
 परिर्मुक्तं स्यात् । गौराश्वमित्यादि तु नात्रमुग्रम् । शब्दरुचिरजन्य
 त्वात् ॥ अनभ्युपगतानुमानमामाप्स्यस्य चान्यनिपपोपि दुस्मभः ।
 धर्मं फलं च भूतानामुपयोगा भव्यदि ।
 80 मत्यस्मुपलम्भः स्यादुत्पादा वा विष्णुत्वात् ॥
 इति कन्यायः ।

एवमुक्तप्रतिबिम्बान्तर्वाद्प्रतिशेषमाख्याय साधितमनापवि
 पात्रात्मनामराभितसन्मनयः मत्यस्तापस्यमाणमप्यनन्तरादे
 यवमन्यन्त तेषामुन्मत्ततापरिमारयमाह ।

प्रतिक्षणोत्पाद्यिनाशयोगि
 स्थिरेकमप्यक्षमपीक्षमाणः ।

जिन त्वताज्ञामवमन्यते यः

स वातकी नाथ पिशाचकी वा ॥२१॥

प्रतिक्षणं प्रतिसमयम् । उत्पादन उचराकारस्वीकाररूपेण विना
 ४ श्वेन च पूर्वाकारपरिहारसमयेन युज्यत इत्यर्थं श्रीमन् प्रतिक्षणात्पाद
 विनाशपाणिः किं तत् । स्थिरैकं कर्मतापत्रम् । स्थिरमुत्पादविनाशयो-
 रनुयायित्वाधिकारवर्ति यद्वैकं द्वयं स्थिरैकम् । एकशब्दात् साधा-
 रणवाची । उत्पादे विनाशे च तस्साधारणम् । अन्वयिद्रव्यत्वाद् । यथा
 चैवमप्रयारेण जननी साधारणस्यार्थः । इत्यमर इति तयारकाधिकार
 10 जता । पर्यायार्थां कर्षविवेकत्वमपि तस्य कर्षविवेकत्वात् ।
 एवं प्रयत्येकं वस्त्रप्यसमपीक्षमाणः प्रत्यक्षमवलोकयन्मपि । हे
 जिन रागादिजन्म । त्वदाज्ञाम् आ सामस्थेनानन्तधर्मविशिष्टया
 ज्ञायन्त अपबुद्धयन्ते जीवाग्नीषादयः पदार्था यथा साक्षा आमयः
 कासनम् तदाज्ञा त्वदाज्ञा तां त्वदाज्ञां भवत्पणीतस्याद्वाद्दुष्टाद्वा ।
 15 यः कश्चिद्विषयव्यवमन्यत अवमानाति । नात्यपेक्षमेकवचनम् अव-
 द्या वा । स पुरुषपशुः वातकी पिशाचकी वा । वातो रोगविशेषा
 ज्ञ्यास्तीति वातकी वातकीव वातकी वातूल इत्यर्थः । एवं पिशा-
 चकीव पिशाचकी भूतादिषु इत्यर्थः । अत्र वाशब्दः समुच्चयार्थ
 उपमानार्थो वा । स पुरुषापशदा वातकिपिशाचकिन्म्य मपिरा-
 २० इति सुसामित्यर्थः । वातातीसारपिशाचात्कथान्तः इत्यनन
 मत्सर्षीयः कथान्तः । एवं पिशाचकीत्यपि । यथा क्रिस् वातेन
 पिशाचन वाकान्तवपुस्तुतर्ग सासारकृत्त्वमपि तदावश्वमाद-
 न्यथा प्रतिपद्यत एवमयमप्येकान्तवादापस्मारपरवश इति ॥

अथ च जिनति साभिमापम् । रागादिमेतत्त्वादि जिनः । तत्रम
 यः क्रिस् विगमितदापकास्तुप्यतयावधयवचनस्यापि तत्रमयत

३० आसनमवयते तस्य कथं नोन्मद्यतेति भावः । नाथ हे स्वामिन
असम्भस्य सम्यग्दर्शनादेर्लम्प्यकृतया सम्भस्य च तस्यैव निर-
विचारपरिपायनापदेशदायितया च योग्यमकरत्वापपत्तेर्नाथ ।
तस्यामन्त्रणम् ।

वस्तुतर्कं चात्यावश्ययर्थाव्यात्मकम् । तथा हि । सर्वं वस्तु
३५ द्रव्यात्मना नोत्पद्यते विपद्यते वा । परिस्फुटमन्वयदर्शनात् । लून
पुनर्जातिनस्त्राविश्वन्वयवशमन व्यभिचार इति न वाच्यम् । ममाणेन
वाध्यमानस्यान्वयस्यापरिस्फुटत्वात् । न च वस्तुतोन्वयः ममाण
विरुद्धः । सत्यमत्यमिद्वानसिद्धत्वात् ।

सर्वव्यक्तिषु नियतं तणे तणञ्जत्वमथ च न विज्ञेयं ।

४० सत्याधित्यपचि-योराकृतिजातिव्यवस्थानात् ॥

इति वचनात् । ततो द्रव्यात्मना स्थितिरैव सर्वस्य वस्तुनः ।
पयोपात्मना तु सर्वं वस्तुत्पद्यते विपद्यत च । असंभितपयावानुम
वसद्भानात् । न चैव गृहे ग्रहे पीठादिपर्यायानुमबन व्यभिचारः ।
तस्य स्वरूपद्रष्टृत्वात् । न तन्तु सास्त्ररूपं यन पूषाकारविनाशा

४५ नरद्वयोत्तगरूपोत्पादाविनाशो भवेत् । न च जीवादी वस्तुनि
होमोर्पादामीन्वादिपयोपपरंपरानुभवः स्वस्वम् । कस्यचिद्
वाचकस्याभावात् । ननुत्पादात्म्यः परस्परं भिद्यत न वा । यदि
भिद्यन्ते कथमेकं वस्तु व्यात्मकम् । न भिद्यन्त चेत् तद्यापि कव-
मेकं प्रयात्मकम् । तथा च ।

५० पयुत्पादादयो भिन्नाः कथमेकं प्रयात्मकम् ।

अथात्पादादयोऽभिन्नाः कथमेकं प्रयात्मकम् ॥

इति चत् । तदुक्तम् । कथंमिद्विप्रसङ्गत्वन तेषां कथंमि
त्रेदाभ्युपगमात् । तथा हि । उपात्तविनाशघ्नोपाणि स्यादि
मानि भिन्नसङ्गतरान् रूपादिबदिति । न च विप्रसङ्गत्वमथ

- ५५ सिद्धम् । असत् आत्मलाभः सत्तः सत्तावियागो द्रव्यरूपवयानु
वर्तनं च सत्कृत्वादादीनां परस्परमसङ्कीर्णानि सप्तणानि सत्कृत
मोक्तसासिद्धाप्येव ॥ न चामी भिन्नलक्षणा अपि परस्परानपेक्षाः
संपुष्यवदसम्भाषणेः । तथाहि । उत्पादः केवलो नास्ति । स्थिति
विगमरहितत्वात् कृष्यरोपयत् । तथा विनाशः केवलो नास्ति ।
५० स्थित्युत्पत्तिरहितत्वात् तद्वत् । एव स्थितिः केवला नास्ति ।
विनाशोत्पादसून्यत्वात् तद्वदेव । इत्यन्योन्यापेक्षाणामुत्पादादीनां
वस्तुनि सर्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । तथा चोक्तम् ।

पटमौलिसुष्यर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिव्यवम् ।

लोकमयोदमाप्पस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥

- ५ पयोव्रतो न दध्यति न पयोऽयि दधिब्रतः ।

अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मादस्तु ध्यात्मकम् ॥

इति काव्यायोः ॥

अथान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदस्य प्रस्तुतत्वाशस्तां तावत्साक्षाद्भवान्
भवदीयमवचनावयवा अपि परतीर्षिकविरस्कारवदकला इत्या
वयवान् स्तुतिकारं स्याद्वादव्यवस्थापनाय प्रयोगमुपन्यस्यन्
स्तुतिमाह ।

अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव तत्त्व

मत्तोऽन्यथा सत्त्वमसूपपादम् ।

इति प्रमाणान्यपि ते कुवादि

कुरङ्गसंभ्रासनसिंहनादा ॥ २२ ॥

- ॥ तत्त्व परमार्थयुतं वस्तु जीवाजीव्यलक्षणमनन्तधर्मात्मक
मय । अनन्तादिशब्दविषयत्वादपरिमिता ये धर्माः सद्भा-
विनः क्रमभाविनश्च पर्यायास्त एवात्मा स्वर्ग्य यस्य तदनन्त-

धर्मात्मकम् । एतदकारं प्रकारान्तरमप्युच्यते । अत एवाह
 अतोन्यया इत्यादि । अतोन्यया उक्तमकारमपरीत्येन । सत्त्वं
 10 मस्तुतत्त्वम् । अमूर्तपादम् सुखेनोपपाद्यत घटनाकोटिसंज्ञमारोप्यत
 इति मूर्तपादम् न तथा अमूर्तपादं दुर्घटमित्यर्थः । अनेन साधनं
 दर्शितम् । तथाहि । तत्त्वमिति धर्मि । अनन्तप्रमात्त्यक्तत्वं साध्यो
 धर्मः । सत्त्वान्ययानुपपत्तेरिति हेतुः । अन्ययानुपपत्त्यकलक्षणत्वा
 15 हेतोः । अन्तर्ध्यात्प्येव साध्यस्य सिद्धत्वाद्दृष्टान्तादिभिर्न मयो-
 जनम् । यदनन्तप्रमात्त्यक्तं न भवति तत्सदपि न भवति यथा
 विषादिन्दीवरमिति कवसम्पत्तिरेकी हेतुः । साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तानां
 पक्षकृत्तिसिद्धित्वनान्वयायोगात् । अनन्तप्रमात्त्यक्तत्वं चात्मनि
 तावत्साकारानाकारोपयोगिता कर्तृत्वं मोक्षतृत्वं मदेनाष्टकनिमसता
 अमूर्तत्वमसंख्यातमदेनात्मकता जीवत्वमित्यादयः सहमाविनो
 20 धर्माः । हर्षविपादशोकमुत्सुहृद्भयद्वन्द्वनरनारकतिर्यक्त्वादयस्तु क्रम
 माविन । धर्मास्तिकायादिव्यप्यसंगत्ययमद्वैतात्मकत्वं गत्यापुप-
 ग्रहकारित्वं मत्पादिज्ञानविषयत्वं तत्तत्प्रच्छेदकत्वमप्युपपत्त्यमवस्थि
 तत्वमरुपित्वमेतद्व्यप्यत्वं निष्पत्त्यमित्यादयः । यदे पुनरायत्वं
 पाकमरुपादिमत्त्वं पृथुपुष्पोदरत्वं कम्बुग्रीवत्वं मलादिपारणा
 25 हरणसामर्थ्यं मत्पादिज्ञानव्ययत्वं नभत्वं पुराणत्वमित्यादयः ।
 एवं सर्वपदार्थेष्वपि नानानयमताभिन्नेन शब्दानार्थाच्च पयाया
 भवतीत्य साध्यम् ॥

अत्र चात्मगण्यनानन्तप्यपि धर्मेष्वनुसंधिरूपमन्वपिद्रव्यं
 ध्वनितम् । ततश्च उत्पादप्यवर्धोप्ययुक्तं सत् इति ध्वनित्यनम् ।
 10 एवं तावदर्थेषु । ध्वन्यपि उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितविभक्तसंज्ञनपोप-
 दधपोपनान्यमाणयहमाणनान्यमन्तदयमस्यायननक्तयादयमार-
 सेयाः । अस्य हनारसिद्धिर्निर्वाणिकत्वादिकम्पकादारः
 [18 स्व२२]

स्वयमभ्युक्तः । इत्येवमुल्लेखमेस्वराणि ते तत्र प्रमाणान्वयि
 न्यायोपपन्नसाधनवाक्यान्वयि । आस्तां तानस्तासास्कृतद्रव्यपर्याय
 ३३ निश्चायो यवान् । तावदेताम्यपि कुवादिकुरङ्गसंभासनासिंहनादाः
 कुवादिनः कुतिसववादिनः । एकांसग्राहकनयानुयायिनान्यतीर्षि-
 काः त एव संसारबभगहनवसनम्यसनितया कुरङ्गा वृमास्तेषां
 सम्यक्प्राप्तने सिंहनादा इव सिंहनादाः । यथा सिंहस्य नादमात्र-
 मप्याकर्ण्य कुरङ्गास्त्रासमाश्रयन्ति तथा यद्यत्यजीतवन्प्रकारममात्र-
 ४० वचनान्मपि श्रुत्वा कुवादिमन्त्रस्तुतामश्नुवत । यत्किञ्चनमदान
 कावरतां विप्रवीति यावत् । एकैकं स्वदुर्गं प्रमाणमन्ययोग्यव
 ज्ञेदकमित्यर्थः ॥

अत्र प्रमाणानीति बहुवचनमेवमातीयानां प्रमाणानां
 भगवच्छासने आनन्त्यज्ञापनार्थम् । एकैकस्य ध्रुवस्य सर्वोदधि
 ४१ सखिषसर्वसरिद्रालुक्कानन्तघृणार्थत्वात् । तेषां च सर्वेषामपि सख-
 विन्मुखतया प्रमाणत्वात् । अथवा इत्यादिबहुवचनान्ता मन्त्रस्य
 संक्षेपका भवन्तीति न्यायात् इतिमथ्येन प्रमाणबाहुस्यसं-
 चनात् पूर्वार्धे एकस्मिन्मपि प्रमाणे उपन्यस्ते लक्षितमेव बहुव-
 चनम् ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अनन्तरमन्त्रधर्मात्मकत्वं वस्तुनि सार्धं मुकुञ्जितमुक्तम् ।
 तदेव सप्तमहीप्रकृषणद्वारेण प्रपञ्चयन् भगवतो निरतिशयं
 वचनातिशयं च स्तुवमाह ।

अपर्ययं यस्तु समस्यमान
 मग्नव्यमेतच्च विविच्यमानम् ।
 आदेशमेवोदितसप्तमङ्ग-
 मदीदृशस्त्वं बुभरूपवेद्यम् ॥२३॥

समस्यमानं संक्षेपेणोच्यमानं वस्तु अपर्ययम् अभिवक्षितपर्यायम् ।
 ८ वसन्ति शुणपर्याया अस्मिन्निति वस्तु धर्माधर्माकाशपुद्गल-
 कासृज्रीवसृजणं द्रव्यपदम् । अयमभिप्रायः । यदैकमेव वस्तुत्वात्
 घटादिकं चेतनाचेतनं सतामपि पर्यायाणामनिवृत्तमा द्रव्यरूपमेव
 वस्तुमिष्यते तदा संक्षेपेणाम्यन्तरीकृतसकलपर्यायनिकायत्वसंज्ञ-
 नेनाभिधीयमानत्वादपर्ययमित्युपदिश्यते । केवलद्रव्यरूपमेवेत्यर्थः ।
 10 यथास्मात् घटयमित्यादि । पर्यायाणां द्रव्यान्तिरेकात् । अत एव
 द्रव्यास्तिकनया शुद्धसंग्रहात्तयो द्रव्यमाश्रमेनेच्छन्ति । पर्यायाणां
 तद्विषयगुणत्वात् । पर्ययः पर्ययः पर्यायः इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।
 अद्रव्यमित्यादि । चः पुनरर्थः । स च पूषस्मादिमेपद्योतने भिन्नक्रमश्च ।
 विविच्यमानं चेति विषयेन पृथगुपपत्तयोच्यमानम् । पुनरेतद्द्रव्य-
 12 अद्रव्यमेव । अभिवक्षितान्वयिद्रव्यं केवलपर्यायरूपमित्यर्थः ॥

यदा धात्मा ज्ञानदर्शनादीन्यर्थायानभिकृत्य प्रतिपर्यायं विचा-
 र्यते तदा पर्याया एव प्रतिमासन्त न पुनरास्याम्यं किमपि
 द्रव्यम् । एवं घटापि कुण्डलीष्टपृषुषुष्णोदरपूर्वापरादिमागाद्य-
 धरापेक्षया विविच्यमानः पर्याया एव न पुनर्पञ्चस्य तदतिरिक्तं
 20 वस्तु । अत एव पर्यायास्तिकनयानुपातिनः पठन्ति ।

मागा एव हि मासन्ते संनिविष्टास्तथा तथा ।

तद्भास्य पुनः कथिभिर्भागः सप्रतीयते ॥

इति । ततश्च द्रव्यपर्यायोमयात्मरुत्नेपि वस्तुनो द्रव्यनयार्पणया
 पर्यायनयानर्पणया च द्रव्यरूपता पर्यायनयार्पणया द्रव्यनया
 22 नपेक्षया च पर्यायरूपता समयनयार्पणया च तदुभयरूपता । अतः
 एवाह पाञ्चकमुक्त्याः अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः इति । एवंविधं द्रव्यपर्या-
 यात्मकं वस्तु स्वमेव अदीदृशः स्वमेव दक्षितवान् । मान्य इति
 काश्चावधारणावगतिः ॥

नन्वन्याभिधानप्रत्यययोग्यं द्रव्यमन्याभिधानप्रत्ययविषयम्
 20 पर्यायाः तत्कथमेकमेव वस्तुमयात्मकमित्याशङ्क्य निशेषज-
 हारेण परिहरति आदक्षमदत्यादि । आदक्षमेदेन सकृदादेश
 विक्रसादेशसङ्गणेनादेशद्वयेनादिताः प्रतिपादिताः सप्तसंख्या
 भङ्गावचनमकारावस्थिन्वस्तुनिवचनम् । ननु यदि भगवता शिष्ट
 वनवन्पुत्रा निर्विशेषतया सर्वेष्वपि पर्वविष्य वस्तुतत्त्वमुपदर्शितं तर्हि
 25 किमर्थं तीर्णान्तरीयाः तत्र विप्रतिपद्यन्त इत्याह बुध-
 क्यवेद्यमिति । बुध्यन्ते यथावस्थितं वस्तुतत्त्वं सारेतरविषयवि-
 भागविचारणया इति बुधाः । मङ्गला बुधा बुधक्याः नैसर्गिका
 भिगमिकान्यतरसम्यग्बोधनविषयदीकृतज्ञानसाक्षिनः प्राप्तिनः । तैरेव
 वेदितुं शक्यं वेद्यं परिच्छेद्यम् । न पुनः स्वस्वप्राप्तवत्त्वाम्नासं
 40 परिपाकशानानिश्चयबुद्धिभिरप्यन्यैः । तथामनादिमिथ्यादर्शन-
 नासनादुपितमविवक्षा यथास्थितवस्तुतत्त्वामबोधनेन बुधक्यत्वा-
 भावात् । तथा चागमः ।

सदसदविधेसणाज, मयदेवमहिच्छिमोबर्धमा ॥

जापफलाभावाज मिच्छादिहिस्स अण्णार्थं ॥ १ ॥

48 अत एव तत्परिगृहीतं द्वादशाङ्गमपि मिथ्याश्रुतयामनन्ति ।
 तेषामुपपत्तिनिरपेक्षं परहण्यम् । वस्तुतत्त्वोपक्रमसंरम्भात् । सम्य-
 ग्दृष्टिपरिगृहीतं तु मिथ्याश्रुतमपि सम्यक्श्रुततया परिणमति
 सम्यग्बुद्ध्याम् । सर्वत्रिपुद्गेषात्तुसारिमहत्तितया मिथ्याश्रुतोक्तस्या-
 प्यवस्य यथावस्थितविधिमिषेयविषयतयोन्नयनात् । तथा हि
 50 किञ्च वेदे अर्जयेष्टव्यम् इत्यादिवाक्येषु मिथ्यादृष्टोऽग्रहण्यं
 पशुवाक्यकृतपा व्याचक्षतं सम्यग्बुद्धस्तु जग्यामायोर्न्य भिवापिठं
 यक्ष्मीणादि पञ्चवार्षिकं तिलमसूरादि सप्तवार्षिकं कङ्गुसपेपादि
 पान्यपर्यायतया पयवसाययन्ति । अत एव न भगवता श्रीवर्ध-

मानस्यापिना विज्ञानमन एवैतेभ्यो श्रुतेभ्यः साधुत्वाप तान्येषां
 ६५ विनश्यति न मेत्य संज्ञास्ति इत्यादिभ्यः श्रीमदिन्द्रश्रुत्यादीनां
 दुष्पगणपरदेवानां जीवादिनिषेधकतया प्रतिमासमाना अपि
 तद्वत्परत्वापकतया व्याख्याताः । तथा स्मार्ता अपि

न मांसमसने दोषो न मधे न च मैथुने ।

मद्विरेषा श्रुतानां निवृत्तिस्तु महाफला ॥

७० इति श्लोकं पठन्ति । अस्य च यथाश्रुतार्थव्याख्यानेऽसंबद्ध
 मलाप एव । यस्मिन् सत्पुष्टीयमाने दोषो नास्त्येव तस्याभिद्विचिः
 कसमिव महाफला भविष्यति । इत्याध्ययनदानादेरपि निवृत्ति
 प्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादन्यदैर्दोषमस्य श्लोकस्य । तथाहि न मांसमसने
 कृते अदोषः अपि तु दोष एव । एवं मधमैथुनयोरपि । कर्ष
 ७५ नादोष इत्याह यतः मद्विरेषा श्रुतानां । प्रवर्तन्त उत्पद्यन्तेऽ
 स्यामिति मन्वृचिः उत्पत्तिस्त्वानम् । श्रुतानां जीवानां तच्चक्षीषसंस-
 क्रिहेदुरित्यर्थः । मसिद्धं च मांसमधमैथुनानां जीवसंसक्रिमूलकार
 णम्बमागमे ।

आमास्तु य पक्तास्तु य निपद्यमाणास्तु मंसपेसीतु ।

७० आर्यतिभृशुबभामो मभिभो च णिगोभजीबार्ण ॥ १ ॥

मञ्जे महुम्मि मंसम्मि णवणीयम्मि चउत्त्वप ।

अप्पमंसति अर्णता तम्भण्णा तस्य मंसुणा ॥ २ ॥

मेहुणसण्णाकम्हा णवसक्ख हणेइ सुहुममीवार्ण ।

केवल्लिणा पण्णत्ता सवहिमम्भा सया कासं ॥ ३ ॥

७५ तथाहि

इत्थीगोभीए संमवति वेइदिया च भे जीवा ।

इसो च दो तिण्णि च उरम्भपुहुत्त च सक्कोत्तं ॥ ४ ॥

न प्रयुज्यते तथापि व्यपच्छेदफलैवकारणत्वं बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रतीयते
एव । यदुक्तम्

सोऽप्रयुक्तोपि वा तद्वैः सर्वव्याप्यत्वतीयते ।

यवैवकारोऽप्योगादिव्यपच्छेदमयोगनः ॥ १ ॥

इति मय्यो भङ्गः ॥

स्यात्कथञ्चिन्मास्तेष्वङ्गमादिः स्वद्रव्यादिभिरेव पद्व्यादि-
मिरपि वस्तुनोऽस्तत्त्वानिष्टी हि मतिमियतस्वक्यामावाह-
स्तुमतिनियतिर्न स्यात् । न चास्तित्वैकान्तवादिमिरपि
135 नास्तित्वमसिद्धमिति वक्तव्यम् । कथञ्चित्तस्य वस्तुनि युक्तिसिद्ध-
त्वात् साधनवत् । नहि कथञ्चिद्विनिवृत्त्यादौ साध्ये सत्त्वादिसाध-
नस्यास्तित्वं विपक्षे नास्तित्वमन्तरेणोपपन्नम् । तस्य साधनत्वा-
भावप्रसङ्गात् । तस्याह वस्तुनोस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेनाविनाशपूर्वं
नास्तित्वं च तेनेति । विवक्षावशाच्चामयोः प्रधानोपसर्जनभावः ।
140 एवमुत्तरमङ्गेष्वपि हेयम् । अपितानपितसिद्धेः इति वाचकवचनात् ।
इति द्वितीयः ॥

तृतीयः स्पष्ट एव ॥

इहान्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्माभ्यां युगपत्प्रधानतयाऽपितान-
ध्यामेकस्य वस्तुनोऽभिहितत्वायां तादृशस्य शुब्दस्यासंभवात्
145 वक्तव्यं बीजादिवस्तु । तथाहि सदसत्त्वगुणद्वयं युगपदेकत्र
सदित्यनेन वस्तुमशक्यमातस्यासत्त्वमपिपादनासमर्थत्वात्तथाऽ-
सदित्यनेनापि । तस्य सत्त्वमस्यायनसामर्थ्याभावात् । न च शुष्प-
वन्तादिवस्ताद्वैकमेकं पदं तद्वद्वत् समर्थम् तस्यापि कमेधार्थ-
हृष्यत्वायने सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः । अतुष्टानयोः संकेतितसत्त्वम्वद्वत् ।
150 नत एव इन्द्रकर्मधारयहृष्योर्वाच्यस्य च न तद्वद्वत् । इति
सत्त्वम्वद्वत्तादित्यादिवक्तव्यं वस्तु युगपत्प्रधानतयाऽपितान-

मावापित्वाभ्यामाक्रान्तं व्यपतिष्ठते । न च सर्वथाऽवनतव्यम् ।
अवक्तव्यपद्वेनाप्यनभिधेयत्वमसङ्गात् । इति चतुर्थः ॥

शेषास्त्रयः सुगमाभिधायाः ॥

- 185 न च बाध्यमेकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्त
धर्माभ्युपगमेनानन्तमङ्गीमसङ्गादसंमतेष सप्तमङ्गीति । विधिनिषेध
प्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्याये वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तमङ्गीनामेव
संभवात् । यथा हि सर्वसत्त्वाभ्यामेवं सामान्यविशेषाभ्यामपि
सप्तमङ्गपेक्ष स्यात् । तथाहि । स्यात्सामान्यं स्याद्विशेषः ।
190 स्यादुभयं स्यादवक्तव्यं स्यात्सामान्यावक्तव्यं स्याद्विशेषावक्तव्यं
स्यात्सामान्यविशेषावक्तव्यमिति । न चात्र विधिनिषेधप्रकारौ न
स्व इति बाध्यम् । सामान्यस्य विधिरूपत्वाद्विशेषस्य च व्यावृत्ति-
क्यतया निषेधात्मकत्वात् । अथवा प्रतिपक्षपक्षद्वयाद्यदा सामा-
न्यस्य प्राधान्यं तदा तस्य विधिरूपता विशेषस्य च निषेधक्यता
195 यदा विशेषस्य पुरस्कारस्तदा तस्य विधिरूपता इतरस्य च निषेध-
क्यता । एवं सर्वत्र योग्यम् । अत्रा सुसूक्तम् अनन्ता अपि सप्तमङ्गप-
एव भवेयुः इति । प्रतिपर्याये प्रतिपाद्यपक्षद्वययोगानां सप्तानामेव
संभवात् । तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधत्वमिद्व्यतिशानियमात् । तस्या
अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तपैव तत्संवेदिसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तविधत्व
नियमा स्वसोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेरिति । इयं
200 च सप्तमङ्गी प्रतिमङ्गं सकलादेष्टस्वभावा विकलादेष्टस्वभावा
च । तत्र सकलादेष्टः प्रमाणवाक्यम् । तद्वत्सर्णं चेद्म् । प्रमाण-
प्रतिपमानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिमापान्याद-
भेदोपचाराद्वा योग्यपथेन प्रतिपादकं बन्धः सकलादेष्टः । अस्यार्थः ।
205 कालादिभिरवृत्तिभिः कृत्वा यद्येदद्वत्तेर्धर्मधर्मिणोरपृथग्भावस्य
प्रामाण्यं तस्मात्कालादिभिर्मिथात्मनामपि धर्मधर्मिणामभेदा

पुरिसेण सह गयाए तेसिं बीयाण होइ उद्वरणं ।

भेषुगदिहंतणे तत्तायसत्तागजाएण ॥ ५ ॥

०० संसत्तायां योनौ द्वीन्द्रिया एवे । शुक्रस्रोणितसंभवास्तु गर्भम
पञ्चेन्द्रिया इमे ।

१ पंचिन्द्रिया मनुस्ता एगजरसुत्तजारिगम्मम्मि ।

सक्कोसं जवसक्खा जायंति एगमेखाए ॥ ६ ॥

जवसक्खारणं मज्जे जायइ इक्कस्स दुण्णं व समची ।

६४ सेता दुण एमेव य पिछयं ववति तस्येव ॥ ७ ॥

तदेवं जीवोपमदेहेतुस्याम मांसमसृणादिकमदुष्टमिति प्रयोमः ।

अथवा भूतानां पिशाचमायाजामपा महतिः । त एवात्र मांसमज्ञया

दौ प्रवर्तन्ते न शुभविशेषे किं इति भावः । तदेवं मांसमसृणादे

हुंष्टां स्पृष्टीकृत्य यदुपदेष्टव्यं तदाह । निहृषिस्तु महाफला । दुरेव

१०० कारार्थः । तुः स्याद्देवधारणे इति वचनात् । ततश्चैतेभ्यो मांस

मसृणादिभ्यो निहृषिरेव महाफला स्वर्गापवर्गफलमप्रा न पुनः मह

तिरपीत्यर्थः । अत एव स्थानान्तरे पठितम्

वपे ववेणमेवेन या यजेत स्रतं सयाः ।

मांसानि च न आदेयस्तपोस्तुष्यं भवेत्कलम् ॥

६५ एकरात्रोपितस्यापि या गतिर्भक्ष्यचारिणः ।

न सा क्रतुसहस्रं मांसं घस्या पुपिष्ठिर ॥

मयपाने तु कृतं स्यानुवादेः । तस्य सर्वविगर्हितत्वात् । तानेके-

मकारानर्वात्कथमिव शुषाभासास्वीयिका नदितुयर्हन्तीति कृतमिति

मसङ्गेन ॥

१०० अथ केऽपि सप्तमहाः कस्यापमादेसमेद इत्युच्यते । एकत्र

जीवादी वस्तुन्यैकसत्तादिपर्यपिपयमभवत्ताद्विरोधेन मत्पक्षा

दिवावापरिशारेण धृगभूतयोः समुदितयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः पर्या-
लोचनया कृत्वा स्याच्छब्दसांख्यतो बह्व्यमागैः सप्तभिः प्रकारैश्च-
जननिन्यासः सप्तमद्गीति गीयते । तद्यथा । स्यादस्त्येव सर्वमिति

106 विधिरूपनया प्रथमो यद्गः १ । स्यात्वास्त्येव सर्वमिति निषेध-
रूपनया द्वितीयः २ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यात्वास्त्येवेति क्रमतो विधि-
निषेधरूपनया तृतीयः ३ । स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति युगपद्विधि-
निषेधरूपनया चतुर्थः ४ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिरूप-
नया युगपद्विधिनिषेधरूपनया च पञ्चमः ५ । स्यात्वास्त्येव

110 स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधरूपनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधरूपनया च
षष्ठः ६ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यात्वास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति क्रमतो
विधिनिषेधरूपनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधरूपनया च सप्तमः ७॥

तत्र स्यात्कर्णचित् स्वद्रव्यस्यैवकाष्ठमात्ररूपेणास्त्येव सर्वं कु-
म्भादि न पुनः परद्रव्यस्यैवकाष्ठमात्ररूपेण । तथाहि कुम्भा द्रव्यतः

116 पार्ष्णिमत्वेनास्ति नाभ्यादिकल्पत्वेन । शेषतः पाटलिपुत्रकल्पेन न
कान्धकुम्भादित्वेन । काष्ठतः क्षैरित्वेन न वासन्तिकदित्वेन ।
माषतः इषामत्वेन न रक्तदित्वेन । अन्येष्वेतररूपापस्या स्वस्य
हानिमसङ्ग इति । अवधारणां चात्र मङ्गेऽनमिमतायेव्याहृत्यर्थे
मुपात्तम् । इतरयानभिमिहिततुल्यतेवास्य वाक्यस्य प्रसज्येव ।

120 प्रतिनियतस्वार्थानभिधानात् । यदुक्तम्

वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिवृत्त्यर्थे निवृत्तये ।

कर्तव्यमन्ययामुनतसमस्वात्तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥

तथाप्यस्त्येव कुम्भ इत्येतावन्मात्रोपादाने कुम्भस्य स्तम्भाद्य-
स्तित्वेनापि सर्वप्रकारेणास्तित्वमाप्तेः प्रतिनियतस्वरूपानुपपत्तिः

126 स्यात् । तत्प्रतिपक्षे स्यादिति शङ्कः प्रयुज्यते । स्यात्कर्णचित्स्वद्र-
व्यादिमिरेवायमस्ति न परद्रव्यादिभिरपीत्यर्थः । यत्रापि वासो

न प्रयुज्यते तथापि व्यवच्छेदकस्यैवकारणत्वं बुद्धिमहिः प्रतीयते
एव । यदुक्तम्

सोऽप्रयुक्तोपि पा तज्ज्ञैः सर्वप्रार्थितवीर्यते ।

यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः ॥ १ ॥

180

इति प्रथमो यज्ञः ॥

स्यात्कर्मविभास्त्येव कुम्भादिः स्वप्न्यादिभिर्देव परद्रव्यादि
भिरपि वस्तुनोऽस्तत्त्वानिष्टौ हि मतिनियतस्वप्नाभावाद्
स्वप्नविनियतिर्न स्यात् । न चास्तित्वैकान्तवादिभिरपि
184 नास्तित्वमसिद्धमिति वक्तव्यम् । कर्षपित्तस्य वस्तुनि युक्तिसिद्ध-
त्वात् साधनत्वं । नहि कर्षपित्तनित्यत्वाद् साध्ये सत्त्वादिसाध-
नत्वास्तित्वं विषये नास्तित्वमन्तरेणोपपन्नम् । तस्य साधनत्वा-
भाषमसङ्गात् । तस्माद् वस्तुनोस्तित्वं नास्तित्वनादिनापूर्वं
नास्तित्वं च तेनेति । विवक्षावशाच्चानयोः प्रधानोपसर्जनमात्रः ।
140 एवमुत्तरमद्वेष्यपि ज्ञेयम् । अपित्तानपित्तसिद्धेः इति वाचक्यवचनात् ।
इति द्वितीयाः ॥

तृतीयाः स्पष्ट एव ॥

इहाम्नामस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्माभ्यां युगपत्प्रधानतयाऽपित्ता-
भ्यामकस्य वस्तुनोऽभिधित्सायां तात्पर्यस्य द्रव्यस्यासंभवात्
145 वक्तव्यं जीवादिबस्तु । तथाहि सदसत्त्वगुणद्वयं युगपदेकत्र
सदित्पनेन वस्तुमभ्यन्यात्तस्यासत्त्वमतिपादनासमर्थत्वात्तयाऽ-
सदित्पनेनापि । तस्य सत्त्वमत्यापनसामर्थ्याभावात् । न च युष्म-
दन्तादिपत्साङ्गेविकमेकं परं तद्वस्तु समर्थम् तस्यापि कमेनार्थ-
द्वयमत्यापने सामर्थ्योपपत्तः । द्रव्यज्ञानयोः संकेतितवत्त्वमव्यव-
180 यत एव द्रव्यकर्मधारयद्वयोर्गोत्रयस्य च न तदापक्यम् । इति
सकलराषकरहितत्वाद्ब्रह्मकर्म्यं वस्तु युगपत्सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां प्रधान-

मावापिताभ्यामाकान्तं व्यतिष्ठते । न च सर्वेषाञ्चक्षुष्यम् ।
अवक्षुष्यध्वेनाप्यनभिधेयत्वमसङ्गात् । इति चतुर्थः ॥

शेषाक्षयः सुगमामिमायाः ॥

155 न च धाप्यमेकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्त
पर्याभ्युपगमेनानन्तमङ्गीमसङ्गादसंगतैव सप्तमङ्गीति । विधिनिषेध
प्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्याये वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तमङ्गीनामेव
संभवात् । यथा हि सदसत्त्वाभ्यामेव सामान्यविशेषाभ्यामपि

160 स्यादुभयं स्यादवक्षुष्यं स्यात्सामान्यावक्षुष्यं स्याद्विशेषावक्षुष्यं
स्यात्सामान्यविशेषावक्षुष्यमिति । न चात्र विधिनिषेधप्रकारी न
स्व इति बाध्यम् । सामान्यस्य विधिरूपत्वाद्विशेषस्य च व्यावृत्ति
रूपतया निषेधान्यकत्वात् । अथवा प्रतिपक्षध्वत्वाद्यदा सामा
न्यस्य प्राधान्यं तदा तस्य विधिरूपता विशेषस्य च निषेधरूपता

165 यदा विशेषस्य पुरस्कारस्तदा तस्य विधिरूपता इतरस्य च निषेध
रूपता । एवं सर्वत्र योग्यम् । अतः सुष्ठुक्तम् अनन्ता अपि सप्तमङ्गप
क्ष भवेयुः इति । प्रतिपर्याये प्रतिपाद्यपर्यन्तयोगानां सप्तानामेव
संभवात् । तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधत्वजिज्ञासानियमात् । तस्या
अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तत्वं तत्संज्ञेहसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तविधत्व

170 नियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुपर्याणां सप्तविधत्वस्वैशेषोपपत्तेरिति । इयं
च सप्तमङ्गी प्रतिपक्षं सकल्पादेस्तत्त्वभावा विकल्पादज्ञस्वभावा
च । तत्र सकल्पादेस्तः प्रमाणवाक्यम् । तल्लक्षणं चेदम् । प्रमाण
प्रतिपमानमपमार्थमकृतवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृद्धिमाधान्याद
भेदोपचाराद्वा योग्यत्वेन प्रतिपादकं तत्र सकल्पादज्ञः । अस्त्यर्थः ।

175 कालादिभिरभेदभिः कृत्वा यदभेदवृत्तपर्यपरिणोरपृथग्भावावस्य
प्राधान्यं तस्मात्कालादिभिर्मिमांस्यनामपि यदभेदपरिणाममदा

ध्यारोपाद्वा समकालमभिप्रायकं वाक्यं सकलादेशः । तद्विपरी-
 तस्तु विकलादेशो नयवाक्यमित्यर्थः । अयमाश्रयः । यौगपद्य-
 नाशेषधर्मात्मकं वस्तु कालादिभिरभेदमाधान्यद्वयस्याऽभेदोपचारेण
 180 वा प्रतिपादयति सकलादेशः । तस्य प्रमाणाधीनत्वात् । विकला-
 देशस्तु क्रमेण भेदोपचाराद्भेदमाधान्याद्वा तदभिप्रेते । तस्य न वा
 त्यक्तत्वात् ॥

का पुनः क्रमा किं च यौगपद्यम् । यदाऽस्तित्वादभिधर्माणां
 कालादिभिर्भेदविषया तद्वक्तृद्वन्द्वस्यानेकार्थमस्यायने शक्य-
 185 भावात् क्रमा । यदा तु तेषामेव धर्माणां कालादिभिरभेदेन ह्य
 मात्मरूपमुच्यते तद्वक्त्रेणापि द्वन्द्वैकधर्ममस्यायनद्वयेन तदा
 त्यक्ततामापन्नस्यानरुपधर्मरूपस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपादनसंभवाधी-
 गपद्यम् ॥

के पुनः कालादयः । कालः आत्मरूपम् अर्थः संबन्धः
 190 उपकारः गुणिदेशः संसर्गः ध्वजः । तत्र स्याच्चीवादि
 वस्त्वस्त्येवत्यत्र यत्कालमस्तित्वं तत्कालाः ध्वजानन्तधर्मा वस्तु
 न्वेकत्रेति तेषां कालेनाभेदवृत्तिः (१) । यत्रैव चास्तित्वस्य तद्वत्
 त्वमात्मरूपं तत्रैवाभ्यानन्तगुणामामपीत्यात्मरूपेणामेदवृत्तिः (२) ।
 य एव चाधारोऽर्थो द्रव्यात्म्योस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यपयोयाजा
 195 मित्यर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः (३) । य एव चाविष्कम्भादः कर्त्तव्यता
 वात्म्यसप्तमा संबन्धोस्तित्वस्य स एव शेषविशेषाणामिति
 संबन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः (४) । य एव चापकारोऽस्तित्वेन स्यात्तुरक्त
 स्वरूपं स एव श्रपैरपि गुणैरित्युपकारेणामेदवृत्तिः (५) । य एव
 गुणिनः संबन्धी द्रव्याः शेषसप्तमोस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यगुणामा
 200 मिति गुणिदेशमाभेदवृत्तिः (६) । य एव चैकवस्त्वात्मनास्तित्वस्य
 संसर्गः स एव शेषपयोणामिति संसर्गेणामेदवृत्तिः (७) । अथ

- पञ्चममेवेदं प्रधानं भेदो गौणः संसर्गे तु भेदः प्रधानम
 भेदो गौण इति विज्ञेयः । य एव चास्तीति शब्दोस्तित्वधर्मा
 स्मकस्य वस्तुनो धातुकः स एव शेषानन्तधर्मास्मकस्यापीति शब्दे
 205 नामेदद्वयः (८) पर्यायार्थिकनयगुणमात्रे द्रव्यार्थिकनयमाधान्या
 दुपपद्यते द्रव्यार्थिकगुणमात्रे पर्यायार्थिकमाधान्ये तु न गुणा-
 नामभेदद्वयः सम्भवति । समकालमेकत्र नानागुणानामसंभवात् ।
 संभवे वा तदाभयस्य तावदा भेदमसङ्गात् । नानागुणानां संब-
 न्धिन आत्मक्यस्य च विभक्तात् । आत्मक्याग्नेदे तेषां भेदस्य
 210 विरोधात् । स्वाभ्युपस्यार्थस्यापि नानात्वात् अन्यथा नानागुणा
 भयत्वस्य विरोधात् । संबन्धस्य च संबन्धमेवेन भेददर्शनात्
 नानासंबन्धिमिरेकैकसंबन्धाघटनात् । तैः क्रियमाणस्योप-
 कारस्य च प्रतिनियतकृपस्यानकृतात् अनेकैककारिभिः विप्र-
 माणस्योपकारस्य विरोधात् । गुणिदेशस्य च प्रतिगुणं भेदात् तद्
 215 मदे विभार्थगुणानामपि गुणिदेशभेदमसङ्गात् । संसर्गस्य च
 प्रतिसंसर्गिभेदात् तदग्ने संसर्गिभेदविरोधात् । अग्नस्य प्रति-
 विपर्यं नानात्वात् सर्वगुणानामेकशब्दवाच्यतायां सर्वार्थानामेक-
 शब्दवाच्यतापक्षः शब्दान्तरैकस्यापक्षः । तत्त्वतोस्तित्वादी-
 नामेकत्र वस्तुन्यवमभेदद्वयेरसंभवे कासादिमिर्मिमात्मनाम
 220 भेदोपचारः क्रियत । तदेताभ्यामभेदद्वयभेदापचाराभ्यां कृत्वा
 प्रमाणप्रतिप्रमानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनः समसमर्थं यदभिधायकं
 वाक्यं स सङ्गच्छेत् प्रमाणवाक्यापरपर्यायः । नयविपर्ययकृतस्य
 वस्तुधर्मस्य भेदद्वयमाधान्याग्नेदोपचाराद्वा प्रयेण यदभिधायकं
 वाक्यं स विरुद्धादेशो नयवाक्यापरपर्यायः । इति स्थितम् । ततः
 225 साधूस्तम्, आग्नेभेदोदितसप्तमम् ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अनन्तरं मगवद्वर्षितस्यानेकान्तात्मनो वस्तुनो बुधस्य
 वेपथ्वस्तम् । अनेकान्तात्मकत्वं च सप्तभङ्गीभिरूपेण सुतो
 मेयं स्यादिति सापि निरूपिता । तस्यां च विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितं
 वस्तु पश्यन्त एकान्तवादिनोऽबुधरूपा विरोधमुज्जाययन्ति तेषां
 ४ प्रमाणपार्गात्प्यवनमाह ।

उपाधिमेवोपहितं विरुद्ध

नार्थेप्यासत्त्व सदवाच्यते च ।

इत्यप्रबुध्यैव विरोधभीता

जडास्तथेकान्तहताः पतन्ति ॥ २४ ॥

अर्थेषु पदार्थेषु भेदनाभेदनप्यसत्त्वं नास्तित्वं न विरुद्धं न
 विरोधावच्छेदम् । अस्तित्वेन सह विरोधं नातुभवतीत्यर्थः । न
 केवलमसत्त्वं न विरुद्धं किं तु सदवाच्यते च । सत्त्वावाच्यं च
 सदवाच्ये तयोर्मात्रौ सदवाच्यते । अस्तित्वावच्छेद्यत्वे इत्यर्थः ।
 10 ते अपि न विरुद्धे ॥ तथा हि । अस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेन सह न
 विरुध्यते । अवक्तव्यत्वमपि विधिनिषेधात्मकमन्योन्यं न विरुध्यत ।
 अवयवावक्तव्यत्वं वक्तव्यत्वेन साकं न विरोधमुद्भवति । अनेन च
 नास्तित्वाऽस्तित्वाऽवक्तव्यत्वकल्पनायङ्गकषयेन सत्त्वसत्त्वमद्वया
 निर्विरोधतोपलसिता । अमीषामेव त्रयाणां मुख्यत्वाच्छेष-
 11 भङ्गानां च संयोगभत्वेमासीज्ज्वान्तर्मावादिति ॥ नन्वेते धर्माः
 परस्परं विरुद्धास्तत्त्वमेकत्र वस्तुम्येषां समावेशः संभवती-
 ति विधेपनद्वारेण हेतुमाह उपाधिमेवोपहितम् इति । उपाधयोऽ
 वच्छेदका अन्धमन्धराः तेषां भेदो मानात्मस्त्वमोपहितम् अपितम् ।
 सत्त्वस्य विधेपनमेतत् । उपाधिमेवोपहितं सदर्थेप्यसत्त्वं न

- २० विरुद्धम् । सद्व्याख्यतयोश्च वचनमेवं कृत्वा योजनीयम् ।
 अपाधिभेदोपरिते सती सद्व्याख्यते अपि न विरुद्धे ।
 अयममिमायाः । परस्परपरिहारेण ये वर्तते तयोः क्षीतोष्णव
 स्सहानवस्थानसंज्ञाणो विरोधः । न चार्थवत् । सत्त्वासत्त्वयारि
 त्वेतरमपि न्यायेन वर्तनात् । नहि यत्रादौ सत्त्वमसत्त्वं परि
 २५ हृत्य वर्तते । पररूपेणापि सत्त्वमसत्त्वात् । तथा च तद्व्यतिरि-
 क्तार्थान्तराणां नैरर्थव्ययम् । तेनैव विद्वन्नार्थसाध्याप्यभित्याणां
 सिद्धेः । न चासत्त्वं सत्त्वं परिहृत्य वर्तते । स्वरूपेणाप्यसत्त्वमाप्तम् ॥
 तथा च निरुपाख्यत्वात्सर्वगून्वतेति । तदा हि विरोधः स्यादु-
 ययेकोपाधिकं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च स्यात् । न वैवम् । यतो न हि येनै
 ३० वाञ्छन सत्त्वं तेनैवासत्त्वमपि । किंत्वन्यापाधिकं सत्त्वन्यो-
 पाधिकं पुनरसत्त्वम् । स्वरूपेण हि सत्त्वं पररूपेण चासत्त्वम् ।
 ह्येकस्मिन्नेव विप्रपञ्चयमपिन्यन्योपाधिकं तु नीलत्वमन्यो-
 पाधिकाद्येवैवैव । नीलत्वं हि नीलीरागाद्युपाधिकं वर्णा-
 न्तराणि च तत्तद्रूपनद्रूप्योपाधिकाणि । एवं भेषकरत्नेपि तत्त
 ३५ हर्णपुद्गलोपाधिकं वैशिष्ट्यमवसयम् । न चैर्मिष्टान्तेः सत्त्वा-
 सत्त्वयामिष्टदेशत्वमाप्तिः । विप्रपञ्चयमपिन एकत्वात् । तत्रापि
 मिष्टदेशत्वासिद्धेः । कथञ्चित्सत्त्वस्य ह्यनन्त दार्ष्टान्तिके च स्याद्वा
 दिनां न दुर्लभाः ॥

एवमप्यपरिवाप्येदाप्युप्यतस्तर्पेकस्यैव पुंसस्तदुपाधिभेदात्पि
 ४० तत्त्वपुत्रत्वमात्रसत्त्वमाग्निनेयत्वपितृत्वस्वप्नातृत्वस्वादिभमाणां पर
 स्परविद्धानामपि प्रसिद्धिद्वन्द्वनार्त्तिक वाच्यम् । एवमथक्तव्यत्वा
 दयोपि वाच्या इति । उक्तप्रकारणोपाधिभेदेन चास्त्वयं विरापाया-
 वममनुपैयमश्वार्थव । एवकाराज्यधारण । स च तयां सम्यग्ज्ञान
 स्यामाव एव न पुनर्भेदताऽपि भाव इति व्यनक्ति । तनस्त विराप

45 भीताः सञ्चासञ्चान्निधर्माणां बहिष्ठेस्त्वद्येमुप्या संभावितो वा
 विरोधः सदानवस्थानादिस्वस्माद्भीताः भस्तमानसाः । अत एव
 जडाः तास्त्रिक्रमयहेतोरभावेपि तथाविधपथुबन्त्रीरुत्वान्मूर्खाः पर
 वादिना । तद्वक्तान्तइतां तेषां सञ्चासञ्चान्निधर्माणां च एकान्त इतर
 धर्मनिषेधेन स्वाभिमतधर्मव्यवस्थापननिग्रहपक्षेन इता इव इताः
 50 पतन्ति स्तसन्ति पतिताय सन्तस्ते न्यायमार्गाक्रमणे न समर्था
 न्यायमार्गाघ्ननीनानां च सर्वेषामप्याक्रमणीयतां यान्तीति भावः ।
 यद्वा पतन्तीति मयाणमार्गतत्त्वयवन्ते । सांके हि मन्मार्गेष्वुतः
 पतित इति परिमाप्यते । अथवा यथा ब्रह्मादिपट्टिद्वारेण इता
 पतितो मूर्च्छामनुच्छामासाद्य निरुद्धवाक्मसरो यवत्येवं तेषां
 55 वादिनः स्वाभिमतैकान्तवादेन शुक्तिसरणिमननुसरता ब्रह्माघ्ननि
 मायेन निहताः सन्तः स्याद्वादिनां पुरतोऽर्कचित्करा बाह्मात्र
 मापि मोक्षारयितुमीशत इति ॥

अथ च विरोधस्योपलक्षणत्वाद् वैयधिकरभ्यसु अनवस्था संकरा
 व्यतिकरा संशयः अश्रविपत्तिः विषयव्यवस्थाहानिः इत्येतेषां
 60 परोद्भाविता दोषा अभ्युक्ताः ॥ तथाहि । सामान्यविशेषात्मकं
 वस्तिव्युपन्यस्ते पर लपासम्भारो भवन्ति । यथा सामान्य
 विशेषयोर्विभिन्नतिषेधरूपयोर्विरुद्धधर्मयारेकभाविने वस्तुन्यसं
 भवाच्छीतोष्णवदिति विरोधः । न हि यदेष विपेरविकरणं
 तदेव प्रतिषेधस्याधिकरणं भवितुमर्हस्येकस्यतापचेः ततो वैय
 65 धिकरभ्यमपि भवति ॥ अपरं येनात्मना सामान्यव्याधिकरणं येन
 च विशेषस्य तावप्यात्मानौ एकेनैव स्वभावेमाधिकरोति द्वाभ्यां
 वा स्वभावाभ्याम् । एकेनैव भेत् तत्र पूर्ववद्विरोधः । द्वाभ्यां
 वा स्वभावाभ्यां सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां स्वभावद्वयमधिकरोति
 तदानवस्था तावपि स्वभावान्तराभ्यां तावपि स्वभावाव्य

70 साम्यामिति ॥ येनात्मना सामान्यस्याधिकरणं तेन सामान्यस्य
 विशेषस्य च येन च विशेषस्याधिकरणं तेन विशेषस्य सामा-
 न्यस्य चति संकरदोषः ॥ येन स्वभावेन सामान्यं तेन विशेषो
 येन विशेषस्तेन सामान्यमिति व्यतिकरः ॥ ततश्च वस्तुनोऽसाधा-
 रणाकारेण निमित्तमशक्तेः संशयः ॥ ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिः ॥ ततश्च
 75 मयाजविषयव्यवस्थाहानिः इति ॥ एते च दोषाः स्याद्वादस्य
 आत्यन्तरत्वाच्चिरवकाशा एव । अतः स्याद्वादमर्मवेदिमिरुद्धरणी-
 यास्तदुपपत्तिमिरिति । स्वतन्त्रतया निरपेक्षयोरेव सामान्य-
 विशेषयोर्विधियतिपेक्षमप्योस्तेषामवकाशात् ॥

अथवा विरोधश्चोप दोषवाची । यथा विरुद्धमाचरतीति ।
 80 द्रष्टव्यमित्यर्थः । ततश्च विरोधेभ्यो विरोधवैयधिकारव्यादिदोषेभ्यो
 भीता इति व्याख्येयम् । एवं च सामान्यसंभवेन सर्वा अपि दोष-
 व्यक्तया संगृहीता भवन्ति ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अयानेकान्तवादस्य सर्वत्रभ्यसर्वपर्यायव्यापित्वेपि मूलभेदा-
 पेक्षया चातुर्विध्याभिधानद्वारेण भगवत्स्वत्वापुत्रसात्वादसौहि-
 त्यमुपवर्णयमाह ।

स्यान्नाशि नित्य महेश विक्रय

वाच्यं न वाच्यं सदसत्तदेव ।

विपश्चितां नाथ निपीततत्त्व

सुषोत्रतोद्गारपरंपरेयम् ॥ २५ ॥

स्यादित्यम्पमनेकान्तघोतकमष्टास्त्रपि परेषु पाण्ड्यम् । तदे-
 5 वाधिहृतमेवैकं वस्तु स्यात्कर्षं विनाशि विनश्वनशीलमनित्यमि-
 त्यर्थः । स्यादित्यमविनाशपर्यायित्यर्थः । एतावता नित्यानित्यञ्च
 सणभेकं विधानम् ॥ यथा स्यात्सदृशम् अनुवृत्तिरेतुसामान्यरूपम् ॥

- स्याद्विरूपम् विविधकर्म विसहस्रपरिणाधात्मकं व्यावृत्तिहेतुविशेष-
कर्ममित्यर्थः । अनेन सामान्यविशेषकर्मो द्वितीयः प्रकारः ॥ तथा
10 स्याद्वाच्यं वक्तव्यम् ॥ स्वाध्यायवाच्यम् अवक्तव्यमित्यर्थः । अत्र
च समासे अवाच्यमिति युक्तं तथाप्यवाच्यपदं योन्मादौ स्व-
मित्यसम्बन्धतापरिहारार्थं न वाच्यमित्यसमस्तं चकार स्तुतिकारः ।
एतेनाभिलाष्यान्मिलाप्यस्वकर्मस्तुतीपो भेदः ॥ तथा स्यात्सद-
विषयानमस्तिरूपमित्यर्थः । स्वाध्यायसद्वद्विरूपजनमिति । अनेन
15 सदसदाख्या चतुर्थी विधा ॥

- हे विपश्चिता नाव संसृपावर्ता मुक्य इयम् अनन्तरोक्त्य निपीत-
तत्त्वसुषोऽज्ञतोद्धारपरंपरा । तवेति प्रकारजात्सामर्थ्याद्वा गम्यते । तत्त्वं
यथात्वस्वित्तपस्तुस्वकर्मपरिच्छेदः तदेव जरापरणापहारित्वाद्विदुषो-
पमांश्चत्वांश्चिप्यात्विपोर्मिभिराकरिष्युत्वाद्भन्तराद्वावकारित्वा
20 च सुषा पीयूषं तत्त्वसुषा । नितरामनन्वसामान्यतया पीता
आत्माविता या तत्त्वसुषा तस्या वृद्धता प्रादुर्भूता तत्कारणिक-
उद्धारपरंपरा उद्धारमेभिरिवेत्यर्थः । यथा हि कश्चिदाकण्ठं पीयूष-
रसमापीय तदनुविधायिनीमुद्धारपरंपरां धृञ्जति तथा मन-
वानपि जरापरणापहारि तत्त्वाद्यतं स्वीरमास्वाद्य तद्वसानुविधा-
25 यिनीं प्रस्तुतानेकान्तबाधभेदचतुष्टयीकृत्यामुद्धारपरंम्भं देवना-
मुत्तेनोद्गीर्णयामित्याशयः ॥

- अथवा धैरेकान्तबाधिमिर्मिध्यात्वगरसमोजनमावृत्ति भक्षितं
तेषां तत्त्ववचनकया उद्धारप्रकाराः प्राक् प्रवक्षिताः । यैस्तु पचेन्निम-
माचीनपुष्पमाग्न्यामुमृहीतैर्जमदुस्त्वदनेनूनि स्पन्दि तत्त्वाद्यतं
30 मनोहस्य पीतं तेषां विपश्चितां यथार्थबाधविदुषां हे नाप इयं
पूर्वदृग्दर्शितोद्देशेस्वरूपोद्धारपरंपरति व्याख्येयम् । एते च तत्त्वा-
रूपेण बाधास्तेषु तेषु स्वाग्नेषु प्राग्नेषु चर्षिताः । तथा हि । आदी-

पमाब्धोम समस्वभावात् इति वृत्ते नित्यानित्यवादेः प्रदर्शितः ।
 अनेकमेकात्मकमेष बाध्यम् इति काव्ये सामान्यविशेषनादः संश-
 ४३ धितः । सप्तमङ्गनामभिरुपानभिरुपवाद्ः सप्तसद्भावात् प्रदर्शितः ।
 इति न भूयः प्रयासः ॥ इति काव्याधेः ॥

इदानीं नित्यानित्यपक्षयोः परस्पररूपणमकाशनवद्वन्द्वतया
 बैरावमाणवारितरेतरोदीरितविधिभेदेतु इतिसंनिपातसंभातविनि-
 पातयोरप्यस्तसिद्धमतिपक्षमतिशेषस्य भगवच्छासनसाम्राज्यस्य
 सर्वोत्कर्षमाह ।

य एव दोषा किल नित्यवादे
 विनाशवादेऽपि समास्त एव ।

परस्परव्यसिपु कण्टकेषु

अयस्यधृष्य जिनशासन ते ॥ २६ ॥

५ किञ्चित् निबध्ने । य एव नित्यवादे नित्यैकान्तवादे दोषा
 अनित्यैकान्तवादिभिः प्रसञ्जिताः क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यामप्यक्रियानु-
 पपत्त्यादयस्त एव विनाशवादेऽपि क्षणिकैकान्तवादेऽपि समाः दुस्याः
 नित्यैकान्तवादिभिः प्रसज्यमाना अन्युनापिकाः । तथाहि नित्य-
 वादी प्रमाणयति । सर्वे नित्ये सत्त्वात् । क्षणिके सदसत्काययोरप्येक-
 १० याविरोधात् तल्लक्षणं सर्वं नावस्थां बध्नातीति तदा निर्वर्तमान-
 मनन्यभरणतया नित्यत्वमतिष्ठत । तथाहि क्षणिकार्यः सन् वा
 कार्यं कुर्यात् असत्त्वा । गत्यन्तराभावात् । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः । सम-
 समयवर्तिनि व्यापारायागात् । सकलभावानां परस्परं कार्यकारण-
 भावभाष्यातिमसद्भावात् । नापि द्वितीयः पक्षः सोऽहं क्षमत् । असत्ता-
 १५ कायकरणप्रक्रियारूपत्वात् । अन्यथा क्षणविपाणादपि
 कार्यकरणायास्तरेण । विषयभावात् । इति ॥ अनित्यवादी

- नित्यमादिर्न प्रति पुनरेवं प्रमाणयति । सर्वे सन्निकं सत्त्वात् ।
 असंनिधौ क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविराभात् अर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य
 च भावसंज्ञनत्वात् ततोयंक्रिया व्यावर्तमाना स्वक्रोडीतृता
 20 सत्ता व्यावर्तयदिति सन्निकसिद्धिः । नहि नित्यार्थोयंक्रिया
 क्रमण मयवर्तयितुमशक्यं । पूर्वार्थक्रियाकरणस्वभावोपमद्वारेणोत्तर
 क्रियायां क्रमण मयवर्तयतेः । अन्यथा पूर्वक्रियाकरणाविराममसङ्गात् ।
 तत्त्वमावमप्यस्य च नित्यता प्रयाति । अतादृशस्यस्यानित्यतासंज्ञ
 नत्वात् । अयं नित्योपि क्रमवर्तिनं सहकारिकारणमर्थमुदीक्षमाण
 25 स्तावदासीत् पश्चात्तमामाद्य क्रमेण कार्यं कुर्यादिति चेत् न । सहकारि
 कारणस्य नित्यर्थेऽस्ति चिरकरत्वात्किंचित्करस्यापि प्रतीक्षणऽ
 नवस्यामसङ्गात् । नापि योगपद्यन नित्योर्थोयंक्रियां कुरुते । अ
 प्यस्यविरापात् । नयककार्यं सक्रमाः क्रियाः प्रारम्भाणः कश्चिदुप
 सभ्यत । करोतु वा । तथाप्याद्यस्य एव सक्रमत्रियापरिसमाप्तं
 30 द्वितीयादिसंगेष्वनुपाणस्यानित्यता वसादादाफन । फरणाकरण
 पारकस्मिन्विरापात् । इति ॥ तदवमकान्तद्वयेपि य इतवस्त मुक्ति
 साम्यादिकदं न व्यभिचरन्तीत्यविचारितरमणीयतया ह्युपमनस्य
 व्याप्यं चास्यादवन्तीति विरुद्धा व्यभिचारिणाऽनैकान्तिकाः ।
 इति ॥ अत्र च नित्यानित्यकान्तपक्षप्रतिषेध एवाक्तः । उपमसंज्ञ
 35 स्ताव मामान्यविषयार्थेकान्तयादा अपि मियस्तुन्यदापनया
 विरुद्धा व्यभिचारिण एव हनूनुपस्तृप्तनीति परिभाषनीयम् ॥
 अमानरार्थं व्याख्यायन । परम्परेत्यादि । एवं च कष्टकपु
 धुङ्गापुन्यकान्तवादिषु परस्परार्थमिषु सम्पु परस्परस्माद् घमन
 विनाऽसुपयान्तीत्यर्थंभीलाः मुन्यापगुन्दवदिनि परस्परार्थमिनः ।
 40 तनु इ भिन न तत्र ज्ञानं व्यादात्ममप्यणनिपुणं दादसाद्रीरूपं
 वचनं परामिमातुक्तानां कष्टकामां व्यपमुच्छिन्नतरनवाभावाद

पृथग्भूयपरामर्शनीयम् । अकारे कृत्याय इति कृत्यविधानाद् धर्षि
 तुमशक्त्यं धर्षितुमर्हं वा । भवति सर्वोत्कर्षेण वर्तते । यथा
 कश्चिन्महाराजः पीडयन्पुण्यपरीपाकं परस्परं निरुद्ध स्वयमेव
 45 तप्तमुपेयिषत्सु द्विपत्स्वयत्नसिद्धनिष्कष्टकर्त्तुं समुद्धं राज्यमुप
 ह्वञ्चानः सर्वोत्कृष्टो भवत्येवं स्वच्छासनमपि । इति काम्यार्थः ॥

अनन्तरकाव्ये नित्यानित्याद्येकान्तवादे दोषसामान्यमभि
 हितम् । इदानीं कतिपयवादिष्वेवाभावाद्वाहं दर्शयन्त्यत्यल्पकाला
 यस्तत्त्वज्ञानावकतयोद्भूततयाविधिरिष्टमनमनिवोपद्रवमिव परिभातु
 र्धरित्रीपतेस्त्रिभुवत्पतेः पुरतो भुवनत्रयं मत्स्यपकारकारितामा
 5 विष्करोति—

नैकान्तवादे सुखदुःखभोगौ

न पुण्यपापे न च बन्धमोक्षौ ।

दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिनेव

परैर्विलुप्त जगदप्यदोषम् ॥ २७ ॥

एकान्तवादे नित्यानित्यैकान्तपक्षाभ्युपगमे न सुखदुःख
 भोगौ घटेते । न च पुण्यपापे घटेते । न च बन्धमोक्षौ घटेते ।
 पुनःपुनर्नमः श्रयोगोऽत्यन्ताघटमानतादर्शनायः ॥ तथाहि एका
 न्तनित्ये आत्मनि तावत् सुखदुःखभोगौ नोपपद्यते । नित्यस्य
 10 हि ससणम् अग्रश्रुतानुत्पन्नस्विरैकरूपत्वम् । ततो यदा
 भात्मा सुखमनुभूय स्वकारणकलापसामग्रीषणात् दुःखमुपसृजे
 तदा स्वभावमेवादनिस्मत्त्वापरया स्वरैकरूपताहानिमसङ्गः ।
 एवं दुःखमनुभूय सुखमुपह्वञ्चानस्यापि शक्त्यम् । अयं
 अपस्वामेवादर्श व्यवहारः । न चावस्थासु मिथ्यामानास्त्वपि
 15 तद्वतो भेदः सर्वस्येव शुद्धकार्गपापवत्त्वात् इति चेद् न ।

तास्ततो व्यतिरिक्ताः अव्यतिरिक्ता वा । व्यतिरेके तास्तस्यानि
संबन्धाभावाः । अतिमसङ्गात् । अव्यतिरेके तु तद्वानेवेति
तदवस्थितय स्थिरकल्पताहानिः । कथं च तदेकान्वैक
रूपत्वेऽवस्थामेवोपि मवेत् । इति ॥ किंच सुखदुःखमार्गी

२० पुण्यपापनिर्देश्या तभिर्वर्तनं चार्थक्रिया सा च कूटस्थानित्यस्य
क्रमेण अक्रमेण वा मोपपद्यत इत्युक्तमायम् । अत एवोक्तं
न पुण्यपापे इति । पुण्यं दानादिक्रियोपार्जनीयं शुभं कर्म
पार्थ हिंसादिक्रियासाध्यमशुभं कर्म । ते अपि न ध्येते ।
प्राप्तुक्तनीतेः ॥ तथा न बन्धमोक्षौ । बन्धं कर्मपुद्गलैः सह

२१ मविमद्बन्धमात्मनो बन्धयमपिण्डवद् अन्योन्यसंस्लेपः ।
मोक्षः कृत्स्नकर्मसयः । तावप्येकान्तनित्ये न स्याताम् ।
बन्धो हि संयोगविशेषः स च अप्राप्तानां प्राप्तिः इति लक्षणम् ।
मात्रकालमाविनी अप्राप्तिरन्यावस्था चरकासमाविनी प्राप्ति
भान्या । तदनयोरन्यवस्थामेवोपो हुस्तरः । कथं वैकल्प्यत्वे

२२ सति तस्याकस्मिन्ने बन्धनसंयोगा । बन्धनसंयोगाच्च प्राक् किं
नार्यं वृत्तोऽमवत् । किंच तेन बन्धनेनासौ विवृतिमनुभवति
न वा । अनुभवति चेत् चर्मादिष्व अनित्याः । नानुभवति
चेत् निर्पिकारत्वे सता असता वा तेन गमनस्पष्टं न कोऽप्यस्य
विशेषः इति बन्धवैकल्याभित्यमुक्त एव स्यात् । ततश्च विधीर्णा

२३ जगति बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था । तथा च पठ्यति ।

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्याज्जन्ममप्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।

वर्षोपपन्नसोऽमित्याः स्वतुल्यमवसत्कथः ॥

वर्षानुपपत्त्या मोक्षस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः । बन्धनविच्छेदैर्नपार्यत्वान्मुक्ति
वन्द्यस्य । इति ॥

- 40 एवमनित्यैकान्तवादेपि सुखदुःखाद्यनुपपत्तिः । अनित्यं हि
अत्यन्तोच्छेदपर्यन्तम् । तथाभूते चात्मनि पुण्यापादानक्रियाका
रिणो निरर्थं विनष्टत्वात् कस्य नाम तत्फलभूतसुखानुभवं ।
एवं पापोपादानक्रियाकारिणोपि निरुपपन्नत्वात् कस्य दुःखस
वेदनमस्तु । एवं चान्याः क्रियाकारी अन्यथा तत्फलमोक्ता
45 इत्यसमञ्जसमापद्यते । अथ

यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।

फलं तत्रैव मेषणे कर्पासे श्रुत्वा यथा ॥

- इतिष्यनाभासमञ्जसमित्यपि शास्त्राग्रम् । संतानवासनयो
रवास्तवत्वेन भागेन निर्वोदितत्वात् । तथा पुण्यपापेपि न घटेते ।
50 तथाहि अर्थक्रिया सुखदुःखोपभोगः तदनुपपत्तिश्चानन्तरमे
वोक्ता । ततोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वमाधात् तयोरप्यघटमानत्वम् ।
किंचानित्यः क्षणमात्रस्यायी तस्मिन् क्षणे उत्पत्तिमात्रम्यग्र
त्वात् तस्य कुतः पुण्यपापोपादानक्रियार्जनम् । द्वितीयादि
क्षणेपु चावस्थातुमेव न शक्यते । पुण्यपापोपादानक्रियामात्रे च
60 पुण्यपापे कुतः । निर्मुक्तत्वात् । तदसत्त्वे च कुतस्त्वनः सुखदुःख
भागः । आस्ता वा कथं चिद्वेतत् । तथापि पूर्वक्षणसद्वेदनोच्चर
क्षणेन भवितव्यम् । उपादानानुपपत्त्याद् उपादेयस्य । ततः पूर्वं
क्षणाद् दुःखमितादुत्तरक्षणः कथं सुखित उच्यते । कथं च
सुखितात्ततः स दुःखितः स्यात् । निसहजमागतापत्तः । एवं
70 पुण्यपापादावपि । तस्मादर्थविरहितम् ॥ एवं च प्रमोसयोरप्य
मेषणः । सादृशेपि हि य एव वदः स एव सुच्यत । निरन्वय
नात्राम्युपगम चेतिष्येकरणस्याभावात् मैतानस्य चावाम्तवत्त्वात्
कुतस्तयोः समावनामानवपि । इति परिणामिनि चारमनि स्वीक्रि-
यमाणं सर्वं निषाद्यनुपपन्नम् ।

४६ परिणामोऽवस्थान्तरगमनं न च सत्त्वा अवस्थानम् ।

न च सत्त्वा विनाशः परिणामस्तद्विदामिष्टः ॥

इतिवचनाद् । पातञ्जलटीकाकारोऽप्याह । अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य
पूर्वपर्यन्तिवृत्ता पर्यान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणामः इति ॥ एवं सामान्य
विशेषसद्व्यवस्थितमिष्टमिष्टानभिष्टाव्यकान्तवाद्यपि सुखदुःखाद्य-

७० भावः स्वयमभियुक्तरभ्युत्तः ॥

अवाच्यरार्थव्याख्या । एवमनुपपद्यमानेषु सुखदुःखमाणादि
व्यवहारे परैः परतीर्थैः अथ च परमार्थतः अनुभिः । परमार्था हि
अनुपपन्नाः । दुर्नीतिवाद्यव्यसनासिना । नीयते एकदेश
विशिष्टार्थः प्रतीतिविषयमामिरिति नीतयो नयाः । दुष्टा नीतयो

७१ दुर्नीतयो दुर्नयाः । तेषां वदन् परम्यः प्रतीतिवदन् दुर्नीतिवदः ।
तत्र यद् व्यसनम् अत्यासक्तिः आचित्यनिरपेक्षा महतिरिति
यापत् दुर्नीतिवाद्यव्यसनम् । तद्वत् सङ्कोचधरीरोच्छ्रयनशक्ति
युक्तत्वाद् असिरिव अस्ति कृपाणां दुर्नीतिवाद्यव्यसनासिः । तेन
दुर्नीतिवाद्यव्यसनामिना करणभूतत्वं दुर्नयमव्यसनहेतुकत्वं न ।

८० एवम् इत्यनुमदसिद्धं प्रकारमाह । अपिशब्दस्य विभक्त्युत्पत्त्या
अद्वेषमपि जगत् निमित्तमपि श्रेष्ठोत्पत्त्यम् । तास्त्वप्याह तद्व्यवस्थेः
इति श्रेष्ठोत्पत्त्यगतमनुमातवम् । विलुप्तम् सम्यग्ज्ञानादिभावमाणव्य
परापन्नं व्यापादितम् । तत् भावश्च इत्याशयः । सम्यग्ज्ञाना-
दयादि । भावमाणाः भावप्रतिर्गम्यन्तः । अत एव सिद्धपि

८१ जीवव्यपक्षः । अथवा हि जीवपातुः प्राणधारणार्थेभिपीयते
तेषां च द्रव्यविषयप्रधारणाभावाद्जीवितव्याप्तिः । सा च
विरुद्धा । तस्मात्संसारिणो द्रव्यविषयद्रव्यमाणधारणाजीवाः ।
सिद्धाश्च ज्ञानादिभावमाणधारणाः । इति सिद्धम् ॥ दुर्नयस्वरूपं
वाच्यरार्थे व्याख्यास्यामः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

सांयते दुर्नयनयप्रमाणमरूपणद्वारेण प्रमाणनयप्रमाणः इति
 वचनाश्रीशामीरादित्वाभिगमनिबन्धनानां तेषां प्रमाणनयानां
 प्रविपादयितुः स्वायिनः स्याद्वादिराधिदुर्नयमार्गनिराकरिष्यु
 मन्नन्यसामान्य वचनातिशयं सूचयामाह ।

सदेव सत्स्यात्सदिति त्रिभार्थो

मीयेत दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणैः ।

यथार्थदर्शी तु नयप्रमाण-

पथेन दुर्नीतिपथ स्वमास्थः ॥ २८ ॥

- ४ अथ्येव परिच्छिद्यत इत्यर्थः । विषा विभिः प्रकाशः ।
 मीयेत परिच्छिद्येत । विषा सप्तमी । कस्त्रिभिः प्रकाशित्याह ।
 दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणैः । नीयत परिच्छिद्यते एकद्वन्द्वविशिष्टोर्थ
 आभिरिति नीतयः नयाः । दुष्टा नीतयो दुर्नीतयो दुर्नया इत्यर्थः ।
 नया नगमायाः । ममीयत परिच्छिद्यतज्योऽनेकान्तविशिष्टाञ्ज
 १० नेति प्रमाणं स्याद्वादसमकं प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षप्रमाणम् । दुर्नीतयश्च
 नयाश्च प्रमाणे च दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणानि तैः । कनोऽस्वन मीयते
 स्याह सत्त्वं सत्स्यात्सदिति । सदिति अभ्यक्तन्वाभ्युपगच्छत्वं यथा
 किं तस्या गर्भे जायमिति । सदेवेति दुर्नयः । सदिति नयः ।
 स्यात्सदिति प्रमाणम् । तथा हि । दुर्नयस्यापत्सदयति प्रतीति ।
 १४ अस्त्येष घट इति । अयं वस्तुन्यकान्ताभित्त्वमराभ्युपगच्छति
 तरपमाणां विरम्भकारण स्वाभिप्रत्ययार्थं व्यक्त्यापयति । दुर्न
 यत्वं चास्य मिथ्यारूपस्यात् । मिथ्यारूपत्वं च तत्र ध्यान्तराणां
 सतामपि निहन्तान् । तथा सदित्युद्भवाभावः । स यस्मि
 २० न्यः इति यो स्वाभिप्रत्ययभित्त्वमरा प्रसाधयन् व्यपपन्नः
 गत्रनिमीलितरायाभ्युपगच्छते । स चास्य दुर्नयम् । ध्यान्तरा

निरस्कारात् । न च प्रमाणत्वम् । स्याच्छब्दनाम्नाच्छ्रितत्वात् ।
 स्यात्सदिति स्यात्स्वयेधिस्तदस्तु इति प्रमाणम् । प्रमाणत्वं
 चास्य दृष्टेष्टायाधिनम्नादिपक्षे बाधयमद्वासात् । सर्व हि वस्तु
 स्वरूपेण सत् पररूपेण चासदित्यसङ्गुक्तम् । सदिति दिदृमात्
 ३३ धनार्थम् ॥ धनया दिना अमरनिमित्तस्थानिस्त्वन्वरक्तम्यत्वात्क
 म्यत्वासादान्यविषयापि बाधव्यम् ॥

इत्थं वस्तुस्वरूपमाम्नाय श्रुतियाह यथार्थदर्शी इत्यादि । दुर्नी
 तिवर्षं दुर्नययागम् । वृद्धश्चस्यावधारणायस्य विमलकम्भात् स्वम
 य । आस्थाः स्वमेव निराकृतवान् । न तीयान्तरदर्शकानि । केन
 ३० कृत्वा । नयप्रमाणपथन । नयप्रमाण उक्तस्वरूप । तयोर्मार्गेण मवा
 रेण । यतस्त्वं यथार्थदर्शी । यथार्थोऽस्मि तर्ह्येव पश्यतीत्यर्थं
 श्रीला यथार्थदर्शी । विमलकम्भमण्योतिषा यथानस्थितवस्तुदर्शी ।
 तीयान्तरज्ञास्तारस्तु रागादिदापकाद्युप्यरुल्लङ्घितत्वेन तयारिष
 ज्ञानामावाप्त यथार्थश्रुतिना । ततः कथं नाम दुर्नययममवन
 ३३ मगलमन्त्रं ते तपस्विनः । नहि मन्त्रयमनपब्रुवाः परेषामनयं निपे
 दुमुदरतां पथ । इदमुक्तं भवति । यथा क्वचित्तन्मार्गवेदी परा
 पकारदुर्लभितः पुरुषधारन्नापद्रुक्कृष्णकायाकीर्णं मार्गं परित्याग्य
 पयिकानां गुणदापोमयविकृतं दोषास्पृष्टं गुणयुक्तं च मार्गमुप
 दर्शयति एवं जगन्नाथापि दुर्नयतिरस्करणेन भक्ष्येभ्यो नयममा
 ४० नमार्गं प्रकल्पयतीति । आस्थाः इत्यस्यवरपथतर्मां चास्त्यमूयक्ति
 क्पतिरह इत्येहि नयस्यमूयवपथः आस्थयोपपत्तम् इति
 अस्मादन्ते स्वरादेस्तास्तु इति वृद्धा रूपम् ॥ मुख्यवृत्त्या च प्रमाण
 स्यच प्रामाण्यम् । यथाच नयानां प्रमाणतुल्यरुक्ततास्यापनं तत्ते
 पामनुयोगद्वारमृततया मज्ञापनाज्ञत्वज्ञापनार्थम् । चत्वारि हि
 ४३ मयपनानुयोगमज्ञानगरस्य द्वाराण्युपक्रमो निक्षेपोऽनुगमा मयमेति ।

एतेषां च स्वरूपमाश्रयकमाप्यादेर्निरूपणीयम् । इह तु मोक्ष
ग्रन्थगौरवमयात् । अत्र यैकत्र कृतसमासान्तं पयिन्नाह
अन्यत्र चाभ्युत्पन्नाः पयमश्वोऽश्वन्त इति पयमश्वस्य द्विभ
न दुप्यति ॥

- 50 अयं दुर्नयनप्रमाणस्वरूपं चिन्धिभिरूप्यते । तत्रापि प्रथमं
स्वरूपम् । तदनधिगमे दुर्नयस्वरूपस्य दुप्परिज्ञानत्वात् ।
चाचार्येण प्रथमं दुर्नयनिर्देशो ययोत्तरं प्राधान्याश्रयः
कृतः । तत्र प्रमाणमतिप्राथम्येकदेशपरामर्शो नयः । अनन्त
प्यासितं वस्तु म्यामिमैकैकपर्यवधिर्नयति प्रा
55 संवेदनकोटिमारोहयतीति नयः । प्रमाणमद्वैतचरका
परामर्श इत्यर्थः । नयामानन्ता । अनन्तपर्यवन्नाहस्तुनस्त
पर्यवसितानां बहुदुरभिप्रायानां च नयत्वात् । तथा चट्टदाः
जावद्वा वयणपद्मा तावद्वा चेष हुंति नयमाया ।

इति । तथापि चिरंतनाचार्यः सर्वसंग्राहिसत्ताभिप्रायपरिह
60 द्वारेण सन्न नयाः मतिपाशिता । तद्यथा । नैगमसंग्रहस्य
प्रसुप्तमृगस्य सममिच्छन्वृत्ता इति । कथमेषां सर्वग्राहकत्वं
चेदुच्यते । अभिप्रायस्तान्तर्यद्वारेण शब्दद्वारेण वा प्रवर्तते ।
न्तराभावात् । तत्र ये केचनार्थनिरूपणमवज्ञा प्रमाणभिप्रा
सर्वेप्यामे नयचतुष्टयस्य नन्ति । ये च शब्दविचारच
70 शब्दादिनयनय इति ॥

तत्र नैगमं सत्तासंज्ञां महामासान्यम् अवान्तरसामान्य
च द्रव्यगुणस्वकर्मत्वादीनि तथान्त्यान् विज्ञेयान् स
साधारणरूपसंज्ञानवान्तर विज्ञेयप्रापेक्षया पररूपस्या
समान् सामान्यादित्यन्विनिर्मुक्तिस्वरूपानभिप्राति । इ
70 स्वतंत्रसामान्यविज्ञेयवादे शुण्णमिति न पुनरुच्यते । म

मसिद्धनिष्पन्नमस्त्यह्यन्तद्वयगम्यभाष्यम् ॥

संग्रहस्तु अत्रेवविशेषातिरोषामद्वारेण सामान्यरूपतया
विश्वमुपावृत्ते । एतच्च सामान्यैकान्तवादे माह प्रपञ्चितम् ॥
व्यवहारस्त्येवमाह । यथासोकग्राहमेव वस्तुस्तु किमनया
75 अह्यह्यव्यवहारियमाणवस्तुपरिकल्पनकष्टपिष्टिकया । यद्व च
सोकव्यवहारपक्षमप्यतरोति तस्यैवानुग्राहकं प्रमाणमुपलभ्यते नेत-
रस्य । न हि सामान्यमनादिनिषेधमर्कं संग्रहमिमत्वं प्रमाण-
युतिः । तत्रानुमयामावात् । सर्वस्य सर्वदक्षित्वमसङ्गात् । नापि
विशेषाः परमाणुलक्षणाः सजसयिणः प्रमाणगोचराः । तथा-
80 म्पुष्टेरमावात् । तस्माद्विमेव निश्चितसोकावाचितं प्रमाणमसिद्धं
कियत्कालमाविष्कृततामाविष्माणमुदुकापाहरणाद्यर्थक्रियानिर्वर्तन-
समं घटादिकं वस्तुरूपं पारमार्थिकम् । पूर्वोत्तरकालमावि-
तत्पर्यायपर्यालोचना पुनरन्यायसी । तत्र प्रमाणमस्यरामावात् ।
प्रमाणमन्तरं च विचारस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अवस्तुत्वाच्च
85 तेषां किं तद्वोत्तरपक्षालोचनेन । तथाहि पूर्वोत्तरकालमा-
विनो इत्यविबर्ताः सजसयिपरमाणुलक्षणा वा विशेषा न
कथंवन सोकव्यवहारमुपरचयन्ति । तत्र ते वस्तुत्वाः ।
सोकव्यवहारोपयोगिनामेव वस्तुत्वात् । अत एव पन्था-
गच्छति कुण्डिका क्षरति गिरिरेक्षत मन्थाः क्रोशन्तीत्या-
90 दिव्यवहारानां प्रामाण्यम् । तथा च वाचकमुक्त्या ।
लौकिकसम उपचारमात्रो विस्तृतार्थो व्यवहारः इति ॥

अतस्तु पुनरिदं मप्यते । वर्तमानसजाविबर्त्येव वस्तुरूपम् ।
मातीतमनागतं च । अतीतस्य निनष्टत्वात्तनामवस्थासम्भारय
सामत्वात्स्वरविषाणादिभ्योऽविशिष्यमाणतया सकलवृत्तिविरह
95 रूपत्वाभाषक्रियानिर्वर्तनसमत्वं तद्व्यापारं न वस्तुत्वम् । यदे

धार्यक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् इति वचनात् । वतमानक्षणा
 सिद्धिर्त पुनर्वस्तुरूपं समस्तार्थक्रियासु व्याप्तिवत् इति तदेव पार
 मार्थिकम् । तदपि च निरस्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अक्षम्यात्तेषु किरिक
 त्वात् । एकस्यानेकस्वभावतामन्तरेणानेकस्वापयवव्यापनायोगात् ।
 100 अनेकस्वभावता एवास्तु इति चेत् न । विरोधव्याघातावत्त्वात् ।
 तथाहि यद्येकः स्वभावः कथमनेकोऽनेकमस्तकथमेकः । एकानेकयोः
 परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् । तस्मात्स्वरूपनिमग्नाः परमाणव एव
 परस्परपसर्पणद्वारेण कथंविधिविधयकृततामापन्ना नितिलक्षकार्येषु
 व्यापारभाज इति त एव स्वलक्षणं न स्पृष्टतां धारयत्पारमा
 105 र्थिकमिति । एवमस्याभिप्रायेण यदेव स्वकीयं तदेव वस्तु न
 परकीयम् । अनुपयोगित्वात् । इति ॥

अहंस्तु स्मृतो यावन्तो ध्वनयः कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे प्रवर्तन्ते यथे
 न्द्रमक्षपुरन्दरादयः सूरपती तेषां सर्वेषामप्येकमर्थमभिधेयंति क्लृप्तम् ।
 प्रतीतिवद्वात् । यथा अग्राभ्यतिरेकार्थस्य प्रतिपाद्यते तथैव तस्यैक-
 110 मनेकत्वं वा प्रतिपादनीयम् । न चन्द्रमक्षपुरन्दरादयः पर्याय
 अग्राभिभिन्नार्थवाचितया कदाचन प्रतीयन्ते । तेभ्यः सर्वदा
 एकाकारपरामर्शोत्पत्तेरस्त्यस्त्यव्यतिरिक्ततया तथैव व्यवहारदर्शनात् ।
 तस्मादेक एव पर्यायशब्दानामर्थ इति । श्रव्यते आहूयतेऽनेनामि
 प्रायेणाथ इति निरुक्तात् एकार्थमतिपादनाभिप्रायेणैव पर्यायध्वनीनां
 115 प्रयोगात् । यथा धार्य पर्यायशब्दानामेकमर्थमभिधेयंति तथा तत्र
 स्तमी तदमिति विरुद्धलिङ्गलक्षणधर्माधिसंबन्धादभ्युक्तो भेद
 - २ भाविपक्षः । न हि विरुद्धधर्मकृत भेदमनुभवतो वस्तुना विरुद्ध
 धर्मापागो युक्तः । एवं संख्याकालाकाररूपरूपादिमदादपि
 भेदोभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तत्र संख्या एकतयादि कालोपीवादिः
 120 कारकं कर्मादि पुरुषः प्रथमपुरुषाणि ॥ सममित्यहंस्तु

- पर्यायशब्दानां प्रविभक्तमेवार्थमयिमन्यते । तथाया इन्दनादिन्द्रः ।
 परमैश्वर्यमिन्द्रशब्दार्थं परमार्थतस्तद्व्यर्थं । अतश्च तस्यै
 पुनस्त्यचारतो वर्तते । न वा कश्चित्तद्वान् । सर्वशब्दानां परस्पर
 विभक्तायमतिपादितया आभयाभयिभावनं मन्त्रसिद्धेः । एवं
 १२५ शक्त्याप्यङ्काः पूर्वोक्तानां सुन्दर इत्यादिभिश्चार्थत्वं सर्वशब्दानां
 दक्षयति । प्रमाणयति च । पर्यायशब्दा अपि मिश्राणाः । प्रवि
 भक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तकत्वात् । इह ये ये प्रविभक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्त
 कास्ते ते मिश्राण्येव यथेन्द्रपशुपुरुषशब्दाः । विभिन्नव्युत्पत्तिनि
 मित्तकाम पर्यायशब्दा अपि । अतो मिश्राणा इति ॥
- १२७ एवंभूतः पुनरेव भाषते । यस्मिन्नर्थे शब्दो व्युत्पाद्यते स
 व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमर्थो यदेव प्रवर्तते तदेव तं शब्दं प्रवर्तमानमपि
 सौते न सामान्यन । यथोक्तकथाहरणवशायां योपिनादिमल्लका
 र्कः विविधेष्वेष्टानेव घटमिधीयते न शेषः । यद्वद्व्युत्पत्ति
 निमित्तशून्यत्वात् पटादिष्विति । अतीतां भाविनीं वा चेष्टा
 १२९ पङ्क्तिरूपेण सामान्यनैवोच्यते इति चेत् न । तथाचिन्तानुत्पन्नवशा
 दभविषाणरूपत्वात् । तथापि तद्वारेण शब्दमपवर्तनं सत्तत्र प्र
 तपितव्यः । विप्रपाभावात् । किञ्च यद्यतीतवत्स्वर्षेष्टापेक्षया
 पदशब्दाऽवस्थावत्यपि प्रमुच्यते तदा क्वाप्यस्तिगदादावपि तत्र
 वर्तनं दुर्निवारं स्यात् । विप्रपाभावात् । तस्माच्च सजे व्युत्पत्तिनि
 १३० मित्तमधिकृत्यमस्ति तस्मिन्नेव सोपस्तच्छब्दवाच्य इति ॥
 अत्र संग्रहशङ्काः ।

अन्यत्र हि सामान्यमभिप्रायमकारणम् ।

विप्रोपाप्यन्य एवति मन्यत नैगमा नयः ॥ १ ॥

मन्त्रानामितान्तं स्वस्वभावाभिर्न जगत् ।

मन्त्रारूपतया सर्वं संगृह्यन् संग्रहो मतः ॥ २ ॥

व्यवहारस्तु तायेव प्रतिवस्तु व्यवस्थिताम् ।
 तथैव दृश्यमानत्वाद्वापापारयति देहिन् ॥ ३ ॥
 तमर्जुसूत्रनीतिः स्याच्छुद्धपयोपसंश्रिता ।
 नन्वरस्यैव भावस्य भावास्तिव्यतिषियोगतः ॥ ४ ॥
 विरोधिसिद्धसेख्यादिभेदाद्विभक्त्यमायताम् ।
 तस्यैव मन्यमानोर्य शब्दः मत्स्यवतिष्ठते ॥ ५ ॥
 तद्याविषस्य तस्यापि वस्तुनः सणवर्तिनः ।
 श्रुते समभिरुक्तस्तु संज्ञामेदेन भिन्नताम् ॥ ६ ॥
 एकस्यापि ध्वनेर्वाच्यं सदा तन्नोपपद्यते ।
 क्रियामेदेन भिन्नत्वादेर्बभूतोऽभिपन्यते ॥ ७ ॥

एत एव च परायणं अयमेतत्पर्यायधारणात्मकतया शेष
 धर्मतिरस्कारेण प्रवर्तमाना दुर्नयसंज्ञापशुबते । तद्वत्प्रमायित-
 सत्ताका हि स्वत्वते परमशब्दाः । तथा हि । नैगमनपदार्थानुसा-
 रिणौ नैयायिकबैधेयिकौ । संग्रहाभिप्रायवृत्त्याः सर्वेभ्यदैतवादाः
 सांख्यदर्शनं च । व्यवहारनपातृपातिमायभार्वाकदर्शनम् ।
 ऋतुमुभाकृतमहत्तुष्टपस्ताषागताः । छन्दादिनयावसन्निना नैया-
 करणादयः । उक्तं च सोदाहरणं नयदुर्नयस्वरूपं श्रीदेवसूरिपादैः ।
 तथा च तद्वन्व । मीयते येन क्षुतास्पृशमाणविषयीकृतस्वार्थ-
 स्वाद्यस्तदितरांशौत्सीन्यताः स प्रतिपत्तुर्मिमायत्रिशेषो नयः
 इति । म्याभिमेतार्थादितरांश्चापलापी पुनर्नयायासः । स
 म्याससमासाम्यां द्विप्रकारः । म्यासतोऽनेकविकल्पः । सयास
 तस्तु द्विमेवो द्व्यर्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च । आयो नैगमसंग्रहभ्यवहा-
 रमेवात्रेषा । धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मधर्मिणोश्च । यथानापसर्जनभावेन
 यद्विषयार्थं स नैकगमो नैगमः । सर्वतन्वयात्मनीति धर्मयोः । यस्तु
 पर्यायवद्भ्यमिति धर्मिणोः । सणमेकं धुन्वी निपयासकजीव इति

पर्यपरिणोः । पर्यद्रव्यादीनामेकान्तिरूपार्थस्थाभिसंविर्नममाभा
 सः ॥ यथा आत्मनि सत्त्वैतत् परस्परमत्यन्तं पृथग्भूते इत्यादि ॥
 सामान्यमानग्राही परामर्शः संग्रहः । अयमुपपन्नरूपः पराऽ
 परश्च । अत्रपरिणयेष्वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धद्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिम
 175 न्यमानः परः संग्रहः । विश्वमकं सत् अविशेषादिति यथा । सत्तादृशं
 स्वीकृत्वा । सकृत्सर्वविशेषाभिराचक्षणास्तदाभासः । यथा सर्वत्र तत्त्वं
 ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषणामदर्शनात् । द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसा
 मान्यानि मन्वानस्तन्नेत्रेषु गगनिमीलिकामवमन्वमानः पुनरपर
 संग्रहः ॥ पर्यायमाकाशकाशपुद्गलजीवद्रव्याणामेकं द्रव्यत्वामे
 180 दादिस्वादिर्यथा । द्रव्यत्वादिर्कं प्रतिमानानस्तद्विशेषाभिधानं
 स्तदाभासः । यथा द्रव्यत्वमेव तत्त्वं ततोऽर्थान्तरभूतानां द्रव्याणाम-
 नुपलम्भरित्यादि ॥ संग्रहेण गोचरीकृतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमव-
 हरणं येनाभिसंविना क्रियत स व्यवहारः । यथा यत्सत्तद्रव्यं
 पर्याया येत्यादिः । यः पुनरपारमार्थिकद्रव्यपरायविभागमभिधेति
 185 स व्यवहाराभासः । यथा चार्वाकद्वन्द्वेन ॥ पर्यायार्थिकवदुर्था
 क्रतुसूत्रः सञ्चः सममिरुद्ध एवभूतश्च ॥ अतः वर्तमानसमस्यापि
 पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्यतः सूत्रमभिधाय त्रयसूत्रः । यथा ह्युत्सविवर्तः
 संवत्सरीत्यादिः । सर्वथा द्रव्यापक्षापी तदाभासः । यथा तभाग
 तमवत् ॥ कासादिभेदेन घनेरर्थभेदे मतिपक्षमतनः शब्दः । यथा
 190 वयुश्च भवति यमिष्यति ह्युमेरुतिरित्यादिः । तद्वेदेन तस्य तमेव
 समवेयमामस्तदाभासः । यथा वयुश्च भवति यमिष्यति ह्युमेरुतिरित्या
 दयो मिमक्षात्ता शब्दा मिमयेपार्थम्यमिष्यति मिमक्षात्तव्यत्वा-
 त् तादृकसिद्धान्तव्यवहारद्वितीयादिः ॥ पर्यायपक्षेषु निरुक्तिभेदेन
 विभक्त्यैव समभिरोहन् समधिकः । इन्द्रमादिन्द्रः अकृताच्छकः
 200 पूर्वाक्षरणात्पूरन्दर इत्यादिषु यथा पर्यायध्वनीनामभिधेयमानात्वमेव

कसीद्वर्णस्तदामास* यथेन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर इत्यादयः शब्दा
भिन्नाभिधेया एष भिन्नशब्दत्वात्कारिकुरङ्गपुरङ्गशब्दवदित्वादिः ॥
शब्दानां स्वमहत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाविष्टमर्थं बाध्यत्वेनाभ्युपग
च्छनेर्षयः । यथेन्दनयतुमबन्धिन्ः शक्रनक्रियापरिणतः शक्रः

205 पुरंदारणमहत्तः पुरन्दर इत्युच्यते । क्रियानाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया
प्रतिक्षिपस्तु तदामासः । यथा विशिष्टेष्वेष्टान्यं घटस्य वस्तु न घ
टशब्दवाच्यं घटशब्दमहत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशून्यत्वात् घटवदित्वा
दिः ॥ एतेषु चत्वारः प्रथमेनेक्यणप्रवणत्वादर्थनयाः । शेषास्तु
त्रयः शब्दवाच्यार्थगोचरतया शब्दनयाः ॥ पूर्वं पूर्वो नयः प्रष्टु

210 रगोचरः परः परस्तु परिमितविषयः । सन्मात्रगोचरास्तं ग्रहाभैगमो
भाभाभावभूमिकत्वाभूमविषयः । सद्विशेष्यकाशकाम्यवहारतः संग्रहः
समस्तसत्समूहोपदर्शकत्वाद्भूविषयः । वर्तमानविषयादनुसूत्राभ्यव
हारक्षिकाशविषयाबलम्बित्वादनस्वार्थः । कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थो
पदर्शिनः शब्दादनुसूत्रमस्तद्विपरीतवेदकत्वान्महार्थः प्रतिपद्योमशब्द

215 मर्थभेदममीप्सतः समभिकृताशब्दस्तद्विपर्ययानुपायित्वात्प्रभूत
विषयः । प्रतिक्रियं विभिन्नमर्थं प्रतिज्ञानानादर्थभूतात्समभिरू
ढस्तद्वन्यार्थस्यापकृतान्महागोचरः । नयवाच्यमपि स्वविषये प्रव
र्तमानं विभिन्नविषयाभ्यां सप्तमङ्गीभूतवन्ति । इति ॥ विशेषार्थिना
नमानां नामान्तर्यविशेषकसङ्गणोपपरिहारादिष्वस्तु भाष्यमहो-
220 दधिगन्धहस्तिटीकाभ्यायावतारादिग्रन्थेभ्यो निरीक्षणीयः ॥

प्रमाणं तु सप्रयगयेनिर्णयसप्तार्णं सर्वनयात्मकम् ॥ स्याच्छ
ब्दसांख्यिकानां नयानामेव प्रमाणव्यपदेशमात्रत्वात् । तथा च
श्रीविमलनाथस्तत्र श्रीसमन्तमन्त्रः ।

नयास्तव स्यात्पदसांख्यना इमे रसोपमिदा इव मोहमातवः ।

225 मयन्त्यभिधेयकला यतस्ततो मयन्तमार्थाः प्रणवा हितेषिणः ॥

इति । तत्र द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षं पराक्षं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं द्विधा साम्प्र-
हारिकं पारमार्थिकं च । साम्प्रहारिकं द्विविधम् इन्द्रियानिन्द्रिय-
निमित्तमेवात् । तत्र द्वितयमवग्रहोऽभ्यायधारणामेवादेकैकशब्द-
विकल्पम् । अवग्रहादीनां स्वर्णं धुमतीतत्वाच्च प्रकल्प्यते ।

२२७ पारमार्थिकं पुनरुक्तत्वात्मात्ममात्रापेक्षम् । तद्विविधं सायो-
पक्षमिकं सायिकं च । आद्यमवधिमनःपर्यायमेवाद्विधा । सायिकं
तु केवलज्ञानमिति । परोक्षं च स्मृतिमत्यमिद्वानोद्धानुमानागम-
मेवात्यक्षमकारम् । तत्र संस्कारमयोपसंयुतमनुभूतार्थविषयं
तदित्याकारं वेदनं स्मृतिः । तत्तीर्थकरविम्बमिति यथा । अनु-
भवस्मृतिरेतदुक्तं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं संकचनात्मकं ज्ञानं
प्रत्यमिद्वानम् । यथा तज्जातीय एवार्थं गोपिण्डो गोसङ्घा-
गवयः स एवार्थं भिनदत्त इत्यादि । उपालम्भानुपलम्भसं-
र्गं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंघ-पायालम्बनमिदमस्मिन्सत्येव
भवतीत्यापाकारं संवेदनमूहाऽपरनामा तर्कः । यथा यावान्

२२८ कश्चिद्भूतं स सर्वो बहो सत्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्सत्यसौ
न भवत्येवेति वा । अनुमानं द्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्रान्यथा
ऽनुपपत्त्यकलतज्जहेतुग्रहणसंबन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं
स्वार्थम् । पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकं परार्थम् अनुमानद्वयपचारात् । आस्तव-
चनादादिर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः । उपचारादास्तवचनं च । इति

२२९ स्मृत्यादीनां च विशेषस्वर्णं स्थावावरत्नाकरास्तापेपरिहारं ज्ञेय-
मिति । प्रमाणान्तराणां पुनरर्थोपपत्त्युपपत्त्यसंभवातिमौलिषादीनां
प्रमेयान्तराणां ॥ सैनिकपोतीनां तु जटस्थलेयं न प्रामाण्यम् ।
इति ॥ तदेवंविधं नयप्रमाणोपन्यासेन दुर्भयमार्गस्थया रितली
कृतः । इति काम्यार्थः ॥

इदानीं सप्तदीपसमुद्रमाग्रे लोके इति पापदूषणानां तन्मात्रलोके
परिमितानामेव सत्त्वानां संभवात् परिमितात्मवादिनां दोष-
दर्शनमुखेन गगनव्यतीर्णं जीवानन्त्यवादं निर्दोषतयाभिप्रेतमाह ।

मुक्तोपि बाभ्येतु भव भवो वा
भवस्यशून्योस्तु मितात्मवादे ।

पद्जीवकार्यं स्वमनन्तसख्य

माख्यस्तथा नाथ यथा न दोष ॥ २९ ॥

मितात्मवादे संख्यातानामात्मनामभ्युपगमे दूषणद्वयमुपतिष्ठते ।
१ तत्क्रमेण दर्शयति । मुक्तोपि बाभ्येतु भवमिति । मुक्तः निर्दोषि-
माप्तः । सोपि वा । अपि निश्चये । बाभ्यद् उत्तरदोषापेक्षया
समुच्चयार्थः यथा देवो वा दानवो वेति । भवमभ्येतु संसार
मभ्यागच्छतु । इत्येको दोषसङ्गः ॥ भवो वा भवस्यशून्योस्तु ।
भवः संसारः स वा भवस्यशून्यः संसारिणीवैविरहितः अस्तु
१० भवतु ? इति द्वितीयो दोषमसङ्गः ॥

इदमभाकृतम् । यदि परिमिता एवात्मानो मन्यन्ते तदा
तत्त्वज्ञानाभ्यासमर्कपादिक्रमेणापवर्गं गच्छन्तु तेषु संभाव्यते सख्य
स कथित्वालो यत्र तेषां सर्वेषां निर्दोषः । कालस्यानादिनिप-
नत्वादात्मनां च परिमितत्वात्संसारस्य रिक्तता भवन्ती केन
१३ वार्यताम् । समुपनीयते हि प्रतिनिपतसखिसुषुप्तपरिपूरिते
सरसि पवनतपनातपनमनोदधनादिना कालान्तरे रिक्तता । न
चापमर्याः मामाभिरस्य कस्यचित्सिद्धाः । संसारस्य स्वरूपज्ञा-
निपसङ्गात् । तत्स्वरूपं ज्ञेयमत्र कर्मवत्प्रवर्तिनः प्राणिनः संसरन्ति
समासार्थः संसारिष्यन्ति वेति । सर्वेषां च निर्दोषत्वे संसारस्य वा
२० रिक्तत्वं इवाहभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । मुक्तैर्वा पुनर्यत्र मागन्तव्यम् । न
च क्षीणकर्मणां भवाधिकारः ।

दग्धे बीमे यथात्यन्तं मादुर्भवति नादुरः ।

कर्मबीमे तथा दग्धे न राहति भवादुरः ॥

इति वचनात् । आह च पतञ्जलिः । सति मूत्रे तद्विपाकौ नास्यापु
 १५ भोगा इति । एतद्दीक्षा च । सस्युः हन्त्रपुः कपोशया विपाकारम्भी भवति
 नोच्छिद्यते मूत्रमूत्रम् । यथा तुपावनद्धाः शास्त्रितण्डुला अदग्धबीज
 भावाः परोक्षसमया भवन्ति नापनीतनुपा दग्धबीजभावा वा
 तथा क्लेशावनद्धाः कपोशयो विपाकपरोक्षी भवति । नापनीत-
 क्लेशो न प्रसृतस्यानदग्धतेऽन्वीजभाषो वेति । स च विपाकवि-
 २० विषो नातिरायुर्योग इति । अक्षपादोप्याह । न मृच्छिः प्रतिस-
 म्भानाय हीनकृशस्य इति ॥

एवं विमङ्गलानिखिबरामर्षिमतानुसारिणो रूपयित्वा उचरा-
 षेन भगवदुपक्रमपरिमितान्यवार्त्तं निर्दोषतया स्वीति । पट्टीवे
 स्यादि । त्वं तु इ माय तथा तेन मकरेण अनन्तसंख्यम् अन-
 २५ स्तास्यसंख्याविशेषयुक्तम् पट्टीवकायम् । अजीबन् जीबन्ति जीवि-
 प्यन्ति चेति जीवाः इन्द्रियादिज्ञानादिद्रव्यभावमाणधारणयुक्तः
 तेषां संवेदानूर्ध्वे इति विनातेर्षणि आदेश कृत्वे कायाः
 समूहो जीवकायाः पृथिव्यादिः । पङ्गा जीवकायानां समाहारः
 पट्टीवकायम् । पात्रादिदर्शनाभर्षुसकत्वम् । अथ वा वज्या
 ३० जीवानां कायाः मत्स्यकं संयाताः पट्टीवकायाः तं पट्टीवकायम् ।
 पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतिवसस्तणपट्टीवनिष्कायम् । तथा तेन
 मकरेण । आस्यः मर्यादया मरूपितवान् । यथा येन मकरेण । न
 दोषा रूपमिति । आस्यपेक्षमेकवचनम् । मादुर्दोषद्वयभातीया
 अग्नेपि दोषा यथा न मादुर्दोषान्ति तथा त्वं जीवान्मत्स्यरूप
 ३५ दिष्टवानिस्पर्षाः । आस्य इति आरूप्यस्य स्यातेरदि सिद्धिः ।
 त्वमित्येकवचनं चेदं ज्ञापयति यत्तदगदुरोरेवैकस्येह मरुपण
 सामर्थ्यं न तीर्यान्तरास्तुष्यामिति ॥

पृथिव्यादीनां पुनर्जीवमित्थं साधनीयम् । यथा सात्मिका-
 विटुमशिलादिरूपा पृथिवी छेदे समानभातृत्यानात् अर्धोऽङ्गुरवत् ।
 ४० मौममम्भोपि सात्मकं सत्वभूसजातीयस्य स्वभावस्य संभवात्
 श्वरवत् । आन्तरिक्षमपि सात्मकम् अन्नादिविकारे स्वतः संभूय
 पातातु मत्स्यादिवत् । तेजापि सात्मकम् आहारोपादानेन वृद्ध्यादि-
 विकारोपकम्मात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । वायुरपि सात्मकः अपरमेरितत्वे
 तिर्यगतिमत्त्वात् गोवत् । बनस्पतिरपि सात्मकः छेदादिभि-
 ४५ र्म्भान्यादिदर्शनात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । कर्पाक्षित्वापाङ्गनोपल्लेपादि-
 विकारात् । अपकर्षतश्चेत्यन्वादा सर्वेषां सात्मकत्वसिद्धिः ।
 आस्रवचनात् । असेषु च कृमिपिपीलिकाभ्रमरमनुष्यादियु न
 केषांचित्सात्मकत्वे विगानमिति ॥

यथा च भ्रमरदुपश्ले जीवानन्त्ये न दोषस्तथा दिक्स्मात् प्राप्यते ।
 ५० मगबन्धते हि पञ्चा जीवनिष्कायानामवदस्यबहुत्वम् । सर्वस्तो-
 कास्तकायिकाः । तेभ्योऽसंख्यातगुणास्तेजस्कायिकाः । तेभ्यो
 विज्ञेयायिकाः पृथिवीकायिकाः । तेभ्यो विज्ञेयायिका अष्का-
 यिकाः । तेभ्योपि विज्ञेयायिका वायुकायिकाः । तेभ्योनन्तगुणा
 बनस्पतिकायिकाः । ते च व्यावहारिका अप्यावहारिकाश्च ।
 ५५ गोष्ठा य असंखिन्ना असंखिनिगोश्च गोल्लभो भूमिभो ।
 इक्षिन्मि निगोश्च अणन्तग्रीवा मुण्यभम्भा ॥
 सिङ्गति अक्षिया स्वच्छ इह संवत्सरजीवरासिभो ।
 एति अजाइवणस्स इ रासिभो तक्षिया तम्मि ॥

इति भवनात् । यावन्तथा यतो मुक्तिं गच्छन्ति जीवास्ताप-
 ७० न्तोऽज्ञादिनिगोद्वयमस्पतिराशेस्तथागच्छन्ति । न च तावता तस्य
 काचित्परिहाणि । निगोद्वयजीवानन्त्यस्यास्रवत्वात् । निगोद्वयकर्म च
 समयसागरादवगन्तव्यम् । अनाद्यनन्तेति कासे ये केषिभिर्हता

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं मादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः ।

कम्पबीमे तथा दग्धे न राहति भवाङ्कुरः ॥

इति वचनात् । आह च पतञ्जलि । मति मूले तद्विपाक्यो जात्यापु
 25 भोगा इति । एतद्दीक्षा या सस्तु कृत्र्यु कमाश्रयो विपाक्यारम्भी भवति
 नास्ति उभेन्द्रमूय । यथा तुपायनदाः स्नातितण्डुला अदग्धबीज-
 भावा' मरोहणसमया भवन्ति नापनीततुषा दग्धबीजभावा वा
 तथा क्लेशावनदाः कमाश्रयो विपाक्यमरोही भवति । नापनीत-
 क्लेशा न मसंभ्यानदग्धकृत्र्यबीजभावा वेति । स च विपाक्य-
 30 विधो जातिरापुर्भोग इति । असपादोप्याह । न महतिः प्रवित्त
 श्रानाय हीनकृत्र्यस्य इति ॥

एवं विमङ्गलानिष्ठिपरानर्पितवानुसारिणो रूपयित्वा उत्तरा
 येन भगवदुपहृतपरिमितात्मन्वाद् निर्दोषतया स्तीति । पट्टीपे
 स्वादि । त्वं तु ह नाथ तथा तेन मकारेण अनन्तसंख्यम् अन-
 35 न्ताल्पसंख्याविशेषयुक्तम् पट्टीपकायम् । अमीषन् जीवन्ति जीवि
 प्यन्ति पति जीवाः इन्द्रियादिज्ञानादिद्रव्यभावमानधारणयुक्ताः
 तेषां संप्रदानूर्ध्वे इति चिनातेर्षमि अत्रेव कत्त काया
 समूहा जीवकायाः पृथिव्यादिः । पण्यां जीवकायानां समाहारः
 पट्टीपकायम् । पात्रादिदर्शनाभर्षुसकृत्वम् । अथ वा पण्यां
 40 जीवानां कायाः मत्स्यकं संपाताः पट्टीपकायाः संपट्टीपकायम् ।
 पृथिव्यक्षेत्रावायुवनस्पतिजमलक्षणपट्टीपनिकायम् । तथा तेन
 मकारेण । आत्म्याः मर्यादया प्ररूपितवान् । यथा येन मकारेण । न
 दोषा रूपमिति । जात्यपेक्षमेकवचनम् । मातृकदापद्वयभाटीया
 अग्रेपि दोषा यथा न मातृप्यन्ति तथा त्वं जीवानन्त्यरूप-
 45 विष्टवानित्यस्य । आत्म्य इति आहपूयस्य स्यातेरदि सिद्धिः ।
 त्वमित्येकवचनं चेद् बापयति यज्जगद्गुरोरेवैकस्येहक् मरुपण
 सामर्थ्यं न तीवान्तरास्तृणामिति ॥

पृथिव्यादीनां पुनर्जीवमित्यं साधनीयम् । यथा सात्मिका
 विष्मद्विज्ञादिभ्यां पृथिवी छेदं समानभातृत्यानात् अर्धोद्भूतपदम् ।
 ४० मीमम्भोपि सात्मकं सतभूतमासीयस्य स्वभावस्य संभवात्
 भ्रातृत्वात् । आन्तरिक्षमपि सात्मकम् अन्नादिविकारे स्वतः संभूय
 पावात् पस्त्यादिवत् । तृणापि सात्मकम् आहारोपादानेन वृद्ध्यादि
 विकारोपकम्भात् पुरुषाद्भवत् । वायुरपि सात्मकः अपरमेरितत्वे
 विर्यगातिमत्त्वात् गोवत् । वनस्पतिरपि सात्मकः छेदादिभि
 ४५ र्भान्यादिदृष्टमात् पुरुषाद्भवत् । कर्पाणिस्त्वापाङ्गनोपकृपादि
 विकाराच्च । अपकर्षतश्चेतन्याद्वा सर्वेषां सात्मकत्वसिद्धिः ।
 मातृवचनाच्च । त्रसेषु च कृषिपिपीलिकाभ्रमरमनुष्यादिषु न
 केर्पाणिस्त्वात्मकत्वे विगममिति ॥

यथा च भगवदुपशे जीवानन्त्ये न दोषस्तथा दिक्षुमात्रं प्राप्यते ।
 ५० ममवन्मते हि पण्णां जीवनिक्कायानामतदल्पबहुत्वम् । सर्वस्तो
 कास्तसकायिकाः । तेभ्योऽसंख्यातगुणास्तेजस्कायिकाः । तेभ्यो
 विद्वेषायिकाः पृथिवीकायिकाः । तेभ्यो विद्वेषायिका अप्का
 यिकाः । तेभ्योपि विद्वेषायिका वायुकायिकाः । तेभ्यानन्तगुणा
 वनस्पतिकायिकाः । ते च व्यावहारिका अव्यावहारिकाश्च ।

५५ गोला य असंखित्वा अमन्त्रणिगोअ गोसमो मणिभा ।

इतिअस्मि णिगोए अणन्तजीवा मुणेअम्भा ॥

सिद्धंति जत्तिया म्बलु इह सबमहारमीवरासिभ्यो ।

एति अणाइयजस्सइ रासिभ्यो तत्तिया तम्मि ॥

इति वचनात् । पावनमथ यतो ह्यति गच्छन्ति जीवास्ताव
 ७० न्तोऽन्नादिनिगोदवनस्पतिरात्रेस्तत्रागच्छन्ति । न च तावता तस्य
 काचित्परिहाणिगानिगोदजीवानन्त्यभ्यासयत्वात् । निगोदस्वरूपं च
 समयसागरादवगतम्यम् । वनाद्यमन्तेपि काले य केचिभिर्गता

हाव्यपदेश एव पृथगभिसम्बन्धीनां नयानां स्याद्वावसप्तजैरूप
 मोक्षानां श्रुताभ्यपमानाभ्यपदेश इति । ननु मत्स्यकं नयानां वि-
 द्यते कथं सद्बुद्धितानां निर्विरोधिता । उच्यते । मया हि समी
 40 चीनं मध्यस्थं न्यायनिर्णेतारमासाथ परस्परं विषदमाना अपि
 यादिनो विवादाद्विरमन्ति एवं मया अन्योन्यं वैरायमाणा अपि
 सर्वज्ञासनमुपेत्य स्याच्छब्दमयागापद्यमितविमतिपक्षयोः सन्तः
 परस्परमत्यन्तं सुहृद्भूयावतिष्ठन्ते । एवं च सर्वनयात्मकत्वे भग-
 वत्समयस्य सर्वदर्शनमयत्वमविरुद्धयेव । नयकपत्वावर्जनानाम् ।
 45 न च बाध्यं तर्हि भगवत्समयस्तेषु कथं नोपक्रम्यत इति । सद्बु-
 द्धस्य सर्वसरिर्मयत्वमपि विमक्षासु तात्त्वनुपक्रममात् । तथा च
 वक्तुमवयवमारैक्यमव्यवस्य श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरपादाः ।

उदधाविष स्रजसिन्धवः

सङ्गृहीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ हृदयः ।

50 न च तातु मयाम्यहम्यते

प्रविमक्षासु सरिस्त्रिषोदधिः ॥

अग्रे त्वेव व्याचक्षते । ययान्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभाषात्परे
 मवादा मत्सरिणस्तथा तत्र समयः सर्वनयान्मध्यस्त्वतयाही-
 कृर्षाणो न मत्सरी । यता कर्षयुताः । पक्षपाती पक्षमेकपक्षमि-
 55 निवेष्टं पातयति विरस्करोतीति पक्षपाती । शमस्य जीवनाद्यं
 मष्टत्वात् । अथ च व्याख्याने मत्सरीति विषेयपदं पूर्वस्मिन्
 पक्षपातीति विधेयः । अथ च त्रिषात्रिष्टम्भाख्यानाविशेको विद-
 क्रिमिः स्वयं कार्यः । इति काव्यायैः ॥

इत्थंकारं कतिपयपक्षार्थविषयनशोभेन स्वागमिभो यथाववादात्म्य
 मूलमभिप्रेत्य समग्रवचनविषयव्याख्यानं स्वस्यासामर्थ्यं दृष्टा

न्तपूर्वकमुपदर्शयन् औद्धत्यपरिहाराय भङ्गवन्तरतिरोहितं स्वामि
पार्तं च प्रकाशयन् निगमनमाह—

वाग्वैभव ते निखिल विवेक्तु

माशसमहे चेन्महनीयमुख्य ।

लङ्घेम जङ्घालतया समुद्रं

वहेम चन्द्रपुतिपानतृष्णाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

- ५ विभव एव वैभवम् । प्रकादिस्थात्स्वार्थेऽण् । विमोर्भावः
कर्म चेति वा वैभवम् । वाचां वैभवं वाग्वैभवं वचनसं-
त्यक्त्वम् । विमोर्भाव इति पक्षे तु सर्वनयभ्यापकत्वम् । विमुद्रम्यस्य
व्यापकपर्यायतया कृतत्वात् । ते तत्र सवर्णिनं निखिलं कृत्स्नं
विवेक्तुं विचारयितुं चेत् यदि वयमाशास्महे इच्छामः । हे महनीय
१० मुख्य महनीयाः पूज्याः पञ्च परमेष्विणस्तेषु मुख्यः प्रधानभूतः
आयत्वात् तस्य संबोधनम् । ननु सिद्धेभ्यो हीनगुणत्वादर्हातां कथं
वागतिशयशालिनामपि तेषां मुख्यत्वम् । न च हीनगुणत्वम
सिद्धम् । अत्रत्यावसरे सिद्धेभ्यस्तेषां नमस्कारकरणभ्रमणात् ।
काङ्क्षन् नमुक्त्वात् सिद्धाणमभिगाह्यु सो गिष्हे इति श्रुतकेव
१५ लिखननात् । वैभवम् । अर्हदुपशेनैव सिद्धानामपि परिहानात् ।
तथा चार्पम् । अरहन्नुपशेनं सिद्धा गच्छन्ति तेषां अरिहाई
इति । ततः सिद्धं भगवत् एव मुख्यत्वम् । यदि तत्र वाग्वैभवं
निखिलं विवेक्तुमाशास्महे ततः किमित्याह । लङ्घेम इत्यादि ।
तदा इत्यप्याहार्पम् । तदा जङ्घालतया जाङ्घिकतया वेगव
२० तया समुद्रं लङ्घेम क्लृप्तं समुद्रमिव अतिफ्रमामः । तथा वहेम
धारयेम । चन्द्रपुतीनां चन्द्रमरीचीनां पार्तं चन्द्रपुतिपानम् ।
तत्र तृष्णा तर्षोपिभ्यश्च इति वाक्यं चन्द्रपुतिपानतृष्णा ताम् ।

निर्बान्ति निर्वास्यन्ति च ते निगादानामनन्तमागेषि न वर्तन्ते
 नावर्तिपक्ष न वस्त्यन्ति । ततश्च कथं मुक्तार्ता मयागमनप्रसङ्गः
 75 कथं च संसारस्थ रिक्ततापसकिरिति । अभिमेत चेददन्यपूष्या-
 नामपि । यथा चोक्तं पार्तिककारेण ।

अथ एव विगुह्यस्तु गृह्यमानेषु संततम् ।

ब्रह्माष्टलोकजीवानामनन्तत्वाद्गुह्यता ॥

अन्त्यभ्यूनातिरिक्तत्वैर्गुह्यते परिमाणवत् ।

80 वस्तुमपरिमये तु पूर्णं तेषामर्ममयः ॥

इति व्याख्यानम् ॥

अपुना परदर्शनानां परस्परविरुद्धार्थसमर्पकतया मत्सरित्वं
 मन्त्राद्यपि सर्वज्ञोपपत्तिद्वान्त्वस्यान्योन्यानुगतसर्वनयमयतया मा-
 त्सर्याभावमाविर्भावयति ।

अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावा

यथा परे मत्सरिण प्रवादाः ।

नयानशेषानविशेषमिच्छन्

न पक्षपाती समयस्तथा ते ॥ ३० ॥

प्रकर्षेणोपपत्तेरिति पाद्यते स्वाभ्युपगतोर्षो धेरिति यथादाः ।

85 यथा येन प्रकरेण । परे भवच्छासनादन्त्ये । यथाश्च दर्शनानि ।

मत्सरिणः अनिष्टायनं मत्सर्वायभिधानात् सातिश्चयासङ्गता-

धाकिनः क्रीडकृपायकृतुपित्वान्तकरणाः सन्ताः पक्षपातिन इतरपक्ष

तिरस्कारेण स्वकृतीकृतपक्षम्यवस्थापनप्रयत्ना वर्तन्त । कस्मात्

हेतोर्मत्सरिण इत्याह । अन्यान्पक्षप्रतिपक्षभावात् । पश्यते

10 म्यवतीक्रियते साध्यवर्मवैशिष्ट्येन इत्यादिभिरिति पक्षः । कृती

कृतप्रयत्नप्रतिष्ठापनाय साधनापन्यासाः । तस्य यतिरूपः पक्षः यति

- पक्षः । पक्षस्य प्रतिपक्षो विरोधी पक्षः प्रतिपक्षः । तस्य भावः पक्ष
 प्रतिपक्षभावाः । अन्योन्य परस्परं यः पक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाः पक्षप्रतिपक्षत्व
 मन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाः तस्मात् । तथाहि । य एव मीमांसकानां
 15 नित्यः शब्द इति पक्षः स एव सौगतानां प्रतिपक्षः । तन्मते शब्द-
 स्थानित्यत्वात् । य एव सौगतानामनित्यः शब्द इति पक्षः स
 एव मीमांसकानां प्रतिपक्षः । एवं सर्वमयोगेषु योग्यम् । तथा
 तेन प्रकारेण । ते तत्र । सम्यगेति गच्छति शब्दोऽर्थमनेनेति पुष्पाम्नि
 यः समयः संकेतः । यद्वा सम्यग् अवैपरीत्येन ईयन्ते ज्ञायन्ते
 20 जीवाजीवादयार्था अनेन इति समयः सिद्धान्तः । अथवा सम्य
 गयन्ते गच्छन्ति जीवादयः पदार्थाः स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठां
 प्राप्नुवन्त्यस्मिभिति समय आगमः । न पक्षपाती नैकपक्षानुरागी ।
 पक्षपातित्वस्य हि कारणं मत्सरित्त्वं परमवादेयूक्तम् । त्वत्सम-
 यस्य च मत्सरित्त्वामावाप्त्य पक्षपातित्वम् । पक्षपातित्वं हि मत्स
 25 रित्वेन व्याप्तं व्यापकं च निवर्तमानं व्याप्यमपि निवर्तयतीति
 मत्सरित्वे निवर्तमाने पक्षपातित्वमपि निवर्तय इति भावः ।
 तत्र समय इति बाध्यबाधकमायलक्षणे संबन्धे पट्टी । सूत्रापेक्षया
 गणपरकर्तृकत्वेपि समयस्यावापेक्षया भगवत्कर्तृकत्वाद्वाप्य
 बाधकभावो न विरुध्यते । अर्त्यं भासइ अरहा मुक्तं गैर्यति गणहरा
 30 निवर्ण इति बधनात् । अथवा उत्पादय्ययधौष्यमपक्षः समयः ।
 तर्पा च भगवता साक्षान्मातृकापदरूपतयाभिधानात् । तथा
 चार्थम् । उष्येइवा विगमेइवा धुपेइवा इत्येदायः ॥ मत्सरि
 त्त्वामावमं च निक्षेपणद्वारेण समर्थयति । नयानन्नेपानविज्ञप
 मिच्छन् इति । अक्षपान् समयस्तामनाभैगमादीनविज्ञेयं निर्व
 35 क्षेपं यथा भवत्येवमृच्छन् आकाङ्क्षन् । सर्वनयात्मकत्वाद्नेकान्त
 वादस्य । यथा निश्चकस्त्वानां मुक्तायणीनामकसूत्रानुसूतानां

हारम्पदेश एव पृथगग्निसन्धीनां नयानां स्याद्वावसप्तजैकमुज-
 मोतानां श्रुतास्त्वप्यपानम्यपदेश इति । ननु मत्स्येकं नयानां विरु-
 द्धत्वे कर्षं समुदितानां निर्विरोधिता । उच्यते । यथा हि समी-
 40 चीनं मध्यस्थं न्यायनिर्णेतारमासाद्य परस्परं विवदमाना अपि
 वादिनो विवादादिरमन्ति एवं नया अन्योन्यं वैरायमाणा अपि
 सर्वद्वेषासनमुपेतस्य स्याच्छब्दमयोगापक्षमितविप्रतिपक्षयः सन्तः
 परस्परमत्यन्तं सुहृद्व्यावृत्तिमुन्ते । एवं च सर्वनयात्मकत्वे मम
 वत्समयस्य सर्वदर्शनमयत्वमविरुद्धमेव । नयकपत्वार्षनानात् ।
 45 न च वार्ष्यं तर्हि मगवत्समयस्तेषु कर्षं नोपलभ्यत इति । समु-
 द्रस्य सर्वसरिर्मयत्वमपि विप्रक्याप्तं तास्वनुपलभ्यात् । तथा च
 कन्तुवचनयोरैक्यमव्यवस्य जीसिद्धसेनविवाकरपादाः ।

उदयाविष सर्वस्मिन्वचः

समुदीर्णास्तवयि नाथ ह्ययः ।

न च तासु मवान्महस्यते

मविमक्यासु सरिस्त्वोदधिः ॥

अन्त्ये त्वेवं व्यापकते । यवान्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावात्यरे
 प्रवादा मत्परिणस्तदा तत्र समयः सर्वनयाम्मध्यस्वतयाद्वी
 कुर्वाणो न मत्सरी । यतः कर्षंयुतः । पक्षपाती पक्षमेकपक्षाभि-
 50 निषेधं पातयति तिरस्करीतीति पक्षपाती । रागस्य जीवनाद्यं
 नष्टत्वात् । अत्र च व्याख्याने मत्सरीति विधेयपदं पूर्वस्मिन्म
 पक्षपातीति विधेयः । अत्र च क्रिष्टक्रिष्टव्याख्यानविधेको विष-
 क्रिमिः स्वयं कार्यः । इति व्याख्यानः ॥

इत्थंकारं कतिपयपक्षार्थविषयनङ्गोऽत्र स्वामिनो यवार्थपादात्म्य
 पुनर्ममिदस्य समग्रवचनाविषयव्याख्येने स्वस्यासामर्थ्यं दृष्ट-

न्तपूर्वकमुपदर्शयन् औदन्यपरिहाराय भङ्ग्यन्तरविरोहितं स्वामि
पार्त्तं च प्रकाशयन् निगमनमाह—

वाग्बेभय ते निखिल विवेक्तु

माशसमहे चेन्महनीयमुख्य ।

लङ्घेभ जङ्गलतया समुद्र

वहेभ चन्द्रयुतिपानतृष्णाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

- ४ विमय एव वैमयम् । प्रज्ञादित्यात्स्वार्थेऽण् । विमोर्मावः
फम्ये चोति वा वैमयम् । वाचां वैमयं वाग्बेभयं वचनसंप-
त्त्यर्कम् । विमोर्माव इति पक्षे तु सर्वनयस्यापकृत्वम् । विमुञ्च्यदस्य
व्यापकपर्यायतया कृत्स्नात् । ते तत्र संबन्धिनं निखिलं हृत्स्नं
विवेक्तुं विचारयितुं च यत्तु यदि वयमात्रास्माह इच्छामः । हे महनीय
१० मुख्य महनीयाः पूण्याः एव परमस्तिनस्तेषु मुख्यः प्रधानभूतः
आयत्नात् तस्य संबोधनम् । ननु सिद्धेभ्यो हीनगुणत्वादर्थतां कथं
वागविशेषवाचिनामपि तेषां मुख्यत्वम् । न च हीनगुणत्वम-
सिद्धम् । मन्त्रावसरे सिद्धेभ्यस्तेषां नमस्कारकरणश्रवणात् ।
काऊण नमुरकारं सिद्धाणामभिग्राहं तु सो गिण्हे इति श्रुतकेव
१३ विवचनात् । वैमम् । अर्हदुपदेशेनैव सिद्धानामपि परिज्ञानात् ।
तथा वाचम् । अर्हदुपदेशेन सिद्धा णञ्छ्रंति तेषां अरिहाह
इति । ततः सिद्धं भगवन् एव मुख्यत्वम् । यदि तत्र वाग्बेभयं
निमित्तं विवक्तुमात्रास्माह ततः विविख्याह । लङ्घेभ इत्यादि ।
तदा इत्यप्याहायम् । तदा जङ्गलतया जाद्विकृतया वेगव
२० तथा समुद्रं मह्यं किम् समुद्रमिव अधिकमाया । तथा वरेभ
पारयम् । चन्द्रगुनीनां चन्द्रमरीचीनां पार्त्तं चन्द्रयुतिपानम् ।
तत्र तृष्णा तर्षोमिच्छा इति वाच्यं चन्द्रयुतिपानतृष्णा ताम् ।

अथयथापि समावने सप्तमी । यथा कश्चिन्नरवचङ्गमणवेग-
 वचया यानपात्राधन्तरेणापि समुद्रं लङ्घिषुमीहते यथा च
 १३ कश्चिन्नद्रपरीषीरसूतमयीः श्रुत्या जुलुकादिना पाशुमिच्छति न
 चैतद्वयमपि क्षयसाधनम् तथा न्यसेज भवदीयवाग्यैभववर्ण-
 माकाङ्क्षापि अक्षयवारम्भप्रवृत्तिनुस्या । आस्तां तावत्तावकीन
 वचनविषयानां सामस्त्येन विवेचनविधानं तद्विषयाकाङ्क्षापि
 महस्तादृशमिति भावार्थः । अथवा कापि श्लोपणे इति पातोर्लङ्गेन
 २० श्लोपयेम समुद्रं जङ्घास्यया अतिरईसा । अतिक्रमजार्बलङ्गेस्तु
 मयोगे दुर्कर्म परस्मैपद्व्यनित्यं चात्मनेपदमिति । अत्र च
 औद्धत्यपरिशारेषिकृतेपि यथाचास्महे इत्यात्मनि बहुवचनमाचार्यः
 प्रयुक्तत्वात्स्वादिति सूचयति यद्विद्यन्ते जगति माह्वा मन्दमेवसो
 भूयांसः स्तोतारः इति बहुवचनमात्रेण न सन्त्वहङ्कारः स्तोतारि
 २५ मयौ चङ्गनीयः प्रस्युत निरभिमानताप्रासादोपरि पताकारोप
 एवावधारणीयः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

एष एकमिदं किञ्चित्पु उपजातिरुच्छन्दः ॥

एवं विप्रतारकैः परतीर्थैर्कर्म्यापोहमय तमसि निमज्जितस्य
 जगतोऽभ्युदग्रेऽभ्यमिचारिवचनतासाध्येनाम्ययागव्यवच्छेदेन न
 गत एव सामर्थ्यं वर्धयन् तदुपास्तिविन्यस्त्वमानसानां पुरु-
 षाणामौषितीचतुरतां प्रतिपादयति ।

इत्थं तत्त्वातत्त्वव्यतिकरकरालेन्धतमसे
 जगन्मायाकारेरिव हतपरेर्हा विनिहतम् ।
 तदुद्धर्तुं शक्तो नियतमयिसंवादिबचन
 स्वमेवातस्त्रातस्त्रायि श्रुतसपर्यां श्रुतधियः ॥ ३२ ॥

- इदं मत्स्यलोपसम्बन्धान् अगतुं विन्धुं उपचाराज्जगद्वर्ती जनः ।
 इतरे इता अपमा ये परे तीर्थान्तरीया इतरे तेः । मायाकारैः
 इन्द्राशिकरिषिषु वाम्बरीयमयागनिपुणैरिवेति यावत् । अन्य
 समसे निबिडापकारे । हा इति स्त्रे । निनिहतं विभ्रपण निहित
 स्थापितं पातितमित्यर्थः । अर्थं करातीत्यपयति अन्ययती
 10 त्यर्थं तच्च तत्तमयेत्यपतमसम् समयनापातमसं इत्यत्यत्यर्थं
 तस्मिन्नन्यतमसः । कथंभूतेपतमसं नति द्रव्यान्कारव्यवच्छेदं
 दार्यमाह । तत्त्वात्तत्त्वव्यतिकरकरात् । तत्त्वं वातत्त्वं च तत्त्वा
 तत्त्वे तयार्थविकृतो व्यतिकीर्णता व्यापिभ्रता स्वमाययिनि
 ययस्तत्त्वावस्थव्यतिकरः तेन करात्ते भयङ्करे । यत्रापतमस
 11 तत्त्वं अतस्त्वाभिनिबध्नीयतत्त्वे च तत्त्वाभिनिबध्नीयतत्त्वो व्यति
 कृतः संज्ञायत इत्यर्थः । अनेन च विश्रपणन परमायतो
 मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयमेवान्यतमसम् । तस्यैवैकस्मिन्नणत्वात् । तथा च
 ग्रन्थान्तरे मन्तुतरमुक्तिकारपात्राः ।

अद्वे तच्चमुक्तिर्या गुरुपीरगुती च वा ।

- 20 अर्थे धर्ममुक्तिश्च मिथ्यात्वं तद्विषयत्वात् ॥

ततोयवयः । यथा किम् ऐन्द्राशिकास्तथाविधमुमिति तत्पर
 व्यामाह नरुपापपञ्चास्यथाविधमपीयमहस्तमायनादिमायं किं
 चित्तमुक्त्य परिपञ्चन मायामय तमसि भक्षयन्ति तथा परती
 यिकरपि तादृश्यकारदुरपीतकृतकपुस्कीरूपद्वयं अगदिदं व्यापो
 21 इमहान्धकार निक्षिप्तमिति । तच्छगदुद्धर्तुं मोहमहापकारापक्ष
 पात् कर्तुं निवर्त निवर्त स्वमय नाश्वं शक्तः सयव । मिथ
 यमिथ्यैकस्वैवं अगवताः सायम्यमुपबन्धत इति विश्रपणद्वारेण
 कारणमाह । अविर्त्तवादिषयनः । कपञ्जदनापमक्षपरीताय
 विष्टद घन फलमाहो न विम्वदतीत्यर्थं प्रीत्यमिर्मवादि । तथा
 22 भूतं वचनमुपदशो यस्यासावविर्त्तवान्निषयन । अयमिवादि

श्रीमिनमयसूरीणां साहाय्योद्भिन्नसौरभा ।

श्रुतावुचसतु सर्वा हृषिः स्यात्तादमञ्जरी ॥ ८ ॥

विप्राणे कसिनिर्मर्याग्निनतुष्ठा श्रीदेवचन्द्रमभौ

80 ववृम्भस्तुतिहृषिनिर्मितिमिपात्तक्तिर्मया विस्तृता ।

निर्नेतुं गुणवृषणे निजगिरां तन्मार्षये सञ्जनां

स्तस्यास्तुत्तमकुशिर्यं बहुमतिः सास्त्यत्र सम्यग् यतः ॥ ९ ॥

इति श्रीटीकाकारस्य मञ्जस्तिः समाप्ता ॥

NOTES

[P 1.

The Mangalacarana (Page 1)

The *Syādvādamānjari* opens with a *mangalacarana* in four verses. The Jains, like the Brāhmanas believe in the efficacy of prayer to Higher Powers for successful execution of literary undertakings. cf. येदांति बहुविधावि भवन्ति मह्यमपि । अथेवसि प्रवृत्तायां कापि वाप्ति विनायका ॥ तस्मात्सेवयन्पूजेन धनया यदुक्तमपिमेवम् । ... । सर्वमेव वा धार्ष्ट्यं यदुक्तं द्वावप्यन्वयात् । ... । यदुक्तमपिमेवम् । ... । मां गच्छन्त्यप्यवसि यदापि यदुक्तम् । वा यदुक्तो विना गच्छे वा नाह वाच्येति यदुक्तम् ॥ —*Śālikācārya's Commentary on the Aśvārāga Sūtras.*

Much intellectual energy has been spent in Brāhmanical books of Logic (*Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya*) on demonstrating the necessity of *mangalacarana* and on determining the manner in which it acts towards fulfilling its purpose. The duty of performing a *mangalacarana* is based upon *śikṣā* (practice of the good and respectable) which itself presupposes, say the Brāhmanas a *vedic* commandment. As regards its *modus operandi*, while some hold that it brings an undertaking to a successful completion removing obstacles (नश्यति ० निर्विघ्नमपि) others think that its function is simply to counteract the bad luck which causes obstacles (निर्विघ्न), the completion itself depending upon other natural or supernatural causes. Then again while some connect the *mangala* with the completion (नश्यति) through the removal of bejacles (निर्विघ्नमपि यदुक्तम् गच्छे), others believe that kind of religious merit (अपुष्टे) is created by the *mangala* which removes the obstacles and produces the completion (अपुष्टेनैव यदुक्तम् नश्यतिगच्छे). The schollasts were not aware of such incomplete works in Indian literature as Bhaṭṭa Kādambari despite a *mangalacarana*, or complete works even without a *mangalacarana*. Consequently they have endeavoured to explain the breach in the causal law by

the hypothesis of mangalocaraṇa done in previous life (अन्तर्मातृव्यं बहुक), and also of comparative quantities and qualities of the mangalocaraṇa and the evil karma. ("समस्तबाधनं कश्चित् प्राचलितविश्ववृत्तत्वात् इतिम्यदुक्तान्तरेत्यविनात् कश्चित्कृतमन्तकारनाश्यात् "अन्ते तु बहुकं तत्रापि नष्टत्वात् नष्टत्वात् नष्टत्वात् स्याति बहुक इति प्रकाशं कर्मास्तिभेदात् अपरीक्षितम्" T itre-Ok.) Yet, the trend of their belief in the efficacy of mangalocaraṇa would seem to be in the direction of rationalism. For the whole subject, see mangala lila in Taiti-Ok. N Kaustubha N Man jara M kiāvali and its commentaries [बहु न बहुकं विनाशस्तं प्रति न वा समाप्तिं प्रति कारणं विनाशितुं नान्तिप्रतीतिं अन्ते विनिर्धनमप्रतिबन्धनम् इति चेन्न अविनाशविद्याचारविश्ववृत्तेन बहुकस्य सकलत्वे तिष्ठे उप कश्चिद्विनाशस्तं सप्तति दहककलत्वे नष्टदहककलत्वात् अन्तर्मातृत्वात् अपविनाशस्तं सप्ततिरेव कृतं कलत्वे । इत्येव न वा बहुकं न कलत्वे उप अन्तर्मातृत्वं तत्कलत्वे इत्येव सप्तति बहुके सप्ततिरेव दहते तत् सकलत्वे विनाशे विनाशस्तुर्वा वा योऽपि— विनाशस्तु बहुकस्य द्वारमिवाहू प्राञ्च । अन्तर्मातृ बहुकस्य विनाशस्तं एव कृतं समाप्तिस्तु बुद्धिबलमिवाहूकलत्वात् ।—अन्तिप्रतीतिं अन्ते अन्तर्मातृवमदुक्तान्तरेत्यन्तं एतत् तिष्ठतिविनाशस्तमामात्रो बाधनीति न अपि चर इत्याहु ॥ इत्याहु]

The religious belief in the necessity of propitiating gods before commencing any serious piece of work—even the day's routine—is natural and so we find that in the vedic ritual, the main sacrifice was often preceded by small introductory offerings made to the gods (cf. "नारायणवन्देनष्टकपदं च विनिर्धेनं दूर्वासाधनपरिष्कृतम्). Similarly as recorded in the Bharata-Nāṭyaśāstra, tediously long religious ceremony was performed on the stage, before commencing dramatic representation. The ceremony which was originally mixed doing (कारिण) and speaking (वाचिण) came, in course of time, to be cut down to the latter thus, the recitation of Nāṭi remained the sole survivor of the old elaborate ceremonies of the Pūrva ranga. Thus, the mangalocaraṇa is all literary work as is mostly verbal.

"सुविनयकथारिषु मङ्गलकथनहार विज्ञेयम्—अत एव इतिनामकमपि मङ्गलकथारिषु न बहुकम् Taiti-Ok. Such mangalocaraṇa generally

takes one of the three following forms: (I) आशीः Benediction or Prayer (II) नमस्विदा Salutation, and (III) वस्तुनिर्देश Description the last being supposed to be accomplished even by a bare reference to the name of a god, or the use of a word which means a god as, for example, the word देवता in 'अस्तु चरतां रिषि देवताया दिग्गच्छो नाम नमोविदा' the first line of Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava.

The old practice was probably the performance of mangalācarana *outside* the work, in the shape of the recitation of certain mantras, of the syllable Om, or of the names of deities and gurus (vide *infra*), and hence its apparent absence from early works. But the duty of performing a mangalācarana is so liberally construed by the later schoolasts, that it is supposed to have been silently discharged by the use of a word like अस्—which is said to be *apologetic*, but which really means nothing more than now—as the commencement of work e.g. अवातो नमो ब्रह्मणास्थाय 'अवातो नमोविदा' ["अवबन्धो विष्णुविष्वक्कृत्वात्मनोऽयम् । ओङ्कारपाद्यद्यद्य ह्येतौ नमज्ज पुरा । कथं सिद्धा विविधांस्तै र्वेन यादुकिञ्चिदुदी-ति स्युते —*latte*-(a.)]

Some manuscripts of the *Hydralimamjari* open with नमो सर्वज्ञाय—the usual mangalācarana of nāmāskāra to be found in Jain and Buddhist works the 'सर्वज्ञ' being of course the Perfect Man i.e., the Jina or the Buddha. This may be part of the author's *mangala* or it may be the copyist's. St. 1 (Page 1 ll 1-4)

ज्ञानमस्तु वस्तुविषयम्—knowledge of innumerable things, substances and modes rather than of one endless Reality of the Vedāntins; for the Jainas pluralist. This *ज्ञान* is technically known as वेदज्ञान (see below) or अद्वयते देवतेर्निर्वाण—viz., of his spiritual perfection, is higher than gods—a doctrine contributed to the history of world's religious thought by Jainism, Buddhism and Valmikiism. दूरेद—false doctrines or systems. बोधद्वय—the Jargon

arising from their mutual contradictions. रामदेवबहुविधं परिण-
the crowd of examples consisting of or full of passions such
as राग and द्वेष Here रामदेवबहुविधं परिण may mean: (i) examples
beginning with राग and द्वेष i. e. all the passions; or (ii) examples
whose mouths are full of राग and द्वेष i. e. the heretical schools.
(of राग). श्रीरविश्व - The Lord Mahāvira. For the name see Kalpa-
sūtra 108 श्रीरविश्वो लम्बायं क्षितिपते परिमार्गं वाच्यं धीर्बलं यत्तु एतौ
इति श्रीरविश्वो लम्बायं क्षितिपते परिमार्गं वाच्यं धीर्बलं यत्तु एतौ
he stands fast in the midst of dangers and fears, patiently
bears hardships and calamities, adheres to the chosen rules of
penance, is wise, indifferent to pleasure and pain, rich in
control, and gifted with virtues, the name Venerable Acetis
Mahāvira has been given him by the gods." [Tr. S. B. E.];
also vid Hemacandra's note on Haribhadra's ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति
श्रीरं विरहस्यपञ्चमस्तु वरं विरहो वा लक्ष्म्यान्मन्त्रेण लक्ष्म्यां सुतं श्री
विष्णुस्तौ इत्यत्र वा श्रीरविश्वं वर्मस्यपञ्चमस्तु विष्णुस्तौ इति श्रीरं । तदुक्तं
श्रीरविश्वं वरं लक्ष्म्यां वा विरहो वा । एतौवीर्येण दुष्टं लक्ष्म्यां इति
इत्यत्र ॥

श्लो. ३ (P go 11 5-8)

वि जीवपतिर्भेदजीवितवती रं चरो—whose very life or being
consists of an unbounded play of genius. श्रुतिमा—intuition
or quasi-perception. It goes with ईश्वरमा or सरस्वतीहरहृत्
(Saravati and Brahmapati) according as we read चरो (रं) or
चरी. वि देवभूमिस्तु वा दुष्करीतेव—Owing to the mass of punya of all
those who re-born on this earth the mortals; that is to say it is
our good fortune that Hemacandra was born in this world. The
various लक्ष्म्यां दुष्करीतेव would give the sense—By the mass of punya
which in its magnitude covers the whole earth. सरस्वतीहरहृत्
लक्ष्म्यां दुष्करी इत्यत्र—Hemacandra representing in his person both
Saravati and Brahmapati—the former the goddess of learning,
and the latter the teacher of gods. लक्ष्म्यां चरो (रं)—too sing
or so dual in apposition to सरस्वतीहरहृत्. The former appears to
be preferable. वा लक्ष्म्यां लक्ष्म्यां लक्ष्म्यां लक्ष्म्यां लक्ष्म्यां
of him being both सरस्वती and लक्ष्म्यां, may be said to have
demonstrated the Bṛāhmadā doct. in of Many-in-One or

One-to Many by his own personal example. लक्ष्मणमित्रि-
 चन्द्र—The sea is roused into activity by the moon (चन्द्र);
 so is good thought by हेमचन्द्र. आहसुते—of the Dvātrīṃśikā
 which is a panegyric of Mahāvīra—the आह आह—originally
 a kinsman (cf. व आपिर्मित्रो वचनं प्रियमसौ Rg 8.) or a friend;
 and, hence he who declares the Truth—आहसु वचनमवचय. or
 is competent to declare the Truth. लक्ष्मणमित्रिचन्द्रवचनमवचयितुं
 वचनं आहसित्वा लक्ष्मणं वचसा—Vācaspathi's *ra s* योऽयं वा टी
 ५१४ (Page 111 13-16)

विदितं—the present work of Mallisena—that is the
 Syādvādamānjari प्रसिद्धि—proves successful. आरम्भसमाप्त-
 undertaking of the work, or the work which is respectfully
 undertaken (= समाप्तः आरम्भः) यद्वा विस्तृतम्—an instance
 of आलोचनाकार—of विवेको बहुविधस्य यो विवेकप्रतिपत्तिरसौ ।
 बहुभाष्योपनिषत् स आलोको द्विधा मतः ॥ K. Pr

From the original stock of the Indian Religion Jainism
 and Buddhism branched off as separate religions many years
 after the time of the great reformers Mahāvīra and Gautama
 Buddha; and even when eventually Brahmanism, Jainism and
 Buddhism stood as rival religions in the country they
 influenced each other much more profoundly than their follow-
 ers cared to admit. Owing to their common origin, they
 possess mainly the same religious traditions including the
 Pantheon. The prayer in Sanskrit here is an instance to the
 point. The prayer is howsoever withdrawn (यद्वा विस्तृतम्)
 in favour of the author Jain master—Udayaprabhu—as
 quickly as the reverence which the Jains at one time paid to
 the ancient Indian religion. शारदातः आगतो मन्त्रः—The termal
 mystic formula of Sarasvatī; here, the name of the author's
 guru—इक्ष्वाकु which is to take the place of the formula.
 इक्ष्वाकु wrote आरम्भसिद्धि, यमोन्मुख महाभाष्य and उपदेशमाहात्म्य-
 बुद्धि, etc.

Page 2

L 17 दृष्टपारम्—The wheel of Time with its spokes (Sk. चक्र,
 -Gaj. भास) is divided by the Jains into two parts—अवसर्गिणी

and उत्तरिणी—i. e. the half with the *downward* move, and that with the *upward* move. The former is subdivided into six *aras* i. e. spokes, sectors, or *arcs* in the descending order of happiness: 1 सुख-दुःखमा (the period of extreme happiness), 2 सुखा (the period of happiness), 3 सुख-दुःखमा (the period of mixed happiness and misery the former preponderating), 4 दुःख-दुःखमा (the period of mixed misery and happiness, the former preponderating), 5 दुःखा (the period of misery) and 6 दुःख-दुःखमा (the period of extreme misery). The first Tirthankara—Rambhadradeva—was born during the 3rd and the remaining twenty-three during the 4th period. Ours is the 5th. The same divisions in the reverse order belong to the other half viz., उत्तरिणी. For detailed account of their characteristics see Mrs. Stevenson “The Heart of Jainism” pp. 272-278. “The main features of the chronological system of the Gaias equally differ from those of the Buddhists as from those of the Brahmins. For it is impossible to divide the Utsarpi and Avasarpi eras with their six *Aras*, from the Buddhistical four great and eighty smaller *Kalpas*, which are as it were the acts and scenes in the drama of the successive creations and dissolutions of the universe so from the *Yugas* and *Kalpas* of the Brahmins. I am of opinion that the Buddhists have improved on the Brahminic system of the *Yugas*, while the Gaias inverted their Utsarpi and Avasarpi eras after the model of the day and night of Brahmā. —Jacobi, S. II. E. Gaias *Śāstras*, Pl. I p. xxi.

“જાલ જાલો દિવિષ । ઇતરિણી અવતરિણી વેલિ । તરુદા પ્રલોક વર ।
અન્નપાન કંઠે । અનુચારાદિકિચ્છાનર્વજાણા ઇતરિણી । તીર્થોત્તરવચીય
અરહરિણી । તપાવતરિણી વહુકિયા । સુવનસુવપા, સુવપા, સુવનસુવપા,
દુવનદુવપા, દુવપા અતિસુવપા । ઇતરિણી અતિદુઃખપા સુવનદુઃખપા
વહુકિય વચલિ ।” —*Ār* Tabl.

હારહાર વાગવર્ષ દેતુ વાગવર્ષચરિતે । જાલો દિવિષોત્તરવર્તિણી
વિશેદતા । અપ વરવતરિણીએવાગ્વસુવપાદુઃખ । તીર્થવળા સુવપા વાગ્વ
વિશેદ । જાગરાણી સુવપા સુ વિષવતરોદિકિશેદ । દુઃખદુઃખપા કે દુઃખવપા

यथा पुनः। सैवा सहस्रवर्षाणां शिष्यत्वारिच्यतो मित्वा । एकविंशतिरभ्यासां सहस्राणि
 तु पुनश्च । एकाग्रतुल्यमापि स्वाध्यायवर्षप्रमायिका । अरथा नवसर्पिण्यां
 च स्वे समुदीरिता । जलसर्पिणां च एव स्तु प्रसिद्धोपमामेव तु । तदेवमवसर्पिणा-
 म्मुलसर्पिणां च मीक्षिता । सागतोपमयोदीरां कोऽप्य लक्ष्म विव्रति ।” Hem-
 chandragiri Barga II, Verses 111, etc.

L III वसुधावसर्पिणी etc.—वसुधावसर्पिणी—a canal or stream of nectar
 A canal near Māngrol in Kāthiāwāḍ is known by the proper
 name of Sāraṇ. वसुधावसर्पिणी (a. v l.) streaming with nectar
 causing nectar to flow देवदेववामित्वा—Spreading of the
 gospel of J unias among his pupils or those who are prepared
 or fit to hear it.

वसुधावसर्पिणी—For Kumārapāla's conversion to Jainism
 and th stories of his enthusiasm fo the new faith, see
 Dharmaraja Kumārapālacarita of Hemacandra Prabandha
 cātāmanī, Pt iv pp. 132-133 Tawney's Edition, A. S. B.
 Rāmānātha of I pp. 187-192 & 194-197 the Bombay Gazetteer
 Gujarat pp. 190-193 “The King and the monk [Hemachā-
 rya] et rned to Unhūpoor There Hemachārya instructed
 Kumāra Pāl in the purity which proceeded from th mouth of
 Jīn Dev and caused him to become great among the followers
 of Urhant. Under the Achārya directions, the King forbade
 the destruction of life fo a period f fourteen years in the
 eighteen countries of Goozerat, in which his order was
 obeyed.” (Rāmānātha vol. I pp. 187-188.) The order is known
 by the name of वसुधावसर्पिणी or proclamation prohibiting
 slaughter :

L 31 वागुर्विष—Explained in marginal note in some of
 the manuscripts as वसुधावसर्पिणीवसुधावसर्पिणी i. e. Grammar
 Sacred Canon (Jaina), Literature and Logic. This nes ly
 accorde with the f or subjects in which Makulabhatta (ix cen-
 tury A D.), the teacher f वसुधावसर्पिणी (9th century) is said
 to hav been erud. viz., मीमांसा, व्याकरण तर्क and साहित्य In
 several Gujarat inscriptions, however the word वागुर्विष occurs
 in the sense of the four Vedas. (see Fleet's Inscriptions.)

सुखज्ञानयोः क प्रतिविशेष इति । अत्रोच्यते । अत्रानादिनकार्यकार्य साम्यवशात्
 विपरं प्रतिज्ञानम् । सुखज्ञानं तु विद्वत्प्रतिपत्त्यात्प्रतिपत्त्याकार्येणानुसृज्य—
 T Bh) I illustrating the difference thus drawn Mr Jaint
 says— An eclipse to-day may be known by Matijñāna, b t one
 in the time of Alexander or one to happen next ye r can now
 only be known by Śruti-jñāna. All true history is thus सुखज्ञान
 in the same way as वेदज्ञान is included in अक्षरज्ञान in Brahmanical
 Logic. This is, how er extending the scope of सुखज्ञान beyond
 its intended limits, it being originally opposed t मनुज्ञान in
 the sense of Authority. Revelation as distinguished from
 Experience and Reason.

(3) अक्षरज्ञान—Knowledge of the distant & time & space
 (अक्षरि—limit or boundary) It is more (अक्षर) in the case
 of the celestial (देव) and the infernal (नारक) & also acquired
 by the precipitation or annihilation of karmic matter (कर्मो-
 पशमनिमित्त), in the case of other souls such as men & low
 animals (मनुष्ये and तिर्यग्योनि). This variety of ज्ञान is concerned
 with only इन्द्रियव्यवसाय (material objects possessing कर्म रस etc.)

(4) मन्त्र परीक्षा (1 को) ज्ञान—knowledge of what passes in
 other minds. मन्त्र प्रतीत्य प्रतिपत्त्यात् वा ज्ञानं मन्त्र परीक्षा (T. R.)
 reaching and reading the mind. It has two varieties—सद्वृत्ति
 and विद्वत्प्रतिपत्ति i. e. simple and complex. The latter is poor
 (विद्वत्प्रतिपत्ति) thus the former and, unlike it, is not exposed to
 the risk of distraction (अप्रतिपत्ति)

(5) शेषज्ञान—pure or perfect knowledge—which is the
 emancipation of the soul entirely liberated from the bondage of
 matter. The word is thus explained (1) वात्सल्यमन्त्रविद्यानिर्देशात् परीक्षा
 वेदज्ञाने लक्षणे इत्यम् (तत्र-विद्यानिर्देशात् वात्सल्यमन्त्रादीन्परात् वात्सल्यमन्त्रादुप-
 कार्यानिर्देशात् वेदज्ञाने लक्षणे इत्यम् शेष ज्ञानम्); (2) अमृत्युपदो वात्सल्यमन्त्रादी
 शेषज्ञानम् (शेषज्ञानम् शब्दो वेदज्ञान इति । अतहादीं परममन्त्रादीं शब्दो
 अमृत्युपदो इति । अतहादीं परममन्त्रादीं शब्दो इति । अतहादीं परममन्त्रादीं शब्दो
 इत्यम्) a. (1) that which is sought and practised, from the
 root वेद-ज्ञाने; or (2) pure, unmixed, free from other shades of
 ज्ञान such as वात्सल्यमन्त्रादिकम्. The second is rightly better
 explanation than the first. But, in reality the word as well

L 39 अवान्विद्वान् etc.—him who has taught the doctrine of त्याग which successfully resists the attacks of heretical teachers.

L 40 अवर्षावर्ष—him who has received the highest homage (महाप्रतिहारनर्त) from the chiefs of gods and demons. An account of how Indra and others waited upon Varidhamana may be read in Kalpasūtra and Andragga.

L 43 अत्र न etc.—The author now proceeds to consider certain possible (I do not think anyone actually raised them) objections, with view to showing the need of each of the adject as in the Sūtra. These are :—

First, it may be objected :—अवर्षावर्ष necessarily implies शेषत्व and so the word अवर्षावर्ष in the stanza is superfluous. This is answered by referring to the law of the Ājīvikas according to whom even the emancipated sages—the founders of the Law—are reborn as Saviours, when they find the Law in danger. Compare in this connection, the distinction between Arhas and Bodhisas in Rhys Davids' *American Lectures on Buddhism* and Kern's *Indian Buddhism*.

The Jainas regard this as weakness, and so deem it necessary to state explicitly that the Tirthankara is not only all-wise, but is also free from all evil, i. e. is liable to re-birth on no account whatsoever.

Ājīvikas were sometimes confounded with Buddhists. Compare अपरे हि लौक्यपदो भोजनवत्प्रापि तीर्षनिद्रापरितर्क्ये ब्रूते ब्रूते परमावर्तते । अत्राह—अस्मिन् नर्मवीर्येण नानां परं कुरु । मत्ता गच्छन्ति ब्रूतेऽपि सर्व तीर्षनिद्रात् इति । न ते परमावर्तते भोजनवत्प्रापः बर्हिब्रह्मवत्प्रापः । न हि तत्र नर्मकमेव नर्मवैराग्यात् । ब्रूयन्—रात्रे वीरे परात्पुनः प्रादुर्भवति प्रादुर नर्मवीरे ब्रह्म रात्रे न रोहति परादुर इति ” *Manibhadra Laghuvṛtti on Haribhadra's Siddhanta*.

For Ājīvikas see Hearnle article on the subject in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* Vol. I Hookhill *Life of Buddha*, Appendix II, and Bhattacharya and Pathak articles in the *Indian Antiquary* Vol. XL (1913).

The founder of this community according to Jaina scriptures was one Gosāla Mañikhaliputra (see Uvāsagadasilo and Bhagavatlādītra. The latter gives an account of his life.) The teachings of Gosāla were condemned by the Buddhists and the Jainas, as unumoral and immoral. King Asoka, however in the 13th year of his reign (B. C. 251) bestowed a cave on the Ājīvikas, whom in a later Pillar Edict he co-ordinates with the Brāhmanas and Nigganthas. In the 6th century Varāhamihira in his astrological works, the *Bṛhatsaṅgita* and the *Laghusaṅgita*, names them as one of the seven classes of religious mendicants. They were also known as *Ekaśandins* according to his commentator Bhaṭṭotpala and were sometimes identified with Digambaras, (of course, wrongly) as for example by Śūdraka (9th century) in his commentary on *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, and in the inscriptions of the Chola King Rājaraṇya. The origin of the word is obscure Hoernle, surmises that Ājīvikas = Professionals a account of their leader's peculiar views on the ājiva or profession of religious mendicant. There is nothing, however very peculiar about the views to justify the conjecture.

¶ 51-55 on P 4. (2) Second objection — असीतरेव necessarily implies अनन्तविज्ञान and therefore 'अनन्तविज्ञान' is superfluous. To it the author replies that according to some heteretical thinkers ज्ञेयज्ञान is quite compatible with limitation in knowledge. Thus, they say it is immaterial whether one knows everything or not; what matters is whether he knows the essential thing, that is what he ought to know or not. It does not matter at all if one does not know the number of bacteria in a thing; the *ज्ञान* that matters is the *अवगमनमज्ञान* i. e. the *ज्ञान* that has a bearing on life or practice; if *ज्ञान* 'long sight', i. e. the mere range of knowledge were valuable in itself without its bearing on life why not worship vultures who are tall birds with long range of sight? Thus, then, absolute purity of life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic of a Teacher. The Jaina rejects this view of the comparative unimportance of the extent of *ज्ञान* in a Teacher

the Siddhānta is propounded by a *person or persons* (who possess the two former qualifications) as distinguished from the Vedas which are supposed by some (the Mīmāṃsakas, for example) to be *अपीहिते* i. e. not manifesting from a personal author—which is impossible. Note the word *अनात्मविद्या* in the text for direct $\&$ our attention to the personality of the founder of the सिद्धांत who deserves to be revered not only by mortals, but even by immortals. Another answer: *आत्मायाः तारक* [P 4 / 71] certain k Vallins who simply save themselves, and are not authors of any true सिद्धांत of “आत्माधर्ममहासाधनोपपन्नप्रतिबद्धविताः तौ नरा निरन्तरं स्वात्मैः सुखदेवयै इत्यप्यत्र सुखमप्यावस्थापरिचयः आत्मविद्यासूत्रम् —Haribhadra's सम्पादयित्वा १५. Cera.

L 3 (4) P with objections—अप्यर्थेयुक्तं is superfluous, since it follows as a matter of course from the qualities above mentioned. Answer: Tr a. But people worship only gods, and do not know that the Jaina, what is greater than gods and therefore worthy of greater worship.

179 अवन्तिविशालत्वं च etc.—Next, it is suggested that the word *अविर्भाव* in the stanza may be taken as a विशेषण also—to which case it will mean *विद्या* (अनुविद्यमतिशयान्नमृद्व्यपवायेन आरहितवत्परा) *अविर्भाव* = infinitely possessed of the glory of *आरहित्य* consisting of the personal experience of the wealth of thirty-four excellences. *आरहित्य*—not to appear so but the reality not the external possession but the inward being of A bathood. The thirty-four excellences have been referred to above (see Notes p. 11) These consist of 19 वैश्या 4 लक्षण and 11 अविर्भाव आरहित्य—अविर्भाव इत्यत्र । अविर्भाव नाम नमो वा आरहित्य । आरहित्य—Bil. has read *अविर्भावोऽयम्* च (71/40 Hem. B'abdy) अनुविद्यमतिशयान्नमृद्व्यपवायेन आरहित्येति अविर्भाव इत्यत्र नाम नमो वा आरहित्यम् आरहित्य—Hem.

Pag 5

L 82 *अविर्भाव*—ever increasing, infinite. How is this consistent with the limit of *अविद्यम* mentioned in the Jaina Siddhānta, such as the number thirty-four etc. ? Ans.—In the Nalika Cūṇi (Nalika—one of the Aṅga-bhāṣya) are enume-

You cannot know
 Jaina lest you be
 related, and so is it
 all. (Here one is re-
 ferred) Hence at
 of "अथ सर्वमज्ञानेन
 विराजितं विदुषस्तथा
 Pravachanasara st.

of also "हं
 उचिरेवात्मन एवैव
 व्यवस्थितः । ते ए
 ज्ञानम् । तथा—

(Manibhadra
 dra p. 48 Ben B

"तथा अनेनैव तु
 विदुषा । सर्वं पश्य-
 तां (or न) होयपुनरप्येव ।
 अथ अस्मत्पक्षेण विदुषा
 भावः सर्वथा वेद इह सर्वे
 एते भावः सर्वथा तेन एव
 of इतिप्रसूति These quot

Page 4

L. 67 (3) Third bjeat
 oomarily foll w from the
 It does But, then, you can

"The six (? five : Vācānandin Nandimītra, Aparāṣita, Govardhana, and Bhadrabāhu.) spiritual leaders who followed Jambuvāmin are called *Sṛutakṣaṇa*, because, though the complete omniscience which Jambuvāmin and his predecessors attained was denied to them, they possessed complete knowledge of the scriptures (बुध)" (H J pp 72 80).

L. 93 अर्वादिभ्यश्च etc.—See Panini 8-2 127 अर्वादिभ्यश्च Hemacandra : Śabdānukṛānta 7 2 40 where अर्वा is included in अर्वादिभ्यश्च

L. 95 साधनेषु—See Hem. : Śabd. 7-1-114.

L. 95 अमर्त्यपुरुषता च etc.—अमर्त्यपुरुषता may conceivably exist even in such ages as have equipped themselves with wisdom and character by sitting at the feet of great masters and serving them. But their wisdom and character are, after all, acquired not innate. स्वर्गपुत्रश्च etc.—(L. 99) स्वर्गपुत्रश्च self-enlightened. वदितुम् (L. 100). Mark the word which only means I will endeavour or strive, thus suggesting the difficulty of doing full justice to the subject. The future tense of the root has also point in it, viz., that of suggesting faith in the task. अहम्—Though already implied in the first person form वदितुम् अहम् is explicitly mentioned in order to suggest that the author proceeds on his own initiative and is not led to his task by either the advice or the example of others.

Page 6

L. 100 etc. अमर्त्यः श्रीरर्चयन्तारि... — It is legendarily pointed out that the four adjectives (1) श्रीरर्चयन्तारि (2) शिबे (3) आशु-हर्षे and (4) स्वर्गपुत्रे in the last two lines may be connected with the four words (1) अमर्त्यशिरः (2) अमर्त्यशिरः (3) अमर्त्यशिरः and (4) अमर्त्यपुरुषश्च respectively in the first two lines, as cause and effect. Thus, श्रीरर्चयन्तारि i. e. 'infinitely possessed of glory necessarily implies infinite knowledge 'अमर्त्यशिरः' the glory consisting in the possession of the four infinities as consequence of the destruction of all karmas. वदितुम्—The word वदितुम् primarily signifies growth, but there is no occasion for growth in this case where excellences are possessed in infinite measure from

rated 1008 'external marks' of an Arhat and the number is taken at the same time to be suggestive of an infinite number of internal marks; in the same way the special mention of 34, does not exclude the possibility of the number being really infinite.

L 88 अश्वत्थामा एव etc.—Next, the word *सिद्धि* in the stanza is justified. The term implies more than 'अश्वत्थामा' of the first line. On the fourteen Steps to Liberation from Karma known as Gunasthāna see II. J pp. 185-192. अश्वत्थामा एव is the eleventh and अश्वत्थामा एव the twelfth step of the ladder. On their difference, see *Ibid* p. 190. When a man has attained to the eleventh stage, *Upasādhāna* *gunasthāna* he has reached a really critical point, where everything depends on how he deals with the sin of greed. If he destroys it, and it becomes quite extinct, he is *सिद्धि*; but if it only remains quiescent, he is in a perilous state, for like a flood, it may at any moment burst its dam and with force of its current may carry the soul far down the slope he has been climbing, depositing him on either the sixth or the seventh step (*Pravṛtta* or *Upavṛtta* *gunasthāna*), or even on the lowest (*Alakṣya*). On the other hand, if he deal successfully with greed, he becomes an *arhat* *Arhat* and knows that he will become a *Śiddhi* after he has undergone one more rebirth as a man.

If a man be on the twelfth step, *Arhat* *gunasthāna*, he has won freedom for ever not only from greed but from all the *gati* *karma* and the *gati* *aghatin* *karma* may still persist, they have little power to bind the soul: in fact, so limited is their power that at death a soul passes at once through the two remaining stages and enters *mokṣa* without delay. The *Ugri* *gama* believe that at this stage the first two parts of *par* *contemplation* (*Śukla-dhyāna*) are developed."

L 91 अश्वत्थामा एव etc.—Next is justified the word 'अश्वत्थामा' in the stanza. *Alakṣya* was of course perfect *kevalin* so are the next three propagators of the *śiddhi* *śiddhi*, viz., Gautama, Harihara and Jambuvāmin (—B. C. 45.).

the very birth, therefore the word should be understood in the secondary sense of infinite and eternal possession. अवन्तस्त्वन (L 110). The 'four infinites' are infinite ज्ञान (knowledge), दक्षिण (faith), चरित्र (character or conduct) and शक्ति (spiritual energy). Some substitute दक्षिण for चरित्र in the list of the four anantas or infinites, the first three of which are the well-known एतन्त्रय or the 'Three Jewels' of Jainism. (see O. J. p. xli) Some, again, put दक्षिण first and ज्ञान second in the list of the three Jewels. For a discussion of the relative positions of दक्षिण and ज्ञान and the particular position of ज्ञान between दक्षिण and चरित्र see T. B. v. 20-25 on T. B. I. See also O. J. pp. 53-58. Dr. Bhandarkar's Report Bom. Mus. etc. Some authorities mention ज्ञान before दक्षिण.

l 112 etc. अवन्तस्त्वन etc.—Since 'अवन्तस्त्वन' connotes the possession of the '4 or infinites' including 'infinite knowledge' the word अवन्तस्त्वन in the first line would seem superfluous. But it is in way yet it has been specifically mentioned in order to suggest that infinite knowledge (अवन्तस्त्वन) is the great instrument for beneficence possessed by the Master.

l 116-125 क्व वया अवन्तस्त्वन etc.—A query. Just as अवन्तस्त्वन is the great instrument of beneficence, so is अवन्तस्त्वन; why then is the latter not mentioned specifically like the former? Answer. The word अवन्तस्त्वन in the stanza not only stands for ज्ञान but includes दक्षिण also—the difference between ज्ञान and दक्षिण being only the difference between the particular and the general. Every object has particular and general aspect, of which the general is subordinated to the particular in ज्ञान, and the particular to the general in दक्षिण. (साधारणव्यवहारतत्वेनीहृत्तत्वेनमर्त्यव्यवहारदक्षिणव्यवहारो तथा प्रत्यक्षविशेषतत्वेनीहृत्तत्वेनसाधारणव्यवहारो ज्ञानम् ll. 124-25). Mark, how is that there is a different kind of distinction from that drawn in T. B. and T. B. v., where दक्षिण and ज्ञान stand for the 'अज्ञान' and knowledge ('व्यापकत्वोपपत्ति') respectively.

l 126 तथा वया दक्ष-अवन्तस्त्वनिति—Next (3) विद्युत् (4) 'अवन्तस्त्वन' & (4) 'व्यवहार' are shown to be connected with (3) अतीतदोषम् (5) अवन्तस्त्वनम् and (4) अवन्तस्त्वनम् as cause and effect.

L. 20 वसोदं etc.—This writer presumes to scan Mahāvira's intellectual greatness, not because he is really competent to do so but because he possesses Faith and Love (*वैश्वा* and *प्रेम*), of which an eulogium like the present is but one expression.

tantra III

Page 9

L. 4-5 वसी --विपुल-वसी Those, from *वस*—a pronoun suggesting distance or remoteness. The commentator sees in this word a sly hint that those heretical writers deserve to be avoided.

L. 9-10 कर्मः दुग्धद्वारम्—as a camel dislikes a white sugar-cane.

L. 18 संयम्य—The author wishes they closed their eyes in meditation and pondered over these philosophical problems dispassionately.

L. 15 अत्र च विचारयन्माम्निवा —E the point which the commentator sees is the *Ātmanepada*, see Pān. 1.3.72 एवमित्यादि वचनानि विचारये.

L. 19 etc. वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् etc.—O closing the eyes while the great physician, Mahāvira, disinflects and thrusts down their throats the better yet wholesome medicine of Jainā Siddhāntas. Let us recall that Gaṭama Buddha is similarly characterised as 'मित्र'! Buddhist two ka.

Page

L. 25 प्रतिपद्य—One to whom Truth is imparted; a pupil,—whether willing or otherwise to sit at the Master's feet.

L. 28 परं वा ..Note the philanthropic missionary zeal expressed in this old tantra.

L. 31 वाचस्पत्यः —Umiśvātī = Umiśvāmīn, the great exponent of Jainā scriptures, respected alike by the *bhāṭṭamāras* and the *Dharmamāras*, probably because the split between the two sects had not yet established itself in his life-time. For an account of the man and his parentage, see his *Tat.Sūtra* Ch. x p. 233 B b. Ind. Ed.

cf. "न्यायोविद्याप्रसूतेषु विहस्ता गुरुषु ब्रह्मनाम्निः कौ मीरजिता स्वाति
तनयेन वात्सीहतेनार्थम् । अहं ब्रह्म सत्यागुरुम्येनागतं सङ्गमार्थं ब्रूयाति च
ब्रह्मयमविद्वत्तमिति लोकमनसोक्तम् । इह ब्रह्मैवायं प्राचक्षते सत्त्वाद्ब्रह्मण्या ब्रूयन् ।
तत्त्वार्थाभिगमात्तर्कं स्पष्टब्रह्मास्वातिना साधयम्" from which it appears
that his father's name was Svātī and his mother's Vātī
(Umā of the Vaisa gotra.) A similar account is found in
the commentary on the Tattvāsātra by Siddhasenagupta.
Dr. Satishchandra is evidently wrong in understanding the
word ब्रह्मरवाचक as probably containing a reference to his
Śākhā (spiritual genealogy) ; the word ब्रह्म means
Kusumapura or Pataliputra (as they call London 'the Town'),
and ब्रह्मरवाचक is the celebrated teacher who belonged to
Pataliputra—the scene of Umasvāmi's literary and missionary
activities. He lived according to the tradition, for 84 years, 8
months and 6 days and attained Nirvāṇa in Samvat 143 i.e. 811
A. D. For further particulars see Peterson's 4th Report on
Sanskrit MSS. p. xvi, Dr. Hoernle's article in the Ind. Ant.
Vol. XX p. 351, and Dr. Satishchandra's H. L. L. p. 169.

Stanza IV

The system first examined is the Vaiśeṣika system of
Kapila. ब्रह्मरवाचक—from st. IV to IX, both inclusive

1.2 ब्रह्मरवाचकमिदमवधारय—The categories laid down in the
system of Kapila, the Vaiśeṣika system, one of the six great
systems of Brahmanical philosophy

As to the sense of the words ब्रह्मर and ब्रह्मर ब्रह्म and
ब्रह्मर side the following — वैशेषिकशास्त्रप्रणेता ब्रह्मरः स च
मार्गमही । विद्याभ्यसेनैवैविविधयोगाभावात् काचं वायुमयमीनि ब्रह्मरः
वायुमयमहीनि ब्रह्मरः ब्रह्मरः एव, काचमयं यद्वायुमीनि ब्रह्मरं तस्य
वैशेषिकशास्त्रप्रणेता ब्रह्मरस्य ब्रह्मर इति नाम ।... काचस्य ब्रह्मरमयं

Ashtakya given by Mādhava as name for the tenets of Kapila
rests on play upon the word Kapila, crow-eater—Ulrich Weber
H. L. L. p. 244, footnote 284. This wretched derivation has been
rightly disclaimed by Prof. Keith as 'an idle fiction'

Introduction to the *Daśapadārthī*. "Ci-tsū (540-633 A. D.), a Chinese Buddhist, relates the following traditions with regard to the *Val-eśika* and its founder:—"(The founder's name) *Ulōka* means an owl.... The time when he lived was 800 years before the Buddha. By day he composed a work and by night he wandered about for alms.....The *sūtra* composed by him is called the *Val-eśika* (-*sūtra*) and consists of 100,000 *śloka*s. The main tenets are the doctrines of the six categories, of the *anukāryavāda*, and that self (*ātman*) is something different from cognition (*buddhi*). In another passage he states —"According to the life of *Harivarman* there lived a follower of *Ulōka* (at the time of *Harivarman*, c. 260 A. D.). He said that the *sūtra* composed by our teacher *Ulōka*, is named the *Val-eśika* (-*sūtra*), and is subtle or scholastic. Its general tenet is the doctrine of the six categories, and the speciality is that cognition is something different from self.... *Val-eśika*, the name of the *Sūtra* means superior or excellent and distinguished (i.e. different). The origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the *Śāṅkhya*. . . . *h-wai-c* states:—"About the end of the time of the creation (*vyūti*) when the age of creatures was immeasurable a teacher (*Tīrthaka*) came to the world. He was named *Ulōka*. *Ulōka* means an 'owl'. In the day time he meditated in a dense forest, excluding himself from worldly affairs. And at night when people went to rest, he wandered about for food. This mode of living was very similar to that of an owl so that he got the name *Ulōka*. He was also called *Kapabhuja* or *Kapabhaka*. *Kapa* means 'a grain (or a piece) of (rice-) corn' and *bhuja* or *bhaka* means 'to eat'. The origin of the name was that he was usually wandering about at night, but as young women were frightened by the sight of him he afterwards went in secret into mills, plucked up pieces of corn from *śrotra*-*śraṇa*, and ate them. He was consequently nicknamed the 'corn-plice eater'. He was further called (the teacher of) the *Val-eśika*. *Val-eśika* means 'superior or excellent' (literally 'conquering') His composed work

explaining the six categories. The work was named the *Vaiśeṣika* (—śāstra), since it excelled other works in all respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence." Kwhāi-ci also calls the founder Kanāda; but to the Chinese tradition it is not known that Kanāda or Kanabhrj means, "atom-eater" and the meaning of the term *Vaiśeṣika* is 'superior' or 'excellent' Atom-eater "as the nickname of the founder might not be probable, because a atomic theory is not special to the system, and the *Vaiśeṣika* is not the first pioneer of the theory 'Superior' or 'excellent' is secondary meaning of the term, and the term is not used in this sense in *V B*. The explanation of the name *Vaiśeṣika* that it was derived from the fifth category particularly (*Vaiśeṣa*), or the characteristic of the system that an object is precisely analysed and classified, is more probable..... Rāja sakharā, in the *Hyāyakaśāstratīkā* explains that Kanāda was favoured by Iśvara on account of the merit of his ardent ascetic practices. Iśvara appeared to him as *Ulūka-rūpa-dhārī* (bearing the form of an owl)..... But Iśvara is not mentioned in *V B*, although late commentators strain the meaning of some passages. Praśastapāda acknowledged Iśvara for the first time in the history of the *Vaiśeṣika*. Consequently the tradition must have originated some later than Praśastapāda who lived in the fifth or sixth century A. D. The Chinese traditional explanation of *Ulūka* seems to have been derived from an etymological meaning of the term, but it represents an older tradition. Even Asvaghosa alludes to the meaning

In his *Sātralanakāra*. But somewhat differently. Before Buddha came to the world, all creatures were so uncultivated and blind to truth that they looked upon the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra* as the best. But after our Buddha, the sun, appeared and thence, wisdom (of creatures) became clear so that the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra* was known not to contain any reasonable explanation and to be good for nothing, like an owl that is flying and energetic at night and sleeps itself and is not energetic in the daytime. (*Mahāvastu*.)

Summary :

I **वीरुक्** from **वृक्ष** ; so called,

(1) because Śiva appeared to the **ṛi** in the form of an owl (**वृक्षरूपवारी**) and taught the **Valśvika Sūtras** ;

or (2) because the **ṛi** went about like an owl in the night and collected grains of corn for his food

or (3) because his system was all-powerful like an owl in the night, *i. e.* before the appearance of the Buddha, but worthless in the day *i. e.* after his appearance.

II **वैशेषिक** so called,

(1) because superior to the **Sāṅkhya** which was the older philosophy ;

or (2) because of its peculiar category called **विशेष** ;

or (3) because of its favourite method of investigating truth by determining the **Vśeṣas** or distinguishing properties of things

III **कवच**—

(1) **कवच**—a crow-eater or owl (? see Weber's H. I. L.)

(2) so called, because of his ascetic practice of maintaining himself by eating grains of corn collected in the night

(3) so called sarcastically because of his Atomic Theory

III **उपपत्तं वदामविशेषी**—The characteristic method of investigating Truth adopted in the **Valśvika** system is to find out the **Vśeṣas** *i. e.* the differentials or distinguishing properties of things. This gives the name to the system, and is therefore rightly selected first for attack. The Chinese account of the origin of the word **Valśvika** meaning superior *i. e.* superior to the **Sāṅkhya** may be set aside as less likely

explaining the six categories. The work was named the *Valśeṣika* (- śāstra), since it excelled other works in all respects or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence." Kwhai-chi also calls the founder Kanāda; but to the Chinese tradition it is not known that Kanāda or Kanabharj means, "atom-eater" and the meaning of the term *Valśeṣika* is 'superior or 'excellent "Atom-eater" as the nickname of the founder might not be probable because an atomic theory is not special to the system, and the *Valśeṣika* is not the first pioneer of the theory 'Superior' or 'excellent' is secondary meaning of the term, and the term is not used in this sense in V S. The explanation of the name *Valśeṣika* that it was derived from the fifth category particularly (*Viśeṣa*), or the characteristic of the system that an object is precisely analysed and classified, is more probable.... Rāja-sekhara, in the *Nyāyakandalītika* explains that Kanāda was favoured by Jīvara on account of the merit of his ardent ascetic practice. Jīvara appeared to him as *Uḍāka-ripa-dhātṛ* (bearing the form of an *uḍ*)... .. But Jīvara is not mentioned in V S., although later commentators strain the meaning of some passages. Praśastapāda acknowledged Jīvara for the first time in the history of the *Vaiśeṣika*. Consequently the tradition must be originated in time later than Praśastapāda who lived in the fifth or sixth century A D. The Chinese traditional explanation of *Uḍāka* seems to have been derived from an etymological meaning of the term, but it represents an older tradition. Even Aśvaghoṣa alludes to the meaning

in his *Sātralaṅkāra*. But somewhat differently. Before Buddha came to the world all creatures were so uncultivated and blind to truth that they looked upon the *Valśeṣikaśāstra* as the best. But afterwards Buddha, the sun, appeared and shone, wisdom (of creatures) became clear so that the *Valśeṣikaśāstra* was known not to contain any reasonable explanation and to be good for nothing, like an owl that is flying and energetic at night and sleeps itself and is not energetic in the daytime. (*Mahāvastu* p. 11.)

Summary :

I जीदस्य from जडस्य ; so called,

(1) because Srya appeared to the rsi in the form of an owl (जडस्यपक्षी) and taught the Vaisesika Sūtras ;

or (2) because the rsi went about like an owl in the night and collected grains of corn for his food ;

or (3) because his system was all-powerful like an owl in the night, i. e. before the appearance of the Buddha, but worthless in the day i. e. after his appearance.

✓ II विद्वेक्षिक so called,

(1) because superior to the Sāṃkhya which was the older philosophy ;

or (2) because of its peculiar category called विद्वेक्ष ;

or (3) because of its favourite method of investigating truth by determining the *Viesas* or distinguishing properties of things.

III कर्माङ्ग—

(1) = कर्माङ्ग—a crow-eater or owl (? see Weber's H. I. L.)

(2) so called, because of his ascetic practice of maintaining himself by eating grains of corn collected in the night ;

(3) so called sarcastically because of his Atomic Theory

13 प्रवर्तनं लक्षणविद्वेक्षे The characteristic method of investigating Truth adopted in the Vaisesika system is to find out the *Viesas* i. e. the differentia or distinguishing properties of things. This gives the name to the system, and is therefore rightly selected first for attack. The Chinese account of the origin of the word Vaisesika meaning superior i. e. superior to the Sāṃkhya may be set aside as less likely

explaining the six categories. The work was named the *Vaiśeṣika* (—śāstra), since it excelled other works in all respects or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence." Kwhāi-chi also calls the founder Kanīda; but in the Chinese tradition it is not known that Kanīda or Kanabhrj means, "atom-eater" and the meaning of the term *Vaiśeṣika* is "superior or 'excellent' Atom-eater" as the nickname of the founder might not be probable because an atomic theory is not special to the system and the *Vaiśeṣika* is not the first pioneer of the theory. "Superior or 'excellent'" is secondary meaning of the term, and the term is not used in this sense in V B. The explanation of the name *Vaiśeṣika* that it was derived from the fifth category particularly (*Vaiśeṣa*), or the characteristic of the system that an object is precisely analysed and classified, is more probable. .. *Bhāṣa*-*śekhara*, in the *Nyāyakandalitika* explains that Kanīda was favoured by Iśvara on account of the merit of his ardent ascetic practice. Iśvara appeared to him as *Uldha-rīpa-dhīri* (bearing the form of an owl) .. But Iśvara is not mentioned in V B., although later commentators strain the meaning of some passages. *Prastapīda* acknowledged Iśvara for the first time in the history of the *Vaiśeṣika*. Consequently the tradition must have originated in a time later than *Prastapīda* who lived in the fifth or sixth century A D. The Chinese traditional explanation of *Uldha* seems to have been derived from the etymological meaning of the term, but it represents an older tradition. Even *Aśvaghoṣa* alludes to the meaning

In his *Sātrākama*. But somewhat differently. Before Buddha came to the world, all creatures were so uncultivated and blind to truth that they looked upon the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra* as the best. But after our Buddha, the sun appeared and some wisdom (of creatures) became clear so that the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra* was known not to contain any reasonable explanation and to be good for nothing. Like an owl that is flying and energetic at night and conceals itself and is not energetic in the daytime. (*Mahāvastu*.)

as those things; in other words, अनुवृत्ति means a common concept (एवाकार प्रतीतिः) and a common name (एकवचनवाच्यता च). व्यतिरिक्त्यनुवृत्ति etc. The points of वि and अति are brought out in the explanation attached to the word; thus, व्यतिरिक्त्यनुवृत्ति (the latter is more intelligible being more commonly employed) निवृत्तौपेक्ष (वि) सर्वथा (= अति) व्यवच्छेदः

II. 9-10 हमे अपि लक्षिते etc.—object to यन्मते the subject being यथा:

अस्मिन्मते व्यतिरेकवादः—The negative side of the same fact: यथा or things are not presented to the mind through anything other than the मार themselves ('माया व मायान्तरवैयर्थ्याः' st. L 2) i. e. through सामान्य and विशेष categories which the Vallabha recognises in addition to द्रव्य गुण and कर्म and समयत्व. According to this explanation मायान्तर in the compound 'मायान्तरवैयर्थ्या' (in L 2 of the st) means द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-समयवैयर्थ्याः परार्थान्तरवैयर्थ्या प्रतीतिविषयं प्राप्यविषयम्—whose character (स्वरूप) of अनुवृत्ति and व्यतिरिक्ति is brought to the mind (बोध) by the additional categories (मायान्तर) of सामान्य and विशेष respectively

II. 16 etc. एवमात्र एव etc.—It is the very nature of things to produce ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यतिरिक्ति. Thus वस्तुमान्त्र (वस्तु) is nothing but the वर itself; a वर possessing a certain form and presenting itself before the mind thereby causes other objects possessing the same form to come before the mind as वर and be denotable by the term 'वर' (वर एव सात्त्विकं शुद्धवृत्त्योद्धारणकारकान् प्रतीति विषयीकयन् लब्धं भव्यादि तदनुवृत्तिवृत्तः परार्थान् वरव्यवस्था वरैक्यव्यवस्था तथा च प्रत्यावर्तन् सामान्यान्तरा लभते (II. 17 20) in other words, things by their very nature, and not through any imaginary category like the सामान्य bring about their co-ordination with other individuals of their class, and give rise to common terms. The same वर moreover becomes विशेष in so far as it distinguishes itself from the individuals of the same (सामान्य) or different (विशेष) class by virtue of its peculiar द्रव्य (substance), स्थान (place), काल (time), and जाति (nature or quality). Therefore सामान्य and विशेष need not be recognised as separate categories ('न सामान्यविशेषयोः शुद्धवृत्त्यवैयर्थ्यव्यवस्थां स्याद्व्यवस्थां L 23), they being

B. स्वतोऽव्युत्पत्तिरुचिमात्रो...

The Jain view on the question of सामान्य and विशेष is (1) that they are not required to be recognized as special *वर्ग* to account for अव्युत्पत्ति and व्युत्पत्ति (= व्युत्पत्ति of the Stanza); if अव्युत्पत्ति and व्युत्पत्ति can very well be explained as arising from the nature of the objects themselves, without the hypothesis of separate categories called सामान्य and विशेष; (2) that they are neither absolutely the same as the objects in which they are supposed to inhere (स्वात्म्य भवेत्), nor absolutely distinct from those objects (स्वात्म्य भवेत्) in fact, they are both.

L 5 अमवद् अवन्ति यविष्यन्ति चेति यावत् — *ya* re things past, present or future & a *यावत्* does not necessarily connote *present* existence thus a *वस्तु* or *प्रापक* which the Vaiśeṣika regards as the *अ-यावत्* of a thing is as much a *यावत्* as the thing itself; moreover the so-called *अमवद्* is not *गुण* or *विषय* i. e., one substantial thing, as some Vedantins would have it, but is an aspect of *यावत्* and therefore the *यावत्* itself.

L 58 आत्मव्युत्पत्त्यर्थः—*Spirit, matter* & c.

सर्वं हि शक्यं च — Every proposition is determining and therefore, *exclusive* of something & it implies 'only even' when the word is not expressly employed. Hence स्वतः in the stanza = स्वतः स्वः न परतः; स्वतः स्वः = आत्मव्युत्पत्त्यर्थः — Things co-ordinate to themselves and distinguish themselves *as forts*; they do not require such mediators as सामान्य and विशेष to enable them to accomplish the task.

Page 1

IL 8-0 स्वाधारा इतिविशेषव्यवस्थया वाव्युत्पत्ति — सामान्य and विशेष are assumed by the V. works to account for अव्युत्पत्ति and व्युत्पत्ति (or व्युत्पत्ति as it is called in the stanza). Of these अव्युत्पत्ति is defined as 'स्वाधारा इतिविशेषव्यवस्थया च' & c. It consists of the fact that (a) thing () appears to possess the same form as certain other things, and (b) is expressible by the same word

as those things; in other words, अनुवृत्ति means a common concept (एवमाकार प्रतीति) and a common name (एवमव्यवहारात्ता च). व्यतिवृत्तिर्वावृत्तिः etc. The points of वि and अति are brought out in the explanation attached to the word: thus, व्यतिवृत्तिर्वावृत्तिः (the latter is more intelligible, being more commonly employed) अविभाज्येयम् (वि) सर्वथा (= अति) व्यवच्छेदः

Il. 9-10 इमे अति लुप्तसिद्धे etc.—object to अत्रान्ये the subject being यथा:

अस्मिन्मार्गस्य व्यतिरेकमाह—The negative side of the same fact: यथा or things are not presented to the mind through anything other than the मार्ग themselves—(माया च मायान्तरवैयर्थ्याः st. 1. 2) i. e. though सामान्य and विधेय categories which the Valmiki recognises in addition to द्रव्य गुण and कर्म and समयश्च. According to this explanation मायान्तर in the compound 'मायान्तरवैयर्थ्याः' (in L. 2 of the st.) means द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-समयावेयम्: यथायन्तरवैयर्थ्यं प्रतीतिविषयं प्राप्नोति च—whose character (स्व) of अनुवृत्ति and व्यतिवृत्ति is brought to the mind (बोध) by the additional categories (मायान्तर) of सामान्य and विधेय respectively

Il. 16 etc. एवमात्र एव etc.—It is the very nature of things to produce ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यतिवृत्ति. Thus वस्तुसामान्य (वस्तु) is nothing but the वस्तु itself. वस्तु possessing a certain form and presenting itself before the mind thereby causes other objects possessing the same form to come before the mind as वस्तु and be denoted by the term 'वस्तु' (वस्तु एव तावत् प्रपञ्चोद्घोषाकारत्वात् प्रतीति विषयीयम् लक्ष्णमयमिति लक्षादिति च यथा यथा वस्तुसामान्यं तथैव प्रत्यक्षपक्षे सामान्यत्वम् उच्यते (Il. 17-20) in other words, things by their (or) nature, and not through any imaginary category like the सामान्य bring about their co-ordination with other individuals of their class, and give rise to common terms. The same वस्तु moreover becomes विधेय in so far as it distinguishes itself from other individuals of the same (नवार्थीय) or different (विद्यमान) class by virtue of its peculiar द्रव्य (substance), देश (place), काल (time), and माय (nature or quality). Therefore, सामान्य and विधेय need not be recognised as separate categories ('य सामान्यविधेयोः द्वयद्वयवैयर्थ्यं व्याप्यम् L. 3), they belong

nothing more than certain aspects (बहुवृत्ति aspect and व्यावृत्ति aspect, respectively) of the things of which they are predicated (वशात्त्वयैवेवैव तयोः यतीवमन्वात् L 23). For इव क्षेत्र काव and माव see *Byādrā-māḍjari* on Bk. XXIII. "इव त्वात् कर्त्तव्यत् एवम्-क्षेत्रकावमावक्येभ्योऽन्येभ्यः सर्वे दुष्प्रसङ्गः । न पुनः परस्परलोकात्मकभावक्येव । तथा हि । इम्यो इवता वार्त्तिकेणास्ति भावार्त्तिकत्वेन । क्षेत्रता वास्तुतुल्यत्वेन न वास्तुतुल्यत्वेन । कावताः क्षितिगतत्वेन न वास्तुतुल्यत्वेन । मावताः इवतात्वेन न इवतात्वेन । अन्येतरक्यारणा लक्षणव्यतिरेक इति ॥"

Mark that upto this point Mallinson has taken the word 'मावन्तर' of the second line of the stanza as referring to सावान्य and विवेक recognised as categories other than the well-known माव or वशात् viz. इव तुल्य कर्त्तव्य and लवभाव (मावन्तराभ्यां वशात्मावताम् इवतुल्यकर्त्तव्यमवापेक्षः वशात्मावताम् भावव्यतिरेकसावान्य विवेकाभ्यां etc.). The explanation invol as the use of the word 'माव' in two different senses in one and the same verse, say in one and the same line 'माव' in भावाः means things in general, while 'माव' in 'मावन्तर' means the वशात् or categories, viz. इव तुल्य कर्त्तव्य and लवभाव. This is obviously contradictory and one would, therefore, prefer to take मावन्तर in the sense of 'other than the things themselves' and, this is the sense in which the author understands the word in the passage that follows, viz., "वशात्त्वयैवेवैव तयोः यतीवमन्वात् । न च यती वर्मित लवभावत्वेन व्यतिरेकः (ll. 21-24). The transition, however from one explanation to the other is almost unconscious, the argument being continuous, and the words इवत्त्वशावान्तर (to सावान्यविवेकयोः इवत्त्वशावान्तरत्वेनैव व्याख्या) and मावव्यतिरेक (to भावव्यतिरेकसावान्यविवेकाभ्याम्) leading themselves to a double interpretation, viz. (1) other than the categories इवतुल्य-कर्त्तव्य-लवभाव or (2) other than the things themselves.

L 23 न च यती वर्मित लवभावः etc.—सावान्य and विवेक are but the यती (not real independent entities, but mere aspects) of the वशात् of which they are predicated. Thus —Are not यती other than the वर्मित of which they are predicated? Is not प्रद्वय different from its subject? To this the author replies No. If यती were absolutely other than the वर्मित there could be no such relation between them as विशेष and विशेष्य

or subject and predicate any more than between a camel and a donkey two absolutely distinct entities which could never be related as subject and predicate, (ब्रह्मन्तमेवे दिव्येवमदिमेव्यमात्र-
हृत्पदे । परमपुन्यपदेरिह पर्यवर्तिम्वदेष्टव्यमात्रमात्र (II 34 35) More-
over if ब्रह्म were held to be distinct from the अदिम् i.e. the sub-
stratum in which they are supposed to inhere, there would
be as many distinct entities in a अदिम् as there are अदिम्, that
is to say an infinite number of पदार्थ would have to be
admitted on the proposed hypothesis (ब्रह्मात्रमात्रं पृथक्पदार्थेन
ब्रह्मदेवद्विमेव वस्तुनि पदार्थोपपत्तयः । अत्रन्तर्भव्यपदार्थस्तु-
त-
II 36-37)

Page 12

L 23 पदार्थवत्त्वात् etc. St. iv II 3-4 - Construe thus :-पदे
(पदार्थेभ्यो ज्योतिरिच्छायाश्च अत्र परस्परविरुद्धौ च) यौ सामान्यविशेषौ
तयोर्वै भावतः (इत्येव-अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिश्च) तत्रात् (तत्रादिप)
(II 33-34) इति = L. Other than (अत्र) & strangers to each other
(परस्परविरुद्धौ) सामान्य and विशेष which are supposed to be other
than the पदार्थ of which they are predicated or other than the
categories इत्येव तु च ब्रह्म and सत्त्वात् (For the two explanations
see here), and which, moreover are regarded as two distinct
पदार्थः i.e. as (पदार्थेभ्यो ज्योतिरिच्छायाश्च परस्परविरुद्धौ च). Their
भावतः their सत्त्वात् consisting of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति respec-
tively सामान्य-विशेष । I reference that For the meaning
of the ब्रह्म the author cites सम्बन्ध-कर्मोचारे (II 8. 2-74)
अनन्यवत्त्वात् - a bahuvrīhi dyuti a qualifying, the tatpuruṣa
मोक्षपदार्थवत्त्वात् it means - it is the all good otherness is not
fact, is it what it is said to be literally = it is it does not
possess the अव्ययत्वं the सत्त्वात् or character which has been
ascribed to it by the वैशेषिक-मतः that (1) सामान्य and विशेष
are absolutely other than the पदार्थ of which they are predi-
cated, and (2) are distinct अत्र अतिशयोक्त्या - as separate
entities (from it not, and इत्येव-इत्येव to adhere hence त्रिव्यम्
separate), इति ब्रह्म इति - I say that some thing is वत् i.e.
अत्र is to assert ब्रह्मन्तमेव (absolute distinction) as its necessary
implicate

II 43 : इति च पदार्थेन सामान्यविशेषवदेष्टव्यमदिच्छाये इति विधाने
etc. - Now if there were ब्रह्मन्तमेव between सामान्य and विशेष etc

the one hand and the *परार्थ* on the other || would be impossible to connect the two cognitions of *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति* with the *परार्थ*. For if the two sides fall absolutely and *सामान्य* and *विशेष* could have nothing to do with the *परार्थ*. If on the other hand we adopt the alternative of *इकान्त भेद*—absolute identity—one member of the pair *सामान्य* and *विशेष* would vanish leaving only the other in the field. (*इकान्तभेदे सामान्यविशेषयोरेकत्वम्*: L 45). For both being mutually contradictory they could not be identified with the same *परार्थ*. Moreover if *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were merged in the *परार्थ* there would be no explanation of two non-evilent facts as *सामान्य* and *विशेष* (= *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति*) which appear in every experience.

L 47 *परस्परविरुद्धवत्त्वाच्च* etc.—The word *पर* in the stanza was interpreted in the sense of (1) other than the *परार्थ*, and (2) distinct *enter as*. The *परस्पर* *सामान्य* and *विशेष*! the latter sense will be discussed later on. See *इति* on St. VIII

I was tempted to interpret the passage in somewhat different way that is, as referring to the *परस्पर* or *अन्तर* of *सामान्य* and *विशेष* *enter as*. Thus the argument in *सामान्यविशेषयोरेकत्वमिच्छते स्वीकृत्य* etc., would be that if *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were regarded as absolutely distinct from each other they could not give rise to the ideas of *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति*! reference to one and the same object—as in fact they did—being contradictory. If, on the other hand, *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were regarded as absolutely one, one would be merged in the other leaving only the other in the field, which would be contrary to our everyday experience of both *सामान्य* and *विशेष* appearing together in one and the same object (*सामान्यविशेषयोरेकत्वमिच्छते स्वीकृत्य* *प्रतीते* L 47). But this interpretation while it possesses the advantage of giving point to *पर* and *इति* in *इकान्तव्युक्ति* and *इकान्तव्यावृत्ति* and also to *इकान्तव्यावृत्ति* in the last quoted line, is precluded by the fact that the author *enter as* speaks of the *परस्पर* or *अन्तर* as *परार्थ* and not *enter as* in his passage; *enter as* *परार्थ* *व्यतिरिक्तसामान्य* and *परार्थ* *इकान्तव्युक्ति* *स्वीकृत्य*

Stanza V

Divide the Commentary thus :—

- I आदीनि... सर्वे हि भाव्य इत्यर्थिकमवायेकत्वा विरपाः सर्वाचार्यिकमपा-
रोक्षत् प्रवर्तित्वाः। Introductory
 - II तदेकमवाचित्वतया...वित्वावित्त्वं एव। तथा इति but a form of तेज
and so the latter is both वित्त्वं and अवित्त्वं
 - III एवं व्योमादि... इति सिद्धं वित्त्वावित्त्वं व्योम्ना ।
आकाश is similarly both वित्त्वं and अवित्त्वं
 - IV स्वार्थद्वया अविति...इत्युपपत्तिः। The doctrine of the Yogins on
the nature of वित्त्वं and अवित्त्वं.
 - V () अवोचत्पर्यं... कथञ्चित्, The second half of the Stanza
explained.
- (b) The doctrine of the Vaisesikas unwittingly in
favour of वित्त्वावित्त्वं

Page 12.

II. 2-3 आदीनि etc. —All things, हीन (a flame of light)
and व्याम (ākāśa) alike, possess the common nature
of permanence and change. For all Reality is ~~substance-con-~~
mode (द्रव्य स्वार्थं द्रव्यपदवाचकम्). This is stated by
Udayanīti the T Sūtra “इत्याद्वयव्योमपुच्छत्” —of which the
terms इत्याद्वय and वीक्ष्य are thus explained in the T R.
Vārtika स्वभावावित्त्वादेव भावान्तरावितिह्येतत्, तथापूर्वभाव-
विगमो व्यर एवे एवेर्धर्मोक्तुवतीति ह्ये” Note that द्रव्य is
not merely द्रव्य but also वर्ण्य and hence, इत्याद्वय and व्यय in
addition : वीक्ष्य moreover, द्रव्य is not simply वर्ण्य but is
also द्रव्य and therefore वीक्ष्य in addition to इत्याद्वय and विनाशः.
Thus, everything that exists (सत्) is द्रव्यवर्धवाचक and
इत्याद्वयव्योमपुच्छत्. As is the point of “पुच्छ and its implication
in regard to the relation of द्रव्य and वर्ण्य see the Com. on the
T. R.—Vārtik on the T Sūtra V 29— which thus sums up
the whole position: वर्ण्यविषय वर्ण्यवानां च इत्याद्वयार्थं स्वार्थद्रव्यम् ।
यथा वयस्य मनुष्यत्वं जातिपुच्छकयादिभिः अविवक्षितत्वं अनेकलक्षणान्तरा-
दिभिरपि पुच्छमन्त्यागिष्येयादयो धर्मो परस्परतो विविधा इत्यव्ययते । न तेन
वेदाद्वय मेव नापि तद्वयमेव शेषाममेव । तत् विमृशदिवक्त्रवैकल्यात् नाना

the one hand and the *वस्तु*s on the other it would be impossible to connect the two cognitions of *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति* with the *वस्तु*s. For if the two sides fall absolutely asunder *सामान्य* and *विशेष* could have nothing to do with the *वस्तु*s. If on the other hand we adopt the literal of *एकान्त अमेव*—absolute identity—one member of the pair of *सामान्य* and *विशेष* would vanish leaving only the other in the field. (*वस्तुसमये सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तिः* L 45). For both being mutually contradictory they could not be identified with the same *वस्तु*s. Moreover if *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were merged in the *वस्तु* there would be no explanation of two such evident facts as *सामान्य* and *विशेष* (= *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति*) which appear in every experience.

L 47 *परस्परविरुद्धवस्तु* etc.—The word *वस्तु* in the stanza was interpreted in the sense of (1) *other* than the *वस्तु*s, and (2) *darkness* *under* *it*. The *वस्तु* of *सामान्य* and *विशेष* in the latter sense will be discussed later on. See *इति* on St. VII.

I was tempted to interpret the passage in a somewhat different way that is, as referring to the *वस्तु* or *अव्युक्ति* of *सामान्य* and *विशेष* *under* *it*. Thus the argument *सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तिः सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तिः* etc., would be that if *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were regarded as absolutely distinct from each other they could not give rise to the idea of *अव्युक्ति* and *व्यावृत्ति*—reference to one and the same object—as in fact they did—being contradictory. If, on the other hand, *सामान्य* and *विशेष* were regarded as absolutely one, as we would be merged in the other leaving only the other in the field, which would be contrary to our everyday experience of both *सामान्य* and *विशेष* appearing together in one and the same object (*सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तिः* *वस्तु* *प्रतीतेः* L 47). But this interpretation, while it possesses the advantage of giving point to *वस्तु* and *व्युक्ति* in *वस्तुव्युक्ति* and *व्युक्तिवस्तु*—I leave to *वस्तुव्युक्ति* in the last quoted line—is precluded by the fact that the author in the peak of the *परस्परविरुद्धवस्तु* as '*वस्तुव्युक्ति*' did not *inter* *it* in his passage; only *वस्तुव्युक्ति* *व्युक्तिव्युक्ति* and '*वस्तुव्युक्ति* *व्युक्तिव्युक्ति* *व्युक्तिव्युक्ति*'

अनुपपत्त्येव वा न ह्यनङ् । तथा इत्यस्यापि वाक्यान्तरौदयविशेषापरिहारा
 र्वात्म्यं कर्मविशिष्टा इत्यापेयात् कर्मविशिष्टाः इति वाक्यत्वं न कल्पकञ्च
 यावामात्रम् । तस्मात्तुल्यद्वारिकैववद्वक्तिः तथा, तनुर्ह्य इत्यमित्यवसेदङ् ।
 Note, again, how शीघ्रम् is reconciled with इत्याह and अथ Thom
 "अवरोत्पाद्यव्यतिरेकात्तत्त्व प्रीत्यानुपपत्तिरिति चेदपि विहितवचोवाह । ...
 इत्याद्यमस्यात्वात् प्रीत्यमपि विहितं अवरोत्पादादप्या व्यतिरेकात् । अथ च अवरोत्पा-
 दात्माप्यव्यतिरेकात् प्रीत्यमपि विहितं स्यात् तदव्यतिरेकात् प्रीत्यं भवेत् । अथ
 वा अवरोत्पादादप्या व्यतिरेकात् इत्थं ह्यं इत्याहपि व्यतिरेकात् अवरोत्पादो-
 बीत्यं प्रत्यक्षेत् । etc.

L 6. स्वाहाद्वारिकपत्तिरिति—Nothing can break through the
 seal of स्वाहात्, i.e., the conditions imposed by the Universal
 Law of स्वाहात्—the doctrine of the "May-be"—which declares
 all absolute propositions, such as, something is absolutely
 true or untrue every proposition according to the Jain doctrine,
 being only relatively true, i.e., true from certain point of
 view and untrue from a different point of view. It is thus
 doctrine of Relativity of Truth, of fluid as opposed to rigid
 Truth, and should not be confounded with any form of
 Skepticism or Agnosticism, ancient or modern.

L 7. स्वास्तिसम्भवः etc. स्वात् (originally Pot. 3rd pers. sing
 of अस् to be) is generally treated by commentators as an
 indefinable noun or adjective denoting indefinite possibility

L 8. स्वाहाद्वारिकपत्तिरिति etc. The doctrine of the "May-be"
 means the doctrine of *Indefinite* aspects of Truth, involving co-
 existence of such apparently inconsistent dharmas as विद्यत्
 and अविद्यत्

L 10. अथा हि अविद्यमिहे राज्ञि etc. The word राज्ञि suggests
 the idea of the royal seal, and through it, the analogy of
 sovereign whose law all must obey. Nothing can trans-
 gress the law of स्वाहात् says the author without committing
 suicide or throwing itself out of the world-order (तनुहृदे तेषा
 स्वकान्तराद्यानिवृत्तये । It is possible to take स्वकान्तराद्या
 पतितसुराह, but I prefer to take it as ह्यङ्, thus drawing
 from it two ideas instead of one)

L 15. सर्वस्यैव तत्त्वस्य सात्वत्त्व The स्वाहात् — that all things
 partake of the common nature of अविद्यमिहत्त्व or स्वाहात् is

the form (परिवर्त) of light and assume that (पर्यायान्तर) of darkness. Thus, the particles persist as the original matter (पुनरुत्पन्न), that which changes being only their form (पर्याय). A mere change of form does not mean अविवर्तन—सृष्टिदा for example may take numberless forms such as those of a jar, a storehouse, etc.; yet the सृष्टिदा is recognised as the identical substance persisting through all the changes. This, says the author, is patent to the dullest man (आवागोचरं प्रतीतयात्). The case of घटि and ताम्रः is not so patent; yet it is the same. That transformation is not causation (अविवर्तन) is shown here in the same way as in the theory of the सत्कारणवादिन् (Sāṅkhya and Vedānta) which goes as far back as the Upaniṣads, to which see Inter alia Sāṅkhya Kārikā IX and Com., Sāṅkhya Sūtras I. 115-123 and Com., Brahma-Sūtras-II-1-14-18 and Śaṅkara's commentaries thereon:—

“अतदकारणमुपद्रव्यमवस्थात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् । अथस्य व्यक्त्यकारणात्
कारणभावात् सत्कारणम् ॥ B. Kār IX.

“अथ हि कुर्मस्वहृदि कुर्मस्वरीरे विविधभावाणि तिरोभवन्ति निःसरन्ति
आनिर्भवन्ति न तु कुर्मस्वहृदमुत्पन्नान्ते मर्त्यलान्ते वा स्वमेवस्व सृष्टं तु सर्वस्व वा
वदुःखदुःखयो विनाश विस्तरस्त आनिर्भवन्त उत्पन्नस्त इत्युक्तं विविधभावात्
तिरोभवन्तो विदुःखोत्पन्नान्ते न पुनरुत्पद्यन्त्यात् सर्वा वा तिरोभाः —S. T.
Kaṇḍadī (Com on B. K.) IX

“अस्वाविवर्तस्यैव वास्वस्वतीतामागतवर्तमावस्थामेव वा वदन्त्या । वदोऽ-
तीत्ये वदो वर्तमानो वदो अविच्छिन्नोऽपि प्रत्यक्षार्थं तुल्यस्वतीतावस्थात् । न स्वेकस्व
वाच्यविचक्षणमन्त्रोक्त्यामावस्थिपत्यमिति । तै क्वातीतामागतमे अवस्थे ज्वलन्ता
गतावस्थान्तरं अवदन्त ॥ B. Pr Bh. on B. Sūtra 113.

“अथमेव हि सत्कारणविनाशसत्कारणविरहितो विद्येते यत् तैरुत्पन्नानी प्राग-
भावावर्ती सत्कारणमिति वास्वस्वमागतवस्थे भावस्थे प्रोच्येते । वर्तमावस्थान्तर-
वाच्यविचक्षणस्य वदामपि तिरोच्येते । वदोऽवस्थान्तरवदवस्थान्तरमिति ॥ B. Pr
Bh. on B. Sūtra 82.

Let us note here the views of the different Indian Schools regarding the relation of Cause ('material cause in the Aristotelian sense) and Effect;

अद्वयमिति पक्षोऽपि च । अथवाऽपि प्रत्यये विष्णवत् इत्यर्थः । कार्य इति प्रक-
 टीति इत्थं कारणम् । इत्येवमर्थोऽयं कारणमेव कार्यवाचीत्यर्थं न च कार्यकारणयो-
 रन्विहमेवः अनुसन्धेयकारणयेव पराङ्मुक्तिरिति इत्यर्थः । परित्यक्तात् भाव-
 पक्षः । पक्षेव इत्यर्थे कार्यमस्य इत्यन्वयः अतीतामागतयोर्द्विधाऽप्यन्वयेन अत्रा-
 राभावात् न इदं वाक्येऽप्यन्वयेऽप्यमिति पक्षोऽपि च । अथवाऽप्यन्वय-
 पक्षे इत्येवमर्थोऽयं प्रत्ययमिवाभावात्पुनरिति इत्यर्थस्य निमित्तमप्यन्वयमिति
 इत्यर्थः । पक्षोऽयं प्रत्ययमस्य वाचिभावस्यादिति निवन्धनवद्वाक्यमिति चे-
 रिति पक्षोऽपि च । तदुक्तं भगवताम् ॥

(1) इत्यस्तित्वा and (2) पक्षोऽपि च are slight variations of
 इत्यस्तित्वा and पक्षोऽपि च and they mean respectively (1) the
 view that इत्य is the fundamental reality the वाचिभाव being
 nothing apart from it, and (2) the view that पक्षोऽपि च, i.e.,
 वाचिभाव is the only reality the इत्य being nothing apart
 from them. In explaining इत्यस्तित्वा and पक्षोऽपि च, the writer
 refers to three different meanings of the word अर्थ viz., (1)
 Truth or Reality (2) Effect, and (3) Object or Purpose—so
 that the two terms would respectively mean (1) अर्थ = इत्य—
 Reality the view that इत्य is the only reality इत्य and अर्थ
 (comprised under the common head of पक्षोऽपि च) being mere states
 of इत्य, and the view the पक्षोऽपि च (i.e., इत्य such as इत्य etc. and अर्थ
 such as इत्येव) is the only reality इत्य being nothing apart from
 पक्षोऽपि च. (2) अर्थ = इत्येव i.e., Effect the view that इत्य, i.e., कारण
 is the अर्थ, ~ इत्येव and the view that पक्षोऽपि च is the अर्थ i.e.,
 इत्येव. (3) अर्थ = प्रयोज्य object the view that इत्य is the object
 of our thought, language, etc. and the view that the same are
 directed to पक्षोऽपि च

Il. 18—26 तदीयान्निष्कृताः etc. —Next I show the proof
 that प्रीति is at once निष्कृता and अनिष्कृता. The obvious difficulty in
 the way of regarding प्रीति or तैत्ति as निष्कृता is our experience
 of तैत्ति as the negation of प्रीति or तैत्ति. The difficulty is met by
 the Jains by treating तैत्ति as positive substance, kind of
 matter—गुण—into which तैत्ति is at times transformed
 The particles of तैत्ति, according to the Jain theory assume
 the particular form (पक्षोऽपि च) of प्रीति, but when the oil is
 exhausted the oil is a blast of wind the particles abandon

the form (परिव) of light and assume that (परिवान्तर) of darkness. Thus, the particles persist as the original matter (सुक्ष्मद्रव्य), that which changes being only their form (परिव). A mere change of form does not mean अविवर्तन—सुक्ष्म, for example, may take numberless forms such as those of a jar, a storehouse etc.; yet the सुक्ष्म is recognised as the identical substance persisting through all the changes. This, says the author is patent to the dullest man (आद्यान्मोर्षा प्रतीत्यार्थ). The case of मही and हय is not so patent, yet it is the same. That transformation is not creation (अविवर्तन) is shown here in the same way as in the theory of the सत्त्वर्थादिवि (Sāṅkhya and Vedānta) which goes as far back as the Upaniṣads, for which see inter alia Sāṅkhya Kārikā IX and Com., Sāṅkhya Sūtra I 113-115 and Com. Brahma-Sūtra-II-1-14-18 and Śaṅkara's commentaries thereon—

“अतस्कारणानुकारमविवर्तनं सर्वसंभवाभावात् । अकारणं अकारणकारणं
कारणभावात् सत्त्वर्थात् ॥” ■ Kār IX.

“यथा हि पूर्वस्य ह्यनि पूर्वस्य विविधभावाणि विरोधवन्ति नि-सर्गमि
याविर्यवन्ति न तु पूर्वस्य ह्यनिमुक्तान्ते प्रत्यसन्ते वा स्वयेकस्य सूरः स्वयमेव वा
समुद्भूतस्य विरोधो निमित्तस्य आविर्यवन्तं स्वयमेव ह्युत्पद्यते विविधभावा
विर्यमवन्तो निमित्तस्योत्पद्यन्ते न प्रत्यसन्तास्तथा सतां वा विरोधः”—S. T.
Kaṇḍī (Com. on S. K.) IX.

तस्याविवर्तनेव कारकस्योत्पत्त्यागत्यविवर्तनाभावात्तथा च वक्ष्यते । बरो-
दीतो बरो बरोमलो बरो मविच्छिन्ति प्रत्यसन्तां तुम्हवन्तेति चित्वात् । न ज्ञेयस्य
वाच्यविवर्तनमविवर्तनाभावाविवर्तनमिति । ते क्वासीत्याभावात्तथा अविवर्तने चित्तमा
नयाविवर्तनं अविवर्तनः ॥ B. Pr Bh. on B. Sūtra 113.

“अथनेव वि मत्त्वर्थादिविवर्तनसत्त्वर्थादिविवर्तने विरोधे वा वैद्व्यवर्तनी प्रत्य
ध्यावर्तनी सत्त्वर्थादिविवर्तने कारकस्योत्पत्त्यागत्यविवर्तनाभावात्तथा च वक्ष्यते । बरोमलो
विवर्तनमविवर्तनाभावाविवर्तनमिति । ते क्वासीत्याभावात्तथा अविवर्तने चित्तमा
नयाविवर्तनं अविवर्तनः ॥ B. Pr Bh. on B. Sūtra 83.

Let us note here the views of the different Indian Schools regarding the relation of Cause ('material' cause in the Aristotelian sense) and Effect :

It is अनिर्वचनीय It is neither सत् nor असत्, either before or after its birth, II is दिव्य This doctrine which may be called अनिर्वचनीय-कर्मव्यापार is sometimes confused with or placed under सत्कार्यव्यापार But in truth II is सत्कार्यव्यापार rather than सत्कार्यव्यापार

“ये हि दृग्गन्तव्यकृपा न ते नस्तुसन्तो यथा भ्रमग्राभ्यिकोवकारकः । तथा च तत्रैव विचारजातं दृग्गन्तव्यस्य सत् । तथा हि यदस्ति तदस्यैव यथा विहाय्या । न यतो यदपि कश्चि कर्मविद्वांसि किं तु सर्वदा सर्वत्र सर्वथास्त्वैव न नास्ति । न तत्रैव विचारजातम् । तत्र नरापि कर्मविद्वांसि कर्मविदवत्यानाम् । तथाहि सत्त्वमात्रं वेद्विचारजातं कर्म कदापि सत् । अतस्त्वमात्रं केवलम् कदापि सत् । तद् ततोरेकत्वमिदमेव । न हि कर्म कदापि कश्चि कर्मविद्वा मन्त्रो यमपि । अथ तत्र कदापि यमो ते च स्वकारणाधीनमन्यतया कदापिदेव न भवत् । तर्हि विचार जातं दृग्गन्तव्यमात्रं सदावयमिति न विचारः कदापि । अथातस्तत्रमये तथास्ति कस्य हि ब्रह्मोऽन्तरम् । न हि ब्रह्मिण्यस्तुत्ये तद्ब्रह्मोऽन्तरं प्रत्युत्पन्नपपत्ते । अथास्य न ब्रह्म किं पर्यन्तमस्मत्तत्तत् । किमात्रं यावत् । न हि ब्रह्मे जाते परस्व किंचिद्भवति । अतस्तं यावमिदोपीति चेत् । न । अकिंचित्करस्य तत्त्वात्प्रायेः । किंचित्करत्वे वा तद्वान्तत्वादेव तद्ब्रह्मोपमसंभवात् । अथास्वात्मार्थं नाम किंचित् जायते किं तु स एव न भवति । यथाह ‘न तत्र किंचिद्भवति न भवत्यत्र केवलयम्’ इति । अथैव प्रसङ्गप्रतिषेधो विरुध्यताम् । किं तत्त्वमात्रो जाय इव माय स्वभावाः स इति । तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कर्मो यावमात्रं तत्त्वमात्रतया दृग्गन्तव्यं अन्त्यम् प्रसङ्गेव । तथा च मायामयमाय । अतस्मिन् सर्वमायवित्यतया नामावप्यवहारः सत् । कर्मनामाश्रमिषित्तत्वेऽपि विवेकस्य यावन्निष्पत्तापत्तिस्तद्वत्त्वैव । तस्माद्विभवसि कारव्यधिकारजातं न नस्तु सत् । अतो विचारजातमपिर्वैकरीयवदस्य । Bhāṣanā Br 8. II L 14.

(4) According to the Jaina, as with the Śāṅkara Vedāntin, there is partial truth in both the conflicting theories mentioned

Das-Gupta rightly observes "Both the Vedānta and Bhikkhya theories of causation are sometimes called *Sambharyā* *vāda*. But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedānta theory of causation should be called *Satbharyāvāda*, for according to it the *Kāraṇa* (cause) alone exists (sat) and all *Kāryas* (effects) are illusory appearances of the *Kāraṇa*; but according to Bhikkhya the *Kārya* exists in potential state in the *Kāraṇa* and is hence always existing and real.—Das-Gupta H. I. Phil. vol. I. p. 258.

two theories in fact that the earlier strictly evolutionary view would—unless essentially modified—render the Darwinian doctrine of the origin of species impossible. For according to that earlier theory the germ was more than a marvellous bird-like miniature of the adult, it necessarily included in its turn the next generation and this the next—in short all future generations. Germ within germ in ever smaller miniature, after the fashion of an infinite juggler's box: was the corollary logically appended to this theory of preformation. The successive unfolding of such a system of emboliment or involution, though the plus ultra of evolution, literally understood, is than the direct negative of an evolution, as we understand it to-day. According to this latter theory each new organism is not an educt but a product to use Kantian phrases; its parts are in no sense present in the embryo but are gradually organised one after another in due order as the term epigenesis implies and as Harvey who first used the term, prophetically maintained. It is now known too that in this progressive differentiation the individual retraces the main stages through which the species has advanced as Haeckel in technical language concisely puts it: Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.

II. 26-34, III नमः तस्य दीर्घविशेषसिद्धयः—The author next shows how नमः may well be regarded a material substance (द्रव्य). His reasoning is that नमः being quite as visible (वाचस्पत्यव्याख्यानः) as light (चक्षुरद्रव्य), it is as much a material substance as the latter the only difference between the two being that one is dark and the other bright. But it may be objected that नमः is not really visible (चक्षुरद्रव्य) for whatever is really visible (चक्षुरद्रव्य) requires light to make it so; whereas, नमः does not require it; therefore its visibility (वाचस्पत्य) must be deemed to be only apparent. The answer made to this objection is: नमः is seen by eyes without the help of light, which shows that the वाचस्पत्य relied upon by the V i-cerk (viz., whatever is visible requires light to make it so) breaks down. No doubt we do require light to enable us to see

रश्मि इत्यादि, but this is no reason why we should require it in order to see ताम्रम्. So different are the natures of things in this world that you must take the differences as they are, and have no right to obliterate them by adopting a fictitious uniformity. For example, gold, pearls, etc., although all ताम्रम् are not visible without external light; whereas lamp, the moon, etc., are visible even without the aid of other light.

L. 34. अदृश्यात् इत्यादि—Moreover ताम्रम् possesses not only a colour (dark) which makes it visible, but also tangibility (स्पर्श), viz., cool touch.

L. 35-38. यदि अविद्यते इत्यादि—The following are the grounds relied upon by the Vaiśeṣika, says the author for holding that ताम्रम् cannot be material substance—(a) want of density (अविद्यमानत्वम्); (b) want of resistance (अविरुद्धत्वम्); (c) absence of developed—distinct—tangibility (अङ्गुलस्पर्शविशेषत्वम्); (d) absence of its being a fragment cut off like a chip from a block (अव्यतीतान्वयव्यतिरेकत्वम्). To all these, he says, he could make a simple reply: None of these conditions, viz., density resistance, tangibility and divisibility is fulfilled by light—अदीप्तम्—and yet light is undeniably a material substance.

L. 38-42. अदृश्यात् इत्यादि—The dissimilarity between the ताम्रम् particles and their product—the ताम्रम्—may be paralleled by that of वह्नि and दूध the one refulgent (वाक्स्पन्द) and the other dark.

On the question of the nature of दूध, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, see Valī. Sūtras II 19-20 with Śaṅkarānanda Upadhāna, the section on Dravya in Tarkadīpikā with Nīlakaṇṭhi and other commentaries, similarly Nyāya-Siddhānta-muktāvalī and its commentaries, Nyāya-kandall, Vol. III. pp. 910, and Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha O. B. Ed. pp. 228-230 where the Vaiśeṣika view is discussed and established.

अदृश्यात् अदृश्यत्वे निमित्तत्वे इति तत्पर्ययत्वम् । तत्र तदुच्यते विद्यमान-
त्वम् । तद्वति इत्येव तत्र इति पक्षो वेद्यमित्यत्र प्रयोज्यम् । आदेयितं नोपपत्तिरिति
निरूपयत्यर्थः । अदृश्यत्वात् इति भाष्यकारेणोक्तम् । अदृश्यत्वात् इति

II. 76-85. विविध जलसर्वं वर्मिणः परिणामोऽन्यथा—According to the Yogins (See Pāt. Yoga Sūtras and Vyāsa Bhāṣya -III 13), says the author a वर्मिणः (substance possessed of वर्म, as every substance is) undergoes परिणाम or modification of three kinds: (1) वर्म (2) लक्षण and (3) अवस्था—which he thus illustrates: (1) When the substance—gold—is made into ornaments, the ornaments are the वर्मपरिणाम of gold. (2) The वर्म, again, of gold viz., the ornaments may be changed from one shape to another when present shape becomes past and future shape becomes present. This is called लक्षण परिणाम (अद्यतनेनेति लक्षणं कालमेव । नैव द्विःकलितं वस्तु वस्तुवन्तरेणः कालान्तराद्युक्तयोः परस्परिणामे—Vācaspati Mīśra.) (3) Or a certain shape may become old by sheer lapse of time. This is called अवस्थापरिणाम. All the three kinds of परिणाम belong to one and the same वर्मिणः (सोऽयं विविधः परिणामो वर्मिणः). [But how would you reconcile this remark with another just few lines above viz., 'वर्मस्य तु लक्षणपरिणामोऽन्यथा लक्ष्य' ? I suppose by referring the लक्षणपरिणाम through the वर्म to the वर्मिणः]. And they are supposed to be at once distinct from and identical with the वर्मिणः (वर्मलक्षणावस्थाव वर्मिणो विभावा विभाव) How ? they are identical with the वर्मिणः the वर्मिणः being वियः (persistent or abiding reality) the परिणाम too are वियः; and if they are distinct from the वर्मिणः they are subject to इत्यारं and विभाव and are therefore अवियः. Thus they are both वियः and अवियः.

cf तदेतमुदाहरणम् । लक्ष्यार्थं विवक्षाकृतोदयोदयान्तराद्युपलक्षणपरिणामो वर्मणः परिणामतो नराकार इति । यथाकालेऽन्यथा लक्षणं दित्वा वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नत इति लक्षणतः परिणमते । कथं नवपुत्रपत्नी प्रतिपन्नयनुपपन्नवत्परिणामं प्रति दद्यत इति । वर्मिणोऽपि यमोन्मत्तवत्त्वा वर्मक्यानि लक्षणान्तरावस्थानेनैव न इत्यपरिणामो मेदेयोदयार्जित इति । ... न त्वेव वर्मलक्षणपरिणामपरिणामा वर्मिणस्त्वयमवतिकाया इत्येक एव परिणामः लक्षणकृतं विवेचावधिगम्यते ॥ cf also वचार्थं लक्ष्यम् । वर्मास्तु लक्षणा । नैव लक्षिता लक्षिता । तत्र लक्षितायां लक्षणपर्यायाप्युक्तोऽन्यथेव प्रतिविर्तिरुक्तोऽन्यथान्तरतो न युज्यान्तरतः । वयिणः रेखा जलस्थानि जलं दृश्यमाने इत्येव वैकल्याने तथा वैकल्याने लो वावा चोपवने दृष्टिना च स्थिता चेति (Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Pāt. Sūtra III 13.)

11. 86-92. अनासत्तायै विविचते etc.—All things are equally characterised by *ह्यस्व* and *हीयस्व*; and, therefore, it is wrong to draw a line of distinction between things and things and say that certain things are absolutely *वित्त* and *वित्त* only e. g. *आत्मा आद्य* etc., while certain others are absolutely *अवित्त* and *अवित्त* only e. g. *प्रज्ञा एत.* etc.

1 89 अवन्तवर्ग्ये वस्तुनि etc.—Compare—*बोधोत्पत्त्यवर्ग्यवस्तुनि कलत्रपरिष्कृते । अवन्तवर्ग्ये वस्तु तेनोक्तं यावन्मोक्षः ३ येन कारणेन मृत्युत्पत्त्यवर्ग्यवस्तुनि कलत्रपरिष्कृते तेन कारणेनावन्तवर्ग्ये वस्तुनामोक्षः । प्रत्यक्षपरिष्कृतमवित्तवित्तः । उक्ते कथितमिति संवत्स । Lagha-Vrtti on the Sū.*

Page 17

11. 93-96. अत्र च प्रथममासीत् etc.—This is too ingenious. Mallis'ara says that in the first line we had *हीय* and *ह्योय*—the first supposed to be *अवित्त* and the latter *वित्त*; but in the second half the order is reversed, *वित्त* being mentioned first and *अवित्त* afterwards. This *प्रत्यक्षपरिष्कार*—abandonment of the order—is suggestive of the view that after all there is no such thing as fixed or absolute *वित्त* and *अवित्त* and so they may very well exchange places!

11. 96- *प्रत्यक्षपरिष्कारः* etc.—The author has shown above that the Yoga doctrine of *परिचय*s and their relation to the *वर्ग्य* is a virtual admission of the *वित्तवित्त* doctrine, that is, of the *अवित्त* of the Jainas. Next he proceeds to show how the '*प्रथममासीत्*'—the *Vaiśeṣika*s whose system is being discussed—hold a doctrine which is a virtual admission of the *वित्तवित्त* doctrine. Thus '*प्रत्यक्षपरिष्कारः*'—*Prasastapāda*, the *Bhāṣya* of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, says, *पृथ्वी* is of two kinds, *वित्त* and *अवित्त*; that consisting of atoms is *वित्त* that consisting of effects is *अवित्त*. Obviously it may be argued this is not an admission that *पृथ्वी*—the identical *पृथ्वी*—is at once *वित्त* and *अवित्त* but all that is said is that some *वर्ग्य*s of *पृथ्वी* (*वर्ग्य* atoms) are *वित्त* while others (*वर्ग्य*) are *अवित्त*. The statements of *वित्तवित्त* and *अवित्तवित्त* thus refer to two separate *वर्ग्यवर्ग्य*s (*वर्ग्यवर्ग्यवित्तवित्तवित्तवित्तवित्तवित्तवित्त*). That is to say *वित्तवित्त* and *अवित्तवित्त* are here predicated of two separate

subjects. But this defence is futile. For *पृथ्वी* belongs to all the varieties, is *विद्य* as well as to *अविद्य* *पृथ्वी* and is 'स्वप्रतिपत्ति' both with *विद्य* and *अविद्य*; in other words, *विद्य* and *अविद्य* are both predicated of *पृथ्वी*. So also are they predicated of *अक्ष*. Then again, there is a tacit admission of *अविद्य* about *अक्ष* inasmuch as *संयोग* and *विभाग* are predicated of it.

¶ 102-103. तथा च स द्वाहः । etc.—अक्षरान्वयवशात् संयोग-विभाजितम्—*Pr.* Bhāṣya in the section on *वाक्य* p. 58. *Viz.* *Edo*. The passage is thus explained in the *Nyāyakaṇḍell* "संयोगविभाजितं वाक्यं कर्मण्य विप्रतिपत्तिं सुवेचनार्थं वक्ष्ये इति संयोगविभाजौ वाक्यं ह्युक्तं तेषां च संयोगविभाजौ सिद्धौ व्यतिरेकस्यासम्भवादिवाक्यवाक्यं (ibid p. 58). Of the three ways in which *वक्ष्य* is produced two are by means of *संयोग* and *विभाग*. *संयोग* and *विभाग* being the *वस्तुवादिवाक्य* of *वक्ष्य*, they have the same *अविद्य* as *वक्ष्य*, and that is *अक्ष*. *अक्ष* being thus bound to possess *संयोग* and *विभाग* it becomes subject to *वक्ष्य* and *अक्ष*; in other words, it is *अविद्य* (see above). Now from its *परमवृत्तिरित्यादि* it is already known to be *विद्य*. Therefore it is *विद्यविद्य*. The *विद्यविद्य* of *वाक्य* had already been shown here. But the same is shown once more here as a doctrine which is denied and yet virtually admitted by the *Vaiśeṣika* in some of their tenets—thus betraying incoherent talk. (1 103)

Page 17-18

¶ 103-142. अक्षरान्वयं च । etc.—The author now takes up the question of *विद्यविद्य* in its general form—i. e., without any such particular application as that to *क्षीर* or *ज्योति* as was done here, and points out the innumerable contradictions and impossible positions to which the doctrine of absolute *विद्य* or *अविद्य* leads us.

For example, real thing is defined as that which does something. Now let us see how the doctrine of absolute *विद्य* or *अविद्य* will fit in with this. A *विद्य* thing is one which has

The whole paragraph of the text is taken almost verbatim from Hemacandra's commentary on his own *व्याख्यानिर्णय*—1-4 21.

neither beginning nor end but only persistent existence (अप्र-
वृत्तादुत्पत्तिविरहितत्वम्). Now if it is a reality it must do some-
thing, as required by the definition of reality; and that either
at once or gradually for no third alternative is possible according
to the law of the excluded middle (असंश्लेष्यवच्छेदकस्यापि प्रका-
रमवसरसंभवत्). Of the two, the latter that is, gradual activity
is impossible in the present case, for there is nothing to delay
the action of the निरूप्य thing and prevent its doing its work at
once (समवेतं प्रवृत्तौपायोगात्) unless the thing is lacking in the
required energy or competency. It may be argued that the
thing possesses the capacity to do a certain work but it needs
an auxiliary agent to turn that capacity into actuality. But
that is virtually admitting that the thing is so far lacking in
the required competency (कारणवत्त्वमर्थम्—इति व्यस्यत्); for what
depends upon others is profecto lacking in its own strength. It
may be answered that it is not the निरूप्य thing that needs an auxi-
liary in order to produce an effect, but it is the effect itself which
needs it in order to come into being (एतेन सहकारिणोपदेष्टव्यं अवि-
द्युत्पत्तेरसहकारित्वस्य अमयत्त्वमपेक्षते). But this is only trying
to evade the difficulty we want a straight answer to this
question—Is the thing competent or incompetent? If it is
competent, why should it weakly and imploringly look at the
face of the auxiliary and not produce the effect at once? You
will perhaps say that a seed though perfectly competent to put
forth a sprout does so actually only when accompanied by earth,
water etc., and not otherwise. This statement, however will not
stand the test of the following dilemma: Do those companions
render any assistance to the principal cause or not? If they
do not, the cause (the निरूप्य thing of our hypothesis) has no
more reason to be active after than it had before the advent
of those companions. If they do, we ask the question: Is
the substance (स्वरूप) thus rendered by the companions to
the निरूप्य thing identical with the निरूप्य thing or is it different?
If it (स्वरूप) is identical with the निरूप्य thing, it vitiates the
very निरूप्य of the thing and turns it into something अविद्यं
being itself something produced by those auxiliaries. (अपेक्षे स

एव निवृत्ते इति नामविच्छेदो दुष्प्रतिपाद्यः । इत्यत्रैव तस्याविच्छेदार्थः)
 If, on the other hand, it (स्पर्श) is different from the thing
 thing itself, how can it affect the thing at all, any more
 than the Babia mountain can affect the Vladhya mountain?
 (This is only an example to illustrate two disconnected things
 which have no influence upon each other) It may be argued
 that the assistance (स्पर्श) is neither identical with the thing
 to which it is rendered, nor is it separate from it, but it belongs
 to it (सर्वव्यापकत्वस्य) . To this argument we reply by a
 question What is the relation between the thing assisted
 (स्पर्श—the thing I am hypothesizing) and the assistance
 itself (स्पर्श)? It cannot be *सर्वव्यापक* for *सर्वव्यापक* exists only
 between two things, whereas in the present case the thing assisted
 (स्पर्श) is *स्पर्श* of the assistance itself (स्पर्श) is *स्पर्श* . Nor
 can the relation be *स्पर्श* for *स्पर्श* is one and all-pervading
 and therefore it cannot be connected with any particular
 correlates (i.e., these, rather than those), all the correlates being
 equally far from or equally near to the *स्पर्श* (सर्वव्यापक-स्पर्श)
 मयेव सर्वं दुष्प्रमाणं निवृत्ते सर्वव्यापकत्वस्य दुष्प्रमाणं । If you hold
 that the *स्पर्श* is connected with particular correlates, it means
 that those correlates influence (स्पर्श) the *स्पर्श* in a certain
 manner—in which case the old difficulties (see above) about
 the influence (स्पर्श), whether regarded as identical with or
 different from the *स्पर्श* recur. Thus, if the *स्पर्श* is one with
 the *स्पर्श* it is nothing more than the *स्पर्श* if it is distinct
 from the *स्पर्श*, the *स्पर्श* fails to be the relation of any
 particular correlate. Therefore realising that *स्पर्श* is only *स्पर्श* can
 gradually do something and thus fulfil the condition of Reality.
 Now to take the other alternative, viz. the alternative of the
 thing doing its work all at once. The objection to it is
 that nothing is ever known to be doing all its work all at once.
 Suppose it does, what will remain for it to do in
 the next moment? Supposing, again, that there does remain
 some work to do then the position is the same as the one
 also considered, viz., that of gradual action, of which it is
 only an alias. Supposing, however, that it has no work to do

in the succeeding moment, it fails to fulfil the definition of Reality and is therefore nothing. Thus, both the alternative hypotheses of gradual or successive action and simultaneous action failing in the case of an absolutely *विरत* thing, the activity with which they are concomitant also fails, and with the fall of activity comes non-existence or nothingness. Thus collapses the alternative of absolute *विरत*.

Page 19-20

IL 143-172. Turn we now to the other alternative, viz., that of absolute *विरत*. An *विरत*-thing is one which perishes every moment. Such a thing cannot do any kind of work *सम्पन्न* (सम्पन्न) for in its case no succession either of time or of space is possible. Thus—Succession means the relation of before and after which is impossible in the case of that which has absolutely momentary existence. Only a thing that abides can cover several points of space and time. But the thing which perishes every moment cannot do so. How things fare under the absolute-*विरत*-hypothesis is thus described in a verse "यो जीव स जीव यो जीव त्रीव सः । न देवदानमोर्वातिर्मात्राविह विद्यते ॥"—i. e., Things occupy only a certain point of space or time, they do not cover any length of space or time. It may be urged that things no doubt perish in a moment and so do not admit of succession (सम), but they form a *संज्ञा*, i. e., a continuous series which does not so perish and which consequently makes succession possible. But this assumption will not mend matters. For there is no such reality as continuous series. Supposing there is such a real series, if the series is momentary the position is the same as before, that is, the objection in the case of the single members mentioned above applies to the series as well. If, on the other hand, the series be supposed to be capable of persistence in time the doctrine of momentariness (*विरत*) vanishes. Nor can an absolutely *विरत* thing (as supposed by the hypothesis) i. e. that which is only momentary (*विरत*), do all its work at once (*सम्पन्न*). The dilemma with which the advocate of absolute *विरत*—the

Buddhist—is confronted in this: When a single *वस्तु* [the Buddhist is so obsessed by the idea of *वस्तु* that he calls things 'वस्तु'] when fruit, for example, simultaneously gives rise to numerous effects such as *स्वप्न* etc., does it do so by virtue of single nature or of many natures (*एवम् एवमेव जगद्वासास्त्वदिवा*)? In the former case, there could be no diversity of effects among *एत* etc since they all arise from a single—uniform—nature. In the latter case i. e., if it produced *एत* etc., as *वस्तु* (the stuff of which the effect is made), and *एत* etc., as *सहकारि* (auxiliaries), we would ask whether the many natures (which, by hypothesis, belong to the thing) were the thing itself or otherwise? In the latter case, they could not be natures (*जगद्वासास्त्वदिवा स्वभाववद्वा*). In the former case, the thing itself would have to be regarded as many (*वस्तुनमृत्पृथग्नि स्वभाववत्त्वत्*), or the natures would have to be regarded as one (*स्वभावानां वा स्वभाव प्रसङ्गेन—सर्वव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तेषां तत्त्व वैकल्यात्*). It may be argued that there is no plurality of natures in thing, the thing acting as *वस्तु* in one place and *सहकारि* in another. But this will mean that the thing which is *विरा* and *वस्तु* (persistent and possessed of single nature, uniform), successively produces many effects—an admission of plurality of natures and variety of effects (*स्वभावनेरः कार्यसांख्ये च*). If you object. How can that which is *विरा* and *वस्तु* (uniform) and therefore *वस्तु* (acting at once and not by successive steps) give rise to effects which are *विविध* (various) and *व्यतिरिक्त* (arising in succession)? We retort. If from one single partless *वस्तु* acti g cause there can spring—as you hold—at single flash without succession, numerous effects requiring numerous causes, why can not a *विरा* thing produce successively variety of effects? That is to say the novelty of any and one supposition is the same as under the other. Therefore, thing which is absolutely *विरा* i. e., *वस्तु*, fails to show itself to be reality by doing something at once without succession of steps (*तत्त्वात् वस्तुवत्त्वादि यावत्स्वभाववत्त्वदिवा दुर्विद्य*). Thus, both the alternatives of *वस्तु* and *वस्तु* failing, the *वस्तु*

which they cover also falls, and with the failure of *अर्थविद्या* goes the failure of existence. Thus collapses the doctrine of absolute *अस्तित्व* of which the Buddhist is a special advocate.

of. "अर्थविद्या न सुखेन निवृत्त्यविपरिवर्तनीः । अमाद्यमायां मायायां सा कथयतया मया ॥" Quoted in Hem. & Com. प्र. विमर्श ११११

It is interesting to read, however the following remark made by a Jain writer "अनेक च लक्षणानेन वैवाचिकपरिपरिचयितः सत्त्वतोऽसत्त्वं चोक्तमित्यतः चार्थविद्यासत्त्वं सत्त्वं हे अपि प्रविष्टिमेति चेत्तन्मते" (Guna Octo on Rad. St. 5) where the *अर्थविद्या* is mentioned as the Buddhist definition of Reality

Page 20

Il. 174-180 क्वाहारे तु पूर्वोक्तान्तरा इति.—Now the author shows how things, under the *Śyād* & its hypothesis, can act, while they possess the threefold characteristics of the abandonment of previous form acceptance of a new form and retention of its own identity. The only possible objection to it is that it involves the attribution of contradictory characteristics to one and the same thing. But the objection can be easily met by an appeal to experience—which favours the view that things are multiform in character and so the only doctrine which tallies with experience and therefore with truth is that things are neither exclusively *चित्* nor *अचित्* but are in reality both—like the *Man-lān* (Man-Lion) of mythology "न नर सिंहकल्पात् न सिंहो नरकल्पत ('माते सिंहो नरो माते योऽर्थो पाण्डुरवस्त्रकान् वनपात्रं विमानेन नरसिंहं वचङ्कते)

Il. 181-183. वैवेचिकैरपि etc.—The *Vaivechikas* too, hold doctrines which can be easily shown to savour of *Śyādvāda*—though they would not like to admit it. Thus for example they recognise *विरुद्ध* (which really amounts to contradictory *व्यप*) in a single body or substance, one and the same substance is described as moving or stationary; one and the same object—a *व* for example is supposed to be both red and not-red (the former when it is hot, the latter when it is not so), covered and open etc.

cf. स्वमेव विवक्ष्यतेत्यवशिष्यो नर्तुं प्रविश्यात्तद्व्यवस्थितिः । न च विरोध-
माचक्षते । तदुक्तं स्वप्नव्यासः । विरोधादिप्रमेयस्वभावापपत्त्यतिरिक्ते चेत् । तथा
च भाषातुल्यप्रकारः । यत् चेत्तत् नर्तुं विषयं केत्येतद्विस्तारं नतम् । इति नो विरोध-
इत्यादि । Gern. Comm. on Bhā. 57

सौमतेरिति etc.—The Buddhists, similarly find no contradiction
in seeing बीज and अ-बीज in one and the same विषयः. Note
that they do not attribute qualities to substances, for they
recognise no external reality but only see certain elements in
particular lies—बीज and अबीज, for example, in the idea or
concept of वर

II. 184-188. ननु च कथमविच्छेदव्यवस्थितिः etc.—The author finds it
necessary to bear in mind that so far as प्रतीति is concerned the Vaiśeṣika
unlike the B. Īdhist does not regard it as क्षणिक (momentary)
but only क्षणिक (that which has beginning and an end, not
necessarily the short duration of a single moment of time)
but even he regards इति, एतत् etc. as क्षणिक just like the
Buddhist and so the question of क्षणिकवाद is not irrelevantly
introduced while dealing with the tenets of the Vaiśeṣikas.
Remember that Śāṅkara has called the Vaiśeṣikas on this
account, अर्कदीपादिकः i. e., semi B. Īdhist. For the क्षणिकवाद of
इति, एतत् etc. in the Vaiśeṣika system, see Nyāya Muktāvalī
and Com. thereon, Bh. P. Śāstra 87

I. 188. कथमिति च कथमन्तरावस्थितिः etc.—The V. Śāstra continues
क्षणिकवादः इति एतत् etc.—but many things he regards as
having certain duration in time which is limited. Now if you
put the loss of duration, i. e., persistence of time, and limited
ness in time together it will mean the same thing as निरवस्थितिः

I. 189. कथमिति च एतत् शोभति etc.—There is not
moment of time when thing does not partake of the three-fold
character of अस्थाय, अस्थाय, and निश्चित (see above).

Stanza VI

Page 21

The doctrine next criticized is :—

Stanza VI—(1) There is some maker of the world; (2) He is one; (3) He is everywhere [(3a) He knows everything] (4) He is self-dependent; (5) He is eternal.

Criticism —

L. II. 3-8 अगस्तः प्रत्यक्षारि etc.—वदिह = अनिर्बचनीयत्वस्य सर्वैर्बलवत्तारिहं etc.—A syllogism to prove the existence of God. The major premises on which it rests is वद्यन् वदि तस्यै हविमत्कर्तृहं इया वर'—

Everything that is made requires an intelligent maker—e.g. a jar etc.; the Earth etc. are things made; therefore (वदिमान्) they have an intelligent maker whom we call Isvara or God.

II 9 व वायमसिद्धो हेतुः etc.—Here the minor premise is not "unproven." For it can be easily shown to be true by means of the following argument:—The Earth etc. are things made because they spring from definite causes (सत्त्वकारणवशादव्यवस्था), also because, they are bodies possessed of parts (अवयवविता).

II. 10-11. वायमैकमिहो विद्यते वा—No is the *hetu* (वदिमान्) of the theistic syllogism either "inconclusive" or "hostile" For it fully satisfies the condition निवृत्त्याभावात् the violation of which involves the fallacies of inconclusive and "hostile" *hetu*. If there be a logic case in which the हेतु exists without the साध्य the हेतु is inconclusive (अवैकान्तिक) If the हेतु exists always without the साध्य it is distinctly hostile ('विच्छेद'). But in the present case, the हेतु is one which is never found where the साध्य is not (निवृत्त्याभावात्) and hence, there are, good हेतु (वद हविमत्कार्यकर्तृत्वं नास्ति तत्र कार्यमवधि नास्ति इया जाकारो).

II. 11-12 वदि वायमव्यवस्थारिहः etc.—Nor is the हेतु "precluded" (वदिह) by प्रत्यक्ष अवयव = सत्त्व having closed the question of the contrary सर्वैर्बलवत्तारिहः—It is stated as a हेतु after the statement of the वद (वदिह) and the साध्य (वद).

IL 13. वरिषि वरुणस्य etc. There is no rival देव or ब्रह्मन् to prove the apposition. The foil wing may be plausibly advanced as such an ब्रह्मन् but it will fail

God could not be the maker of the Wld—the Earth, etc., because he would be wanting in physical body to accomplish the task he being like emancipated souls (विमुक्तसत्त्व) whom no one supposes to be world-makers.

This syllogism may be subjected to the following criticism.

Is God—the subject of the proposition to be proved—known or unknown? If unknown the argument involves the fallacy of अज्ञवादि (देव affirmed of subject-एव—which is fictitious). If known, there is no reason to think that he is lacking in body and is therefore, incapable of making the world. If a body is required for the task, he may be supposed to have got it, by what is called वर्णियुक्त्वमात्र, that is to say the प्रमाण which proves वर्णिव् may be supposed to prove also the वर्णः that are required in the वर्णिव् [Example: If you assume the existence of substance called ethr to explain the phenomenon of light, that substance may be supposed, by the same hypothesis, to possess all those properties that are required to make the phenomena possible]

Page 23

IL 20 (2) एतैव इति etc.—*God is one.* If there were many gods, &c., many masters of the world, the world would be thrown into confusion by the conflict of discordant wills; of the very purpose for which we had resorted to the hypothesis of a divine maker viz to explain the harmony and order of the Universe would thereby be defeated.

IL 24-29. (3a) एतावत् सर्वम् इति etc.—*सर्वम् = Omnipresent*; because his activity is wanted everywhere. Or (3b) *सर्वम् = omnipotent* because intelligent making requires thought & wisdom.

IL 30 ॥ (4) एतावत् सर्वम् इति etc.—*God is self-dependent.* ईश्वरप्रेरितो etc.—Originally found in the Mahābhārata, Yana-parva. It has been subsequently reproduced in many works both of Jaina and Brāhmaṇa literature. It means Impelled by

God a soul moves to heaven or to hell. No other person is master of his *गुण* and *दुःख*. Self-dependence is implied in the very notion of one who is the Lord of all.

Il. 36 (3) *सदा स विद्य* etc.—He is eternal. A created God is a contradiction in terms. This may be shown by a simple question: Is the Creator of God eternal or not? If he is, why not so God himself? If not, he will have to be supposed to be a creature created by another and he by another and so on ad infinitum.

Page 23

L. 45. *इमा वृताः* etc.—*दुष्टवाक्यरिम्बदा* :—ridiculous and false doctrines.

Il. 54. *अनेटया* etc.—The master preaches his doctrine to all, yet all do not benefit by it, because there are some whose minds are so bedimmed by passions that they cannot receive the light of his teaching. It is their fault, not his. *कार्मवर्षी वाचोऽपि*—See K&D. Vlr ed. p. 196. *दीपिह*—owl.

Il. 6—*नया जीमिदमेव* etc.—Oh friend of the World! Despite your possessing faultless skill in sowing seeds of the right Dharma, even you have had your barren lands. It is not surprising. To birds of darkness (owls) the rays of the sun are as white (ironical black) as the feet of bees!

Page 24.

Il. 75 Il. *अथ वक्ष्यामि* etc.—Here begins detailed criticism of the theistic syllogism—*विष्णुपरो इदिवानृषाः कार्यं नाथं वरयन्*

L. The first objection is that here the *व्याप्ति* (major premiss) is not known to be sound (*प्राप्तेरप्युक्तम्*). All are agreed that a *नानथ* (हेतु) leads to the inference of *नाथ* when the *व्याप्ति* (i.e. its invariable concomitance with the *नाथ*) is established by *प्रमाण*. But we are going to show that such *व्याप्ति* is impossible in the present case.

Il. 5—*न चरं वपनि गृह्यन्* etc.—Here is a dilemma. Is God (1) possessed of a body or (2) not—when making these worlds? If he is possessed of a body we also like to know

whether the body is (1, a) visible like ours, or (1, b) invisible like that of a ghost? The former alternative (No. 1, a) is ruled out by *ग्रहण*. We do not see any such body working in the production of grass, trees, rain-bows, clouds, etc. Hence the alleged *व्यक्ति*—*एव एव सर्वत्र तत्र तत्र सर्वव्यापकवस्तु* falls in the ground. The *हेतु* here is *साधारण अवैयर्थ्य* i. e. inconclusive, on account of its being common to things possessed of *सत्त्व* and those possessed of *सात्त्वाद्या* like the *हेतु* *मोक्ष* which is inconclusive as to *निरास* or *अनिरास*, being found in things which are *निरास* (e. g. *द्वय*) and also in things which are *अनिरास* (e. g. *द्वय*). The latter alternative (No. 1, b) requires to be made clearer as to whether the invisibility of his body is due to his unique greatness or to any fault of our *adṛṣṭa* i. e. misfortune, caused by the law of Karma—i. e. *dharma* and *adharma*. The first of these alternatives is not supported by any proof; moreover it involves argument in circle (*वृत्तेष्वप्यवश्यं*) in that his invisible body will be proved when his unique greatness is proved, and his unique greatness will be proved when his invisible body is proved. The second alternative (No. 2) is not free from certain doubts. Thus, a doubt will arise in our mind whether our failure to see his body is due to the fact of his not existing at all (e. g. we do not see the body of a son of a barren woman) or to any defect in our *adṛṣṭa* which incapacitates us for the sight (e. g. owing to the same reason we do not see the body of a ghost). Moreover if God works without a body it is contrary to all our experience of other instances or examples. For all the examples of *ईश* which we have heard (such as *वृत्* etc.) show *maker* possessed of body (such as *potter*). Without body *maker* can do nothing; he would be as inactive as *आत्मा*. So the *व्यक्ति* of the *हेतु* (*वर्ण*) with the *ādhyā* (*सर्वव्यापक*) breaks down, when placed on the horns of the dilemma of *सर्वव्यापक* and *अव्यक्ति*. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments, see *स्य. व. VI. Ed.* pp. 55-57 *विचारी* on *स्य. व. VI* on *वृत्* 81. I.

II. 90-93-2. Moreover the *हेतु* is *व्यस्तव्यापक* or *व्यक्ति* as it is otherwise called. For we see by *सर्वव्यापक* that certain

things do spring into existence even without an intelligent maker e.g. a tree, a lightning, a cloud etc., in fact all natural phenomena which we do not see created by man or any other living being

So we conclude: 'न यदि जगत् कर्ता.'"

Page 23.

Mallapana next proceeds to examine the so called attributes of God viz. स्वतन्त्र सर्वगत्य etc.

II. 95. इद्वैद्यवर्चसादृश etc.—God is supposed to be one because it is said multiplicity of gods would mean multiplicity of wills, with its necessary corollary,—a conflict of wills and the consequent confusion in the making and management of the world. But the Jaina denies the necessity of the corollary and in support of his position he cites the examples of (1) an anthill made by many ants, (2) that of a palace made by many artisans and (3) that of a beehive made by many bees—all working harmoniously together to a common end.

अथ तेष्वपेक्ष etc.—Some might see one Supreme Maker behind each of these makers viz. the ants, the bees etc. But they may well be asked: Why not say then that God is the maker of हर हर etc. instead of the potter the weaver etc.? If you say their agency is too visible to be denied we should like to know how the agency of the ants and the bees is any the less visible. of. BIL's Com. on the Bôtrâk p. 72 "आप च—व्यतिरिक्तमाणां कुम्भकार एव निदिष्ट कर्तृफलवत्ते चेन्न । अपि पुनरीतराः स्यात् किं कुम्भकारेणेति । नैतदस्ति । तत्रापीतर एव सर्वव्यापितया निमित्तकारणत्वेन व्याप्तिवत्ते । अन्ये च दृष्टान्तिरप्यस्त्वप्यस्य स्यात् । तथा चोक्तम्—सर्वव्यापितकर्मव्यवहारस्य अकारोहे । अतस्तद्वत्त्वं किं स्वानेन कारणात्वं न कर्तृत्वे । तरे च दृष्टान्तपरतिपादनादप्यप्यप्यस्य न व्याप्तेति । अपि च—देव कुम्भकाराणां च कर्ता स साधवोऽप्यप्यप्यप्यो दृष्ट तदुद्यमस्तथापि तेष्वपि सर्वव्यापक व्याप्तेति । अन्यथा कुम्भकारा दृष्टान्तमात्रात् व्याप्तेति चेन्नैवमस्ति ।"

BIL. Com. on दृष्टान्तान् समवायकव इति ३

[They do say however that God is according to them the primary cause, and the potter etc. the secondary causes. See Bk II Br Sôtras etc of Martineau's Study of Rel. Vol. I.]

L. 105-107.—सर्वव्यापक इत्यादि etc.—To hold that God is one in order to avoid conflict of wills is like getting rid of a family to avoid quarrelling about food!

L. 108.—तदा सर्वव्यापक इत्यादि etc.—If, as you say he is omnipresent, it must be either through the body (वरीरूपत्वा) or through the mind (ज्ञानरूपत्वा). In the former case, his body would fill all space, leaving no room for other objects. The latter alternative is all right, for we too held that the Supreme Person (परब्रह्म) pervades the whole Universe with his boundless ज्ञान. But it is not a position which you can take up since your Veda asserts the non-presence of God in the physical sense. For your texts such as विवर्तमान इत्यादि etc. declare his physical ubiquity.

L. 115.—इत्येवम् etc.—A possible reason for regarding God as physically all-pervasive is this. If God occupied only particular spot he could not well deal with objects at a distance. But this is bad reasoning. Is the Divine Architect, who is the supposed maker of the three worlds, working like a carpenter through the instrumentality of his body & through that of his mind? The first would be a long and tedious process if his body is to be supposed to be limited in size to avoid the difficulties of the hypothesis of an infinite body. The second process viz. that of working by the mind will not accommodate physical omnipresence of the deity. Minor gods, all are agreed, dwell in limited worlds of their own and yet work by their mind at great distances. Moreover the physical omnipresence of God would mean his contamination through contact with all sorts of impurities including residence in hell. It may be urged from the other side that this objection will apply equally to the doctrine which we have accepted viz. that the mental omnipresence of the Supreme Person (the Perfect Man). But this is wrong. It is mistaking the very nature of mental process, in which you have to leave the object and travel to the object from a distance. Besides, the argument of contamination is absurd: thought of a dirty thing does not fill the mouth with dirt, or the thought of luxuries provide you with the luxuries themselves.

Page 26

L. 133.—अनु आवाप्यवा etc.—This is withdrawing a point which was conceded in a foregoing passage (see supra)

L. 138.—अथ ये दहान्तकस्ति etc.—The case of ज्ञान is sometimes illustrated by the analogy of the light (किरण-rays) of the sun, which, though a गुण (attribute) of the sun travels from the sun to the world which it illumines. But the analogy will not bear scrutiny. The rays are not a गुण of the sun, but a द्रव्य made of luminous matter (pradgala), and the luminosity (light-वक्र) which belongs to them as a गुण never travels out of them.

L. 143.—तथा च सर्वमपदिष्टं etc.—See vv. 370-73. The passage occurs in a discussion about the nature of Jiva. The position of the opponent and the Jain criticism of the same are very clearly brought out in the text and the Com. of the verses quoted here. These have been explained in the Commentary as follows :—

किरणा गुणा न --

यत् किरणा गुणा न भवति किंतु इत्यम् । अमुं चेत् किरणायां प्रवाहः स गुणः । न तस्मात् प्रवाहकस्या गुणोऽप्यो इत्येवकारम्बव मनने । ज्ञानं पुनरिदं अन्वयावाप्यगुणमस्त न अन्वयावाप्य इत्यपदिष्टं तच्च अन्वय आत्मरेखातिव्ययेन वदेत् । नैव भवति हि ज्ञानं । तस्मात्प्रकारेण ज्ञानरूपवत्त्वमात्रा लक्षणायां प्रतीयत इति । तेषां विराट्पदव्यवस्थानेन वरेणाभिहिते नान्यथावत् तन्मगुणरमाह-
न तु च परिशिष्टाह--

न ज्ञानं अस्मिन् वेद्ये ज्ञेयमस्ति तस्मिन् हि ज्ञेयं मत्ता परिशिष्टमस्ति न वेत्ति किन्तु आत्मरूपमेव सन् तत् इत्येवपरमवति ज्ञेयस्य परिशिष्टमस्ति किन्तु मत्तावति इति वद-
अमुमेवार्थे दहान्तक वाच्यम्--

तद्विषयस्य मत्ता --

चोदनादर्पक इत्यन्त मोहोदयः । अथाहुः प्रत्यक्षेण वाच्यमस्ति इत्येव वदति । यथा राज्ञः पुत्रस्य हत्याय सोमरोषकथाते तस्य शक्तिराज्यवैय मनी विहारेवमिति विचारः (नमः) त्वि मोहवाच्यमस्ति इत्यन्त । न च इदं अनुपपद्यते वाच्यम् । अनी प्रियवन्वाप्यप्रीत्यां चत्ते तस्या इत्येवमिति चेत् । अत आह-- वाच्येण वाच्यं तद्विषयस्य मत्तावति इति वदति । न च इत्येवपरमवति । तस्मात्प्रकारेण ज्ञानरूपवत्त्वमात्रा लक्षणायां प्रतीयत इति । तेषां विराट्पदव्यवस्थानेन वरेणाभिहिते नान्यथावत् तन्मगुणरमाह-
न तु च परिशिष्टाह--

Page 27

II. 144.—**विद्यते**—This formulates the objection. The rays of the sun are not *gupa*s but *dravya*s; and so little wonder that they travel out of the Sun; luminosity is their *gupa*, which cannot go out of the *dravya*. Similarly *ज्ञान* is a *gupa* of *ātman* and it cannot travel out of *ātman*.

तं ह्येतत् etc.—Wonderful is the nature of *ज्ञान* it has not to go out in the spot of its object—it remains in *ātman* and works at a distance. If an analogy is wanted it is afforded in a magnet—which is wellknown for its action at distance.

II. 153-194.—**अथ सर्वज्ञः सर्वज्ञः** etc.—Taking **सर्वज्ञः** omniscient. The doctrine of the omniscience of God can be easily disproved by means of the following dilemma: Is the omniscience of God proved by **प्रत्यक्ष** or **श्रोत्र** (i. e. **व्युत्पन्न** or **श्रुत**) ? Not the former. For **प्रत्यक्ष** springs from the contact of **हृदि** and **वर्त** which is not possible in the case of omniscience which transcends the employment of **हृदि**. Not the latter—in the shape of **व्युत्पन्न**. For **व्युत्पन्न** is based upon the recollection of an invariable concomitance between **सिद्धि** (**हेतु**) and **सिद्धि** (**गुण**) and we do not know of any **सिद्धि** which can prove omniscience—the latter being too far away from the field of our observation.

It may be argued that the **व्युत्पन्न** in the present case is of the nature of **वर्तव्य**, that is to say omniscience is inferred as necessarily implied in the wonderful variety of the cosmos. But the argument is wrong. There is no necessary implication of omniscience contained in the variety of the Cosmos; which can be easily explained by the law of karma in the case of living beings and by an uncaused natural state of things in the case of inanimate matter. Nor is there any testimony of **व्युत्पन्न** or **व्युत्पन्न** to prove the omniscience. Is the **व्युत्पन्न** (1) made by God or (2) made by any other person? (1) If it is made by God it is wonderful self-laudatory document—hardly worthy of true greatness. Moreover it is impossible that he could be given out the *śāstras* without physical body the very utterance of the sounds of their letters requiring a throat,

points etc., (cf. Br. Sū. II. II. 35-40) And if he has a body it is a position which has been already disposed of (see above). (E) If it is made by any other person, is that person (2a) omniscient or (2b) not? (2a) If he is omniscient, God is one such person and here is another—a position which militates against the unity and singularity of God. Besides, the omniscience of the other person will require to be demonstrated by the word of a third person, who must be also omniscient, and so on *ad infinitum*. (2b) If he is not omniscient, what faith can we put in his word?

Page 26

IL 174.—*सर्वं च सर्वज्ञं* etc.—The author next proceeds to show that if God is the source of the Brahmanical scriptures, he is anything but omniscient. For, the Brahmanical scriptures, says the writer are full of contradictions.

IL 175-178.—*सर्वज्ञ* etc.—The passage that follows is taken verbatim from Gunaratna's T. B. D p. 261-62 The conflicting texts quoted therein are selected with reference to the *vratas* or moral precepts of the Jains viz. *अहिंस, सत्य, अस्वच्छाद, (अस्तेय)* *अपराध* together with *अपरिवर्ग*

IL 192.—*सदा स्वयम्भूतं* etc.—If God is self-dependent and at the same time all-merciful, why should he create a world full of misery? There is nothing to prevent him from creating a perfect world. Not even his independent will? No. For the will is linked to an all-merciful nature. of Śaṅkara on Br. Sū. II. II. 37

L 201-02.—*समृद्धि*—Full of ; *सर्व*—happiness.

IL 202.—*सर्वं अज्ञानं* etc.—If you propose to reconcile the misery in the world with God's mercy by the hypothesis of *āśwas*, it will amount to surrender of the principle of his independence (cf. Śaṅkara on Br. Sū. II. II. 37).

IL 204.—*अस्त्रादि*—Funeral libation of water; equivalent to sounding the death-knell.

Page 27

II. 144.—*सिद्धयः*—This formulates the objection: The rays of the sun are not *gūpas* but *dravya*; and so little wonder that they travel out of the Sun; luminosity is their *gūpa*, which cannot go out of the *dravya*. Similarly *ज्ञान* is a *gūpa* of *Ātman* and it cannot travel out of *Ātman*.

तं त्वं etc.—Wonderful is the nature of *ज्ञान* it has not to go out to the spot of its object—it remains in *Ātman* and works at a distance. If an analogy is wanted it is afforded in a magnet—which is wellknown for its action in *distant*.

II. 153-154.—*अथ सर्वज्ञः सर्वज्ञः* etc.—Taking *सर्वज्ञः*—omniscient. The doctrine of the omniscience of God can be easily disproved by means of the following dilemmas: Is the omniscience of God proved by *प्रत्यक्ष* or *परोक्ष* (i. e. *अनुमान* or *शब्द*)? Not the former. For *प्रत्यक्ष* springs from the contact of *इन्द्रिय* and *वर्त* which is not possible in the case of omniscience which transcends the employment of *इन्द्रिय*. Not the latter—in the shape of *अनुमान*. For *अनुमान* is based upon the recollection of an invariable concomitance between *सिद्ध* (सिद्ध) and *सिद्धि* (सिद्धि) and we do not know of any *सिद्ध* which can prove omniscience—the latter being too far away from the field of our observation.

It may be argued that the *अनुमान* in the present case is of the nature of *वर्तपरि*, that is to say omniscience is inferred as necessarily implied in the wonderful variety of the cosmos. But the argument is wrong. There is no necessary implication of omniscience contained in the variety of the Cosmos, which can be easily explained by the law of karma in the case of living beings and by an uncaused natural state of things in the case of inanimate matter. Nor is there any testimony of *अनुमान* to prove the omniscience. Is the *अनुमान* (1) made by God. (2) made by any other person? (1) If it is made by God, it is a wonderful self-laudatory document—hardly worthy of true greatness. Moreover it is impossible that he could have given out the *Āgamas* without a physical body the very utterance of the sounds of their letters requiring a throat, a

II. 225-229.—*एवम यत्नां* etc.—A plurality of natures is attributed to God in the Brahmanical scriptures. Thus, the nature of *होद्युज* is active at the time of creation, of *समोद्युज* at the time of destruction, and of *सुखद्युज* at the time of its existence: *ब्रह्मन्, एव* and *विष्णु*.

एवं चावस्थायेरे etc.—A change of states in God would mean a changing God.

II. 229.—*ब्रह्मास्तु विद्मः* etc.—Granting that God is eternal how is it that he is not ever-creating? A possible answer is that it depends upon his free and independent will when to be engaged in the act of creation and when not, and hence the creation is occasional. But the answer is futile. On what should his will depend? On him and him only? If so, it should be eternally there, and the creative activity should be eternal and not occasional and spasmodic.

II. 232—*तथा ब्रह्मोत्पत्त्युक्तौ* etc.—God is said to have the following attributes: *बुद्धि* etc. (For this and small differences on the point see *Ta kasmagrata* and *Com.*, *Kārikāvall* with *Com.*, *Muktāvall* and *Dīnakari*, and *Nyāyakandall* p. 57). If these have to be inferred from their effects, they will be of a very unsatisfactory kind, unworthy of God. For the world we see is by no means perfect. From our imperfect or finite world we can only argue to a finite or imperfect God: See E. Caird's *Com. on Kant: Rational Theology*; John Caird's "Introduction to the Phil. of Religion, and Flint's "Theism."

II. 233.—*किं न प्रेरयति ब्रह्मि* etc.—The famous dilemma raised by Mill and Śaṅkara. Creative activity on the part of God may be supposed to spring either from self-interest or pity for his creatures. The former is impossible in the case of God. The latter is not possible without the presupposition of misery of his creatures which he strives to remove. The misery however is impossible without a body and organs to suffer it, and these are not existing prior to creation. Thus

सिधिरि-Visnu, God. सिध-*a* world. बह्वर्णं प्रयास-
Arriving in the morning at a toll-bar. You drove your cart
all night in the hope that you would thereby pass the toll-bar
unnoticed in the darkness of the night. But unfortunately you
reached the toll-bar just when there was daybreak and the
officer at the station had got up to do his duty! Hence वृ-
हन् प्रयास is an idiomatic expression to state that you have
arrived at the very position you wanted to avoid all along.

II. 207.-सि व सिधिरि etc.--He is not only *dependent* upon
the law of Karma of his creatures for the allotment of happi-
ness and misery in this world, but a farther question arises as
to who is the maker of the law of karma (कर्मा)? If he has
not made it, he is not *Ivara* or Lord in regard to it.

II. 211.-सदा सिधिरि etc.--If he is eternal, his nature
should be eternal, his creativeness should be eternal—he should
be ever creating and creating—a process which would never
end, and not a single act of creation would ever be complete.
And, since an incomplete act is no act (a वृ is not a वृ before
the last moment of completion is reached and it is fit to perform
the work for which it was intended for सदा-सिधिरि)
God would be the maker of nothing. If on the other hand
creativeness were not part of his nature, he could not create
the world any more than *ākāśa* which never creates any world.

Page 30.

II 218.-सि व सिधिरि etc.--If he has an absolutely eternal nature,
and creativeness is part of that nature, he would be ever creating
and creating without any possibility of सृष्टि or destruction. If
creation and destruction sprang from a single nature—the two
would be simultaneous; moreover it would mean difference of
effects (creation and destruction) without difference in the
cause (single nature). If you adopt the hypothesis of two
natures, one of which (सृष्टि) is put forth at one time and the
other (संहार) at the other time, that is tantamount to
admission that his nature is not eternal, but only occasional.

II. 225-229.—*इहम् यवन्ति* etc.—A plurality of natures is attributed to God in the Brahmanical scriptures. Thus, the nature of *इहोपु* is active at the time of creation, of *स्रवोपु* at the time of destruction, and of *स्रवोपु* at the time of its existence: *स्रव*, *स्र* and *विष्णु*.

एतं चरत्वादेरे etc.—A change of states in God would mean a changing God.

II. 229 —*यदास्य विराः* etc.—Granting that God is eternal, how is it that he is not ever-creating? A possible answer is that it depends upon his free and independent will when to be engaged in the act of creation and when not, and hence the creation is occasional. But the answer is futile. On what should his will depend? On him and him only? If so, it should be eternally there, and the creative activity should be eternal and not occasional and spasmodic.

II. 233—*सदा सम्पूरकपुत्रो* etc.—God is said to have the following attributes: *सुखि* etc. (For this and small differences on the point see *Tarkasamgraha* and *Com.*, *Kārikāvalī* with *Com.*, *Maṭṭivālī* and *Dinakarī*, and *Nyāyakandall* p. 57.) If these have to be inferred from their effects, they will be of a very unsatisfactory kind, unworthy of God. For the world we see is by no means perfect. From our imperfect or finite world we can only argue to a finite or imperfect God: See E. Caird's *Com. on Kant Rational Theology*; John Caird's "Introduction to the *Phil. of Religion*, and Flint's "Theism."

II. 233.—*किं च प्रेरणां वृत्तिः* etc.—The famous dilemma raised by Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya. Creative activity on the part of God may be supposed to spring either from self-interest or pity for his creatures. The former is impossible in the case of God. The latter is not possible without the presupposition of misery of his creatures which he strives to remove. The misery however is impossible without a body and organs to suffer it, and these are not existing prior to creation. Thus

the theist finds himself lost in vicious circle—pity and misery necessary to account for God's creative activity and the creative activity necessary for the possibility of misery!

Page 31

Il. 242.—*वस्तुतः*—Going both ways like the pendulum of ball. For the Jain argument see Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya, Tārka-bhāṣya-dīpikā pp. 52-53, 115-24 ŚiL. Com. on the Sūtrakriyāṅga pp. 42-47).

For the Theistic argument examined in the Sāstra and the Com. see *सूत्र* p. 54-55.

For the difficulties of the Theistic position consult Śāṅkara's Com. on the II Bā. II. L. 37-41 Rāmānuja Com. on the same and on I. 1. 3. For an attempt at a solution of some of the difficulties see B. Bā. II. L. 30-36 The point of *वस्तुतः* will be found suggested by a corresponding passage in *सूत्र* p. 55-56: of. "Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists

larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all. Thus would sort of polytheism return upon us....."

Upholders of the monistic law will say to such polytheism (which by the way has always been the real religion of common people and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only all is saved. If there be different Gods, each caring for his part, some

portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete... .. Common sense is less sweeping in its demand than philosophy I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider II —James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* p. 626.

"This [a belief in more gods than one] of itself is what reason cannot rest in—what reason is constantly finding out more clearly to be false. The more the universe is examined and understood, the more apparent does it become that it is a single, self-consistent whole—a vast unity in which nothing is isolated or independent. The very notion, therefore, of separate and independent deities—and still more of course, of discordant or hostile deities ruling over different departments of nature, is opposed to the strivings and findings of reason Flint's *Theism* pp. 40-41.

For the Design Argument in its old form see Paley's *Natural Theology* and for its defence against later criticism see Flint's "*Theism*," and for a history of the Teleological Argument, Flint's *Theism* pp. 887-90.

For the whole subject of Theistic proofs, see *ibid.*, Lectures IX to end. Among modern writings on the subject in addition to Flint's "*Theism*" and *Anti-Theistic Theories* the reader may consult Kant's criticism of Cartesian proofs and *Rational Theology* and the statement of difficulties in the design argument in the old orthodox form and a reinterpretation of the argument in John Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, and Edward Caird's *Com. on Kant*. Consult also Millman's "*Study of Religion*" Vol. I, Fraser's "*Theism*" (Kantian presentation of the subject), Lindsay's "*Recent Advances in Theism*" Pringle-Pattison's "*Idea of God*," Ward's "*Realm of Ends*" and Alexander's "*Space, Time and Deity*."

विर्गन्वामीति । ततः प्रवृत्ते । तद्वद् वायं व्यापारयति । ततः करोति । अथवा-
 रवमिच्छन्प्रवृत्तमात्रं वायमव्यापारवत्करोतीत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकान्तरं इति वक्तव्यं-
 रमि कार्यान्तरादुपायवृत्ते निमित्तेषामभिग्रहणे व्यतिषाहक्यमात्रादेवावधारितं
 न प्रवृत्ते महादुःखं । कहेरिवेवमविकारस्यामर्थं ब्रूमावुमाने । तत्परित्यागे च
 तद्विरपि परित्यज्यताम् । प्रवाधातिशयाद्यपीरवद्विमानेवायमीरवः करिष्यति ।
 इत्यादौ नोक्तव्यमित्यवगत्यमिच्छो न कर्तव्यतीति चेत् कुत एतत् ? । तदाप्रपन्नमा-
 रिति चेत् कश्चित् ममापि ममोरवबुधेन । न तथा वाचद्विष्टा प्रमत्तम्यवहितं
 काकोर्यादुपायवृत्ते बनेमन्वद्विष्टम्यपारं करिष्यम् । एवं तर्हि वा मतिरत्र
 बुद्धिमत्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वतामात्रवत् ? । अगतिरेव । उभयोर्पि धीरव्याधिरित्यविशेष-
 कोरुपपत्तेः । विविधैकस्य सप्तम्यस्य सिध्यप्यपत्ताम् । विमदुमानस्य बुधत्वम् । न
 किञ्चित् । इतर एवाय विशेषम्यावाच्छब्दविवादावयाने साधनार्थं सामान्ये
 साधनं प्रयुक्तानो निपुण्ये यदा कश्चिन्निमित्तं वृत्तात्मन्येवमाकाशं प्रति व्यापा-
 रयन् । अवावुमानवृत्तं विवा बभूव्यति यथात् तद्विहमधरीरिर्बुद्धत्वमार्थं व्यापि
 ब्रह्मक्यमात्रवाचित्वात् कान्यात्ववापारिहं व्यतिष्येन वाभिमेतमधरीरित्वविशेषं
 विस्मयद्विषेयविशेषं ततश्च विद्वान्वातात्प्रमेरं स्वेति पूर्वपक्षसंशयः । अत्र
 प्रतिषमप्रति । किं धीरत्वमेव कर्तव्यमुत परिदृष्टतामर्थकारणप्रयोजकत्वम् ? ।
 न तावच्छीरित्वमेव कर्तव्यम् । बुधत्वस्योदासीनस्य च कर्तव्यप्रसङ्गात् । किं तु परि-
 दृष्टतामर्थकारणप्रयोजकत्वम् । तस्मिन् तति कार्यात्वत्ते । तदाधरीरत्वापि
 निर्बन्धे यदा स्वधरीरमेरवावामात्रमवः । अस्मि तत्रावस्य स्वकर्तव्यार्थित्वं तरेव
 धरीरमिति चत् सत्कमसि । परं मेरवोपाधे न मवति । स्वात्मनि विवादिरो
 वात् । देवन्दास्तीति चेत् ईश्वरस्यापि देवं परमादृष्टिन् बहु स्वधरीरे मेरवावा
 इच्छाप्रवृत्त्यान्वामुल्लेखेच्छाप्रवृत्तयोश्च तति धरीरे यावावृत्तवमावात् अस्मि
 तस्य स्वमेरवावामिच्छाप्रवृत्तमवमहारेभोपावृत्तयिति चेत् । तस्येच्छाप्रवृत्त-
 योदवमवर्णं प्रत्येव वारकलात् कान्यात्मवोरिच्छाप्रवृत्तयो मेरवाकरवकले तु
 तद्वृत्तावमवमेव धरीर कर्मत्वादिनि व्यभिचारः । अवपेक्षितधरीरव्यापारस्वेच्छा
 प्रवृत्तमावृत्तविविधव्य वेगमव्य कवाचिद्वेगमव्यापारं प्रति सामर्थ्यवर्धनात् बुद्धि-
 मवमव्यवधि तु कार्यत्वमितीकारमिति । इच्छाप्रवृत्तौ तत्वापि धीरवमे
 कर्तव्यमिति चेत् अनेकानां वय तयोरावमुक्तत्वम् । अत्र धृतिर्यो व्यापविवावाताते
 वयात्वापेक्ष्यं प्रवर्तम् । न च बुद्धत्वच्छाप्रवृत्तायो विलम्बे करिद्विष्टेव । एता हि
 कथरीतां बुधतामावमवमेवेन हृषी मतिः मित्वत्तमित्यन्वा च यदा बुद्धधरीतामपि
 मविष्यतीति । तेवमीरववादे वावियतिवाविनो वराकलात् । अत परं मपत्र ।
 आत्मविहिता वरावत्य मवमिष्यन्ते इति चेत् । तेन स्वकर्तव्यार्थित्वेच्छिद्यमा-
 वीन मविरा धरीरोत्पन्न । सर्वविषयावबोधविरहात् । अकलात्मनामपि सर्व-
 विषयव्यपि नद्वैतैतन्मवमिति चेत् । तद्वत् धीरत्ववृत्तमात्रं तस्येवाविशुद्धं
 चेदे सर्वव्यापारवृत्तवामपति । धरीरवपतिरोदाव्यात् । तान्मन्वेव तवावीवते
 न वरिर्बुधं मवतीति चेत् व्यापारत्वेन तन्म विषयत्वकलात्तुच्छेन मित्वमेव च

कथये। तेन ह्युद्दिमत्पूर्वकप्रवर्थायैव कार्यं
न कदा कर्तृत्वाधामायां शरीरव्यवहार
कथये न शरीरकथने कर्तृत्वोपकम्पात्।
यत्ने नष्टिपैतृत्वात्तपि दूरे प्रति कारण
इत्यादीनां समस्तानां व्यस्तानां वाच्यते
दि कर्मोत्पत्त्यकारणकथनार्थं यत् न
रिज्यवीच्य वशात् नानुविद्यमानाधिक कर्मैव
निष्कर्षकर्मोत्पत्तिश्च। नमोऽस्तु। ॥ १५
यो वि यत्न कर्ता स तनुपायत्वावधिष्ठ
विष्ठ। यत्नः कर्ता यत्नः। तस्याप्यर्थ
तेजस्यत्ववीच्यवशात्तदुर्विवा परमात्मना।।
तन्मात्रे। न वैमनस्यित्वात् किमासी कर्तृ
ज्ञानादयो निष्ठा कुलमपरिच्यो विस्तार
कर्तृत्वमेकविद्याविपयितानां प्रवृत्तुपवने नि
कसुचयत्नकथनार्थं मत्तमात्तारिच्यैव
निष्कर्षे न कार्यत्वात् कारयित्वात् वैच्यैव
कारयित्वाविच्यैवकारिच्यैव कार्यानां क
संभवत्। न किञ्चिदेवविच्यैवकारिच्यैव
कुलविद्यैववत्। न यत्न स कथयमाणा एता
निष्पत्त्यावतिष्ठत्वात्। तत्त्वज्ञानम्। यत्न मा
नवीकृत, तर्हि दूपायत्नव्यतिष्ठत्वावच्छिन्नम्। यत्नवि
ह्यिमत्पूर्वकप्रवर्थायैव प्रतिपत्तिविनाशकत्वात् किमासी
न च यत्नः वशात् कृतका ताकता कृतविद्यात्मक
कात्तारिच्यैव ह्युत्पत्तिव्यतिष्ठत्वात् कुलविद्यैवकारि
चावीच्यव्यतिष्ठत्वात् यत्नः प्रवृत्तिः। यत्नविद्यु
व्यवहारव्यतिष्ठत्वात्। न वैमनस्य तेजस्यतां यत्नकर्तृत्वाव
वेत्तव्यत्वे विद्याव्यतिष्ठत्वात् तन्मात्रे विद्यैव।

अथ प्रतिनिधौ । तत्र यथायथा विन्यासैर्हि
 साधनद्वयं तत्र हि साधनद्वयं १ साधनस्य स्वकारण
 साधनविषयत्वं २ विचारित्वं ३ अथ एवम् ४ अथ साधन
 वर्तमानत्वं ५ अथ यथासाधनसाधनत्वं ६ साधनत्वं ७ त
 वा । यथासाधनोपकरणसामान्यैव साधनत्वमिति ८ इति ९
 निरवयवत्वमर्थं १० साधनत्वमिति ११ साधनत्वमिति १२
 साधनत्वं, एवं परमात्म्यावयवकारणत्वमिति । तृतीयोऽव्या
 योक्तव्यविचारार्थम् । यथायथायति । यथायथायति ।

इच्छाप्रयत्नप्रतिरेकेणात्सत्त्वैर्नर्मनिबन्धनस्यैवरेणमाणात् ॥ किं चेन्नरत्न जग-
 त्निर्माणे नवावधि प्रवृत्तिः । कर्मकारतन्मयेन २ कलत्रवा ३ श्रीरथा ४
 निग्रहद्वयविचारार्थ ५ स्वभावती ६ वा । अवाच्यविषयैः कदाचिदन्वयस्यैव
 दृष्टिः स्यात् । द्वितीये स्वात्मप्रज्ञानि । तृतीये सर्वमपि जगत्सुखितमेव
 करोति । अथेव किं करोति । पूर्ववर्तिर्येन कर्मविषयौघता दुःखमहमवसिति ।
 तदा तस्य कः पुनरकार । अद्वयविषयः न कर्तुंते किं तत्कल्पनम् । जगत्सुख-
 चीवर्तमाणात् । अतुल्यपञ्चमदोषा राधोपवच्यमाव जगत्पति । तथा हि रामबाजी-
 अथ श्रीराकारिणाह्लात्कवत् तथा अहमप्रयत्नाह्लात्कवत् तथा हृषिकेशो निग्रहद्वय-
 च्छद्वेव इति । अथ स्वभावता सर्वकेशनस्वावि जगत् एव स्वभावतः प्रवृत्तिरस्तु
 किं तत्कर्मकल्पनमिति । न कार्यत्वेनैतदुद्दिमान् कर्तारमीश्वरं तावयति । एवं तन्मि-
 नेकविशिष्टव्याप्यैतयोपादायत्वाद्भूतवाचित्वाविश्याहोपि स्ववस्तुत्वात्वा तुल्या
 क्षेत्रमावाच्यत्वात् । किं न क्षिरवारेर्बुद्धिमत्पूर्ववत्त्वे ताव्यैवतीकमानस्य सर्वेपि हेतवी
 विवक्षा । इहान्वाद्युपदेन सत्परीततर्वातासर्वकर्तृपूर्वकत्वावभावात् । न च धूमात्पाव
 कादुद्गम्यैवैव दोषः तत्र कार्येपाव्यैरिनिषेवाचारवद्विमात्रप्रारम्भेन नृमस्य ईश्व-
 र्वात् । नैवमत्र सर्वज्ञत्वंविशेषाधिकरणतत्तामात्रैव कार्यत्वात्प्रतिष्ठति अस्मिन्
 सर्वज्ञस्य कर्तृत्वोद्भवात्तावगतिश्चेत् । अविच्छादिविषयमी बुद्धिमत्त्वपन्तरेवापि
 विवृतातीना शानुर्वापिपावकात् स्वमाद्यत्वात्तामनुद्धिमत्पूर्वस्यापि कार्यस्य ईश्वरा-
 वेति । अत्राव्यवयविहासिते । प्रत्यक्षानुभववितपज्ञानमन्तरं प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तत्रावा न
 पूर्वमेव इतिता । प्रकरजसमावामी । प्रकरवचिन्ताप्रवर्तकानां हेतुत्वात्ता सत्तावत् ।
 तथा हि । ईश्वरी जगत्कर्ता न भवति निरुपकरत्वात् । इन्द्रज्योतीरानुपकरनरहित-
 कृतत्वत् तत्रा अवाचित्वात्तामत्रवत् इन्द्रज्योतीरित्वात् इति । निरालम्बमीनि
 तु निमैवजगति त्रयवत्तावनावाजीवमानानि एवं प्रति अविम्या कृतवत्पविकल्प-
 वापान्त्वपवर्षमीवात्यैव ॥ विचारसहजान् वाक्तावर्षं तु विविधुष्यते । तत्राती
 निरालं विचारते । तथेवरे न वदते । तथा हि । नैवरी निम्न स्वपावधेरेनैव
 क्षित्वातिरार्द्रकर्तृत्वात् । जगत्पुनाह्लात्कवत्तरेवस्वपावर्षं वृद्धत्वं निरालमिति किं
 निरालकज्ञानमुपगमात् । स्वपावधेरेनानुवगमे न लुहमेदाराविनिन्द्यकार्यं
 कश्चित्प्रवर्तितुर्दम् । नापि तच्छानादीनां निरालं वाच्यम् । प्रतीतिवितीवात् ।
 ईश्वरज्ञानारो न निम्ना ज्ञानपरित्यागस्यद्वानिज्ञानपरित्यागमानवितीवाव । एतेन
 तरीचज्ञानारो विम्या इत्यादि अद्वयदि तदुपपुद्गीवम् । सर्वज्ञत्वपन्ताव केन
 प्रमायेन ज्ञानम् । न तावत्प्रमायेन तथेविप्रार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नत्वेनातीन्द्रिबावै-
 ब्रह्मपममर्षत्वात् । नाप्यनुवायेन अविम्याविनिन्द्यावात् । ननु अतद्विचिन्त्या
 त्वावाद्युपपत्तिर्न वदन्वैवेति चेत् न । तेन सहविवावावावात् । जगद्देविम्याव
 तार्थस्य विवापि एवमावजगत्परिवाकादिबोधीपपयवावत्वात् । किं कार्यं यदि
 सर्वज्ञः तदा अननुपपन्नकरजस्यैविका नवापि कर्तव्यविम्यामनुपपत्तीरविज्ञेय-
 हताप्रपार्थीय विषयं पुनर्तीति नार्थं सर्वज्ञः । तथा वदन्वायेकरार्थकत्वे देवत्व-

विस्तृतम् प्राप्तत्वादेव वाचिः समवायः—Contra, अप्राप्तत्वां प्राप्तिः सद्योय' Difference between संयोग and समवाय—the former joins things that were not joined before; the latter joins things that are already joined i. e. it is the name of a relation to explain a relatedness which has been already there.

II. 50-55-वह पृथिव्यादीनां etc.—A distinction is drawn by the Vaiśeṣika between the case of वृक्षीय and that of the alleged समवाय. The former is a real ऐक्य and a सामान्य which embraces all the व्यक्ति i. e. individual पृथिवी within it, and so the समवाय which connects it with the व्यक्ति is a मुख्य समवाय i. e. समवाय in the primary and real sense of the term, whereas समवाय being but one व्यक्ति, समवायः is not a real सामान्य and therefore its existence in समवाय, and the second समवाय by which it would be expected to exist in it, will be both व्युत्पन्न or गौण i. e. secondary and unreal. The distinction between मुख्य and गौण is pointed out by/r p. 84. II. 53-54-सहस्रं केय etc.

तदेक केयसत्कारः etc.—The fine distinction which the Vaiśeṣika has drawn between the two cases is unfounded. You say that when there is but one व्यक्ति, as in the case of समवाय there can be no real वाचिः or सामान्य. (See Udayanācārya's famous Kārikā. "अद्वैतज्ञानसम्बन्धं संकरोऽभाववस्थितिः। अद्वैतविरुद्धवन्द्यो वाचिःसामान्यः" This will be explained below in Note on St. VIII, II. 74-75.) But we answer: Where is अद्वैतज्ञानः (only a single individual) in the case of समवाय which would preclude the possibility of वाचिः or universal? There is a वस्तुसमवाय there is a वस्तुसमवाय, and so are innumerable समवाय which would require a ऐक्य quite as much as वृक्षीय. (Recall the admission of the new school of Nyāya noted above in Note on II. 79-80).

Page 34

II. 64-65-सहस्रं केय etc.—Distinction between मुख्य and गौण मुख्य is that which is invariable; also complete characteristic and inner; गौण is the opposite of this."

II. 67-69-सामान्यं etc.—So it is a false distinction: draw that the समवाय which joins वस्तु and व्यक्ति is मुख्य, while that which joins समवाय with the original समवाय is गौण न गौण-वेदः" of the Sūtra.

IL. 30-35.—सद्यः परं च—The existence of सद्यः is not a matter of faith, but is evidenced by the seasons, experience 'यत् सद्यः परं' according to the old school of Nyāya, and, I believe, of Vaiśeṣika also. According to the recognised school of the Vaiśeṣikas represented by Praśastapāda, and also according to the later Naiyāyikas, however सद्यः is सद्यः—See Mukti-mālā on St. XL and Dīnākarī on the same. It was only fair that the Naiyāyikas should admit this and change the old dogma, in deference to the voice of a large number of opponents all ready to swear that they never perceived any such thing as सद्यः.

Stanza VII

Another doctrine of the Vaisa ka school which is next criticised is the *Doctrine of Samavaya*.

Stanza VII: If there be an absolute distinction between चर्य and चरित्य, there can be no such relation as that of चर्य and चरित्य. If you say that the relation is due to समवाय (अ' हाणि a coherency or residence) we would point out that three realities—1 चर्य चरित्य and 3 समवाय—are not perceived, but only two viz., the first and the second. If it be contended that the experience this वर is as the तग्ग bears testimony to the residence—Vrtti (Samavaya)—of the former in the latter please note that the line of argument will carry you too far, requiring you to recognise a समवाय in a समवाय and so on ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~infinitum~~. To meet this difficulty you draw a distinction between the two समवाय: saying that while one is primary the other is secondary all that we need say is—the distinction is imaginary. Moreover it is contrary to common experience to say that the वर is in the तग्ग.

Page 31

L 4. चर्यचित्तो etc.—'च' in चरित्य is a rhetorical appendage of चर्य. वाङ्मय a particular meaning of its own. It is sometimes used after चित् as in the two passages cited in the text. The first is from Kamara II: 31 and the second from B's opalavali II.

L 7 समवायम् etc.—समवाय—absolute: synonym of the word चर्य of the stanza. The Jaina does not deny the distinction in a certain sense between चर्य and चरित्य; what he denies is ~~some~~ ^{any} distinction between them. Compare the view of the Bhaktara Vedantins who affirm the identity (समवाय) of the two and while recognizing some distinction declare that it has any real existence the चर्य and the चरित्य being looked upon as a real (चित्त) चरित्य (चित्त) appearances or aspects of the one Absolute Reality (See Bhaktara-Matras on Dr B's II h. 12, and Advaitabrahman III, on समवाय).

निःस्वल्प प्राप्तत्वादेव नातिः समवायः—*Contra*, अत्रात्रानां प्राप्ति संयोगः Difference between संयोग and समवाय—the former joins things that were not joined before; the latter joins things that are already joined i. e. it is the name of a relation to explain a relatedness which has been already there.

Il. 50-55—बह्वृष्टिप्रादीनां *etc.*—A distinction is drawn by the Valisika between the case of वृष्टीरूप and that of the alleged समवायः. The former is a real *रूप* and a सामान्य which embraces all the व्यष्टिः i. e. individual वृष्टीः within it, and so the समवाय which connects it with the व्यष्टिः is a मुख्य समवाय i. e. सामान्य in the primary and real sense of the term, whereas समवाय being but one व्यष्टिः, समवायः is not a real सामान्य and therefore its existence in समवाय, and the second समवाय by which it would be expected to exist in it, will be both अमुख्य or गौण i. e. secondary and unreal. The distinction between मुख्य and गौण is pointed out *infra* p. 34. Il. 63-64.—सद्वृत्तं केचन *etc.*

सदेव केवमस्य *etc.*—The fine distinction which the Valisika has drawn between the two cases is unfounded. You say that when there is but one व्यष्टिः, as in the case of समवाय there can be no real नाति or सामान्य (See Udayanācārya's famous Kārikā: “अदेवेदसामान्यं सकरोपलवस्तिष्ठति । क्य-सन्निरसंस्वो व्यतिपाद्यस्तस्यः” This will be explained below in Note on St. VIII Il. 4-75.) But we answer: Where is अदेवेदः (only a single individual) in the case of समवाय which would preclude the possibility of नाति or universal? There is a परसमवाय there is a परसमवाय, and so are innumerable समवायः which would require a *रूप* quite as much as वृष्टिः. (Recall the immission of the new school of Nyāya noted above in Note on 29-30).

—सद्वृत्तं केचन *etc.*—Distinction between मुख्य and that which is invariable; also, complete, is the opposite of this.”

etc.—So it is a false distinction to draw .s चरं and चरिन् is मुख्य while that the original समवाय is गौण व दीय.

बुद्धिर्लौकिकम् । अररुत्तमप्रधानेष्टा वाचस्पत्यः । तत्त्वामिनिवेदिनी बुद्धिर्लौकिकम् ।
 भीषमात्मन्तुर्लौकिकम् । इत्येवमादि । अररुत्तमेन चर्माचर्मबोद्धर्मपदः । तन्मात्र
 इति च वेगस्य मायनादाः सिद्धत्वावच्छेद चामिवाचस्पत्यः । — “अन्वेष्टं तद्विधिबन्धमा
 न । सेम्पत्तमन्वेष्टया वेगमात्रवासिपत्तयावच्छेदत्वात् । एव तर्हि न चतु
 र्दिगिन्तम् । अररुत्तमन्वेष्टया चर्माचर्मबोद्धर्मत्वात् । न । अररुत्तमन्वेष्ट
 यात् । निरुत्तमेन च गुणेष्वप्यावाप्त्यवयवयोगिनेनोपचातयगुर्विदितिरिति चव-
 द्द्वारः ॥ N Kandali.

4. The five वर्गः इत्येवम् etc.—“गणनपदम्” etc. a remark
 found in almost every book of the school. For स्वम्भूत some
 read स्वम्भूत (vide Pt. Bhīṣya and N Kandali). Upaskāra
 reads स्वम्भूत as in our printed text. वर्ग is thus defined.—

एवम्भूतपदं सर्वोपरिवायेनवच्छेदकत्वमिति वर्गपञ्चमम्

5. सामान्य—Generality—the principle of the co-ordination
 of individuals in one group. The whole passage bearing on
 सामान्य and the next two categories—from here to the end of
 the first section इति च वद वार्त्ता —occurs also in the *Inghe Vṛtti* on
 the *Bād. D-Sam.* see pp. 61-62-63 त्वं इति etc. One would
 suppose that the highest point to which a generalization could
 be carried was वार्त्ता embracing all the वर्ग in one group.
 But this is not what the *Vais* thinks. Certain categories he
 sets aside as incapable of possessing सामान्य in the real sense of
 the term—which according to him, belongs to only three
 categories, viz. इष्टं गुण and वर्ग. This highest सामान्य he calls
 सत्ता, also चर (cf. *Vais. Sūtra* L. II. 4 चरामुत्तमेन देवता
 सामान्येन) which, as it noted, does not mean Existence simply
 but *Existence carried to the highest point is point of generalization*,
 which steps at the collective group of इष्टं, गुण and वर्ग and
 cannot go beyond it. This सत्ता is otherwise called *सामान्य*
 because it is the highest सामान्य to which real generalization
 can be carried. इष्टं गुण etc., are lower than this, but are
 higher than इष्टं गुण इष्टं etc., and are called *असामान्य*.
 A *असामान्य* is not only a सामान्य but also a *विशेष*—*more*

The *Vais. Vidyakāśa*, therefore distinguishes सत्ता from
 चरति. For this and other and other see *Makharāli* and
Vidyakāśa.

much as it co-ordinates its individuals in a group and differentiates them from those of other groups, and is, therefore called, सामान्यविशेष. This field conception of सामान्य-विशेष which was held by the old Vaidika is endorsed among later writers by Kṛṣṇavāstra in his Tarkabhāṣā

ol. "सामान्यं विशेष इति ब्रह्मवेद्यम्"—Vaid. Sūtra I. B. 3.
 "सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । अथ परं सत्त्वं । अपरं सत्त्वाभावं ज्ञानमादि । तत्र
 सत्त्वाभावं तद्विशेषकत्वं च ब्रह्मत्वं ब्रह्मविशेष । अहङ्कारबुद्धिः । सामान्यत्वं व्यावृत्तबुद्धि
 विशेषकत्वं — परमपरि सामान्यपरमपरमपरि सत्त्वं । परं तु सामान्यं विशेषकर्तृज्ञानमपि सम्यक्
 ज्ञानं ज्ञानविशेषं ज्ञानविशेषितब्रह्मब्रह्मत्वे लभ्येन नान्यं तुल्यं वेद्यं कर्तृति विशेषकत्वं ।
 तथा च ज्ञानव्यापकं सामान्यत्वमेव विशेषकम् । — Upanishads on V B.
 L. 8. "सामान्यब्रह्मवेद्यं देवतात् सामान्यवेद्यं" V.B. L. 4. ज्ञानं तुल्यं
 कर्तृत्वं च सामान्यमपि विशेषकम् — V.B. L. 11. 5. "अथ सामान्यवेद्यो विशेषवेद्यः
 V B. L. 11. 6. अथ सामान्यविशेषा विद्यमाना ब्रह्मवेद्यविशेषास्तत्र ब्रह्मविशेष
 सामान्यविशेषाविशेषाविशेषाः ।" Upanishads, Ibid. "तद्विधिं ब्रह्मवेद्यकर्मणो
 सा सत्त्वा । V.B. L. 11. 7. ज्ञानब्रह्मवेद्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्त्वं V B. L. 11. 8.
 "न तु ज्ञानब्रह्मवेद्यं" पुनरुक्तत्वेन सत्त्वं नान्यब्रह्मवेद्यो ज्ञानाभावं समवेद्यं सत्त्वं । नतो
 हि ब्रह्मविशेषं समवेद्यं ब्रह्मवेद्यं वेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं सत्त्वं ज्ञानं सत्त्वं । न च सत्त्वं तेनो
 वेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं इति तद्विधिविशेषकत्वं नान्यं ज्ञानेति । ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं । सत्त्वं
 ज्ञानवेद्यं । तथा च ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 तद्विद्यया । ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 तद्विद्यः । न च ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं सत्त्वं । ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 सत्त्वं सत्त्वं सत्त्वं । ज्ञानवेद्यं तद्विधिविशेषकत्वं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 ज्ञानवेद्यं । Upanishads, Ibid. "ज्ञानवेद्यं तु च सामान्यं कर्म न तुल्यं" V.B. L. 11. 9.
 न हि कर्म कर्मणो वर्तते न वा तुल्यं ज्ञानेन न वा ज्ञानं तुल्यं कर्मणि वा । सत्त्वं तु
 तुल्यं कर्मणि च वर्तते तेन ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 सत्त्वं । Upanishads, Ibid. "सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च न" V B. I. 11. 10. "अथ सामान्यं ज्ञानं
 कर्म वा सत्त्वं सत्त्वं सामान्यविशेषकत्वं सत्त्वं । न च सामान्यं सामान्यविशेषं ज्ञान-
 वेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं । न हि सम्यक् सत्त्वं ज्ञानं तुल्यं कर्म वेद्यं वेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ।
 Upanishads, Ibid

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । अथ परं सत्त्वं । अपरं सत्त्वाभावं ज्ञानमादि । तत्र
 सत्त्वाभावं तद्विशेषकत्वं च ब्रह्मत्वं ब्रह्मविशेष । अहङ्कारबुद्धिः । सामान्यत्वं व्यावृत्तबुद्धि
 विशेषकत्वं — परमपरि सामान्यपरमपरमपरि सत्त्वं । परं तु सामान्यं विशेषकर्तृज्ञानमपि सम्यक्
 ज्ञानं ज्ञानविशेषं ज्ञानविशेषितब्रह्मब्रह्मत्वे लभ्येन नान्यं तुल्यं वेद्यं कर्तृति विशेषकत्वं ।
 तथा च ज्ञानव्यापकं सामान्यत्वमेव विशेषकम् । — Upanishads on V B.
 L. 8. "सामान्यब्रह्मवेद्यं देवतात् सामान्यवेद्यं" V.B. L. 4. ज्ञानं तुल्यं
 कर्तृत्वं च सामान्यमपि विशेषकम् — V.B. L. 11. 5. "अथ सामान्यवेद्यो विशेषवेद्यः
 V B. L. 11. 6. अथ सामान्यविशेषा विद्यमाना ब्रह्मवेद्यविशेषास्तत्र ब्रह्मविशेष
 सामान्यविशेषाविशेषाविशेषाः ।" Upanishads, Ibid. "तद्विधिं ब्रह्मवेद्यकर्मणो
 सा सत्त्वा । V.B. L. 11. 7. ज्ञानब्रह्मवेद्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्त्वं V B. L. 11. 8.
 "न तु ज्ञानब्रह्मवेद्यं" पुनरुक्तत्वेन सत्त्वं नान्यब्रह्मवेद्यो ज्ञानाभावं समवेद्यं सत्त्वं । नतो
 हि ब्रह्मविशेषं समवेद्यं ब्रह्मवेद्यं वेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं सत्त्वं ज्ञानं सत्त्वं । न च सत्त्वं तेनो
 वेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं इति तद्विधिविशेषकत्वं नान्यं ज्ञानेति । ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं । सत्त्वं
 ज्ञानवेद्यं । तथा च ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 तद्विद्यया । ज्ञानवेद्येन ब्रह्मवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 तद्विद्यः । न च ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं सत्त्वं । ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 सत्त्वं सत्त्वं सत्त्वं । ज्ञानवेद्यं तद्विधिविशेषकत्वं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 ज्ञानवेद्यं । Upanishads, Ibid. "ज्ञानवेद्यं तु च सामान्यं कर्म न तुल्यं" V.B. L. 11. 9.
 न हि कर्म कर्मणो वर्तते न वा तुल्यं ज्ञानेन न वा ज्ञानं तुल्यं कर्मणि वा । सत्त्वं तु
 तुल्यं कर्मणि च वर्तते तेन ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं
 सत्त्वं । Upanishads, Ibid. "सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च न" V B. I. 11. 10. "अथ सामान्यं ज्ञानं
 कर्म वा सत्त्वं सत्त्वं सामान्यविशेषकत्वं सत्त्वं । न च सामान्यं सामान्यविशेषं ज्ञान-
 वेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं । न हि सम्यक् सत्त्वं ज्ञानं तुल्यं कर्म वेद्यं वेद्यं ज्ञानवेद्यं ।
 Upanishads, Ibid

सामान्यं विवक्ष्येतिहृदयविवाधि । सामान्यविशेषसामान्यं तु द्वयस्यैव ।
 कथं त्वचक्षते । विवक्षाभरत्वारि सत्ता । सामान्यं द्वयस्यैव । सामान्यविशेष
 प्रविष्टिभारि । ननुविवक्षतेतेषां सत्तासामान्यं द्वयस्यैवकर्मणाः पदार्थोत्तरात्
 सिद्धम् ।" (ibid. p. 277)

तत्र सत्ता द्वयस्यैवकर्मण्येतेषां सत्ता—Next it is shown how सत्ता (the
 महासामान्यं) is a कर्मण्ये outside the groups of द्वय द्वय and कर्म of
 द्वयस्यैवकर्मण्येतेषां सत्ता" Vais. Sūtra L. ii. 8

(1) "न द्वये सत्ता ।" सत्ता is not a द्वय because it is lacking
 the characteristic mark of a द्वय which is that it should be made
 of many constituent द्वय (अनेकद्वय), or of no द्वय (न्यूनद्वय) but
 never of single constituentद्वय (एकद्वय). Like द्वयस्य सत्ता resides
 in each द्वय. And nothing which resides in single द्वय can be
 a द्वय itself. But सत्ता does reside in each single द्वय (एकद्वयस्य
 द्वये कर्मण्येतेषां सत्ता—एकद्वयस्यैव न सत्ता इति द्वयस्यैवकर्मण्येतेषां सत्ता).
 According to the Vaisṛika सत्ता सत्ता—"a द्वय is without a
 constituent द्वय or has many constituent द्वय, but never
 single (no tary) constituent द्वय; for example, अकारः अक्षरः, विष्णुः,
 ब्रह्मण्य and परब्रह्मण्य are द्वय devoid of constituent द्वय, while
 bodies such as द्वयस्य (duads), त्रयस्य (triads), etc., are
 possessed of many constituent द्वय—viz. the parts of which
 they are composed (See Muktā-Dīpakarī). But the सत्ता
 fulfils neither of the two conditions: it is एकद्वयस्यैव that is,
 it exists in a single द्वय—a. g. गोस्य in a single cow—no less than
 in many cows; and it is, therefore, not a द्वय

(2) "एकं न द्वयः सत्ता । सत्ता is not a द्वय For it resides in
 a द्वय. And a द्वय can never reside in a द्वय द्वय being them-
 selves विष्णु

(3) "तत्र न सत्ता कर्म" सत्ता is not a कर्म For it resides in
 a कर्म. And कर्म cannot reside in a कर्म कर्म being them-
 selves विष्णु.

G. विष्णुः—cf. Prastapāda Bh. and Nyāyakandall.
 pp. 321-22. विष्णुः—rather a certain class of विष्णु, according to the
 original notion of विष्णु which was more comprehensive than the
 later are resident in विष्णु and are identical, they are ab-
 solutely exclusive and thus they serve to distinguish the द्वयस्य

to which they belong from other dravyas (स्याद्विधेयत्वात्) They reside in each of the विश्वरूप—one in each individual unit—viz. जलम्, अग्निम् वायुम्, रिक्तम्, आत्मन् and मयः. Just as we distinguish cows from horses owing to certain physical features, so do yogins perceive the distinction of atom A from atom B both of which belong to the substance of the same genus, despite all their homogeneity in point of shape quality etc. This must be in virtue of something in A which is not in B—and that something is called विधेय. There is one विधेय for each विश्वरूप and no विधेय belongs to more than one रूप; therefore it does not serve as a basis of co-ordination and so, unlike अवस्थावाच्य such as इन्द्रिय etc which are सामान्यविधेय, these are pure विशेष.

According to the older conception of विधेय विशेष are of two kinds. First, those that are relative and consequently not incompatible with सामान्य these are सामान्यविधेयः (see supra); secondly those that are ultimate and absolute. The latter are जलम् and 'विश्वरूपवृत्ति'. Later Nyāya takes note of the latter only and in it, it is not जलविधेय (as distinguished from सामान्यविधेय) which is described as विश्वरूपवृत्ति but जलम् and विश्वरूपवृत्ति are both predicates of the object विधेय cf. "जलमे विश्वरूपवृत्तिविधेयं परिचर्तितम्—Bh. Parīkṣhedā and "अन्तेष्टस्यैव वर्तते इति अमत्याः वदन्त्येव विधेयं नास्तीत्यर्थः । वदन्ति तु रूपरूपवन्त्यानां तत्त्वज्ञानमेवान्तरं भेदः । वदन्त्यानां परस्परं भेदो विधेय एव । यं तु स्वान्न एव व्यावृत्त्येन विधेयान्तरावेका नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ —Makṭhālī on the same "अन्तेष्टान्तरमात्रादवाप्यवर्तका परिष्कृतिः किं विधेयेत्येति चेन्न । अव्यावृत्तवर्तस्य व्यावर्तकशक्त्यभावात् । तत्र व्यावर्तकशक्त्यभावात्तदव्यावृत्तमात्रम् । ननु विधेयेत्येव प्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न । तत्र यदि व्यावृत्तमात्रेव स्वतोप्रावृत्तमेव विधेयम् । तत्र च विश्वरूपेण विधेयं निश्चयः । तदुक्तान् न विधेयान्तरं आचक्षते च विधेयेति तेषां व्यावृत्त्यान् आचक्षते च विधेयवत्त्वात् व्यावृत्त्येन विधेयता संभवान् इति भावः । ईदृशकाशपरिचयज्ञानवशात् प्रावृत्ते समश्च तत्र विधेय इत्यन्याहः । नवीनास्तु विधेयानि विधेयानाम् ॥

cf. "अन्तेष्टान्तेष्टो विधेयः" V Sūtra I. H. 6.

"ननु च एव विधेयवत्त्वमस्ति न च किं सामान्यविधेयत्वेनाभिधीयते इति शिष्याणां प्रश्नश्चाह । अन्तेष्टेति । अमत्या विधेयं विश्वरूपवृत्तयो वेदमि-

न हि वै सवरीत्यम् etc.—This is a text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, declaring that when ātman is rid of the body—as he must be in the state of मोक्ष—हृन् and हृन् touch him no more

अरि च etc.—The verses quoted here, with the exception of couplet No. 5 occur in व्यासभट्टी p. 508. The latter has one more couplet which gives the list of the six अरिः प्राणस्य हृत्पिराणे द्वे शोभयोरी च वेगम् ।। जीवात्मा शरीरस्य बहुमिरहित विर । A recent edition of the व्यासभट्टी quotes in the footnote a somewhat different list “प्राणस्य हृत्पिराणे द्वे भवना शोभयते । अस्मान् शरीरस्य बहुमिरहित विर ।—इति गुणैः” The list of the text differs from both (Text p 39 l. 118).

सुखम् etc.—सुखम् (good) a good (ironical and therefore bad) doctrine indeed, has been formulated by them ; सुखम् (adverb) = with excellent (ironical) reason. For the irony contained in the word the commentator compares स्वप्नम् etc.—which is quoted in the Kāvya-prakāśa.

III. Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines detailed above :—

1. अविरोधम् etc.—It is a piece of great audacity to restrict सत्ता to the three padārthas ह्यत्तु गुण and कर्म when the idea of existence is undeniably predicable of all the padārthas.

यदा हरिमाश्रयताम् etc.—Just see how the word सत्ता is formed : It is an abstract noun from सत्—existing, pres. part. । सत् is exist. It is, therefore wholly equivalent to अस्मिन्—and since अस्मिन् is the very essence of thing which you are prepared to predicate of all the वर्गः (see supra) the plea that अनुवृत्तिरप्यत्र or co-ordination is possible in the case of the first three and is absent from the rest is baseless. For अनुवृत्तिरप्यत्र is possible in the case of all the categories. For just as we say पृथ्वी is a सामान्य गीर्ण is a सामान्य, चरत् is a सामान्य and so on, thus referring to a common idea (अनुवृत्तिरप्यत्र) of सामान्य running through all its specimens ; the same way we have this सिद्धे that सिद्धे a third सिद्धे and so on, which shows that we have a general idea of सिद्धे which we recognise in all the सिद्धे. Similarly in the

case of समवाय there are several लक्षणाय taken with their several अर्थव्यवस्था — which reveal one general idea of लक्षणाय.

सदस्यसामर्थ्य—It may be contended that in consequence of all the categories having certain लक्षण of their own, and therefore likeness in this particular लक्षण which really belongs to the first three is erroneously extended to the rest. Thus, in consequence of false ascription (अवधारण) of लक्षण to सामान्य etc. we imagine that the सदस्यस्य runs through them also, whereas, as a matter of fact, what belongs to them is more अस्तित्व (not an अवधारणलक्षण) as their अस्युल्लक्षण i. e. as the very being of those categories. The Jain's answer to this argument is that if the ascription of लक्षण to सामान्य etc. be false for the reason that we are thereby ascribing common nature to things that are really diverse, the same thing could be said about लक्षण as applied to गुण गुण and कर्म and one would be as much an अवधारण (false ascription) as the other. The Vais'v'ika might reply that लक्षण as traced in गुण गुण and कर्म is real, while in the rest it is unreal, for there cannot be a false ascription unless there is reality somewhere and that is in लक्षण as perceived in गुण गुण and कर्म. But this division of लक्षण into गुण and कर्म,—गुण in the first three cases and कर्म in the last three—could be reversed with equal justice, if only the distinction between real and unreal is to be secured somehow.

सामान्यवर्तिन वाक्यलक्षणाय etc. But it may be urged that the लक्षण is the case of the सामान्य etc. is कर्म being to the difficulties mentioned above (see above). But, in truth, the difficulties are quite imaginary. If the admission of लक्षण in सामान्य leads to अवधारण, why not in गुण? If गुण there is its सदस्यस्य (their very being) already and admission of another लक्षण (सामान्य) would lead to similar अवधारण. Then, as to विशेष, there should be no harm in ascribing to them लक्षण, for that will not interfere with their nature, as is supposed, but will on the contrary confirm it. Besides, विशेष which is totally devoid of सामान्य is found nowhere. Lastly the लक्षण would lose its very being, unless it

possessed a स्वस्वसत्ता = a. existence of something that makes it what it is viz., समवाय which gives it its peculiar character of अविवर्थाभावावच्छेदकत्वम् (indissoluble relation)

किं च तद्वैशिष्ट्यः—Moreover the सत्ता cannot be a distinct reality added unto the द्रव्य etc. from without. If सत्ता be absolutely distinct from द्रव्य etc. the latter would be अस्तु. It may be urged that they acquire सत्ता in consequence of their possessing द्रव्य. But the answer to it is—If they are अस्तु in themselves, सत्ता cannot make them सत्तु; if they are सत्तु in themselves, सत्ता can add nothing and is therefore superfluous. If all the वाद्वे have got their स्वस्वसत्ता—their own individual being—what can सत्ता add to them or it? If it be urged that a वाद्वे is neither सत्तु nor अस्तु before it becomes invested with सत्ता and that it becomes सत्तु after it is so invested, all we need say is that it is useless hair-splitting for nothing can be neither सत्तु nor अस्तु, it must be one or the other or as we Jaines prefer to maintain both

८. “अथ सामान्यम् । तद्विधा-परमपरं च । तत्र परं महासत्ताकर्तृ इत्यादि परार्थेभ्योऽपि । तत्रा चोक्तम्—“तदिति ब्रह्मद्रव्यपदमेतत् ता सत्ता” । अपरं च द्रव्यपदं द्रव्यत्वकर्मराज्यकम् । तत्र च सामान्यसत्तायाः पृथक्परार्थता पुनरुच्यते । अतस्तस्यां वा तदिति प्रत्यक्षं च किमवस्तत्ताविशेष्य इत स्वतः सत् ? । तत् सत्त्वस्तत्ताविशेष्यसत्ताप्यपदेन विज्ञेयोऽतोऽन्यस्या । अथ स्वतः सत् स्वस्तद्रव्य इत्यादिभ्योऽपि अत्र पक्ष सत्त्वस्यो मतिरिति किमवस्तत्तायाः समासत्वकल्पना विवक्षितता ? । किं च—इत्यादीनां किं सत्ता सत्ता सत्त्वस्य इवातताम् ? । तत् यदि सत्ता स्वतः सत्त्वस्यो भविष्यति । किं तदा ? । असत्त्वोऽपि तु अविशेष्यतादिभ्योऽपि अत्राचोक्तम् सत्त्वस्य । अतदिति । तत्रा चोक्तम्— स्वतोऽर्थाः सन्तु सत्तायत् अतदा किं सत्तायत्ताम् ? । असत्त्वान्तु नैवा स्वात् सत्तायतिमत्तद्रव्यम् ” इत्यादि । एतदेव स्वस्वपरतामात्रेऽप्युच्यते । द्रव्यपदोपपत्त्यात् । किं च—अस्माभिरपि सामान्यविशेष्यकस्याद्रव्यता कर्तव्यविशेष्यता चेति । तस्य च कर्तव्यसत्तावतिरे नात् इत्यपदेनैव ग्रहणमिति । अथ विशेषा ते आत्मन्तप्याद्विद्वद्भिरेतुमेव परितोऽन्ये । तद्वै विवक्षते—वा तेन विशेषद्रव्ये वा नापरविशेष्येद्रव्यस्य अविशेष्यता । अथवा अतदा । स्वतः सत्तायत्ताम् च तद्वत् इत्यादिभ्योऽपि विवक्षितता स्वात् किं इत्यादिभ्योऽपि विवक्षितता । इत्यादिभ्योऽपि विवक्षता अस्माभि रव्यपदेनैव सत्त्व सामान्यविशेष्यतायत्तावति । एतत्तु मतिरनाद्यम् ।

तयदा—नित्यत्वं इत्यर्थोऽस्या विवेका नित्यत्वादि च कर्तुर्विधा वस्तुमयो
मुच्यमानो वस्तुमयाधि च—इति विरुद्धिद्वारापक्षनैवित्यमिति ।”

2. *ज्ञानमयि वदेर* etc.—If *ज्ञान* is to be supposed to be *absolutely*
distant from *आत्मन्*, the *ज्ञान* of Mr Caltra is in the same posi-
tion with respect to his *आत्मन्* as the *ज्ञान* of Mr Maitra that is
to say both the *ज्ञान*s would be equal strangers to the *आत्मन्* of
Mr Caltra, and there is no reason why his *ज्ञान* should serve
him better than the *ज्ञान* of any other person in determining
the nature of things; in fact there is no such thing as his *ज्ञान*
all *ज्ञान*s being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be
offered by the other side; *ज्ञान* is *absolutely* distant from
आत्मन्, but it is connected with *आत्मन्* by *सम्बन्ध*, and
hence the *ज्ञान* of Mr Caltra is not in the same position with
respect to him as the *ज्ञान* of Mr Maitra; for the former is connect-
ed with him by *सम्बन्ध* relation which the latter is not. But this
explanation can be easily scotched. According to your notion
of *सम्बन्ध* it is *द्वय* *विषय* and *कारण*, and therefore it is impossi-
ble that *ज्ञान* should reside in Caltra and not in Maitra; and
since *आत्मन्* is also *कारण* according to your theory the *ज्ञान*
which takes place in one *आत्मन्* takes place in all the *आत्मन्*s,
and any knowledge which Caltra has acquired will belong
to Maitra also!

यदा च वदेर etc.—Moreover according to the Vain' theory
when the *द्वय* of an object is destroyed and another is substituted,
the object gets destroyed also a new object taking its place
with the new *द्वय*. Similarly when *ज्ञान* perishes *आत्मन्* would
be expected to perish too.

अथानुसन्धानेन etc.—Let us concede that it is possible for
ज्ञान to be connected with *आत्मन्* by *सम्बन्ध* relation. But a
question still remains to be answered. By what relation is the
सम्बन्ध connected with *ज्ञान* and *आत्मन्*? By another *सम्बन्ध*?
That will mean an endless series of *सम्बन्ध*-*सम्बन्ध*. Of
itself! Then, why should not *ज्ञान* and *आत्मन्* be connected of
themselves, without requiring *सम्बन्ध* relation to effect the
connection?

अथ कदा प्रदीपः etc.—A possible argument on the side of the Vais' As it is the nature of a प्रदीप to illumine, so it is the nature of सम्बन्ध to connect. It, therefore, does not require to be brought into connection with ज्ञान and आत्मन् by any other connection. Answer: Why should it not similarly be the nature of ज्ञान and आत्मन् to be self-connected? Moreover the analogy of प्रदीप will not fit in. प्रदीप is a द्रव्य : i. e. वर्मिन् and प्रकाश his कर्म; and according to you कर्म and वर्मिन् are absolutely distinct. So how could a प्रदीप have प्रकाश for its very self or being? And if प्रकाश be not the very self of प्रदीप, it would be absurd to cite प्रदीप as an example of a द्रव्य which illumines both itself and others. If प्रकाश be absolutely distinct from प्रदीप and yet प्रदीप is capable of illumining itself as well as other objects, there is no reason why चर, चर should not do the same.

अथि च ही etc.—Next, are the two स्वभावा of सम्बन्ध viz., that of connecting itself and of connecting others (आत्मन् and ज्ञान in this case) distinct from the सम्बन्ध or one with the सम्बन्ध? In the former case, how can they be its स्वभावा, unless they are connected with it by another connection which would similarly require to be connected by a third and so on ad infinitum? In the latter case, there remains only सम्बन्ध in the field, and the old difficulties continue as before. Therefore just as you say इह सम्बन्धादि सम्बन्धाः and no second सम्बन्ध is required to connect the first सम्बन्ध with the सम्बन्धादि, in the same way why can we not say इहात्मनि ज्ञानम् without requiring a स्वभाव like सम्बन्ध to connect ज्ञान with आत्मन्?

अपारता कर्म etc.—It may be urged that a distinction between आत्मन् and ज्ञान is required owing to their being related as कर्म and करण आत्मन् being the कर्म and ज्ञान the करण. Answer: The position of ज्ञान is different from that of an ordinary करण such as a soythe (दास) ज्ञान is an internal करण while the soythe is an external करण cf. करण etc. Now if an internal करण could be shown which was absolutely distinct from कर्म, the argument of complete distinction between ज्ञान and आत्मन् would hold water but not otherwise. We say हीने चक्षुः देवदत्त

वस्तुनि here हृदि and वस्तु are both वस्तु but on that account the two are not in the same position of अवस्थाने with respect to वेदः.

अपि च साधनिकतो etc.—Moreover it should be noted that the example of the carpenter (कर्तृ) and his tool (करण) does not point to an absolute distinction between the two. The carpenter has to resort to—while in process of वास्तव्य—to use the tool and thus undergo a परिणाम of वास्तव्य till assimilate the tool with himself in order to work on the wood. So in this sense even the carpenter and his tool may be said to be not absolutely distinct. In the same way वास्तव्य resolves to know a particular object by means of his हृदि and undergoes परिणाम and assimilates the हृदि with himself, and thus the two becoming one produce the effect, viz., knowledge of the thing (संविदि).

एवं कर्तृकरणयोरेकत्वे etc.—Now the unity of कर्तृ and वस्तु being proved we have one question to put to the opponent: Is the हृदि or संविदि, which is the effect of the united action of कर्तृ and वस्तु resident in (a) वास्तव्य or (b) विषय? If (a) in वास्तव्य that is all we care to prove. If (b) in विषय, how does that mean consciousness (ब्रह्मत्व) in वास्तव्य? If the consciousness (ब्रह्मत्व) in the person springs from संविदि in the object, why does it not arise in another person? For there is no difference between the position of one person and another, in as much as the विषय with its संविदि is absolutely extraneous to the person.

एवं अवास्तविकत्वे etc.—If हृदि and वास्तव्य are one, how is their relation of कर्तृ and वस्तु to be accounted for? Answer: By the analogy of serpent who makes a coil of his body by his body. It may be said that the कर्तृकरणत्व in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary. Criticism: How can it be said to be imaginary when we actually see the effect, viz., the coil, which is a new state of rest different from the former state of motion? No amount of imagination could make us believe that pillar was going to wind itself into a coil.

किं च चैतन्यम् etc.—Next, consider the word चैतन्य. It is the abstract noun from चेतन which means जाग्रतम्. Thus चैतन्य means the state or स्वस्व of जाग्रतम्. Now how can a state or स्वस्व of a thing be absolutely distinct from a thing?

अपारिण चेतनं etc.—The Vais' argues that जाग्रतम् is no doubt चेतन but that is not without a cause (स्वतः), but is owing to चेतना coming to reside by समवाय relation in जाग्रतम् as is shown by actual प्रतीति (experience). Answer: If you are prepared to accept the evidence of प्रतीति you must admit that जाग्रतम् is by nature 'उपपद्यमानक' i. e. of the nature of consciousness. For nobody is aware of being first अचेतन—that is, lacking in consciousness, and afterwards becoming चेतन in consequence of connection with चेतना or of चेतना coming to reside by समवाय relation in him who was at first अचेतन [उपपद्यमान is thus defined in the Tat. Bāṭ Vārt. "जाग्रदन्तरदेशेऽप्युपपद्यमाने यद्यसम्बद्ध उपपद्यमाने चेतन्यादुपपत्तिरिति परिवायः उपपद्यमान" i. e. उपपद्यमान is the modification that takes place in the knowing mind (उपपद्यमान) in accordance with its चैतन्य when the external and internal हेतु are present.] On the contrary he is always aware of himself as जाग्रदम् which implies सामानाधिकरण्य i. e. apposition unity of जाग्रतम् and जाग्र

मेरे तथा प्रतीतिः etc.—This सामानाधिकरण्य could take place even when there was मेरे. Answer But no or unless there were अमेरे in some way or another. In एहि: पुरुषः (when we speak of a "man," who is straight and stiff like a stick as a "stick") there is no doubt सामानाधिकरण्य (apposition, unity) despite of मेरे. But be it noted that there the सामानाधिकरण्य is figurative, and not real. The figure, however arises from the अमेरे of certain qualities of the stick and the man, a figure being always based upon foundation of reality [see Kārya-Prakāśa Ullāsa II]. In the same way our consciousness of जाग्रदम् in जाग्रतम् shows that the जाग्रतम् is essentially जाग्र or चेतन; without this, one could never say जाग्रतम् any more than एत could say so.

चेतनमेवामयम् etc.—But II may be contended that वर can never say अहम् because वर does not possess चेतनम्. But the answer is it is that similarly if अहम् does not essentially possess चेतनम् it can never be aware of being चेतनम् as shown above. And so, if अहम् is अचेतनम् it should be अज्ञ and incapable of knowing things, which is absurd.

वर ज्ञानवानहम् etc.—It may be further contended that the consciousness ज्ञानवानहम् would prove a distinction between वर and अहम्, for the former is that which is possessed (a.g वर) and the latter is he who possesses (a.g अहम्). But the objection is untenable. For who possesses the consciousness ज्ञानवानहम् in your theory? Not the अहम्; for अहम् is supposed to be वर i.e. devoid of ज्ञान in himself like वर. You cannot assert that अहम् is वर (i.e. essentially devoid of ज्ञान) and yet be able to say ज्ञानवानहम् without contradiction.

ज्ञानवानमिति हि अहमस्मीति etc.—For when I say ज्ञानवानहम् I am supposed to have known both the विज्ञेय and the विज्ञेयवानहम् etc.—See K.P. Now let us enquire how the विज्ञेय and the विज्ञेय in the present case are known—whether स्वयं or वर ? It cannot be स्वयं. For according to the Vaid ज्ञान (the विज्ञेय) and अहम् (अहम् the विज्ञेय) are not self-revealed. It cannot be वर. For in that case one ज्ञान would require to be revealed by another ज्ञान and so on ad infinitum (अनन्तरम्). Therefore, स्वयम् is not in himself वर (devoid of ज्ञान) by nature, who afterwards comes to possess ज्ञान by सम्यक् relation as the result of the working of बुद्धिश्च etc.

३. एवमिति etc.—Next, it is held by the V. that in बुद्धि there is neither ज्ञान nor अहम्, since ज्ञान and अहम् are streams (streams of attributes, a stream of cognitions and a stream of joys, a pleasurable feelings) and all streams meet some at some point. Criticism: What is meant by their being streams—संलग्नम्? Does it mean a series of states which go on producing themselves independently of one another and one after another? Or does it mean the states

which go on springing into existence one by one, but residing in a common shade? The former alternative involves the fallacy of समसिद्धादेशे *i.e.* समस्य in this sense does not necessarily imply cessation. For एत, एत etc. are running on in an unceasing stream. The second alternative presents a conception of समस्य which does not fit in with the example of प्रतीप. Moreover in the case of परमाणुपाकसमस्य (a new रूप produced in atoms by means of heat), there is a continued stream—समस्य—of products, but no absolute cessation. Besides, there may be a continuous stream and no absolute cessation; for there is nothing to render such a position impossible: a suspicion like this would arise in the mind and make the text "inconclusive"

किं च स्वाहार etc.—Besides, according to the *Śrādhvāda* of the Jains there is no अवश्य नश्येत्—absolute annihilation of any thing, all things being regarded as persisting in the midst of change: cf. स्वप्नसौप्थिके सव

न हि समरीरस्य etc.—This text of the *Upaniṣad* admits of a better interpretation than that placed upon it by the *Valī*. Thus: It need not mean that in the state of मोक्ष when the आत्मन् is free from the body there is an end to both सुख and दुःख. It should only mean that आत्मन् in that condition is free from the pair of सुख and दुःख that is to say from such सुख as is bound up with दुःख *i.e.* the सुख of लभार. It does not preclude the existence of pure, unmixed सुख—such as is proper to मुक्ति. Mallinaga seems to read असन्नात् for वाच समस्य in the *Upaniṣad*. असन्नात् = विक्रियेवमव्ययीवत्—occupying the state of मुक्ति or Perfection.

स्वदिरिति etc.—The first half of the verse is the first line of Verse 10 *Ādhyāya* VI of the *Bh. Gītā*. Here सुख need not mean merely दुःखाभावा—a negative condition of the absence of sorrow. For सुख is not a mere negative state of आत्मन्.

न च वदुर्दिरिती मोक्ष etc.—Who would care for the negative state of दुःखाभावा which the V *śā.* holds forth as the state of मुक्ति? Such a state would be no better than that of a stone which too possesses दुःखाभावा (को हि वाच etc.—cf. *मत्.* न p. 506). The *Valī*, मुक्ति is well-ridiculed in the famous passage "एत etc."

अवाप्ति etc. Some out of sheer despair of pessimism may prefer even दुःखाय to the present condition of mixed सुख and दुःख. But it should be noted that even they throw off the poles and honey only with the desire of being thereby happy. Thus, happiness is always the desired end.

किं च यदा प्राप्तिर्वा etc.—Moreover just as we regard दुःख as undesirable and सुख as desirable in the संसारवस्था, so we should be expected to regard दुःखानिष्टाप्ति as desirable and प्राप्तिर्वा as undesirable in मोक्षवस्था. If मोक्ष were such a negative state of दुःखाप्यय as you suppose it to be, no wise man would care for it. But many wise men do care for it. This implies that मोक्ष is regarded by them as a state of positive joy (दुःख).

यद यदि etc.—Does not even Homer nod? If wise men too long for happiness, they are not wise men to that extent, longing of every kind being inconsistent with wisdom and the source of bondage. Answer: It is the longing for the pleasures of संसार that makes for bondage, not the noble desire which opens up the path to wisdom.

यदि च मोक्षपरिचयः etc.—The Jainas out of the fineness of his merciful heart sympathise with the opponent and tells him how after all, he does agree with him to some extent, inasmuch as he too admits some sort of उपोष—annihilation.

दुःखि ता.—दुःखि in the Vais. system means क्षय. क्षय says the Jainas, is of five kinds (1) यदि, (2) क्षय, (3) अयि, (4) क्षयपरी(र्ष)य and (5) क्षेप (See Tattv Sūtra; also supra). Of these the first four, which are क्षयोपपत्तिवद्—a. arising from उपपन्न (quelling, preemption; not, destruction) as well as क्षय (destruction) of Karma—cease as soon as क्षेपक्षय arises. But the क्षेपक्षय which embraces within its range all क्षय with their वधाव (modes) persists in the condition of मोक्ष. In fact, it is the characteristic feature of मोक्ष. Thus there is partial agreement with the Vais. to the extent of the first four varieties of क्षय वद्वि etc.—See वाक्यव्याख्य.

यत्नं तु etc.—The क्षय arising from worldly objects ceases in the state of मोक्ष because the वैद्वीय यत्न which was the source

of the sensations of pleasure and pain in worldly experience has been exhausted. So, in the condition of मोक्ष there is endless infinite सुख of spirit, but no दुःख because अयम् the source of दुःख is no more.

इत्येव ह्यनन्तरं etc.—Following the same line of reasoning it may be argued that सुख would also cease because its source—viz. अयम्—is no more. Answer अयम् is the source of वैचरिक सुख i. e. objective pleasures, and so, अयम् ceasing, वैचरिक सुख would also cease. Not, however the आत्मसुख i. e. the spiritual joy of अयम् which is inherent in him. On अयम् and its relation to सुख and the अयम् transcending अयम् and its सुख as much as अयम् and its दुःख compare the Vedānta doctrine.

इत्या इव etc.—इत्या and इव of course cease, because they are varieties of मोक्ष.

प्रयत्नश्च etc.—Ordinary प्रयत्न i. e. effort in the direction of विद्या ceases, because in मोक्ष nothing remains to be done. But there still persists the one special kind of प्रयत्न which has brought about the destruction of अविद्याशक्त्यः the impediment to मोक्ष consisting of spiritual inertia or slothfulness.

The प्रयत्न however is admitted to be "ineffective. How will it then satisfy the definition of लक्ष्य = अयं विद्याकारिणः ?

अयं च अयं च etc.—अयं च अयं च alias सुखद्वयं must, of course cease in the state of मोक्ष.

अवस्था etc.—This is a kind of अविद्या and it ceases as soon as मोक्ष is destroyed.

It will be noticed that Mallikarjuna has thus passed in review all the special attributes of आत्मन् as held in the Vais. system and shown how far according to himself they persist in the state of मोक्ष.

For a knowledge of the Vais. categories the best books to read are the Vais. Sūtras with Upaśānta, Prasastapāda's Bhāṣya and Śrīlharṣa's Nyāya-Kaṇḍallī. For आत्मन् and the doctrine of लक्ष्य consult the same; also, the Mukṣārālī and the Dīkṣārālī and the Dīkṣapāṭh.

For the nature of आत्मन् and its relation to सुख see Madhvarāṣṭaka's Śūdrhanta-tattva-bindu Com. and Vedānta Sūtras I. LII. with differences between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

STANZA IX

Different views as regards the size (परिमाण) of आत्मन् ।

(1) आत्मन् is विशु (all-pervasive, infinitely vast in size) according to the Vaiśeṣika, Nāyāyika, Sāṅkhya, Yogin and Vedāntins of the Sāṅkara School. [N B With the first two its विशु consists in the possession of a positive परिमाण which does not seem to differ in character from that which belongs to अकार; with the third and the fourth, in its essential freedom from the bondage of प्रवृत्ति; with the last, in the negation of all limiting अवधि including spatial limitations.]

(H) आत्मन् is अणु (infinitesimal) according to the Vedāntins of the Rāmāṇja- and Vallabha-Ācāryas' schools.

(iii) आत्मन् is अणुपरिमाण adjusting itself to the size of the body in which it dwells. This is the Jain view. This, says the Jain, is borne out by our consciousness; for we are not conscious of ourselves as either infinitely vast, or infinitely small (infinitesimal), but as co-extensive with our own physical body—[आत्मनात्मनोऽन्तर्गता एव संविद्यमाना...]

Of these (i) comes up for criticism as a tenet of the Vaiśeṣika school which is now under examination.

अत्र देहे... अकारविवृति—The genus of Ātman, such as देह्य etc., are found within the limits of the body. From this the natural inference is that Ātman is co-extensive with the body (अणुपरिमाण). This is clear from the example of अर etc., which, as all agree, exist only where their genus (अर etc.) are found and not elsewhere and yet these fools who ignore facts place the Ātman outside the body! [अत्र देहो दहण्य एव अर अणुपरिमाण विद्यमान इति चेत्...]

अत्र पुष्पादीनां etc.—The case of a flower emitting its fragrance beyond itself is no exception.

वैवर्तिक्य वाच्यविक्रय वा etc.—Involuntary and voluntary; natural and voluntarily (that is volitionally) caused. of Bījavāri. pp. 200 and 232.

विज्ञता विविधिरप्ये विज्ञातः—वीक्ष्येपरिभाषामावेष्टा विविधा तद्विरप्ये विज्ञतासम्प्रदी निपातो ब्रह्मणः । प्रयोगः पुरुषकामवाहमवस्थानमज्ञानः । इत्यप्यप्यपि द्विरिवा विज्ञा विज्ञता प्रयोगविविधा च । See Tatvārtha.

न च हरेष्टुपपन्नं नाम—A very frequently used argument and phrase cf. B II. com. on Sūtrak

ननु मन्त्रादीनां स्तो—The case of मन्त्र (magic spells or incantations) is cited by the opponent as showing *action* in distance. But this is explained away by the Siddhāntin as really a case of their *deeds* going out to the spot where the effect takes place.

अवाचार इव—The negative (नन्व-अन्व) sometimes connotes not mere negation or absence, but badness (कुला); e. g. अवाचार is not mere absence of वाचार, but bad वाचार. Similarly अज्ञान means not only those who ignore truth but those who espouse the opposite of truth i. e. wretched falsehood.

II वाचार्थस्य च: Substance of the Stanzas—

आत्मा तत्रैवतो न भवति स्तो—A परार्थोपमान with an अन्वय व्यतिरेकि-हेतु and a negative साध्य

न चावयतिहेतु हेतु—The author next shows that the हेतु in the above अनुपाय is free from all fallacies. The only fallacies that could possibly be suspected in the present case are those of (a) an अनिष्ट (स्वकपानिष्ट) हेतु (b) an अविश्वान्तर हेतु and (c) a दिष्ट हेतु. That none of them exists in the present case may be shown as follows:—

(a) धर्म तदुपायस्यैव स्तो—The above अनुपाय is not vitiated by an अनिष्ट (that is स्वकपानिष्ट) हेतु. For the हेतु is predicable of the एत. The gunas of आत्मन्—बुद्धि स्तो, are not found every where. Vide the following from B IIhars: Nyāyakaṇḍali: 'योगतत्त्वप्रामाण्ये विद्वत्सु आनुरागे नान्यत्र । अतीत्येवमेवार्थेऽपि । अन्यथा तत्र विद्वत्सु' by yakaṇḍali p. 62. आत्मन् is everywhere but its एतु takes place within the limits—confines—of the body.

अवागमरह—आत्मेति स्तो—A possible objection: Take an other gun of आत्मन्—viz. अह. It is a विविधकारण of everything

arises into being, and is everywhere. So, it operates at remotest places and produces effects which I am destined to enjoy & suffer. How unless *सर्वत्र* were everywhere—even at the remotest places—its *गुण* viz. *सर्व* could not be there, and it could not produce the things.

सर्वत्र etc.—Mark the weak spot in the above argument: the *Pāras* *pāras* has not proved that the *सर्व* or not *पारस* *पारस* *पारस*. The author, however makes a bolder attack, directing his criticism against the very doctrine of *सर्व* and revealing a situation which makes the existence of God (favourite doctrine of the *Valīśka*) superfluous. As a proof of *सर्व* the *Valīśka* cites phenomena which cannot be explained by any known causes—e.g. the natural properties of fire, air etc. (*गुणसंज्ञा* etc.) All ultimate properties of things are thus determined by *सर्व*. The author asks Could not these properties be regarded as the very nature of fire, air etc. rather than be accounted for by an obscure cause (which we know nothing and which you dub *सर्व* ? It is silly to attempt to explain the known by the obscure. The *Valīśka* would reply by a question What endows them with that nature? What makes their nature what it is?—If not *सर्व* ? The author : Indeed? The *सर्व* will then account for every variety in Creation, thereby making the doctrine of the existence of God superfluous! [Mark that to account for the variety of Creation is not the same thing as to account for Creation itself—unless Creation and its variety may be regarded as a single fact—one integral or concrete reality—not an impossible position in itself. Moreover it may be noted that the early *Valīśka* philosopher did not explain Creation by the hypothesis of Divine Creator but that of the mysterious something—which he called '*सर्व*'—the Unseen]

(b) *व चैवमिति* etc.—The *सर्व* is not *वैवर्तिका* i.e. is conclusive for want of invariable concomitance between the *देव* and the *सर्व*—the *देव* सर्व *सर्व* *सर्व* *सर्व* being in every case accompanied by the *सर्व*—*सर्वतो व चरति*

(c) नापि विरुद्धः etc.—Much less is the हेतु—विरुद्ध i.e. proving the very opposite of what is intended to be proved. There is not a single instance to break the universal concomitance between the हेतु and the साधु.

अस्य सदा वायव्यं वृत्तमिच्छते—See Vaiśeṣika Sū. p. 81 Nyāyabandali p. 88.

The Vaiś. holds that वायव्य are many and that each of them is all-pervasive (विश्व). This says the author would create inter-penetration of वायव्य, and the consequent confusion of their स्पर्श, and also of their दृश्यत्व etc.

This difficulty the opponent may perhaps endeavour to meet by holding that the experience of दृष्ट and दृश takes place, with every individual वायव्य, *within the limits of the body*. But, in that case, सद्यः—whose case is similar to that of दृश्यत्व inasmuch as all of them are groups of वायव्य—would be confined to the limits of the body so that it could not go forth to the spot of the fire and cause it to burn in the particular manner in which it does. And this would be cutting off the ground on which the case of the all-pervasiveness of वायव्य is attempted to be based. [Vide supra वायव्यं च सर्वगतत्वे—]

Not only would our वायव्य—together with their स्पर्श and their दृश्यत्व—get hopelessly mixed up *inter se* but also with God!

किं च वायव्यः etc.—Moreover, the वायव्य would be then living in every possible world—earth, heaven and hell—at one and the same time.

✓ अथ बोधावयवमात्रवशात् etc.—How does वायव्य localise himself in the body? In *totum* or in *part*? In the former case, the position reached would be exactly the one which is maintained by the Jains. In the latter case वायव्य would be a substance possessing parts—which is absurd. Moreover, the experience of pleasure and pain would not belong to the whole but only to a part of वायव्य!

अवयवो व्यपस्तमस्येति —The Vaid. argues: || अवयव
were not all pervasive and were consequently far way from
the particles of matter which have to be set in motion in
order to build a body out of it for its abode, then it could not
exercise any influence on the particles and could not eventually
produce the body and be its own and it would thus be
eternally सुख —liberated!

The author: This argument could be easily met by
denying the necessity of adjacence between the cause and the
material on which it has to act: Compare the case of the
magnet operating on a piece of iron.

V. 12. If distance (अन्तर) were no bar to action would
not the whole world of particles be drawn to अवयव and produce
prodigious body?

The author: Are not all the particles equally in contact
(सम्पर्क) with अवयव on your hypothesis of सिद्धत्व and therefore
equally entitled to get corporealized?

The Vaid: No; they would be selected for the purpose
by अवयव

The author (Buddhastin): The same principle of selection
could work amongst the distant (अन्तर) particles, and prevent
the imaginary rush for corporealization.

अवयवो वा अवयवित्वाद्वा —The Vaidika grant for the
sake of argument that the corporealization of अवयव is
somehow possible. Yet he says, difficulty remains: It
means then that part of अवयव enters every particle of the
body which it becomes incarnate. This will be fatal
position—involving the consequence that अवयव is a सर्वत्र
[produced out of certain ingredients]

Now according to the law of homogeneity of Cause and
and Effect these ingredients should be themselves अवयव. Thus,
the position reached is this: Several अवयव dwell in one body
and combine to produce single अवयव dwelling in the same

body! This is impossible. Supposing it is possible, it means loss of personal identity and liability to disintegration of components and therefore death.

To this the Jaina replies: He is prepared to accept the consequences—as a matter of fact, he does hold that somehow—in a certain sense—*आत्मन्* is possessed of parts (*सामय*) and is a product (*कार्य*). The former *s. e.* *सामय* arises from his possessing innumerable *प्रदेश*. “*आत्मन्* too,” say *रामचन्द्र* and *सुबन्धु* authors of *उपनिषद्भाष्य*, “has got *रेख* (extension), since it can possess contact with all *सुक्ष्म* at one and the same time.” In certain works (*e.g.* *नन्दसिंह*) a distinction is drawn between *सामय* and *प्रदेश* but it is too fine and may be left out of consideration for the purposes of the present argument. *प्रदेश* is sometimes called *सामय* and since the Jaina holds that *आत्मन्* has got *प्रदेश*, he may well make an admission that *आत्मन्* is *सामय*—and in that sense *आत्मन्* is a *कार्य* too, in his system.

वस्तुत्पत्तिर्वाच्ये etc.—The Jaina denies the force of the argument contained in the foregoing parallel. He says Our explanation of the nature of the effect which we call *वृ* is not that it is a new creation arising from the संयोग of the *वस्तु* which are homogeneous with *वृ* but that the *वृ* arises as a change of state from the original state when it is worked upon by the potter. A *वृ* is said to be a *कार्य* when abandoning one form it assumes another. This is true of the internal quite as much as of the external world. And in this sense *आत्मन्* must be admitted to be a *कार्य*. It may be that in making a *वृ* you have to bring together (संयोग) the *तन्तु*, but it is not the only manner of producing things (of *वाच्यरम्भोदयि वाच्य* संयोगेनैव वेद्येन भवति औरज्जगतीनामप्यन्तरात्म्यवचसंयोगान्तरं दधिदिपादिवाच्यरम्भोदयिनाम्” S'ankara on Br Sū. II. II. 17). We must recognise the endless variety of ways in which things are produced in nature.

न चोत्पत्त्य etc.—The Jaina turns the tables against the *Valī*. In the matter of the argument that *वस्तु* परिमाण would involve

શરીર and therefore અનિત્ય which is inconsistent with the nature of આત્મ. Far from અનિત્ય (change) interfering with personal identity it is the *ans æs æs* of its consciousness. "I remember what I saw" would be impossible but for difference between him who saw and him who remembers, and the change from one to the other between the state of seeing and the state of remembering. And this fact is inconsistent with absolute નિત્ય of આત્મ i. e. unchanging personal identity or consciousness.

અવતરણ શરીરપરિમાણે etc.—The Vaid. might urge that આત્મ were only as large as the body it would be *સંપર્ક* (possessed of extension) and in that case, how could it enter the body? For two things possessed of *સંપર્ક* cannot interpenetrate each other and so the body must remain without a soul (આત્મ)?

To this the Jain replies: What is a *સંપર્ક*? Does it mean a *જગત્* which has limited size? In that sense આત્મ is *સંપર્ક* and we see nothing wrong in holding that proposition. In fact, it is just the proposition we have been urging. Secondly *સંપર્ક* may be interpreted to mean *સ્પર્શિણ* i. e. possession of *સ્પર્શ* etc. But in that sense, *સંપર્ક* is not a necessary concomitant of શરીરપરિમાણ i. e. *સંપર્કગુણ*. Thus, for example, *વસ્તુ* is *સંપર્કિણ* but not *સ્પર્શિણ*. [વસ્તુ according to the Vaidika school is not *સંપર્ક*. See Vaid. Śā. and Nyāya-Bhāṣa.]

In the former sense (*સંપર્કગુણ*), a *સંપર્ક* can penetrate a *સંપર્ક* e. g. *વસ્તુ*. Even in the latter sense, (*સ્પર્શ*), *સંપર્ક* things are sometimes found to do it e. g. water penetrates sands.

અવતરણ શરીરપરિમાણે etc.—Another objection to the Jain doctrine of body-sized આત્મ. Does the આત્મ grow in size? If it does, it must part with its former size as it goes on assuming larger sizes—i. e. it is અનિત્ય and may well be expected to perish with the body. If it does not, its size does not keep pace with the growing size of the body and this is abandoning the dogma of body-sized આત્મ.

The author replies: *आत्मन्* may well relinquish its former size without ceasing to be. Take, for example, the case of a serpent which can change its size at different times by expanding or contracting its hood.

स्वयंस्वरूप इति etc.—This contains the gist of the Jaina position which is a recognition of unity-in-difference change-in-permanence *आत्मन्* is substantially *विरह्य* modally *अविरह्य*

अविरह्यः कश्चिदपि भागश्चेत् तत्तत्प्रदेशे etc.—Another objection to the doctrine of body-sized *आत्मन्* is—that the mutilation of the body would involve mutilation of *आत्मन्*

Answer: It is so as a matter of fact. When the body is mutilated a few out of the total number of the *प्रदेश* of *आत्मन्* continue to remain in the mutilated body and the rest have gone off with the part of the body cut off. Hence it is that the part cut off is often found throbbing with life—which is a clear evidence of the existence of some *प्रदेश* of *आत्मन्* dwelling in it. Would not the *आत्मन्* dwelling in the part cut off thereby become a separate and independent *आत्मन्*? No; the *आत्मन्* are dwelling not in the whole but a fraction of the body and cannot therefore be regarded as a single, independent whole. Besides, there cannot be many *आत्मन्* dwelling in parts which together make one continuous whole. For in that case, there would be no unity of consciousness; the cognitions would fall asunder like those obtained through different bodies.

यत्तु अविच्छिन्नवत् इति etc.—If it be asked—How do the parts unite once more?—the answer is They were never absolutely separated in the manner in which a lotus-fibre is separated from the parent stock. That is only temporary and the reunion may be brought about by *अहम्*

तथा वाच्यम् etc.—*देवत्वमपि विरोधि* *अहम्* with a negative *सर्वम्* It is contended that an *आत्मन्* being *देवत्व* must be limited in size; for only an *अवैतन्य*—like *आकाश*—could be unlimited in size. Next, if it is limited in size the limits must be imposed by the body; for its *गुण*—*रूप* etc.—are manifested in the body

अणुवत् इत्यादि—This refers to the Jain doctrine that the soul of an *जीव* may at times fill the whole universe. This, however is occasional, and therefore does not interfere with our main thesis—that *आत्म* is not *विह* but *जीवपरिवाह*.

लघवः—Smallest division of time moment, instant (Jacobi).

Read अनुदाह for अनुदाह्य which is an obvious misprint. Vide Abhayadeva's com. on Bhagavati Sūtra XIII 10 cited in the note on p. 86 of एवा वज्जी published in the "Ārīṣṭa-mata-prabhākara Series" which explains how according to the Jain doctrine the *जीव* are drawn together and mixed with *आत्म* and thereby the *जीव* are suffered and exhausted by the *Kevāḥ* (the pure, emancipated) sage. For this, the *जीव* have to spread through the universe.

अणुवत् इत्यादि—For this Jain Cosmography see Taittirīyādhigama Sūtra III-8, and Lokaprakāśa Sarga 37

Appendices.

I. For the Jain view of the nature of *Ātman*—cf.

जीवोऽपि इह हि जगत्तुल्यं विद्यते नान्यथा ।

मोक्षं च देवदेवो न हि मुक्तो जगत्तुल्यो ॥

आत्मनश्चिन्मनुष्यो ह्यहं जगत्तुल्यं भवति विद्वान् ।

—Pañcātīkāya 37

जीवो जगत्तुल्यो भवति कदा लोकेऽपि नान्यथा ।

मोक्षो लोकात्तुल्यो विद्यते नान्यथा ॥

जीवः जगत्तुल्यो भवति कदा लोकेऽपि नान्यथा ।

मोक्षो लोकात्तुल्यो विद्यते नान्यथा ॥

—Dravyasamgraha—2.

जीवविधिः आर्वाकं भवति; आत्मनश्चिन्मनुष्यो ह्यहं जगत्तुल्यं भवति नान्यथा ॥
स्वार्थं नान्यथा भवति ॥ कर्मानुष्ठानात् स्वार्थं भवति; लोकेऽपि नान्यथा
मोक्षं च देवदेवो न हि मुक्तो जगत्तुल्यो ॥
जीवः जगत्तुल्यो भवति कदा लोकेऽपि नान्यथा ॥
मोक्षो लोकात्तुल्यो विद्यते नान्यथा ॥
जीवः जगत्तुल्यो भवति कदा लोकेऽपि नान्यथा ॥
मोक्षो लोकात्तुल्यो विद्यते नान्यथा ॥

This summarizes very beautifully the differences of the Jain school with other schools in regard to the several points concerning the nature of *आत्म*.

2. For the पूर्वपक्ष and its arguments which have been answered in the text, vide the following:—

व्यवस्थातो वाचा—Vāśa Sūtra III II-20.

वाचऽध्यायः कृतः व्यवस्थातः—Upaśāra.

यस्य तु वाचाध्यायः तस्य सर्वोवाच्यतां सर्वव्यपत्त्येन सर्वपरिहर्तव्यत्वेऽपि न तावदाच्यो भोगः यस्य कर्मणा वच्छेदपरिहारार्थं तस्यैव तद् वयमोपायवर्तनं न तर्क्यम् । कर्माणि यस्य शरीरेण कृतं तस्यैव तद्व्यवृत्ति नापरस्य । एवं शरीरान्तर्निवृत्त्या कर्मान्तरनिवृत्त्या इत्यवधिः ।

—N Kandali p 87

विमुक्तं वाच्यतो व्योर्ध्वार्ज्यत्वात् वाचोस्तिर्यक्पक्षवाहयतश्च । ते प्रसङ्गं कथयिते । न च तदावधेयास्तद्व्यवृत्तिं तपो कारणं मनितुमर्हति । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न वाच्यतामवेतस्यादृष्टत्वं साक्षात् इत्यान्तरसंज्ञको वदते इति त्यागवर्तकत्वं ह्येतत् तस्य संज्ञक इत्यावाहत् । तत् समस्तपृष्ठव्यवृत्तकम्पञ्चमवाच्यतो विमुक्तं सिध्यति । स्वभावश्च एव व्योर्ध्वार्ज्यत्वं नादृष्टादिति चेत् नोचं स्वभावाद्यो वयम् । अवेतव्यविच्छेदप्रत्ययत्वं स्वभावं इति अविच्छेदप्रत्ययस्य निगुहादिप्रत्ययस्य व्योर्ध्वार्ज्यत्वं न स्यात् । अवासीन्निवृत्तः कोपि स्वभावः कान्मुचिह्वविच्छेदसिद्धिं पादाव्योर्ध्वार्ज्यत्वं दधते इति पुनरप्युच्ये का प्रष्टव्यः ? ।

—N. Kandali p. 88.

“ एवं वाचाव्यवस्थान्त्वं ”—Br. B. II. II. 34.

वैधर्म्येन च विविध विच्छेदप्रतीत्यो दोषः स्वाहारे प्रसङ्गं स्वभावाधेयत्वेऽपि जीवस्याव्यवस्थान्त्वं पते दोषः प्रसज्येत । कथम् । शरीरपरिमाणो हि जीव इत्यर्थवत्ता मन्वन्ते । शरीरपरिमाणतायां च तत्त्वमकृत्स्नोऽन्तर्भवताः परिच्छिन्न आत्मेत्यतो वदन्तिरिति स्वभावः प्रसज्येत । शरीरार्थं चावधारितपरिमाणव्याप्यत्व-जीवो मह्यप्रशरीरपरिमाणो भूत्वा पुनः केचित् कर्मविषयेन ह्येकमव्यं प्राप्नु-वन् कृत्स्नं इति शरीरे व्याप्नुयात् । पुनिकाव्यं च प्राप्नुवन् इत्यं प्रतिपाद्यतीति संजीवेत । तस्मात् एव एकस्मिन्नपि जन्मनि जीवावधेयवस्थाविशेषु दोषः । स्वभावे च । अनन्तावस्थो जीवस्तस्य च स्वाभावश्च अन्ये शरीरे संकुचे पुनर्भवति च विक्रमेऽपि । तेषां पुनरनन्तायां जीवावधेयतां तयावधेयत्वं प्रमिहन्ते वा न वेति वक्ष्यम् । प्रतिज्ञाते वाच्यतामन्तावधेयः परिच्छिन्ने देहे संजीवेरत् । अप्रतिज्ञातेऽ-व्येतावधेयत्वोपपत्तेः सर्वव्यवस्थान्तां प्रविधावपपत्तेर्जीवस्यानुभावावधेयत्व-स्यात् । अत्र च शरीरमात्रपरिच्छिन्नतायां जीवावधेयतामन्तावधेयं नोपेक्षितुमपि वक्ष्यम् । अत्र यदावैव बृहन्शरीरप्रतिपत्तौ केचिद्विधावधेयता वगच्छति तद् शरीरप्रतिपत्तौ च कश्चिदवगच्छन्तिष्येत तदाव्यवस्थे—

—Sādhaka & Com. Ibid.,

STANZA X.

Sense: That in this world where men are naturally inclined towards disputes and are anxious to babble out their so-called wisdom, the sage of the heretics should injure the hearts of others by preaching in them false doctrines is indeed a singular mark of his dispassionateness!

अन्यैरेव हि — The sage "of others" that is to say of the heretics, viz., Akṣapāda, the Bāṭrakāra of the Nyāya system. He is also known as Gaṇatama or Gotama after his gotra [Gotama is a Prakṛit form of Gaṇatama]. For further information see Nyāya Vārtika Bhāṣikā by Vināyakaśastrya Prasad. Dr. Satishchandra Vidyabhushana distinguishes between Gaṇatama or Gotama and Akṣapāda, one of whom he believes to have lived in Mithilā long before the Christian era and the other at Prabhās in Kathiawad about 150 A. D. "Akṣapāda he says, was the real author of the Nyāya-Sūtra which derived a considerable part of the materials from the Ārvīkṣit vidyā of Gaṇatama. Just as Oshaka was the redactor of the Agvīva-tantra the Āyurveda of Ātreya, Akṣapāda was the redactor of the Ārvīkṣit of Gaṇatama" [Vide Dr. Vidyabhushana's II. I. L. pp. 47-60.]

Dr. Vidyabhushana's view however has not been generally accepted.

Dr. Keith writes "Of the personalities of Gaṇatama and Kanada we know absolutely nothing. The personal name of the former Akṣapāda has the appearance of being a nick name such as early India seems to have loved — one whose eyes are directed at his feet, but it is variously interpreted and embellished with idle legends. We may well dismiss the fantastic stories invented to account for his name such as that of his falling into well while absorbed in thought and being protected by himself (I) God with pair of eyes in his feet to protect him from further mishaps, and also the other story of Vyāsa falling at his feet and his condescending to see

him with his eyes in his feet. But when so much obscurity hangs about the origin of the name, one may venture to submit a conjecture which is at any rate more plausible than the others. Possibly the philosophy of व्यक्तीक्षिप्यी was the philosophy which aimed at seeing that is bringing to human consciousness by means of reasoning—Pramāṇas (प्रमाण and व्यक्तीक्षिप्यी)—the truths relating to the Prameyas—such as Ātman, sārira, etc. (see N B.). Its founder was व्यक्तीक्षिप्यी and व्यक्तीक्षिप्यी was an honorific word like the same in Prasastapāda, the author of the Vaisesika Bhāṣya.

सर्ग १.—Vital parts; those limbs of the body which are thickly studded with अणुपरमाणु are the vital parts. [Note that the Jains believe Ātman to be possessed of प्रवेष्टा जीवा पोषाद्वयया चमसाद्वयया पुनो य आयातः । वेदेहि अंतर्गतम्"—i. e. the five अस्तिवाच्य वि. जीव, पुरुषाद्वय चर्म अहम् and आकाश are अंतर्गतवाच्ये—Pravacanaśāstra. अणुपरमाणुवद्वयो अंतर्गतवाच्ये वेदा । अहम् अहम् चमसाद्वयया विषयवद्वयो अंतर्गतवाच्ये वा ॥—According to Vyākṣhīpa Naya, the conscious Jīva being without saṃśā ghāta, becomes equal in extent to a small or a large body by contraction and expansion; but according to Nibhaya Naya it is extant in innumerable pradeśā. (Dravyasamgraha Ed U C. Ghosh)] By प्रवेष्टा however one need not understand material space or extension. 2. Secondly vital parts of their systems, = i. e. the essential propositions which are put forward to prove their tenets.

वाच्यपरमाणु etc.—Teaching deceit, in the shape of वाच्य and विप्रवृत्तम् [These will be explained below]

पुनराविर्भाव इव—Hema-S'abdhānus'āraṇa II. 5 ?

असिद्धम्—To this i. e. the vulgar crowd which cannot discriminate between Truth and Error

विप्रवृत्तम् etc.—विप्रवृत्तम् defined.

विप्रवृत्तवर्णिका etc.—A quotation from Haribhadra Śāri-
Arṇaka XII. 4. विप्रवृत्तम् is that set of propositions—consisting of वाच्य (frivolous arguments) and वाच्य (objections in the

एषि कश्चित्तद्वै तदुपयोगात् । यद्येकं तत्त्वात्मकसाधनसंरक्षणादीनमनैकसिध्य-
पद्योपात्तयमानं रहस्वतत्त्वमुपरिसमर्थं ज्ञानतयावसमाचार्यमवार्थः कश्चिद्विपश्चिदात्तः ।
कृतविद्वानस्य दुरविमतकतिपयाह्वयपरिचयमनितद्वत्तरगार्ग्यगुरुरवा मिरा मो-
स्तपस्विन् किमात्मपात्री इतुरमासीत्किञ्चि सख्यमतिप्रियेयं विद्या क वेदा क वेद
प्रामाण्यं कृतमङ्गलं ज्ञानवर्धनी इत्यादि मन्त्रं विद्वस्य तद्वस्य तद्वसा तद्वमेव इव प्रकटित
कश्चिद्विद्वत्कथयितुम्विधासिताधमयुगवर्णस्तदुपाह्वयवाक्यमिति तदा जन्मजात
विद्वत्वाक्यपरिहृतकिसिद्धिमिति ज्ञानजन्यकाम्या परि तदुपेक्षते न विरह्यतोति
तथा तन्मह साधनाप्रतिपाद्येति यदि ज्ञानविमिरेयं न कामपति तदा तस्मिन् गते
तत इत्याव सिध्यतया नूनः कष्टमस्यामे हिद्यः समा । बोधतावत्माकमाचार्य पण्डितो
न्यायविद्वान् । अथ ज्ञानस्य लोभ्येन पण्डितेन वयम्विता ३ तन्मूल्या अथ इतरादिपि
तत्पवत्वाद्येतिन्यास्तपदि तमेव माञ्जुवासीत् । तदुयं परिमन्मूमिकमसता नैतन्वा-
तद्वति स वाचनूकपथाः । तद्विवातवदमे विरलं ज्ञानमन्त्रपरिहृतात् सुनि ।
अज्ञपद्विकमपि प्रबोध्यं तस्य पयिकमवाह वर्जितम् । —N Manjari.

वायोपेक्षारिति etc.—Mallikarjuna is now going to make this one word the basis of his commentary dealing with the exposition and criticism of some of the points of the Nyāya system.

I. न चैतत् etc.—A mere knowledge of each of these sixteen वक्ष्ये taken singly or collectively will not suffice to bring about the *summum bonum*. ज्ञान and विद्या are the two wheels of the chariot of साधन which will not move if either of them is wanting. It may be urged that विद्या is not discarded altogether but it has to be preceded by तत्पञ्चन if it is to bring about मोक्ष. Even if ज्ञान and विद्या be joined together they will be of little use in achieving the end. For, the ज्ञान that is provided there is false ज्ञान. This can be shown as follows :

II. 1. तौ प्रमादस्य तद्वत् etc.—प्रमाद is defined as अर्बोपनि-
देतुः प्रमादश्च अर्बेव प्रमादश्च —N Bhāṣya I. I. I. उपनि-
देतुः प्रमादश्च —N Bh. Vārtika I. I. I; “उपनिदेतुश्च प्रमादं बोधेयं तत्-
परिचयिवद्वा —N Bh. II. I. II. Here II द्वौ means only a cause
any cause, not necessarily an instrumental cause or कारण the
definition will apply to all the कारण (things participating in
or associated with the विद्या such as agent (कर्तृ), object (कर्तव्य)
etc.). If, however द्वौ is taken to mean only कारण ज्ञान and not
ह्निवाचसंदिह्यं is the कारण of अर्बोपनिदेतुः for ह्निवाचसंदिह्यं may
take place and yet for want of ज्ञान there may not be अर्बोपनिदेतुः

Hence, *ज्ञान* is the true *कारण* and not *इन्द्रियार्थनिर्णय*. Besides, a *कारण* must immediately precede the effect, which *ज्ञान* does not. *इन्द्रिया* does not the latter being one step remote.

यदि व्याख्यानं च etc.—Another definition of *प्रमाण* is “*सत्यव्यवसायार्थं प्रमाणम्*” (*Nyāyācāra* of *आनन्द* I I). Here ‘*सत्य*’ is all right. It means *कारण*, and this excludes *कर्तृ* and *कर्तृ* of the *अनुमान*. It would be a definition applicable to *ज्ञान* and not to *इन्द्रियार्थनिर्णय*. The right definition is “*स्वपरम्पराभिः ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्*”—See *Pramāṇa-Nyāya-Tattvālekāṇṇikā*. I II. *व्याख्यानम्* is a commentary on *व्याख्यान* of *आनन्द* an old *Sāṃkhya* writer on *Nyāya*.

2. *प्रत्यक्ष इति* etc.—*प्रत्यक्ष* i.e. the object of right knowledge is of twelve kinds: (1) *आत्मज्ञ*, (2) *शरीर* (3) *इन्द्रिय* (4) *कर्तृ*, (5) *कृति*, (6) *वसा*, (7) *प्रवृत्ति*, (8) *दोष* (9) *वेद्यमात्र*, (10) *काल*, (11) *दृष्ट* and (12) *अवयव*.

तत्र न सत्यम् etc.—The classification is objected to on the ground that *शरीर*, *इन्द्रिय*, etc. deserve to be included in *आत्मज्ञ*. For *जीव* i.e. the *आत्मज्ञ* who is associated with and subject in *संसार* and to whom the knowledge of the *प्रत्यक्ष* is prescribed, cannot be dissociated from his *शरीर*, *इन्द्रिय*, etc. [Note, however that *प्रत्यक्ष* in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* does not mean logical category (*प्रमाणं कर्तृ प्रत्यक्ष*) but topics which deserve to be studied by one desirous of *मोक्ष* (*प्रमाणं योग्यं प्रत्यक्ष*) thus, *आत्मज्ञ*, *शरीर* etc. deserve to be studied so; fully and in detail by a *ब्रह्मज्ञ*, and are in this sense *प्रत्यक्ष*. The criticism therefore misses the point.]

आत्मा च etc.—Another defect in the classification is that *आत्मज्ञ* is not *प्रत्यक्ष* but a *वसा*.

इन्द्रियवृत्तिवशात् etc.—These three are *कारण*, and not *कर्तृ* of *वसा* and therefore not *प्रत्यक्ष*.

दोषकाल etc.—*दोष* are thus defined in the *N Sūtra* *प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्* (N B. I I 15). They are included in *प्रवृत्ति* i.e. activity of the *वसा*, *शरीर* & *मनस्*, all of which *ज्ञान* are included.

Hence, *ज्ञान* is the true *कारण* and not *इन्द्रियार्थनिर्दिष्ट*. Besides, a *कारण* must immediately precede the effect, which *ज्ञान* does but *इन्द्रिया* does not the latter being one step remote.

वदति आचार्यवचनम् etc.—Another definition of *प्रमाण* is “सम्बन्ध-अवधारणं प्रमाणम्” (*Nyāyārṇava* of *भाष्य* L. 1). Here ‘*साधन*’ is right; it means *कारण* and this excludes *कर्तृ* and *कर्त्रे* of the *अवधार*. It would be definition applicable to *ज्ञान* and not to *इन्द्रियार्थनिर्दिष्ट*. The right definition is “*कारणवत्तावि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्*”—See *Prāmāṇya-Nyāya-Tīrthakāṇḍikā*. I.—*आचार्यवचन* is commentary on *व्याख्यान* of *भाष्य* an old Śaivite writer on *Nyāya*.

2. *प्रवेदवति* etc.—*प्रवेद* i. e. the object of right knowledge is of twelve kinds (1) *आत्मज्ञ*, (2) *शरीर* (3) *इन्द्रिय* (4) *वर्ग* (5) *वृद्धि* (6) *वचन*, (7) *प्रवृत्ति*, (8) *शेष* (9) *शेषसाधन*, (10) *कर्म*, (11) *द्वन्द्व* and (12) *अवयव*.

तत्र न तत्त्वम् etc.—The classification is objected to on the ground that *शरीर इन्द्रिय*, etc. deserve to be included in *आत्मज्ञ*. If *शरीर* i. e. the *आत्मज्ञ* who is associated with and subject to *संसार* and to whom the knowledge of the *प्रवेद* is prescribed, cannot be dissociated from his *शरीर इन्द्रिय* etc. [Y is, however, that *प्रवेद* in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* does not mean logical category (*व्याप्त्युपपन्नं प्रवेदम्*) but topics which deserve to be studied by one desirous of मोक्ष (*व्याप्त्युपपन्नं प्रवेदम्*) that, *आत्मज्ञ शरीर* etc. deserve to be studied as, rarely and in detail by a *ब्रह्मज्ञ* and are in this sense *प्रवेद*. The criticism therefore misses the point.]

आत्मज्ञ इति etc.—Another defect in the classification: *आत्मज्ञ* is not *प्रवेद* but *व्याप्त्युपपन्नं*.

इन्द्रियवृद्धिप्रवृत्ति etc.—These three are *कारण*, and not *कर्तृ* of *प्रमाण*; and therefore not *प्रवेद*.

शेषवत्त्वम् etc.—*शेष* are thus defined in the *N Sūtra* *प्रतीति-सम्बन्ध* *शेष* (H. B. I. 1. 18). They are included in *प्रवृत्ति* & activity of the *आत्मज्ञ*, *शरीर* and *अवयव*, all of which *गुण* are included.

Sūtra—युवकवर्गः प्रेतवाचः। तद् (इत्या)ख्यविमोक्षोपपत्तिः (N. S. I. 1. 19 2.)

The right definition of प्रमेय says the author is the famous Jaina definition "अपरलोकात्मके वस्तु प्रमेयम्"

2. एवं लंघनीयं etc.—लंघ्य etc. are the other terms on the list of the पदार्थाः. That they are not तत्त्व or realities can be easily shown.

तरेण प्रसङ्गः etc.—Only three out of the sixteen पदार्थाः have been selected here for detailed criticism, because they are unbecoming of any one who professes to be a sage. These are इन्द्र, जाली and विमलदास.

III. I. इन्द्र पश्य etc.—Definition of इन्द्र. इन्द्र is a deceitful hack upon the opponent by quibbling upon his words. अवि-
—१५/२५—

तद् वदति
ground it is
For वीर
लंघ्य and
cannot be
that प्रमेय
(अत्रात् वदन्तः)
one destroyed
etc. description
od are in
point.]

आत्मा is
is not a प्रमेय
इन्द्रियार्थः
कथं, of अत्र p. 105.

होयन्तु a trans-
मयः होताः (the states
activity of the
like it.

you know that in saying वदन्तः
is used the word वद in the sense of
purposely take the word in the sense of
try to put him out by showing how
he was वदन्तः in the sense of
picks—you re-lapsing in वाद
use of language.

concerning the use of a class-term
अवधारणार्थं वाच्यं इत्यत्रात्
Suppose one says "The Brāh-
the ed and somebody remarks
are quite natural in a Brāh-
only strain the argument beyond
speaker and attribute to him
down via causal connection
अथवा thus If Brāhmanas
four Vratya (a low degraded
would possess them too, for he
would be a case of आचार्यपण
विद्या-वर्ण.

औपचारिके प्रयोगे etc.—When knowing that a term has been used in a figurative sense by the opponent, you purposely take it in the literal sense and attack it, it would be a case of **उपचारच्छेदः**—doctt concerning a figurative word. Example : One says **मञ्जा कोचन्ति**—"The benches are crying out"—meaning thereby that the men seated on the benches are crying out. Here, if you purposely take the word **मञ्ज** in the literal sense and object : "Benches are wooden; they cannot be crying out" your objection would be an **उपचारच्छेदः**. **अग्निबाणस्य चर्यो वक्षस्परेषोऽपि । चर्यविक्षन्पोऽप्यत्र दहस्त्वाम्बुज प्रहोम । तस्य विर्वेगे चर्ये विक्षन्निर्वेदि । यदा मञ्जा कोचन्तीति अर्चसद्भावेन प्रतिषेधः मञ्जस्तः । पुनश्च कोचन्ति न तु मञ्जा कोचन्ति । यः पुनश्चावैविक्षन्पोपपत्तिः ? । कल्पया प्रमुक्तस्याम्बुपक्षस्तथा । यस्या प्रयोगे प्राधान्येन दह्यन्तः । उपचारविषयं कञ्चउपचारच्छेदः । उपचारो वीर्यार्थः लक्षरचारिणिमिषेन । तद्वत्ते लक्षरमिषान् उपचार इति (N. B. Bh. shod) चर्यविक्षन्निर्वेदिर्बलसद्भावाप्रतिषेध उपचार चक्षन् (N. B. L. II. 55).**

✓ **तदा सम्बन्धे इती etc.**—When an opponent uses a **हेतु** whether good or bad, the right way of dealing with it is to examine it. If, instead of doing that, you set forth an argument to prove the opposite, it is a case of **जाति** or bad form of criticism (**दुष्प्रकारः**). **जाति** means class; in the present case, an argument based on class (**जाति**) i. e. based on vicious analogy or likeness. It is of twenty-four kinds (**वा च चतुर्विंशति etc.**) of which only the first four have been illustrated in the Text.

तत्र सादृश्येन etc.—The **सादृश्यसमाजाति** is that bad method of criticism in which you meet the opponent's argument based on a certain **हेतु** and like instances with another argument based upon a different **हेतु** and its own like instances without going to the root of the matter and examining which of the **हेतु** has a better right to be accepted. Thus, against the argument **हन् अग्निः क्षुद्रकल्पात् दहन्** is set up another argument to prove the opposite, such as **हन्तो विष्णुः निरवद्वयत्वात् आकाशवत्** without going into the question which of the two **हेतु** together with their like instances is more entitled to our acceptance.

Sūtra—पुरस्कर्तुः प्रेत्यमात्रं च (इत्या)त्मन्निमित्तोद्देशपरः (N B. I. 1. 19 32)

The right definition of प्रेत्य says the author is the famous Jaina definition "इत्यपराधोद्देशकं वस्तु प्रमेयम् "

2. इति संबन्धिनो etc.—संबन्ध etc. are the other terms on the list of the पराधा. That they are not तत्स or realities can be easily shown.

तदर्थं प्रयाचादि etc.—Only three out of the sixteen padārthas have been selected here for detailed criticism, because they are unbecomings of any one who professes to be a sage. These are तावत् तावति and निग्रहस्थान

III. 1. तत् परस्व etc.—Definition of तत्. तत् is a deceitful attack upon the opponent by quibbling upon his words. त्वि-
वेचनानिर्दिष्टेन वस्तुनिवाचनार्थोत्तरव्यवसा दण्डवत् (N B. I. II. 53)

Example: When you know that in saying वस्त्रमनेन वाच्यः your opponent has used the word वस्त्र in the sense of new and still if you purposely take the word in the sense of the number nine and try to put him off by showing how absurd it was to say that the man was वस्त्रमन in the sense of he who possesses nine blankets—you are indulging in वाचस्पत्य I. a deceitful or dishonest use of language.

✓ 2. सामान्यतया—Deceit concerning the use of a class-term (सामान्य). त्वन्निमित्तोद्देशकनिग्रहस्थानोद्देशोद्देशपरः सामान्यतया (N B. I. II. 54). Example Suppose one says "The Brahman is learned and well behaved" and somebody remarks "Learning and good behavior are quite natural in a Brahman." Then, if you purposely strain the argument beyond the limits intended by the latter speaker and attribute to him what he never intended to lay down viz. a causal connection between वस्त्रमन and विद्यावचनवत्तत्तः If Brahmanas possess learning and good behavior Vratyas (low degraded) and Udderatas Brahmanas) should possess them too for he too is Brahman —then, this would be a case of सामान्यतया I take विद्यावचनवत्तत्तः-साधारण not विद्या-वचन.

and the religion of rituals or works (कर्म). They are also known as देवपथ and शिवपथ—the Path of Gods and the Path of Manes. The earliest locus classicus of the “Two Paths” is the Bhadāranyaka Up. (p. 78) followed and slightly varied by the Ch. Up. (p. 145) and the doctrine is found later in the Bhag. Gītā as follows :

देवविहिता वृद्धिर्वा एतः—Animal slaughter practised in the course of a sacrifice is justified on the ground that it is prescribed by the Vedas, and is pleasing to gods, guests, and manes. This will be discussed in order in the sequel.

शरीरी—See Ās v Branta Sūtras II. III. 1, 2 Kātyāyana Br. Sū. I. II. 22

शिवपथ—A tantra work of that name.

अतिथि एतः—That guests are pleased by the offer of meat is a matter of course—a poor argument, indeed, and perhaps sufficient to condemn the Brāhmaṇa case.

शिवपथ एतः—Quotations from Manu and Mahābhārata etc.

Manu (i) recognises the custom of meat-eating ; (ii) at the same time he sounds a strong note of disapprobation ; (iii) but he approves of, nay prescribes animal slaughter and use of meat at sacrifices to gods, in offerings and feasts connected with ancestor-worship and in the reception of guests. The Mahābhārata which ranges over much wider field of religious opinions contains many dialogues on the question of the religious thios of Ahimsā and Himsā including शिवपथ. Taken collectively they bear witness to (i) the prevalence of animal slaughter and meat-eating at certain period of our religious history ; (ii) condemnation from the stand-point of higher ethics at the same time ; (iii) the animal slaughter and meat-eating permitted or prescribed in certain cases such as a sacrifice etc. and (iv) even the latter sometimes discountenanced as an institution of the शिवपथ (शिवपथ). There was, even at a very early period of our history section of religious opinion which condemned animal slaughter even for a sacrifice, and substituted vegetables

विद्यमाने etc.—विद्यमानता वाति—As in the case of आपत्त्यता
 वाति वाति.

तत्र प्रयोगे दृष्टान्तार्थे etc.—To press the analogy of the
 दृष्टान्त too far and thereupon argue the addition (वृद्धि) of
 such a वृद्धि as would be obviously absurd is वृद्धिर्वाति वाति
 For an illustration, see the Text वृद्धिर्वाति etc.—Similarly to
 press the analogy of the दृष्टान्त too far and thereupon to argue
 the absence (अवृद्धि) of such a वृद्धि as would be obviously
 absurd is अवृद्धिर्वाति वाति. For an illustration see the Text.

वृद्धि विप्रतिपत्ति etc.—विप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्ति विप्रतिपत्ति (N. S.
 L. II 60). विप्रतिपत्ति = position of d (entire) of two kinds: विप्रतिपत्ति
 and अप्रतिपत्ति. The former consists in bandoni g the original
 position or in taking up new position or in contradicting the
 first position. The latter consists in failure to meet the oppo-
 nent by getting d m-b-f unded and so on. There are twenty-two
 kinds of विप्रतिपत्ति, which are all enumerated in the Text. The
 whole Text from वृद्धि वाति to इति विप्रतिपत्ति is taken verbatim
 from Ganesha's Tarkasamgraha-Dipika on Saddarsana-Sam-
 veyya. It recurs also in Manibhadra's Laghavyūhi on the
 same. The subject should be studied in the Nyāya-Śāstra with
 Bhāṣya and Vṛtti. Jayanta's Nyāya-Manjuri also will be
 found to be very illuminating.

Stanza XI

Śaṅkha Himsa (Killing) even tho gh it may be so-
 joined by the Vedas, cannot produce Dharma (religious merit).
 A general rule such as No living being should be killed
 (injured) can have no exception in any other sphere. The
 idea of the heretics is tht the desire to get sovereignty for
 one's self by performing the ceremony of killing one's own son

The system next criticised is the Purva-Mīmāṃsā of
 Jaimini.

एवमपि वाति etc.—अपि वाति and एवमपि—the Path of Light
 and the Path of Smoke are the religion is wisdom (वृद्धि)

and the religion of rituals or works (कर्म). They are also known as देवपथ and विदुषपथ—the Path of Gods and the Path of Manes. The earliest locus classicus of the "Two Paths" is the Brhadâraṇyaka Up. (p. 76) followed and slightly varied by the Ob. Up. (p. 145) and the doctrine is found later in the Bhag. Gītā as follows :

वेदविहिता ह विज्ञा स्तः—Animal slaughter practised in the course of a sacrifice is justified on the ground that it is prescribed by the Vedas, and is pleasing to gods, guests, and manes. This will be discussed in order in the sequel.

अरीरी—See Ās v Śrauta Sūtras II. HL 1 2 ; Kātyāyana Br Sū. I. II. 22

विदुषपथ—A tantra work of that name.

अतिथि स्तः—That guests are pleased by the offer of meat is a matter of मयङ्ग—a poor argument, indeed, and perhaps sufficient to condemn the Brāhmaṇa case.

विदुषा स्तः—Quotations from Manu and Mahābhārata etc.

Manu : (i) recognises the custom of meat-eating ; (ii) at the same time he sounds a strong note of disapprobation ; (iii) but he approves of, nay prescribes animal slaughter and use of meat in sacrifices to gods, in offerings and feasts connected with ancestor-worship and in the reception of guests. The Mahābhārata which ranges over much wider field of religious opinions contains many dialogues on the question of the religious ethics of Ahimsā and Himsā including यज्ञेय. Taken collectively they bear witness to (i) the prevalence of animal slaughter and meat-eating at a certain period of our religious history ; (ii) condemnation from the stand-point of higher ethics at the same time ; (iii) the animal slaughter and meat-eating permitted or prescribed in certain cases such as a sacrifice etc. and (iv) even the latter sometimes disavowed as an institution of the कर्मपथ (कर्मपथ). There was, even at a very early period of our history a section of religious opinion which condemned animal slaughter even for a sacrifice, and substituted vegetables

for animal offerings and regarded the latter as characteristic of *śākyas* only.—See *Alt. Br* 4 *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparvan-Nārāyaṇīya* section—the story of King Vasiṣṭha-Uparikara and the *Āśvamedha* episode; and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.

विष्णुपति etc.—The performance of special *S'rāddhas* with meat for the snakes is laid down for the growth of progeny

भारतवर्ष etc.—(1) Scriptures justify the use of flesh as sacrifices where horses, bulls and even human animals (See *Alt. Br* iv) were slaughtered for propitiating gods. *Śrauta Sūtra*. (2) They lay down its use for the reception of learned guests. See *Manu*, *Āpastamba Gr* etc. *बृहत्* वा etc. quoted from the *Yajñavalkya-Smṛiti* *Ācā* 109 (iii) They also prescribe its use for the propitiation of snakes. See *Manu* 8., *Grhya Sūtras* etc. *ह्रीं वासी* etc. the quotation is from *Manu* III—268-271.

यं वदन्ति etc.—In criticising the *Hippasā* of the *Brāhmanas* the author first cites texts from their own scriptures which condemn *Hippas*.

न हि मरिचि मत्त etc.—I say that *हिम* is *चर्मरेतु* is to say that a woman is both a *मत्त* and a *चर्मरेतु*—in other words it is a contradiction in terms.

हिमवत्पर्वत etc.—A cause is that whose *वर्ग* and *वर्तिरेतु* are followed by the *वर्ग* i.e. whose presence and absence determine the presence and absence of the *वर्ग*; in other words, a cause is an invariable antecedent of the *वर्ग*. Now can you say that *हिम* is an invariable antecedent of *चर्म*? Surely not. For *चर्म* you admit arises from *वर्ग* and similar positions. *हिम* therefore, is not *चर्मरेतु*.

यत् न चर्म etc.—The *Brāhmanas* replies: It is not every kind of *हिम* that we regard as meritorious (*चर्मरेतु*) but only a special kind of *हिम*, viz. that laid down in the Scriptures.

यद् वदन्ति etc.—The *Siddhāntin* (Jaina) asks: How is *हिम* *चर्मरेतु*? Is it that the animals do not die although they are killed? This is evidently absurd, as we see with our eyes that when you kill them they die. Or is it that the animals

retain a quiet mind even when they are being slaughtered and afterwards go to heaven ? This, too, is contrary to what we actually observe. How piteous are the cries of the animals when they are being slaughtered ! They make out in their own language (of bleating etc.) what corresponds to such a human cry as “*ए वयमस्मि* etc. ”—This is evident from the expression on their face, eyes and so forth.

अपेक्षमवर्धयितुं etc.—The natural effect of a thing can be counteracted by certain contrivances and processes. Thus pieces of iron ordinarily heavy and liable to sink can be made to float on water when used as parts of a ship similarly a poison can be turned into a medicine Analogously *हिंसा* though bad in itself can become a good act.

य य ब्रह्माः कृत्स्नित्वं etc.—It is besides not a disgraceful act since the Brāhmaṇa priests who practise it, are treated with respect.

Criticism : *अपेक्षमवर्धयितुं* etc.—The analogies are inapplicable. The pieces of iron are used as parts of a ship and are thus capable of floating. The Vedic mantras do not change the poor animals to a state wherein they would be beyond the touch of suffering. You will say: They get turned into gods. But do they ? What evidence ? There can be no sensible evidence (*प्रत्यक्ष*). For the state of gods can only be supra-sensible. Nor is there evidence consisting of inference (*अनुमान*) pointing in that direction. For our inference will require certain mark (*लक्षण*) on which to base it. There is none such in the present case. Nor is there an authoritative word (*शब्द*) to establish it. The texts cited have no value inasmuch as their authority is at issue. The two remaining *प्रमाण*s viz. *अपौरुषेय* and *स्वप्न* are included in inference (*अनुमान*) and need not be considered separately.

अथ यजमानं विना यजमानं etc.—The Brāhmaṇa: In erecting a Jaina temple many life has to be destroyed. Yet this is justified by the Jainas on the ground of temple-building being a very meritorious and pious act, an act whose merit far outweighs the sin incurred in destroying small lives in the process of building. The case of our animal slaughter at sacrifices is similar.

देव etc.—The Jaina : In temple-building, killing of small पृथिवीजीव is found *unavoidable*. Besides, a small loss of पुण्य incurred by destroying small life is far outweighed by the transcendent merit of temple-building. But you cannot plead inevitability in the case of स्तूप. For your own Scriptures lay down वन विहन and similar other practices as available for securing स्वर्ग. See Gautama Dharma-sūtras, Patanjali's Yoga-sūtras, M. nrasūtrī etc. It is not so in the case of sacrificial slaughter. For the same great merit can be secured by the practices here mentioned.

प्रतिवर्तक etc.—Out and tortured in every limb. कर्मविहीनार्थ—not knowing which way to go ; bewildered. कृषि(ही)विह्वल—far more cruel than butcher. एवं च वं कथं—the citing of an analogy on the strength of some little likeness is wrong. It would go too far and affect injuriously many of your own positions.

न च विनाशक etc.—The outweighing merit of building Jaina temples.

तत्त्वार्थ etc.—The rationale of its meritoriousness : how the sight of the idols installed therein influences the mind of the worshipper and so on. तत्त्व च etc.—व्याख्यान work of Jinas'vara Śāri, teacher of Abhayadeva.

न च विवेक etc.—There is the visible merit contained in giving meat-eaters to the Brāhmanas who are very much pleased thereby.

वसिष्ठवर्ग etc.—Why not give them the holy वसिष्ठ of gold instead of meat ? A very friendly proposal.

न च न ब्रह्मवर्ग etc.—The animal slaughter as sacrifice brings पुण्य = prosperity says the Brāhmana. But the same can be secured by several other means. Hence, स्तूप is not necessary (अविचारः).

वेत वारण etc.—On desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a white animal to the god Vāyu—an oft-quoted text of the Brāhmanas.

न च त्व एवं etc.—The animals get heaven, says the Brāhmana. Who brought the news from heaven ?—asks the Jaina. Here

are the Scriptures, answers the Br. The Jaina rejoins that the authority of the Scriptures will be shortly discussed and shows to be hollow. In the meanwhile, he ridicules the idea of *svarg* associated with animal-killing.

यदि हि हिरण्यं etc.—If *हिरण्यं* can bring heaven, the streets of hell may be taken as closed. For, who will then have to go to the latter place? That is to say if the worst sin could bring heaven, let us declare an end to hell!

पारमर्त्यं —A marginal note says *वीर्यसंज्ञा*. Certainly not they but the *Bhikkhus*.

किं अपरिणिहं etc.—If the offering of a lower life at a sacrifice can bring heaven, why not make an offering of a higher life, for the matter of that, of your father and mother — secure a still better heaven?

अथ यच्चित्तो हि etc.—The Br. So marvellous is the efficacy of Vedic mantras pronounced on the victim that the result is heaven.

इह लोके etc.—The Jaina: The Vedic mantras have been found clearly inefficacious in the matter of marriage, and other ceremonies, many brides becoming widows in spite of the mantras promising a happy and prosperous married life, and many leading a happy married life even without the Vedic mantras pronounced upon them.

अथ त्वं रिदत्तेत्युच्यते etc.—The last stronghold of a defeated logician. The Br. The ceremony in connection with mantras may have been badly performed.

The Jaina: Who can remove the doubt whether the failure of the result has been due to bad performance of the ceremonies or the mantras were inefficacious?

अथ यदा युज्यन्ते etc.—Br: Y u he pray for "Health etc." (See the verses quoted from *आवृत्त* 4-6. p. 509), and the fruit of the prayer is admitted by you to be accruing in another *avasthā*. Similarly the mantras at marriage ceremony may bear fruit in another life. Jaina: In that case, the *Brahmanas*

would be producing their fruits in the succeeding lives, and liberation from Samsāra would become impossible.

आरोह्यदि—The J. na further explains that the prayer for आरोह्य in अथर्व 4-6 p.509 is for mental आरोह्य (मारोह्य) which makes for truthfulness and other virtues.

य च देविरिति etc.—The Jaina quoted passages from Vedic writers who condemn himśā, even at sacrifices.

य च देविरिति etc.—As regards the so-called respectability of sacrificial priests, the Jaina says that only fools respect them. He adds "Even dogs are worshipped by fools."

यश्च यिदं etc.—Gods could produce before themselves any delectable food by their mere will; why should they eat for your wretched meat? The gods have a वैश्वी or वैश्वीरि as distinguished from an औदारिक body which belongs to us. (See Tv Sā IL 36 and Rāja V and Sātra-kṛ p. 577) वैश्वीरि—अहम्भूतैर्बर्षेमाहनेअनेरात्तमहच्छरीरविश्वकार्त्तं विद्विहा हा प्रये जमस्येति वैश्वीरिश्च i. e. adjustable to various needs. औदारिक इहार्त्तं स्वप्नमिति वाचस्वतोमने प्रयोजने वा इति आहारिचमिति वक्षति—gross and rigid.

प्रवेपमार etc.—If the gods be supposed to eat what is thrown into the sacrificial fire, it will conflict with the statement that the gods possess "mantra-bodies."

चतुर्दशामेव etc.—The Ritualists (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsikas) not only denied the existence of God, but even of gods apart from the Vedic word i the dative case—to which offerings were to be made. See Nirukta, and Pūrva Mīm. Vārī

हव्यमस्य etc.—The offering simply burns away in the fire and turns to ashes. It is but vain talk to say that it pleases gods.

अग्निं च योर्दं etc.—A piece of basket. The trail fire (See Ati and N i Br.) is said to be "the mouth of 33 crores of Gods," so there but one mouth for all varieties of gods—high as heaven, low as hell, one god would be eating the offering, (food from the mouth) of another god, thus surpassing even the Turk (M. bene-lane) who eat from a common dish, but not common mouth! Moreover we have heard of many

months to one body but not of one month to many bodies ! Again, suppose a man praises one god and reviles another. One god would thereupon pronounce a blessing and the other a curse. How are the two operations to be carried out from *one* mouth ? Besides a mouth is but a $1/9$ part of the body ; if even that $1/9$ part is a fire, how dangerous to the three worlds would be the 33 crores of gods !

एवमस्ति—The writer is rightly disgusted with his own bantering tone.

एव वारीरि—The वारीरि वृ which is prescribed for rain, does not always secure it. Even when rain follows a वारीरि वृ it is not due to gods eating your offering but owing to their being pleased with the worshipper for his heart's worship. There are many ways of propitiating gods other than the sacrificial butchery which is nothing but sin.

एव एतत् etc.—(See ante.) The deities may be supposed to have been gratified by the idea, they need not be supposed to have eaten the animal offerings. If what is thrown into fire as an offering reaches gods, why not such deleterious and objectionable substances as leaves of the amb tree, bad oil etc. ?

परमार्थस्तु etc.—The true theory in this matter is this : the devotion of the worshipper taken along with certain accessories brings about the desired consequences such as rain, victory etc. This is borne out by the fact that a विष्णुपति (the philosopher's stone) fulfils our objects in spite of its being inanimate.

अतिप्रीतिं तु etc.—Better give your guests nicely prepared vegetable food.

पितृणां स्तुति—The offering made to the manes for increase of progeny often fails to secure the end. Besides, without any such offering a donkey or a pig or an ewe has plenty of progeny. Moreover the manes in their transterrestrial spheres must be engaged in enjoying or suffering the fruits of their earthly works. How could they have any desire for the rice-balls offered by their sons ?

अथ विप्रोपयुक्तं etc.—As to the offerings made in the manes through the mo the of the Brāhmanas the theory is simply ridiculous. The Brāhmanas get a fat belly by eating; there is nothing to show that the manes enter the body or the stomach of the Brāhmanas. In fact the Brāhmanas look like देव (ghosts) when they are engaged in gluttonously devouring the dības spread before them, and so far no Brāddha ceremony need be performed.

एवमवाच* etc.—A dilemma: Is the Brāhmanical Āgama—the Veda—दीहरेव अपीहरेव i. e. composed by a personal (N.B.—It does not mean human being—a mistake often committed) being or not? If it is composed by personal being is that personal being one or more? The former alternative is contrary to your statement contained in the following verse with (See उत्तरार्चसूत्र of अष्टादशित with वज्रिसूत्र—in which verse is quoted with the first line the same as in this)—“There is no direct perceptible or suprasensible objects; the truth about things is determined by the eternal sentences of the Veda.” The latter that the Veda is composed by a personal being who is not omniscient would deprive it of all authority whatsoever. If now you say that the Veda is not composed by a personal being all we need say is, it can never exist any more than the horn of a horse. You speak of the वाक् of the Veda etc. But वाक्=utterance which is clearly an act done by a personal being. We do not hear any sound in the sky; even if we did, we should have to presume a person behind it from whose mouth it emanated. All वाक् is दीहरेव or अपीहरेव? Kālidāsa.

वचसावाक्यं वेदः etc.—The Ved is a heap of articulate sounds which requires a body with organs such as the palate etc.

सुहरेपीहरेकस्य etc.—Even after holding that सुति is अपीहरेव you admit that its interpretation is दीहरेव i. e. the interpretation comes from a personal being or beings—the exponents of the Vedas. Why not then allow सुति to be दीहरेव?

अथवाऽग्निहोत्रं etc.—Why is the text relating to अग्निहोत्र interpreted as referring to अग्निहोत्र, and not as referring to anything else under the sun? In other words, why have the Vedists

texts certain definite meanings in the same manner as propositions of our ordinary parlance? E.g. why is अपिरोक्षं सुहृत्पाद स्वर्गकाम (a Vedic text)—अपिरोक्षं सुहृत्पाद स्वर्गकाम (as we personally believe and understand the terms), and not=अपिरोक्षं नक्षत्रम् (any other irrelevant nonsense).

अस्तु वायौदयेः etc.—Granting that it is अपौदये what bearing could that fact have on the question of its प्रामाण्य ? प्रामाण्य depends on the words being वास्तविक, not अपौदये.

अथ योऽयं न हिंसा etc.—विधि is of two kinds : इत्यर्ग (General rule) and अपवाद (Exception); where the two conflict the अपवाद overrides the इत्यर्ग.

अव्याहृतमुत्तरे etc.—But the necessary condition is that the two—इत्यर्ग and अपवाद—must relate to the same matter. Illustrations as given in the text.

यथां योऽयं etc.—In the case of the question at issue, we find that the इत्यर्ग—न हिंसा etc.—is for the purpose of averting hell (दुर्मितिविरोध), while the अपवाद is for securing propitiation of gods, guests and manes—an entirely different matter. So one cannot be an अपवाद of the other but is a contradiction of the other (दुर्मितिविरोध :—See Artha-Samgraha.)

न च वाच्यं etc.—It may be argued that the अपवाद about the Vedic *Hymn* inasmuch as it relates to securing heaven relates virtually to averting hell (दुर्मितिविरोध). Thus the इत्यर्ग and the अपवाद have the same subject-matter.

Cricket : It has been already shown that the Vedic *Hymn* cannot be a means for securing heaven. Moreover the विधि may be accepted as an अपवाद if there is no other recourse. But in the present case, heaven can be secured in many other ways such as यज्ञ नियम etc.—and therefore the texts about the Vedic *Hymn* had better be thrown overboard as conflicting (विरोध) with the general principle first laid down (न हिंसा), and not treated as an अपवाद.

न च वदयेत् etc.—See supra. See also Dr Bhanjarkar "Valpyanism" etc.

अथ न विनाशः etc.—A mere ambition which is never destined to be fulfilled.

Stanza XII

A Brief Exposition:—

स्वाभावोक्तव्यं यत् बोधः—Theism. Knowledge, thought, or consciousness is capable of revealing itself and its object. Take 'बोधः' as द्वन्द्व compound of स्व and बोधे [i. e. itself and its object: स्वस्य बोधस्योक्तव्यं बोधेन यद्वाच्यं च], and not as their वशीतलुप्त 'बोध' excludes the opposite of which there are two cases: (1) Revealing itself only the world of objects being either मी (आत्मनः), or a matter of mere inference (पराधीनत्ववशात्) or identical with बोध itself (विद्यावशात्); (2) Revealing other objects only itself being revealed by another बोध which some consider to be अहमवस्था (kind of second or after-consciousness), and some अहमवस्था = बोधेन from its affect, viz. आत्मनः प्रकाशते etc.—आत्मनः being made predicate of बोध, the latter is suggested to the mind as a kind of light. And what is essentially of the nature of प्रकाश (light) illumines or reveals everything including itself.

विशेषेण etc.—Otherwise, i. e. if बोध is not regarded as capable of revealing itself i. self-luminous (आत्मनः स्वप्रकाशितवशात्). It does not mean if बोध is not regarded as capable of revealing objects. For all are agreed as to its capacity to do the latter, whatever their difference as regards the nature of the objective world. This eliminates (2) of the foregoing paragraph from our consideration.

बोधवत्—Talk about objects i. e. whether they are or are not etc.

तुल्यता—तुल्यता; बार्धक्य etc.—आत्मनः स्वप्रकाशितवशात्

यदि हि बोध etc.—Now begins the argument.

If बोध is not regarded as self-luminous, it would require to be revealed by another बोध that by third बोध and so on ad infinitum. Thus, while the बोध is at its will's end in the matter of revealing itself, the बोध (objective reality), which is बोध is unable to reveal itself and so even the talk of बोध becomes impossible.

— *स्वास्मिन्* etc.—Therefore there is good reason to hold that *ज्ञान* is self-revealed (*स्वस्मिन्निहित*). And yet other school men maintain that *ज्ञान* is *व्यवस्थित* (St. I L. 4) i. e. not *स्वस्मिन्निहित* or self-revealed; it being as much an object (*कर्मतारक*) of *ज्ञान* as any other object in the universe.

विद्या = *विद्यया* i. e. *लोकज्ञान*

परेष्वपि भयम् :—Afraid of their critics, whom they are too dull to meet with arguments, in spite of their case of self-luminousness of *ज्ञान* being strong.

Fuller Exposition.

L. *ब्रह्मस्वरूपिणी* etc.—*ब्रह्म*—The *Mimāṃsā*ikas represented by the school of *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*.

ज्ञानं etc.—They hold that *ज्ञान* is not self-revealed, because revelation is a *क्रिया* and no *क्रिया* can have itself as its object, any more than “a gymnast however much trained can ride upon his own shoulders, or a sword however sharp can cut itself.”

लोकज्ञानं स्वस्मिन् etc.—*Objection* What is the exact nature of your difficulty of “*स्वास्मिन्निहित* *विद्यारोप*”? Is it that the *क्रिया* of *स्वास्मिन्निहित* cannot be directed towards itself, in other words, nothing can produce itself? Or does it mean that the *क्रिया* of *स्वास्मिन्निहित* cannot be directed towards itself? As to the former alternative, all we need say is that we do not hold it: we quite agree that *ज्ञान* cannot produce itself. But the second alternative we do maintain: *ज्ञान* can be directed towards itself. When *ज्ञान* arises, it arises invested with that particular character just as *दीप्यमानेद्य*—the light of a lamp—springs into existence as *प्रकाश* or Illumination. You will say: If the light of a lamp springs into existence as *प्रकाश* i. e. if *प्रकाश* be the very nature of light, let it illuminate other objects; why should it be supposed to illuminate itself? Answer: Then, is that poor thing—the light—to remain unilluminated while it illuminates others? Or is it to receive Illumination from another light and so on? The first supposition is contrary to

experience, the latter involves *अवस्था—regressus ad effectum*—You will say The light does not make itself an object of its illumination, that is to say it does not illuminate itself, but springs into existence as illumination and in that sense it is self illuminating (स्वप्रकाश).

Answer That is all the admission we need. When we say ज्ञान is self illuminating or स्वप्रकाश we do not mean that ज्ञान appears before itself as an object (like वर वर etc.). But just as we say ज्ञानं ज्ञायामि (I know knowledge; I am aware of the fact of my knowledge), in the same way we say ज्ञानी स्वज्ञं प्रकाशयति

ज्ञानु etc.—As to the objection that a thing cannot direct itself towards itself for that would involve contradiction of *अज्ञ* and *ज्ञ* we reply that the supposed incongruity is justified by experience (अनुभवसिद्धेर्ज्ञे विरोधासिद्धे). Just as we experience ज्ञानी working towards ज्ञानं *ज्ञ* in ज्ञानं ज्ञायामि so do we experience it in ज्ञानं ज्ञायामि. If ज्ञान were not here known by itself it could not have been an object of knowledge. The ज्ञान is not known by another ज्ञान, and that by third ज्ञान etc. as it would involve अवस्था. It may be said (this is the *ग्रन्थ* theory of the *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka*) that ज्ञान is revealed by the revelation of its objects. Thus: Objects are revealed as a matter of fact; this revealedness (ज्ञातता) of objects becomes impossible except on the hypothesis of a ज्ञान having been already there as its cause. But this theory involves अवस्था-ज्ञान. For according to it, objects are objects of knowledge owing to ज्ञान and ज्ञान is possible owing to objects being known. You will reiterate your explanation thus: अवस्था-ज्ञान (ज्ञातता) is impossible except on the hypothesis of ज्ञान. Thus, ज्ञान is known by अवस्था-ज्ञान i.e. the argument of implication. Ortaicism is that अवस्था-ज्ञान or ज्ञातता which presupposes ज्ञान as you say itself ज्ञान or ज्ञान? If it is ज्ञान it cannot form the basis of the revelation of ज्ञान. If it is ज्ञान, it involves ज्ञातता in ज्ञातता *ad inf* (अवस्था), one अवस्था to support another अवस्था and so on *ad inf*. Besides,

ज्ञान and ज्ञातृ will involve each other and there will be व्योमवायव्य Therefore ज्ञान is double-faced It looks towards objects and It looks towards itself, and in this way It is 'स्वसंवित्'

Objection: If अहमूति (ज्ञान) be अहमात्म्य (ज्ञानविषय) i.e. object of ज्ञान It would not be अहमूति any more than वर, पर etc.—(which are अहमात्म्य) are अहमूति [Rāmānuja's Śrī-Bhāṣya Catuṣṭhiti.]

प्रयोगस्तु etc.—Syllogism: ज्ञान though अहमव्य is not अहमूति because It is अहमात्म्य; as for example, वर; and that ज्ञान is अहमात्म्य you do not deny because you admit that it is स्वसंवेद्य (संवेद्य-अहमात्म्य)

हैद etc.—The objection may be thus answered Just as a हस्त is experienced as हस्त so अहमूति is experienced as अहमूति That अहमूति is also अहमात्म्य involves no absurdity (cf Śrī-Bhāṣya). For अहमूति is अहमूति in relation to the objects; it is अहमात्म्य in relation to itself. Thus things might differ according to their several relations e.g. one may be father of his children, but son of his own father and so on.

अहमात्म्य etc.—that ज्ञान is स्वसंवेद्य can be shown by an अहमात्म्य also. Thus:—ज्ञान स्वसं प्रकाशमात्म्यमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वाद् वरि पक्षे i.e. ज्ञान illuminates objects while it illuminates itself, because it is an illuminator e.g. प्रदीप

स्वैरनस्य प्रकाशकत्वाद् etc.—Objection: स्वसंवेद्य (ज्ञान) if it is प्रकाशक cannot be प्रकाशक. Answer: It can be प्रकाशक by removing the screen of अज्ञान

नय नेषादयः etc.—Objection The eyes etc. are illuminators but they do not illuminate themselves; so you हेतु in the above syllogism is inconclusive. नय नेषारिभिः etc.—Answer: They are illuminators as यानेन्द्रियः i.e. not as physical organs—the eye balls—but as conscious consciousness (यानेन्द्रिय) and conscious consciousness is self-revealed (स्वसंवेद्यक). So the above हेतु—to be an illuminator—is not inconclusive.

तथा संविद् etc.—Another अनुमान to support स्वतंत्रित्व of ज्ञान—संविद् स्वप्रकाशः ज्ञानं तन्निष्ठात् वा स्वप्रकाशः etc.—I. e. संविद् (ज्ञान) is स्वप्रकाश because it is revelation of ज्ञान; that which is not स्वप्रकाश is not revelation of ज्ञान. / g a र.

यः निवेदयति etc.—Thus, when ज्ञान and अनुमान both prove स्वतंत्रित्व I. e. स्वतंत्रता of ज्ञान it is needless to set up a series of प्रमाण to account for the revelation of ज्ञान

तत्त्वप्रयोगे—See Mīmāṃsā Darś L. I and Bhāṣya. ज्ञान arises from the contact (स्पर्श) of बुद्धि with the world of Reality (सत्). The three steps are as follows: First there arises ज्ञान from the contact of बुद्धि with the world of Reality [This is the first act of प्रत्यक्ष] By it the लक्ष्य is revealed (अवगच्छतः). [This is the second act of प्रत्यक्ष] From this revealedness I gather by kind of inference or implication, that there has been revelation. [This is the third act of प्रत्यक्ष]

II श्रीगोस्वामी—For श्रीगोस्वामी and the वैयर्थिक, see Gūṇaratna Com. on Śāṅ.

Our ज्ञान they say is अव्यक्त I. e. Illuminable by something other than itself, because it is ज्ञेय—a reality—which is not divya mahadewa. The point of the argument is this: All ज्ञेय, with the exception of God's knowledge which surely does not require any other light, are अव्यक्त; our ज्ञान is one of them; therefore our ज्ञान is अव्यक्त

तत्त्वत्वं हि ज्ञानं etc.—ज्ञान immediately after it is born, becomes an object of mental perception (प्रत्यक्ष) by further act of the mind taking place in the same ज्ञानम्. It is not self-revealed. (Th. is call this अनुप्रत्यक्ष. This view is attributed to Mīmāṃsā in Nyāya books—See their chapter on प्रमाणवाद.)

यः वैयर्थिकता—The charge of अव्यक्तता levelled against the position of अव्यक्तता of ज्ञान (see ante) may be thus met: Ordinarily ज्ञान (knower) is satisfied with the knowledge of an object; when, however, there arises in his mind a desire to know (i. e. to be ware or conscious of)

his own knowledge, a knowledge of the knowledge takes place. [In Western psychology they call it self-consciousness. But I do not adopt the term because in this passage it is the very point at issue whether the consciousness is self-revealed or other-revealed.]

तदुक्तं etc.—Answer: (1) The पक्ष (rather the साध्य of the पक्ष or पक्ष with the साध्य) is दायित by a contrary अनुमान and the हेतु is therefore कान्त्यापत्तिरिति (When one अनुमान is opposed by another अनुमान the fallacy is called सप्रतिपक्ष or प्रकरजतम हेतुमात्र in Brahmanical Nyāya books. कान्त्यापत्तिरिति or दायित is the name of the हेतुमात्र when the साध्य of the अनुमान is contradicted by another प्रमाण such as प्रत्यक्ष)

तथा हि विचारस्तर्क etc.—Syllogism to prove that ज्ञान is स्वसिद्धिरिति (स्वप्रकाश), as against the preceding syllogism: ज्ञानं स्वसिद्धिरिति तान्त्रिकार्थ ईश्वरज्ञानम् & our ज्ञान is स्वसिद्धिरिति because it is a ज्ञान; as for example God's own ज्ञान. The argument is that all ज्ञान by the very nature of it is स्वसिद्धिरिति ours as well as God's.

न चार्थे वाच्यमतीतो etc.—It may be objected by the other side that the दृष्टान्त on which the generalization is based viz. ईश्वरज्ञान is pure fiction according to the Jains—there being no ईश्वर, according to them. But the objection is not correct. The Jains do admit the existence of ईश्वर as a पुरुषविशेष just as the Yogins do (हेतुचर्चविपाकाद्यैरपराधम् पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः See Pat's Yoga Sū.). [If by पुरुषविशेष we are to understand a single पुरुषविशेष I am afraid the author is making an admission not justified by the general tenor of Jainism. But I suppose we can very well understand this as “वाच्यमतीतो” numerous पुरुषविशेष being ईश्वर in Jain Theology.]

अपेक्षितोपादानम् etc.—(2) Besides, the हेतु in the syllogism: ज्ञानं स्वात्मप्रकाशम् ईश्वरज्ञानान्तरे सति अपेक्षितम् अतएव—अपेक्षितोपादानम् or असमर्थविशेष as the Naiyāyikas call it (See Nyāya Sū. or तत्त्वा). The विशेष viz. अपेक्षितम् is redundant, since it adds nothing to the विशेष ईश्वरज्ञानान्तरे सति which is

quite sufficient for the purpose of the argument. The stock illustration of अनपेक्षितेय is पूर्वो वक्ष्यान् एतन्ने इति इत्यन्तात् where इत्यन्तात् : redounds to, एतन्नात् being quite sufficient for the purpose of the argument.

न हीनत्वं हास्यत्वं etc.—That अपेक्षितेय is redundant is obvious; it excludes nothing. There is nothing other than ईश्वरत्व which is अपेक्षितेय and which would accordingly require to be excluded by inserting the word अपेक्षितेय. Nor does the omission of अपेक्षितेय endanger the सारं विज्ञाप्यमाणत्वं making the remainder of the हेतुं विज्ञाप्यमाणत्वं sometimes go with साध्यात्वं & स सर्वविविक्तम्.

अपेक्षितेयत्वं etc.—(3) the हेतु is अपेक्षितेय = लोपविक & a. ineffective, except under conditions which do not exist in the present case. Technically an इत्यन्ति is साध्यात्वंकारे (or साध्यात्वं व्याप्तिरूपे) एति साध्यात्वंकारे i.e. that which covers or is co-extensive with साध्य, b it does not cover the साध्य.

सत्युक्तत्वादिः etc.—The stock illustration of लोपविक हेतुवाच्य is बर्द (बाही विद्यालय) इत्यादि विद्यालयत्वात् अन्धविद्यालयत्वात् & the next son of Mr. B must be dark-complexioned because he is child of Mr. B, like all the other sons of that lady. This argument is considered to be unsound inasmuch as it is based upon a हेतुं विज्ञाप्यमाणत्वं which is अपेक्षितेय & a. ineffective or लोपविक & depending upon a condition viz. साध्यात्वंकारे (to be fed on particular kind of vegetable food). The point is this: A son of Mr. B is not bound to be dark-complexioned simply because he is son of that lady for the dark complexion really arises from one's being fed in the womb on a certain kind of food and not from the simple fact of one's being son of Mr. B. In other words, the validity of the अनुमान depends not merely on the nature of nature, but on the necessity of the uniformity of the law from the law of causation. The technical definition of an इत्यन्ति is साध्यात्वंकारे एति साध्यात्वंकारे (See Nil. and M. ki. viii. with etc.) will apply to the illustration (a) as follows:—एतन्ने इत्यन्तात् न एतन्ने साध्यात्वंकारे b it not एतन्ने इत्यन्तात् एतन्ने इत्यन्तात् the meaning विद्यालयत्वं being not साध्यात्वंकारे.

उपाधिवाच्य etc.—In the syllogism under discussion *ब्रह्म* is the *उपाधि*. Thus: the *साधन* here is *हृदयज्ञानान्वये तसि प्रमेयत्वम्* but it holds good only under the conditions of *ब्रह्म* i. e. that which is not only *हृदयज्ञानान्वय* and *प्रमेय* but also *ब्रह्म*; that alone is *स्वान्वयकारण*. In fact, *ब्रह्म* is the *प्रबोधक* of *स्वान्वयकारणत्व* and is therefore the *उपाधि* in the present case.

स्वयमकारणे परमुक्तं—*ब्रह्म* is defined as that which depends upon another for its revelation.

इत्येवं etc.—Moreover the *ज्ञान* and the *ज्ञान* of the *ज्ञान* (See ante) are not known to be arising one after the other.

आद्यपरात्—It may be argued that they *do* arise one after the other but the succession is so quick that we fail to notice it. For example, when we run a needle into a file of lotus leaves we imagine that we have pierced all of them *simultaneously* but as a matter of fact it is obvious that they have been pierced one after another.

विज्ञाताम्यवहितं etc.—Answer: Between the first and the second *ज्ञान* comes the *विज्ञाता* of the *ज्ञान* so you cannot say that one *immediately* follows the other and so their succession is not noticed.

न च ज्ञातव्यं etc.—Moreover *ज्ञान*s do not necessarily arise from *विज्ञाता*; even without the latter in certain cases, *ज्ञान* does arise, provided the objects are there in the right place.

न चार्पणान्वयोक्तं etc.—Now the first *ज्ञान* (the *ज्ञान* of objects) is not in an unsuitable place so that it could not become an object of *ज्ञान* without a special desire to know it. For that first *ज्ञान* is in the *आत्मन्*—quite a suitable place—and would therefore become known with the *विज्ञाता* on our part—the result of which would be that one *ज्ञान* would spring on another *ज्ञान* and so on *ad infinitum*. *आत्मन्* would thus be engaged in knowing its own series of *ज्ञान*s and could, therefore never turn to other *दिव्य*. The point is that without a *विज्ञाता*, *ज्ञान* can not arise; if it did, there would be nothing to prevent *ज्ञान*s springing in endless succession—like particles of radium—a show to which

there would be no end, so that *साक्षम्* would never have the opportunity of turning against the world of objects. Thus *विज्ञाता* must be interposed between the *ज्ञाय*. But when this is done, the proposition *सहस्रं हि ज्ञायं* etc. (See *supra*) breaks down.

समासम् etc.—Conclusion: Therefore a *ज्ञाय* does not need another *ज्ञाय* to reveal it; it reveals itself; as does the *लक्ष्यम्* in a *पराधार्मिक रूप* (*ज्ञाय* of the nature of attention where the mind continues to rest on particular object for a length of time).

Books of reference.

1. Books on *समासकार*—and *स्य. सि. वजरी* pp. 160-65. *Pradīp* Vol. III; *उद्दिष्टाया*, *उद्दिष्टीकृति*, *वीरकण्ठी* etc.
2. Śrī-Bhāṣya on *सहस्रं*.
3. Ś'leka Vārt. on *Bōtra* 2-4.

Stanza XIII.

Stanza: If *Māyā* is there arises the duality of Brahman and *Māyā*. If *Māyā* is not, how could the manifold world be explained? I say that there is *Māyā* (something that is not real) and that it can do something is equivalent to saying that woman is barren and that she is a mother!

वैशिष्ट्यम्—The Vedāntins of the Ś'ādhikāra school. *ज्ञाय* = *अविद्या* (Needence). It is a much-discussed problem of later Ś'ādhikāra Vedānta whether *ज्ञाय* and *अविद्या* are synonymous or different. Some distinguish between the two, referring one to *सहस्र* or *द्वय* and the other to *जीव*. (For more information, see *Biddhāntakāṇḍa*.)

I Brief Explanation: (समासार्थः)

ज्ञाय द्वयम् etc.—*द्वय* = twofold, द्वौ अवयवौ *ज्ञाय*, viz., (1) *साक्षम्* (*सहस्र*) and (2) *ज्ञाय*.

वरि मसदी etc.—मसाद् being transcendental, मासा is supposed to produce the world. But if it (मासा) is unreal, how can it produce it? Does the horn of a horse (an absolute nothing) ever produce anything? A feat of jugglery or a mirage cannot produce any real effect. Besides, the world is too real to be regarded as a mere show.

अवैरकारो etc.—In यदीव एव = अवि = च. Thus the passage = मासा च अवैरहा च—that something should be मासा and at the same time अवैरहा. Cf. similar use of two चs in the Raghna—Canto X, 6 ते च मासु etc. अवैरहा—capable of doing something. अवैरह्याकारित्व is given as a definition of सत्ता (Existence or Reality), in Jaina and Buddha metaphysics. And मासा can have no सत्ता—without ceasing to be मासा. Thus, to say that मासा (unreal) is अवैरहा (real) is like saying मासा च सत्ता च.

11 Detailed Explanation (व्याख्यानः).

तं वदित्वा etc.—The Vedāntins who cite लक्ष्मि-संहिता and other texts of the Upaniads in support of Monism.

अवे तु प्रपञ्चो etc.—Their syllogism to prove that the world is मिथ्या.

Criticism—अवेतुहारी to.—Here begins the criticism. It is all idle talk.

The Vedāntin is called upon to state what he means by मिथ्यास्वरूप—Three alternative explanations are possible.

(1) मिथ्यात्वं i. e. unreality in the sense of absolute non-existence (अद्वय), such as belongs to दण्डायुध. This however is impossible, as it involves the proposition अद्वयमस्ति (presence of what is nothing) which the Buddhist takes up but the Vedāntin rejects [See, however Upaniśads Kārikās and Śaṅkara's Commentary thereon.]

“असतो माससा प्रपञ्चो जायते ईश प्रकरोते ।

दण्डायुधाय च तदीयं माससा ददति मासने ॥”

—Upaniśads Kārikās, Advaita P3

असत्त्वविवाहस्यो जायस्य मायया लस्यतो वा न कथंचन सम्म दृश्यते
अस्त्वयात् । न हि कल्पदापुषो मायया लस्यतो वा जायते । तस्मादस्त्वयात्
पुनः स्यादप्यस्य इत्यर्थः ।—Bāṅkara's Com.

(2) मिथ्यात्व i.e. unreality is the sense of mis-take—that is, wrongly taking A for B. This, again, would be विपरीत(अन्वया-)
ह्यपत्ति involving the reality of one or both, which too the
Vedāntin does not accept. [The word of Bāṅkara in the
introductory portion of his Bāṅkara Bhāṣya where he
speaks of अस्ति as वस्तु पूर्वोक्तत्वात्मात्मा would seem to be a
acceptance (अन्वयात्कथयति See, II were the commentaries
on the passage.]

(3) मिथ्यात्व i.e. unreality in the sense of what cannot
be described as either existent or non-existent (अनिर्दिष्टत्व).
[There are numerous passages which can be cited to support
this sense of मिथ्यात्व in Bāṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Brahma
Sūtras.] In this sense of मिथ्यात्व the author of the Bhāṅkara
bears " न हि कल्पदापुषो वीजवाद्यात् विविक्तमनुरक्तमिदं वि-
त्तविज्वलीयं बीजादिति ।"—Bh. on Bāṅkara Com. on II li 28.]

Now the Vedāntin may be called upon to explain what
it means by अनिर्दिष्टत्व. Does it mean विस्त्वयात् ? Now
what is that वाय or स्वयात् which is denied by the prefix 'वि'
in the word विस्त्वयात् ?

(a) If it is Being or लस्य (वाय) that is denied, it is once
more the position of अस्त्यपत्ति which has been already re-
jected by them as non-Vedāntic.

(b) If it is non-Being or अलस्य (अवाय) that is denied
it is the position of लस्यपत्ति which is also unacceptable and
unwelcome to the Māyāvādīn.

(c) It speaks निस्त्वयात्—अतीत्यतोत्तर (that which is unthinkable
b). But if the world (प्रपञ्च) is unthinkable, how could it be
made the subject (वस्तु) of the syllogism अतीत्यतो मिथ्यात्वात्, etc. If
Also the last अतीत्यतात्पदम् would not be predicated of the
world, if the world is, as y may अतीत्यतोत्तर. If ye explain
अतीत्यतोत्तर, not as precluding अतीत्यतात्पदम् altogether but as far

plying that it is not known as it ought to be known, that is to say as *ब्रह्म* this would be *विपरिण* (अव्यय-*व्यय*) *व्यय* which has been already shown to be unacceptable to the *Māyāvādīn*.

[For the *Khyāte* see Commentaries on Śaṅkara's *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* in the Introduction of the *Brahma-Sūtra* Śāstraka Bhāṣya, Rāmānuja's *S'ri-Bhāṣya* Appaya-Dīkṣita's *Bhīḍhātalaśa*, and Mādhava's *Paṇḍarāṅga-saṁgraha* and Jhaṅkīra's *Nyāyakośa*]

किं चेदप्यविरोधस्तथा etc.—The unreality of *ब्रह्म* is contradicted by *प्रत्यक्ष*

अथ ब्रह्मकथं etc.—It is urged by the other side that *प्रत्यक्ष* can affirm, it cannot deny. Thus, it is said: *आहुर्विद्यां ब्रह्म* affirms, it does not deny; therefore the Unity which the *Veda* has declared, *ब्रह्म* has no power to deny

अव्ययविरोधस्तथा etc.—Affirmation implies negation. You cannot affirm a thing to be yellow without denying that it is black. You cannot know an empty table by itself without denying its contents. Hence we cannot regard *प्रत्यक्ष* to be purely affirmatory

अथ च विद्यावदमेव etc.—Granting that *प्रत्यक्ष* is affirmatory one would like to ask why should it affirm *विद्या* and not *अविद्या* *ब्रह्म* and not *अब्रह्म*? If it affirms the latter there is the dualism of *ब्रह्म* and *अब्रह्म*

नान्ये वादिनः—There are two schools of *Sāṃkhya* *Yajñika*. One of them takes its stand upon mere *अहि* and rejects *ब्रह्म* which comes in the way of the sole reality of *Brahman* incompetent to pronounce any opinion on this question since *ब्रह्म* is beyond its range. The other school of the *प्रत्यक्ष* too affirmeth all *Brahman* pure *ब्रह्म*, the sole reality of the position. “*प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन ब्रह्मकथं अविद्यावदमेव*। अथ च विद्यावदमेव। अथ च विद्यावदमेव। अथ च विद्यावदमेव। अथ च विद्यावदमेव।” — the *Sāṃkhya* school criticised by Rāmānuja (see Rāmānuja's *S'ri-Bhāṣya*, Appaya Dīkṣita's *Bhīḍhātalaśa*, etc.). It is the latter school that is referred to in this passage.

To say that ब्रह्म is नानावर्णम् is to try to make it विचार्य
b t also निवेद्य तन्मन्त्रम् as a fiction

अनुयायवर्णितम् etc.—A syllogism to prove that the world
not विद्या

प्रमाणे विद्या न ब्रह्म इति etc.—I recover in the Vedānta
the syllogism the kets प्रतीयमानम् is Inconclusive ब्रह्म
being प्रतीयमानम् as well ब्रह्म and yet विद्या If however
you deny प्रतीयमानम् of ब्रह्म, there would be golden for you.
Nor can you cite any दृष्टान्त in support of your reason; for
every दृष्टान्त will be found faulty. If the ब्रह्म is सर्वप्रपञ्च
ब्रह्म, how can it be विद्या (विद्यैवब्रह्म) is golden to be proved.
This is what is called अनुयायवर्णितम् but bhikṣu.

किं वेदब्रह्म इति etc.—Is the यल्ल in which is supposed to
prove that ब्रह्म is विद्या (a) part of the ब्रह्म or (b) it
separate from it? (a) If it is separate from it, is it नाना
or ब्रह्म? If it is नाना why not the whole ब्रह्म? If it is
ब्रह्म, it can prove nothing. (b) If it is part of ब्रह्म it is
विद्या like the rest of it, it cannot accomplish its task of
proving विद्या of ब्रह्म. Thus, it may be shown that Brahman
cannot be the sole real thing.

CL P 4 T 12 ślokaḥ akṣaraḥ Iti bhāṣyaśāstrīkaḥ on L 13
pp. 54-56 Ryaḥ śāstrīkaḥ.

III अक्षरा ब्रह्मत्वम् etc.—

विचिरीयमिति ब्रह्म—(T.Bh.) otherwise called विद्याकारक or निविचेय
ब्रह्म. Contra. Rāmānuja who says “निर्विकल्पकमपि सविचेयविषयमेव
... निर्विकल्पकं नाम केवविहिद्येनेव विबुधस्य प्रवणं न सर्वविचेयमित्यस्य ”]

न च विचिद्यत् etc.—It may be objected that the निर्विकल्पक
प्रत्यक्ष will take note of what ब्रह्म is not quite as much as of
what ब्रह्म is—in which case it will be bearing witness to the
dualism of Brahman and non-Brahman. But the answer to
that objection is that the प्रत्यक्ष is only विद्याकारक and not विचेयक
(cf. आदुर्बिद्यत् etc.), and is, therefore, bearing witness
to the positive Reality namely Brahman. Next, if you take
the other variety of प्रत्यक्ष—the सविचेयक प्रत्यक्ष it too will be
found to be revealing हर हर etc. as imbued with the principle
of existence for which our word is ब्रह्म.

3 अनुयाययारि etc.—Here is an अनुयाय to prove the same—
(a) विचिरेय तत्त्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानं विचि ल. e. the Positive Reality revealed
as हर in our experience, is the only Reality because it is प्रमेय.
For that in which we can direct our the ght must be some-
thing positive and not negative. All प्रमाण—प्रत्यक्ष अनुयाय ब्रह्म,
इन्द्रिय and अर्थापत्ति—accordi gly refer to something positive
“तत्त्वार्थ—प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण एवम् etc. (Mīm. S' L. Vārt. Abbhāva
Parikṣedā, 17) etc. The प्रमाण operate to reveal something
positive; when something negative is known, what takes
place is not that the प्रमाण are directed to a negation but
that there is no operation of the प्रमाण at all. This, of course,
means that there is no such प्रमाण as अनुपपत्ति which is
supposed to be directed to a negative object (अकार)

अतो वा तत्त्वज्ञि etc.—Another अनुयाय to prove ब्रह्म
(b) ज्ञानप्रमाण etc.—The world we see before us is penetrated
through and thro gh with the ght (प्रतिबालान्तरित) because
it is an object of thought (प्रतिबालान्तरित). Whatever
is an bject of thought is penetrated with thought e. g. the
form of thought (प्रतिबालान्तरित). So is this whole objective
world. And, therefore, it is penetrated with thought. The ght
or conclusion is what we call ब्रह्म. Thus, the अनुयायप्रमाण
also bears witness to the existence of ब्रह्म.

T say that *ब्रह्म* is *ब्रह्मवादि* is not only to make it *विवादा* but also *विशेषक*, because *ब्रह्म* implies a *गतो*

ब्रह्मवादि is. — A syllogism to prove that the world is not *विद्या*

ब्रह्मो विद्या न भवति etc. — If however in the Vedāntic syllogism the *हेतु* *प्रतीक्षमाणत्वम्* is inconclusive, *ब्रह्म* being *प्रतीक्षमाण* as well as *ब्रह्म* and yet not *विद्या*. If however you deny *प्रतीक्षमाणत्व* of *ब्रह्म*, silence would be golden to you. For as you do not support of your reasoning; if every *व्याप्त* will be found and led; the *व्याप्त* *वि* *वर्धमान* or *ब्रह्म*, about which *विद्यात्व* (*वर्धमानत्व*) is going to be proved. This is what is called *ब्रह्मपरिहारि* *hetvābhāsa*.

वि *वेदब्रह्म* etc. — Is the syllogism which is supposed to prove that *ब्रह्म* is *विद्या* (a) part of the *ब्रह्म* or (b) is it separate from it? (b) If it is separate from it, is it *सत्य* or *ब्रह्म*? If it is *सत्य* why not the whole *ब्रह्म*? If it is *ब्रह्म*, it can prove nothing. (a) If it is part of *ब्रह्म* it is *विद्या* like the root of it, and cannot accomplish its task of proving *विद्यात्व* of *ब्रह्म*. Thus, it may be shown that Brahman cannot be the sole reality.

OL P. N. Tatvālokaśāntara Ratnākaraśāntarīkā on L. 15 pp. 34-36 *Byādvāda-Ratnākara*.

III. *ब्रह्म* *प्रमाण* etc. —

Another statement of the Vedāntic case and its refutation. Brahman, the pure *सत्य* may be proved by every *प्रमाण*

1. *ब्रह्म* — *Pratyakṣa* is of two kinds — *निर्विकल्पक* and *विकल्पक*, both of which prove the existence of Brahman. The former of these has been thus defined *अस्ति वा* etc. It is such *ज्ञान* as takes note of the abstract reality devoid of the *वर्ध* (Quoted from *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra Vārtika* of Kumārila). The latter is well-known. [For two differing views about the nature of *सत्य* and *निर्विकल्पक* see *Tarka Bhāṣā* and *Rām. Śrī-Bh.* I. 1. *निर्विकल्पकं नामान्वयिरोपपत्ति* *ब्रह्मवादावगति*

3. *अप्रमोदश्चैतन्* etc.—The quotations, which are well-known, are taken from the Upanishads.

दृष्टिं ज्ञानम्—The *Smṛti* which are man-made as distinguished from *Śruti* which is God-made.

सर्वं ज्ञानं etc.—All objects are but appearances of *ब्रह्म*, because they are imbued with *ज्ञान* (Existence). That with which a thing is imbued is the real essence of that thing. For example *दृष्टिः* is the real essence of *दृश्यं* etc., which are all *सर्वं* that is, imbued with *दृष्टिः*.

लोकादिवत् etc.—The Vedāntin is compared to a man who is drunk.

सर्वं हि वस्तु etc.—Nothing can be accepted as true unless it is proved by *ब्रह्म*. In the *A-dont* doctrine however there is no room for *ब्रह्म*—for *ब्रह्म* means *dualism*, that is, *dualism*.

ज्ञानं वदन् etc.—It may be argued that the *smṛtis* have only a *pragmatic* use, and are intended to satisfy the needs of *ज्ञान* i. e., either the vulgar mind (cf. *Spinoza*) or the demands of objective experience. But such an argument will not do. Where is the room for *ज्ञान* in *A-dontism*?

ब्रह्मसु etc.—Granting that there is scope for *ब्रह्म* even in *A-dontism*, one would like to know what *ब्रह्म* is. Is it *प्रत्यक्ष*? No. For *ब्रह्म* only reveals the world of plurality. You mentioned *निर्विकल्पकं ब्रह्म* proving *ब्रह्म*. But we do not recognise its validity as *ब्रह्म*. For *ब्रह्म* is *प्रत्यक्ष* only when its character accords with the character of its object. This can never be unless the *ब्रह्म* is *निर्विकल्पकं* i. e., has certain characters as *वस्तुतत्त्व* etc. Now *निर्विकल्पकं ब्रह्म* which alone deserves to be recognized as *ब्रह्म* amongst the two varieties of *ब्रह्म* is never known to reveal the Positive Reality which you speak of viz. pure *ब्रह्म* betested from its various forms constituting the world of plurality. [See also *Rāmānjan's Śrī-Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1.]

ब्रह्मसु etc.—Then, as regards the remark that *ब्रह्म* reveals only Positive Reality and is incompetent to reveal

Negation, we say it is not justified by experience. For *प्रत्यक्ष* has a double function to perform: it differentiates as well as co-ordinates.

न कदाचिद्दृश्यं इति etc.—We nowhere perceive *सामान्य*—the one pure and simple existence—divorced from विवेक. Cf. Bāṇanāja Māt-Bhāṣya Catus-Sūtrī I L L विविधं हि सामान्यं—Mīm. S' L Vārt. कावृत्तिप्रायः—10

एव प्रत्यक्षतया हि तत्त्वम् इति etc.—The syllogism referred to is विविधेन तत्त्वम् प्रत्यक्षत्वात् (See above). Here, विविधेन तत्त्वम् i. e. the proposition that Reality is always positive, is opposed to the evidence of *प्रत्यक्ष*; for the latter bears testimony to negation also. The *hetu* is, therefore *साधारण्यप्राप्तिः*, otherwise called *वाचित*.

यत् तत्त्विकी इति etc.—Another *हेतु* given to prove the same was *प्रतिमातमावस्था* (See supra.) As to it, we ask the question whether the *प्रतिमातमावस्था*—revelation to consciousness—arises स्वतः or परतः? Evidently it does not arise स्वतः (of itself); for nobody thinks *वत् पर इति*, to be self-revealed. If however the revelation to consciousness is supposed to arise परतः i. e. from some other source, it involves the admission of something that is other which means dualism.

एव परमवत् इति etc.—Then again, as regards the argument that Brahman is that principle of Existence which runs through all things and unites them in one Reality we may observe that it involves the admission of (1) principle that runs through the things and (2) the things through which it runs i. e. the dualism of *ब्रह्मेण* and *ब्रह्मविषयम्*. Moreover it is absurd to think that *चेतनम्* (consciousness, which is but another name for Brahman) runs through *वत् पर इति*. What runs through *वत्* is *वृत्तिः* through *वत्* *तत्त्वम्*, and so on.

किं च पदहेतुप्राप्त्या इति etc.—An *अनुमान* involves *वत्* and *हेतु*. Now tell us whether they are identical or distinct. If identical, it will be impossible to construct a syllogism, which requires different members. If distinct, there is the inevitable dualism.

बरेयमिति बन्धुस्वरूपमेव सूत्राति प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते तद्वत्स्वभावपरस्य प्रतिषेध-
नपि तत् प्रतिपद्यत इत्यभिहितमेव वक्षति । वेदमन्त्रस्तुल्यरूपप्रतिपक्षेरोक्त-
प्रतिषेधप्रतिपक्षित्वत्वात् । अपि च विद्यारूपमेव वक्ष्यमिति विद्यमत्वाद्दीप्तये
विद्याप्रतिपक्षाया अपि विचार्य तत्राहुवच्यते । लोच्यमविद्याविषयेमेव तन्मात्रं
प्रापकात् प्रतिषेधेव न निषेधकं तदिति द्रष्टव्यं कथं स्वस्य । इति सिद्धं प्रत्यक्ष-
वक्षितः वक्ष इति ॥ अत्रमनवक्षितम् । प्रपञ्चो निष्पद्य न वक्षति । अतद्विज्ञान-
त्वात् । न परं न परं वक्ष्य अत्रा । तथा च्छब्दम् । तस्यातीति । प्रतीकमात्रत्वं च
द्रष्टव्यत्वात् न व्यभिचारी । न हि प्रतीकत्वं न च निष्पद्य । अत्रतीकमात्रत्वे तु अस्व-
तन्मोक्षरूपवत्त्वात्तद्वत्त्वेनैव तत्र नः नेवतीत्यात् । दृष्टान्तश्च नाप्यधिक्यम् ।
अतिप्रत्यक्षमप्येवैति प्रपञ्चमन्त्रवत्त्वेनाभिर्वच्यतावा साध्यमात्रत्वात् ।
किं च—इदं वक्ष्यमात्रं वक्ष्याद्विषयम् अपिच वा । यदि विषयं तर्हि तत्त्वमन्त्रत्वं
वा । यदि तत्त्वं तर्हि तद्वदेव प्रपञ्चस्यापि तत्त्वत्वं त्यात् । अथास्तब्धम् ; तत्रापि
स्तब्धम् अन्वयात्त्वात् अतिर्वचनीयं वा । आचक्षते इत्येव न तावत्प्रत्यक्ष-
म् । दृष्टव्यत्वे इति चिन्तनीयम् । तद्वत्त्वेनैव तद्वत्त्वं । अतिर्वचनीयत्वा-
त्तद्वत्त्वेनापि विषयत्वात् ॥ ... अथास्तब्धत्वं च । कथं ततस्तस्य स्तब्धत्वं
वाच्यम् । न हि स्वयमस्तब्धत्वं तत्त्वमन्त्रवत्त्वात् । अतिप्रत्यक्षात् । अत्र
दृष्टव्यत्वे तत्त्वमन्त्रवत्त्वात् अतिर्वचनीयत्वात् इति चेत् तद्वत्त्वेनैव तद्वत्त्वं ।
तत्र बोध्यो दोषः । ... अत्रमन्त्रवत्त्वात् अस्यापि निष्पद्यत्वसंशयः । निष्पद्यत्वं
च तद्वत्त्वं वा अत्राद्यं तावदेव ॥

—Com. Ratnakaravāṭikā.

Stanza XIV

Stanza Things (वाच्य), though many are also one;
though one they are also many So are th words denoting
them (वाच्य) both one and many Those who re not 'yours'
i.e. the heretics, in considering things and words to be of a
different nature from what is mentioned above, are mistaken.

वाच्यम् = अतिर्वच्यम् ॥ १२. वेदमन्त्रमेव वक्ष्य
इत्यन्वयि also.

नामान्तरकथया वक्ष्यावक्ष्यति etc.—One as the universal
(सामान्य) ; many as the particulars (अवशिष्टेभ्यः).

अवधारणेच्छवक्ष्यति etc.—The enlargement of the subject and
the predicate reversed.

एवम वाक्यम्—So also words have a double nature **as** one and many arising from the double aspect, that of **सामान्य** and of **विशेष**.

एव वाक्यस्वरूपेण etc.—Ordinarily in dvandva compound the word with the smaller number of syllables is placed first. Yet, here, वाक्य (three syllabled word) is placed before वाच्य (two-syllabled). This is in accordance with the special provision about the priority of the more important (See Pāṇ. and Kātyāyana). वाक्यस्वरूपः। But वाच्यार्थः च (पूर्वम्). The वाक्य is more important than the वाच्य because the latter depends upon the former. As the word philosophers (the grammarians) say “There is a śloka (वाक्य=वाक्य), which is not accompanied by its word (वाच्य=वाच्य); all thought (अर्थ) appears penetrated through and through with language.” (See Patañjali's M.Bhāṣya and Bhartṛṛ's Vākya-pāṭiṣya : व सोऽस्मिन् वाक्ये चोक्ते etc. I. 124.)

वाक्यार्थस्वरूपः etc.—Substance of the Stanza ;

(1) Some schoolmen recognise only the *Uncreated* (सामान्य) as the Reality. They are in the language of Jaina philosophy followers of *अमोक्षसिद्धन्त* i. e. the point of view of the reality of substance (अर्थ). The typical representatives of this school of thought among Brahmins are preeminently the Advaitins of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (Vedānta) and next the Sāṃkhya.

(2) Then again there are other schoolmen who regard particulars (विशेष) to be the only reality. They belong to the *पर्यायसिद्धन्त* i. e. the point of view of the reality of the changing modes (वर्तमान). This point of view is represented by the Buddhists.

(3) There is a third school of thought which gives equal treatment to सामान्य and विशेष as principles of Reality but recognises them as absolutely distinct entities. This is द्वैत (= द्वैतवादा) point of view—which is advocated by the Vāśiṣṭikas and the Nāyāyikas.

I Discussion of the different schools.

L सपक्षपक्षविषयो etc.—A statement of the सामान्यैकान्तवाद—which according to the Jainas contains only partial truth from the point of view of the संप्रत्यक्ष

सामान्यदेव etc.—सामान्य is the only reality. For we do not see any विरोध apart from the सामान्य. The argument may be stated as follows :

सर्वदेवद्वय अविरोधेन सर्वविशेषादिवाक्यादृष्टिनिवृत्तिमित्युक्तत्वात्
i. e. From the fact that all things are equally (अविरोधेन) known (ज्ञात) and styled (अभिवाच्य) सत् we conclude that *All is One*. Its existence is inferred from the one general notion (अव्युत्ति) and language of सत् which we employ in respect of all things without distinction

Note that the argument is intended to prove two things : that (1) something is; and that (2) something is the *Uncovered Being*

यथा ह्यव्यवदेव etc.—Another argument : ह्यव्यव is the only reality. For the so-called particulars of ह्यव्यव viz. वरं अक्षरं etc. are nowhere found separated from ह्यव्यव i. e. they are known not in themselves but only as ह्यव्यव and, therefore, ह्यव्यव is their only reality

किं च वे सामान्यात् etc.—A third argument which establishes the sole reality of सामान्य by destroying the case for विरोध. Supposing विरोध (defined as अन्वयव्याप्यव्याप्य i. e. consisting of reciprocal distinctions—see Dinakari on Vyāsa Muktiwālī) exist, you have to meet the following dilemma : Do they contain विरोध or not ? In other words do they conform to the general idea of विरोध or not ? If they do not, they have no nature of their own, and therefore no existence. If they do, that विरोध is a सामान्य—which contradicts your dogma of the sole reality of विरोध.

अवि च विरोधात् etc.—विरोध are defined as the ground or cause of व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यक्ष—the idea of distinction. But we shall show that on reflection that व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यक्ष is found to be an in-

possibility What is *व्याप्तिः*? निवर्तितवर्तये इतरवर्तयेतिरेव (Denial of any other वर्तये in regard to the वर्तये in hand). Thus the denial of एतत् in regard to एतत् is एतत् एतद्व्याप्तिः Now the question we ask is this How can the thing—the वर्तये under consideration—a *g* एतत्, which has enough work, be do in securing its own being venture to undertake a denial of other things? If it undertakes to do that work, it will find it too stupendous to do. No innumerable are those other things past, present and future, which it shall have to exclude from itself. They cannot be excluded unless they are known. And if they are known, the knower is nothing short of an omniscient being—a being who knows all things in the Universe from which particular the *g*—a एतत्—is to be distinguished

एतत् एतद्व्याप्तिः—It is not justified either by experience or by reason

व्याप्तिः निरेव etc.—Besides, व्याप्तिः is negation, nothing—which can be made an object of knowledge no more than flower of the sky

एतत् वेदो व्याप्तिः etc.—Another dilemma Are those things, from which the वर्तये under consideration is distinguished, एतत् (existent) or अस्तत् (non-existent)? If they are co-existent the वर्तये could as well be distinguished from the horn of a donkey If they are अस्तत् in calling them all एतत् you have admitted एतद्व्याप्तिः

एतत् वेद व्याप्तिः etc.—व्याप्तिः (exclusion, distinction) *y* may take place wing to विवेकः. Now tell us whether there is one व्याप्तिः for all the विवेका or one for each, and therefore many. In the latter case, the व्याप्तिः will be so many विवेका to be many and distinct *enter* as constitutes the very soul of विवेकः. The व्याप्तिः will then require other व्याप्तिः to account for their विवेका. (एतत् व्याप्तिर्विरेवो विवेकः). Now if a व्याप्तिः possesses व्याप्तिः from व्याप्तिः the व्याप्तिः will be not-व्याप्तिः and therefore there will be no विवेकः moreover there will be an endless series of व्याप्तिः (अनन्तरः).

एव वेद सामान्योऽयं etc.—In the former case i.e. If व्यापारि is supposed to be *one*, it is an admission of सामान्य under another name, inasmuch as all the विधेय have then something in common (अद्वयति).

किं चापी विधेयः etc.—Lastly one more dilemma Are the विधेय distinct from सामान्य or are they identical with it ? Distinct they are not found any more than crest of matted hair is found on the head of a frog. In other words, they do not exist at all. If they are identical with सामान्य there is सामान्य and nothing else. Thus is ruled out the case for the sole reality of सामान्य.

2. वर्णवयस्यविरक्त्यु etc.—A statement of the विधेयैकान्तवाद— which according to the Jains contains a partial truth from the point of view of वर्णवयसिकत्वम्

विविक्त क्वचनविधो etc.—Particulars are the only Reality. They are distinct, self-contained and momentary. No universal is ever found part from them.

न हि गवादिष्ववयवम् etc.—When we see cows, we see this cow or that cow and so on, that is particular cows—each with her own physical shape colour etc.—and no such thing as a universal essence—सामान्य—of cows.

एवा च पश्यन्ति etc.—“Here are five fingers which I distinctly see to be different from one another. He who sees a common form in them might as well see a horn on his own head !” The verse is quoted, says the note in the AMP edition of स्वाहाय्य-मञ्जरी from “ अष्टोद्विग्विजितसामान्यवृत्तपरिहृयकारिभाष्यम् ”

स्वाकारपरामर्शस्य etc.—It then remains for the विधेयैकान्तवादी to account for the idea of unity which is at the root of class-notions and class-names (‘common terms’). It rises, he says, from the particulars themselves, and the particulars are born with the power of causing स्वाकारमत्त्वम् which they therefore, do not need to borrow from elsewhere, i. e. from an Imaginary सामान्य outside them.

अग्नि च वृद्धवयसि etc.—Similarly वृद्धवयसि too has a variety of forms. So when we speak of brindled cow we do not refer to any brindled colour of the animal, but the particular brindled colour which we see in the cow before us. So here, again, the perception of सत्त्वत्व is at the same time perception of विदेव.

ए हि इदम् etc.—The two are never experienced separately from each other anywhere.

अन्वयपक्षपादः—The parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men. The Elephant is not seen wholly by any of the blind men, nor is he the sum total of the partial aspects, but is the one reality which appears different from different points of view or rather touch in the case of the blind men of the parable.

सत्त्वत्वसत्त्वविदेव etc.—Syllogism सत्त्वत्व is in a certain way different for each individual and in certain way it is one with it because made of it, like a dissimilar परिणाम (product), that is, a modification of substance which though like that substance is also unlike it. Similarly we may recognise likeness (सत्त्वत्व) in different individuals, and say this cow is like that and that cow is like this. Thus, we may demonstrate the unity-in-difference of सत्त्वत्व and विदेव. In being one with the stuffs the सत्त्वत्व does not lose its nature. For example, वर and similar qualities are identical with the substances, viz. वृ and yet they do not on that account cease to be वृत्ता. If you say that it is due to some difference existing between वर and its substance, we may point out that some difference exists also between like products such as वृत्ता, inasmuch as very different objects of the same class do bear different names.

Next the Suddhānta criticises विदेवैकान्तवादः—

विदेवा अग्नि वैकान्तेय etc.—The reader will remember that one of the arguments against keeping the two (सत्त्वत्व and विदेव) together was that the two possessed contradictory

किं च वरिं सामान्यं etc.—A series of dilemmas for the सामान्यवादी to answer: Is this सामान्य *one* or *many*? If *one* is it everywhere or only at particular places? If it is everywhere, why is it not found in the space between this cow and that cow? Besides, if it is *one* existing everywhere, why does not बोज embrace within its fold वर and वर as it does गोर? If it (the सामान्य) is not everywhere but only at particular places, it is another name for विशेष and this, again, is contrary to the tenet of the school.

अवयवे etc.—If however you hold that सामान्य is *many* there being each distinct सामान्य as गोर अवयव वर वर etc., it is an admission of विशेष, since the सामान्य distinguish themselves from each other गोर being not the same as अवयव and so on.

अर्थविवक्षारिण etc.—A positive argument to prove that विशेष are the only reality. Reality is defined as 'अर्थविवक्षारिण' i. e. that which does something, serving a purpose; in other words, to be is to do (cf. Modern Pragmatism and Oa Lyle's characterization of the universe as an infinite conjugation of the verb to do). Now this is what you can affirm only of विशेष and not of सामान्य. You cannot ride अवयव or milk गोर; for that you require वर and गोर, i. e. the real particulars, not imaginary universals.

उत्तरे सामान्यं etc.—Lastly is the सामान्य different from विशेष or is it identical with it? If it is different, we do not see it so, and it is therefore only a figment of your imagination. If it is identical with the विशेष, we have विशेष only and no सामान्य. Compare similar argument of the other side at the end of the foregoing section (सामान्यवैकल्यात्पार).

३. त्रैविध्यवादिभिरु—A third view holds सामान्य and विशेष is that both of them are realities, *distinct inter se*. For so we actually find them

सामान्यविशेषौ etc.—That they are *distinct inter se* is thus shown by means of a syllogism:—सामान्यविशेषावयवविशेषौ ।

विद्वद्वाच्यमित्याह etc. They are distinct from each other because they possess contradictory properties as do water and fire. The contradictory properties are, for example, सर्वगतम् and न सर्वगतम्: thus while सामान्य is ubiquitous, विशेष is limited to particular places.

न सामान्यात् एवम् etc.—You may perhaps object that विशेष are not found apart from सामान्य. We would then ask you: How then, are they found? You would reply: As invariably accompanied by सामान्य. Criticism: Then it is not finding a विशेष but सामान्य also. Now if this were true, we should not be using a word to express a विशेष or enter into a व्यवहार founded upon the विशेष. But, as a matter of fact, we do. Therefore we must recognise a विशेष apart from सामान्य.

4. न द्वैतम् एवम्बन्धवति etc.—A statement of the *Siddhanta*. All the three views set forth above are partial representations of the truth. There can be no doubt that we see Reality possessed of a double nature, that of सामान्य and that of विशेष. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of ब्रह्म एवम् etc. as सामान्यविशेषः (See V Bōiras and Prasastapada Bhāṣya).

बन्धुनो हि बन्धुर्वा etc.—सर्वव्यापकव्यतिरेक which is said to be the very essence of Reality (see supra) is consistent only with the thesis here laid down. When we see a cow we apprehend a certain unity of animal form, such as belongs to all individuals we call cows (बन्धुत्ववत् सर्वव्यापकव्यतिरेक). But, at the same time we apprehend its distinction from other animals such as buffaloes etc. When, moreover we speak of a brindled cow thus referring to the विशेष (particular character) of the animal, we must not fail to remember that in doing so we also recognise the fact that the animal is a cow. We thus notice सामान्य and विशेष—the two—in one. [Note carefully the difference of this view from that of the वैशेषिक. The वैशेषिकव्यापकत्वम् recognises सामान्य and विशेष as distinct *inter se* (स्वस्वव्यापकत्वविशेषव्यतिरेकः), the सिद्धांतियुक्तम् recognises them as *two-in-one* (सामान्यव्यतिरेक—*Stanam*)].

अग्नि च वस्तरवदिति etc.—Similarly वस्तर too has a variety of forms. So when we speak of brindled cow we do not refer to any brindled colour of the animal, but the particular brindled col. in which we see in the cow before us. So here, again, the perception of सामान्य is at the same time perception of विधेय.

ए द्वि वदित् etc.—The two re never experienced separately from each oth anywhere.

अणववस्तुत्वात्—The parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men. The Elephant is not seen wholly by any of the blind men, so is he the sum total of the partial aspects, but is the one reality which ppears different from different points of view or rather touch in the case of the blind men of the parable.

एतन्महावाक्यविधेय etc.—Syllogism सामान्य is i a certain way different to each individual and in certain way it is one with it because made of it, lik dissimilar वरिष्ण (product), that is, modification of a substance which though like that substance is also unlike it. Similarly we may recognise likeness (सामान्य) in different individuals, and say this cow is like that and that cow is like this. Thus, we may demonstrate the unity-in-difference of सामान्य and विधेय. In being one with the सक्ति the सामान्य does not lose its nature. For example, वृत् and smaller qualities are identical with the substance, viz, वृत् and yet they do not on that account cease to be वृत्. If you say that it is due to some difference existing between वृत् and its substance, we may point out that some difference exists also between lik products such as वृत्, however much as even different objects of the same class do bear different names.

Next the Siddhāntin criticises विधेयैवत्ववादः—

विधेय अग्नि वैकारण्येय etc.—The reader will remember that one of the arguments against keeping the tv (सामान्य and विधेय) together was that the two possessed contradictory

natures. But the सामान्य according to our Bhāṭṭa is not सर्वगत as विशेष also is not, and therefore there is no conflict of the सर्व of the two

सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां च etc.—They are somehow blend d together सामान्य is many inasmuch as it is inseparable from विशेष विशेष are one inasmuch as they are inseparable from सामान्य

एकत्वं च etc.—सामान्य is one from the point of view of समग्रत्व. From the point of view of the whole truth (प्रमाण as distinguished from वह—see B. Majjari on Stanza XXIII) however it is somehow the subject of contradictory predication, viz. both one and many inasmuch as सामान्य is the universal element in like things, and yet it is particularised in consequence of each of the things having its own individuality

एवं चासिद्धं etc.—So you cannot lay down an absolute opposition between सामान्य and विशेष If you insist upon opposition somehow it is what we are actually contending for against all other schools.

पाकः पावकः etc.—The example of water and fire cited to show the incompatibility of contradictory natures really points to the very conclusion we have been urging. Thus as water and fire they are opposed ; but as द्रव्य they are one.

11. Next we show how द्रव्य also has got a double nature viz. सामान्य and विशेष or one and many द्रव्य is one in all द्रव्य, and it is also many in the particular forms of द्रव्य such as the द्रव्य of a बाण the द्रव्य of a बाहु (bow) the द्रव्य which is sharp or the द्रव्य which is soft and so forth

द्रव्यस्य हि सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं etc.—द्रव्य is पौरुषिक (material that which belongs to matter) and its double nature of सामान्य and विशेष can be easily perceived.

पौरुषिक द्रव्य etc.—That द्रव्य is पौरुषिक may be shown by an अनुमान Thus द्रव्यः पौरुषिक इन्द्रियार्थत्वात् क्वचित्त्वत् = द्रव्य (sound) belongs to matter (and thus material) because it is an

blest of sensuous perception just like स्पर्श (colour) etc.
(For contrary view see अक्षरविवक्षाविकार in Kumāra's
अक्षरवर्णिक).

अक्षर etc.—That अक्षर does not belong to matter is maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas ('वीश' as they are also called) on the following grounds —

- (1) It rests in something that is tangible (viz. वायु).
- (2) It experiences no obstruction in the way of going to or going out even in a crowded place.
- (3) It does not admit of being analysed into successive parts.
- (4) It does not give pain even to any fine corporeal part.
- (5) It is quality of वायु which is not matter.

These five arguments are met by the Siddhāntins as follows

(1) अक्षरवायव्यो etc.—The attribute which we call अक्षर does not rest in वायु but in the different kinds (वर्तमान) of वायु. Both the intangibility of वायु does not affect the argument.

अक्षरवायु etc.—The substance which is the body of अक्षर must be tangible because it is an object of our दृष्टि (I see) or not according as the perceptible is near or far and the wind is blowing in a favourable or unfavourable direction. Parallel case the particles of matter which are the body of स्पर्श. The alleged हेतु of the V. is therefore असिद्ध.

(2) द्वितीयसु अक्षरत्वेन etc.—अक्षर rests in वायु which experiences no such obstruction and yet it is admittedly दृष्टिमान. So the alleged हेतु is अनिर्वाणित. It is inconclusive and not invariably pointing to the conclusion desired. It may be urged that the अक्षर does experience obstruction; if from a tightly closed box, smoke will not emit any small. The answer to it is the same is true of स्पर्श. Therefore the हेतु is असिद्ध. It is found in the पक्ष.

(3) लुटीदक्षु etc.—The flash of a lightning does not admit of analysis into successive parts, and yet it is *वीर्यविक*. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, *अनैवात्मिक*.

(4) चतुर्दोषि etc.—The particles of a fragrant substance or dust or smoke give no push to other matter and yet they are beyond question *वीर्यविक*. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, *अनैवात्मिक*.

(5) रश्मि दूरसिद्ध etc.—रश्मि may be shown to be not a *द्वय* of आकाश because it is perceptible by a sense of ours, like रूप which is similarly perceptible. The हेतु is therefore *असिद्ध*.

सिद्धः *वीर्यविक*त्वाद् etc.—रश्मि being thus shown to be *वीर्यविक* it follows that it is *सामान्यविशेषात्मक*. It may be asked—Are not even *अवीर्यविक* things—e. g. आकाश—*सामान्यविशेषात्मक*? Answer: The Jains hold that the लवणी आकाश somehow gets attached to गुण and is in a certain sense *वीर्यविक* or material.

वस्तुनि स्वाभाविकं etc.—Are not all things—whether *वीर्यविक* or *अवीर्यविक*—*सामान्यविशेषात्मक* according to the Jains? Answer: They are. But the truth cannot be well realized by ordinary thinking in the case of *अवीर्यविक* substances such as अर्थ, अवयव, आकाश and वायु. But it can be realized easily in the case of a *वीर्यविक* इन्द्रिय. Therefore this long digression to show that वायु is *वीर्यविक*.

अवयवि नित्यवत्त्वं etc.—The *नित्यवाक्यवादी* (the *Mīmāṃsaka*) holds that रश्मि is *absolutely one* the *अनित्यवाक्यवादी* (the *Buddhist*) holds that it is *absolutely many*. Both may be shown to be part-truths as is done in the above paragraphs in regard to सामान्य-विशेषः.

अवयवा वाच्यवत् etc.—The वाक्य having been shown to be सामान्यविशेषात्मक it follows as a matter of course that वाच्य is also सामान्यविशेषात्मक since in a certain way वाक्य and अवयव (वाचक and वाच्य) are held to be one.

अविद्याया अविशेषाद् etc.—अविद्यावयवविशेषाद् वदन्ति दिव्यमासीत् च। ह्यविबोधोपाकारे वक्ष्यामि वदन्तवचनोक्तौपि यत्तौ नापि इतो न ह्यर्थः।

object of sensuous perception, just like *var* (colour) etc. (For contrary view see *सर्वविषयाधिकरण* in Kumārila's *न्येयार्थिक*).

वदन्त्य etc.—That *वदन्* does not belong to matter is maintained by the Vallabhis ('*वैष्णव*' as they are also called) on the following grounds—

- (1) It rests in something that is *intangible* (viz. *वदन्*).
- (2) It experiences no obstruction in the way of going in or going out even in a crowded place.
- (3) It does not admit of being analysed into *reciprocal parts*.
- (4) It does not give *push or nio* to any fine corporeal *वदन्*.
- (5) It is *qualit* of *वदन्* which is not matter.

These five arguments are met by the Siddhāntas as follows—

(1) *सर्वविषयाधिकरण* etc.—The attribute which we call *वदन्* does not rest in *वदन्* but in the different kinds (*वर्तमान*) of *वदन्* so the intangibility of *वदन्* does not affect the argument.

वदन्त्य etc.—The substance which is the abode of *वदन्* must be *तङ्ग* because it is an object of *वदन्* and or not according as the perceptible is near or far and the wind is blowing in favourable or unfavourable direction. Parallel case is the *गुण* of matter which is the abode of *वदन्*. The alleged *हेतु* of the *Vais.* is the *सर्वविषयाधिकरण*.

(2) *वदन्त्य* *सर्वविषयाधिकरण* etc.—*वदन्* etc. in *वदन्* has no experience of obstruction, and yet it is admittedly *वदन्* so the alleged *हेतु* is *सर्वविषयाधिकरण* is inconclusive not invariably pointing to the conclusion desired. It may be argued that the *वदन्त्य* does experience obstruction; if from a slightly elevated *वदन्* will not admit any *वदन्*. The answer is that the same is true of *वदन्*. Therefore the *हेतु* is *सर्वविषयाधिकरण* is not found in the *वदन्*.

(3) दृशीदृश्य etc.—The flash of a lightning does not admit of analysis into successive parts, and yet it is *वीक्ष्यिक*. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, *अवैकान्तिक*.

(4) चतुर्घोऽपि etc.—The particles of a fragrant substance or dust or smoke give no push to other matter and yet they are beyond question *वीक्ष्यिक*. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, *अवैकान्तिक*.

(5) वक्ष्यन् दृश्यसिद्ध etc.—*वक्ष्य* may be shown to be not a *दृश्य* of *वक्ष्यक*; because it is perceptible by a sense of ours, like *वक्ष* which is similarly perceptible. The हेतु is therefore *असिद्ध*.

सिद्धा वीक्ष्यिकत्वाद् etc.—*वक्ष्य* being thus shown to be *वीक्ष्यिक* it follows that it is *साध्यान्वयिषेयात्मक*. It may be asked: Are not even *अवैकान्तिक* things—e. g. *वाच्य*—*साध्यान्वयिषेयात्मक*? Answer: The Jains hold that the *संसारो वाच्य* somehow gets attached to *पुरुष* and is in certain sense *वीक्ष्यिक* or *material*.

वद्यपि स्वादादिनां etc.—Are not all things—whether *वीक्ष्यिक* or *अवैकान्तिक*—*साध्यान्वयिषेयात्मक* according to the Jains? Answer: They are. But the truth cannot be well realised by ordinary thinking in the case of *अवीक्ष्यिक* substances such as *वर्ष*, *अवर्ष*, *वाच्य* and *वक्ष्य*. But it can be realised easily in the case of a *वीक्ष्यिक* *दृश्य*. Therefore this long digression is to show that *वक्ष्य* is *वीक्ष्यिक*.

अवापि नित्यवद् etc.—The *नित्यवाक्यव्यापारी* (the *Mīmāṃsaka*) holds that *वक्ष्य* is *absolutely one*; the *अनित्यवाक्यव्यापारी* (the *Buddhist*) holds that it is *absolutely many*. Both may be shown to be *part-truths*, as is done in the above paragraphs in regard to *साध्यान्वयिषेय*.

वक्ष्य वाक्यवद् etc.—The *वक्ष्य* having been shown to be *साध्यान्वयिषेयात्मक* it follows as a matter of course that *वाच्य* is also *साध्यान्वयिषेयात्मक*, since in a certain way *वक्ष्य* and *वर्ष* (*वाच्य* and *वक्ष्य*) are held to be one.

अभिप्रायं अविवेकाद् etc.—*अभिप्रायव्यभिचारेणाद्* वदति विद्यमानि च ।
इतिप्रसिद्धोपायान्ते वक्ष्यान् वक्ष्यवक्ष्यवर्षादि चोरो यदि शरो न दूर्ध्व ।

तेर विभं हु । वस्मात् शोरधोवाचने तद्वैव प्रत्ययो भवति न च भवति अन्यार्थे ।
 शेषविभं हरपण् ॥—Bhadrabāhu. [I have divided the sentences
 of these stanzas according to the sense and they should be so
 construed]

अभिधान ...—अभिध न—अभिधान (वाचकशब्द) is distinct
 from and yet not distinct from अभिवेद (वाच्य). This is the
 proposition to be proved. Next comes the reason why it is
 distinct from अभिवेद.

हुरादि ..विभं हु—When you utter the word हुर (razor), अग्नि
 (fire) or शोरध (sweet ball), neither the mouth that speaks or
 the ear that hears is cut, or burnt, or filled by it (i. e. हुर अग्नि
 and शोरध respectively). Therefore अभिधान is distinct from
 अभिवेद. Next comes the reason why अभिधान is not distinct
 from अभिवेद.

वस्मात् शोरधोवाचने हरवीत्—When one utters the word
 शोरध, the thing denoted by the word, viz., शोरध is presented
 to the mind and not anything else, it follows that the word
 (अभिधान -शब्द) is not distinct from its sense (अभिवेद-वर्त) .

विद्वन्मनोवद शब्द etc.—Words originate from concepts of
 things and vice versa; hence, the two are related as cause and
 effect (respectively and in reverse), at the same time, words
 do not affect things, (hence, they are distinct from each other)

अन्तर वेदवेद तर्क etc.—When वाच्य (वाच्य) conveys its
 वाच्य (वर्त) it becomes transformed into the latter; it is only
 then that it conveys the sense. Hence it is that a particular
 word has particular sense only

II Another Interpretation of the Stanza

वाच्यम्-वस्तु वाचिकम्

वस्तुजन्येव-वस्तुवपदेव तत्

अनेकम्-अनेकत्ववच्छिन्नम् ॥ Reality is at once one and many

अन्यार्थे etc.—When one knows an object (वस्तु), he distinguishes
 it from like as well as unlike objects (other clay

vessel and also वर). Thus, in knowledge, there is a negative element in addition to the positive element. It is only with the help of the former that we fix the nature of an object, which would otherwise remain nebulous floating vague undefined. Therefore सर्वमाचार्यं व्याख्यायामक स्वरूपम्

परात्मवाचकमेव etc.—If a thing had only a *positive* nature the nature would not be its own; it is because of its negative nature, its differentiation from other things, that a thing possesses its specific nature. If on the other hand it had only a *negative* nature, it would have no positive contents and so it would be nothing.

वस्तुत्वस्वरूपेण etc.—A thing is both वाचक and अववाचक— it is वस्तु or वाचक in its own form, it is अवस्तु or अववाचक as another thing.

सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण etc.—This sums up the अवैचारिक (व्याख्याय) part of the J. I. who believe in *beingness* of all things from different points of view viz. एव and पर.

एवं चैवस्मिन्नेव ज्ञाने etc.—Hence *to know one is to know all*. For you cannot know a thing unless you distinguish it from all things.

देहसौमित्रा etc.—इदंकारिणमर्थं परस्परविना अमरम् is the thesis maintained. If you deny the latter as the Buddhists do, इदं would be *everything*; for it is then not अवस्तु in any way. If you deny the former इदं would be *nothing*; for it has no मर in any way.

सौमित्राणाम्—The Valser has would say. In order that इदं may possess its own proper nature all that you require is mutual अवयव (अवयवभाव) of things which are in themselves separate. Why should the things themselves be regarded as अववाचक? Answer. If इदं were not परमात्र इदं would be इदं. Just as इदं is a इदं because इदं is other than इदंमात्र so इदं would be इदं because इदं is also other than इदंमात्र (as represented by इदं).

एवं वाचकविधि etc.—अद्वैत is similarly व्याख्याय व्याख्यायामक; or वस्तुत्व; and अवैचारिक of इदं इदं denote an earlier

(2) **आदिदेविक**—That caused by the *gūṭa* i.e. beasts reptiles, trees etc.

(3) **आदिदेविक**—That caused by godlings, demigods and other lower spirits.

अथैव दुःखप्रवृत्तः समिपतः—All the three kinds of *duḥkha* are effects of the *rajan* principle (see below) which, residing in *hrīdī* attacks adversely the *chetanāśakti*. This contains an explanation of the origin and nature of *Pain*. Pain is that which is experienced by the *chetanāśakti* as *प्रतिदुःख* or adverse (Cf. The *Rājāyika* definition of Pain also those of Spencer etc. As a matter of fact it is very difficult to define pleasure and pain for they are unanalysable and therefore cannot be split up into differentia and genus or species for the purpose of definition.) Strictly speaking however it does not belong to the *chetanā* but to the *qudī* and is a product of the *rajan* principle according to *Bhāskya*.

The whole passage from *सांख्यसूत्रे* to *प्रत्यक्षिणः* is extracted verbatim from *Gematria's Com.* p. 97 on the *Sarj. D. Samu* cōya 34 (See Appendix) The *Com.* is based upon the statements of the *Bhāskya* *śeṭhī* as found in *Vācaspathi-mīmāṃsā* *śā.* *ś. 1.* on the *śrī* *का* *दुःखप्रवृत्तिसिपात्तः* *विज्ञाता* *तदपवादे* *हेतो* (*B. R. 1*)—*ए* *ल* *प्रत्यक्षिणः* of our text.

अथानि च प्रत्यक्षिणः etc.—The *Tantriyāgī* Principles consist in—

(1) **अव्यक्त**—The Unmanifest or the Potential Reality

(2) **ब्रह्म**—The Great Principle—i.e. the Buddhi or Intelligence. It is generally understood as the Cosmic Intelligence i.e. Intelligence manifested in the macrocosm and hence *ब्रह्म*

(3) **अहङ्कार**—the *Ego*. Not to be confounded with *पुरुष* or *आत्मन्* *पुरुष* or *आत्मन्* caught in the *tanmā* of *वृत्ति* appears as *अहङ्कार*—*अहं*.

(4) **पञ्चतन्मासः**—or the Five Elements of *अहङ्कार* *रसा* etc. which are the seeds of the *वृत्ति*

() The *Klesas* क्लेशा consisting of the five बुद्धिभ्रमा or cognate organs five वर्तुलभ्रमा or organs of activity and मन्त्र the organ of mentality

(6) The पञ्चमहाभूत—Or the Great Material Elements:
आकाश etc.

(7) दुःख—The Out or Ātman The last is neither सृष्टि nor विश्रुति

उषा देवरायण etc.—Gomaraṇa also quotes *Īvarakhyāṇa*'s *Kārikā* 3 a d explains it. (See Appendix)

Of the 25 principles one is the original *ब्रह्म* which is in no way *विरुद्धि*; seven beginning with *ब्रह्म* i.e. *ब्रह्म* and the *वस्तुमान* are *ब्रह्म-विरुद्धि* i.e. *विरुद्धि* of their antecedents and *ब्रह्म* & their consequences of the last seven are pure *विरुद्धि*; these are the six in *ह्रिय* and the five *ब्रह्म*; while one *via purā* is neither *ब्रह्म* nor *विरुद्धि*—he is transcendental!

प्रीत्यपीतिविश्राद sto.—प्रीति (Joy), अपीति (grief) and विश्राद
 (stupor or disease—not dejection merely) श्रवस् (lightness—
 not in the English sense of levity but in the good sense of
 agility or easy movement), उपहरण (making stand, aggrava-
 tion), दीन्य (heaviness, look of guilt or ease) are con-
 stantly tending to override one another depend upon another
 produce one another and combine with one another. But
 when they are in state of equipoise they are called वृत्ति —
 which is their original and natural condition. Other names
 for the same are प्रकाश ज्ञानक, to. OE. प्रीत्यपीतिविश्रादप्रकाश
 प्रकाशवृत्तिविश्रादः । जन्मोन्वायिमयाजगन्नयविह्वलरूप एतां ॥
 तस्य कुरुष्यादधविह्वलयम्भक्तं नैव राजा । पुत्रवरणकमेव तत्र मरीच-
 यस्यार्षो हनिः ॥—B. K. 12, 14

A additional series is found in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā and its commentary viz. प्रवास मच्चक्षि and निवृत्त्य a light, activity and arrest or stationariness, mentioned as the 3 actions of सत्त्व रजस्व and तमस्व respectively (See Bhāṣya, II K on 'सत्त्व' etc.).

वषावतन्मयः etc.—शङ्खति is also kao as वषाव (प्रहृष्ट
धीयते अतिप्रसन्नि), the Great Abod or Reservoir and अमय

वर्षे वैराग्य etc.—Are certain tilings of the mind which play a part even in the intellectual determination of the character of the world of objects.

इदेषांकारः etc.—(OL ततोऽपि इदेषांकाराः स्वाध्यायवते न चाहं ह्यमः अहं इहोतीति इत्यादिबिम्बकम् —Gunasena p. 100 OL B T B p. 6. अविद्यावोदप्रसूत also) Parts of this are clear reminiscences of the Bhagavad-Gītā which is unquestionably earlier than the Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Samāna.

तस्मात् सत्त्वगुणरूपानि etc.—OL Gunasena's तदाहंकारादिव्यापि अथपि क्वापि तस्मात्तद्वि सुखसर्तवानि पञ्च इत्यन्ते; also B. T. B. p. 6-7 अथकारान्वितानि गन्धतन्मात्रे विद्येय—See Max Müller's "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" where the Tattva-samāna is rendered into English.

सत्त्वगुणरूपानि etc.—OL B. T. B. From अन्तर्मात्रादिव्यापि to बुद्धिर्वा अथपि—taken from the B T B.

The points to note here are—

1. That the महाबूत, according to the Sāṅkhyas spring from the तन्मात्र (essence) of their respective गुण, and of the गुण गुण 1st preceding महाबूत or महाबूत if any: thus, वायु springs from अन्तर्मात्र and its गुण is अन्तः वायु springs from अन्तर्मात्र पञ्च तन्मात्राणां and its गुण is वायु and एतत्; and so on. It is, as in the Vaiśeṣika system where वायु springs from the atoms of वायु तेषां from the atoms of तेषां etc.—with the exception of अकार which is supposed to be an eternal reality without constituent parts.

2. The evolution of the महाबूत does not take place as a evolution of one महाबूत into another say 1st अकार into वायु, of वायु into तेजः etc., as it does according to Vedānta (cf. वाचस्पति etc. वायुवाह्यायु etc. 1st उप०) but of तन्मात्र into महाबूत; neither does one तन्मात्र beget another 2nd only joins itself with another and begets the next महाबूत in the series. Haribhadra, and Gunasena in his summary of the Sāṅkhya, derive each of the महाबूत from the तन्मात्र of its peccal guṇa, cf. क्वापेवो रमापरो मन्मादुवि न्वापञ्च । एतद्विद्युत्तत्वेन च पञ्चमो नृपराजकः Haribhadra Bāḥ. 40

इदमस्मात् सत्यं ज्ञातेनोपि सिद्धयति तस्यैव कृते
तस्याः स्वतन्त्रतायाः अभाव इति तथा तस्यैव तन्त्राणां
अभावस्तस्याः अपि कारणम् । " Generator = One

इदमपि बह्वर्णः etc.—For a statement of its
इदमपि and reasons for the same quoted ab-
E. T. B. IL

अथारम्भः इत्यादि - अथारम्भः and अथारम्भः
Man and the Law Man who supply
and bring about rational movement
famous Slickby's Parable of the
then set forth in detail in
सर्वं वादितुं नगरं प्रस्थितः । स नगरं
वाच्यं वनात्तरस्येन वहुवा एवेतिदिष्टः
हिंसाविनाशेनारिषयहत्या नव
अथेवेवे । अथारम्भः । अथारम्भः
नव । अथारम्भः वहुवा
हिंसा वहुवा गीतारिषः

१
 श्री
 गुरु
 नारा
 दुष्ट
 अर्थ
 हे
 तो
 गद्यति
 भूषण
 एव

! reality he is distinct from it. Likewise बुद्धि which is un-intelligent in itself, seems possessed of intelligence, as it were in consequence of its proximity to पुण्य or फिर. The parallel passage in G. varatna runs as follows वेदममाया एवं बुद्धेरन्वयि-
रिचममियन्ते । सुखं नृणां विवरा इन्द्रियद्वारेण बुद्धौ लभ्यते इन्द्रि-
योमयसुखसर्वव्यापारो लक्ष्यते चैतन्यवृद्धिः प्रतिदिन्यते ततः । सुखं नृणां इन्द्रि-
यादीनि सुखं नृणां । आह नृणां चैतन्यवृद्धिः । बुद्धेरन्वयि प्रत्यक्षं चैतन्यवृद्धयति प्रत्यक्ष-
प्रत्यक्षव्यापारमपि तदात्मक इव प्रतिपाद्यते इति बुद्धिवाच्येनापि विवद्वि-
त्तिवाचात् वेदममायौमयव्यापारो (p. 105)

The passage attrib. to Patanjali is not found in Patanjali's Y. ga Sūtras, but in Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the same (Vyāsa Pat. Bh. 30 वास्तु तर्हि विद्या । वाचस्पति विद्या ।
व्यासात् । बुद्धेरन्वयौ प्रत्यक्षवृद्धयः । ततः प्रत्यक्षं चैतन्यवृद्धयति । प्रत्यक्ष-
प्रत्यक्षव्यापारमपि तदात्मक इव प्रत्यक्षव्यापारो । तदा चोक्तम्—अपरिचयिणी हि
मोक्षवृद्धिरिति तद्व्यासात् न परिचयिण्यै प्रतिपाद्यते तद्विद्वत्प्रवृत्तिः ॥
p. 91.)

The slip was originally Guṇaratna and was afterwards repeated by Mallikarjuna who does not seem to have either seen Patanjali's Sūtras or verified the source of the quotation. Possibly Guṇaratna too had not, otherwise, he could not have so fondled the language of phorism with that of Bhāṣya. Could it be that in the time of Guṇaratna the author of the Bhāṣya was supposed to be Patanjali himself Vyāsa being too ancient to be a commentator of Patanjali? Perhaps not. The very frequent practice of writing among the Jains—a श्लोक बुद्धि-
रिति a, the author's own gloss, could have also led to the confusion between the Sūtra-kāra and the Bhāṣya-kāra.

इति वाचस्पति-
वा.—See commentary on B. T. K. 23. This shows बुद्धि to be not merely faculty of Intellectual Apprehension but also of Moral Resolve—in other words, it is the attitude of the whole man towards objective reality which implies certain intellectual acceptance regarding the nature of that reality and is therefore rendered by the word Intelligence. As to the correctness of the commentator's explanation of बुद्धि, Prof. Müller is sceptical. (Cf. The Six Systems)

सामर्थ्यरोप्याह etc.—The whole passage upto “एतद्वि वयं” including the quotations, is reproduced from *Gemaratna's Commentary* on *Haribhadra's* *Sūtr*. D. Samuccaya. The analogies of the mirror and the face, the water and the moon, the crystal and the adjacent red flower are easy to follow.

न च वस्तुये etc.—Taken from *Vācaspathi-mītra's Commentary* (B. T. K.) on B. K. 61—स्वार्थेनैव पुनश्चेदप्युक्तोपरिभाषी अपश्य मोक्षः । मुचेर्येकवारिभेदावस्थान् । तथावप्येकस्मिन्प्राधान्यात् न वस्तुन लक्षितानां पुनरेपरिभाषामिष्यमवस्थात् । अथ वस्तुन न तन्मात्रं प्रेत्यामात्यापर वावपि निश्चितत्वात् । तन्मात्रं पुनश्चिन्मोक्षार्थमिति रिक्तं वचः । If पुनश्च is अपुन and अपरिभाषी be as above modifications of any sort ; he is not liable to undergo वस्तुन ; for the same reason he is devoid of किञ्चा and cannot transmigrate from one life to another. Hence there is no occasion for मोक्ष in his case.

न च वस्तुनि etc.—CL. तस्याह वस्तुने ही न वस्तुने वापि तन्मति क्विन् । तन्मति वस्तुने मुच्यते च वावाच्यं वस्तुनि B. K. 62

अथा न वस्तुन पुनश्चो वस्तुने —पुनश्चे वस्तुनैव । अथा अपवर्तयती भूय मयापि स्वाभिन्नुपवर्त्तते । तथाप्येव प्रत्यावा तस्याप्यप्राप्तिना तद्वत्त्वं च मोक्षकामादे स्वामिष्यमवस्थात् । योगापरवर्गवाच्यं बहुविधवस्तुनैव विवेकावस्थात् पुनश्चमवस्था वस्तुनैव —Vācaspathi.

Gemaratna also quotes *तस्याह* etc. and comments as follows न वस्तुनैव वस्तुमोक्षलक्षणाः पुनश्च वस्तुनैव । अथा अपवर्तयती भूय मयापि स्वाभिन्नुपवर्त्तते तद्वत्त्वं मोक्षकामादे (c. l.) स्वामिषि वस्तुनैव । अथा योगापरवर्गवाच्यं बहुविधवस्तुनैव विवेकावस्थात् पुनश्चे नैवम् etc.—p. 107 CL. also *Vyāsa Bhāṣya*, the original of *Vācaspathi*, p. 86. The passage means Just as a king arrogates to himself the victory and the defeat of his army and thereby appropriates and enjoys the treasure of the enemy in the same way मोक्ष and मोक्ष which strictly speaking belong to पुनश्च are associated with वस्तुन by a kind of confusion between the two.

Criticism : The four absurdities of the Sāṅkhya system pointed out in the *Stanza*

1 () To be *विद्* and to be devoid of Intelligence or Consciousness is a contradiction in terms. *विद्*—to know or be conscious; *विद्*—to think from which the word *विद्* has come connotes thought or knowledge. [As matter of fact *विद्* is Vedio *विद्*—to know] If it be not its function to know itself and that which is other than itself viz. its Object or Reality (cf. *स्वरूपमिति ज्ञानम् प्रज्ञानम्* —PNT-kāra 1 2. for this doctrine of the Jai is) the *विद्* is no longer *विद्*. For in that case it would be no better than such dead matter as *वत्* which does not know itself or anything other than itself. Similarly Rāmānandya holds that *तत्* knows itself as well as its object (See Bṛhadya L. 1 1).

(b) Moreover *विद्* has a form or corporeal shape (*वर्तुल*) and th. refore it is impossible for it to be reflected in *वृद्धि* reflection being possible only in the case of things which are possessed of corporeal form (*वत्तु वर्तुलत्वात्*). Then, as regards the प्रतिबिम्ब *तत्*, the response (*वृद्धि*) is the influence of *वृद्धि* it is impossible without the response producing *प्रतिबिम्ब* & affectio or modification of *वृद्धि*. The presence of *वृद्धि* could bring about no change in *वृद्धि*, unless *वृद्धि* was possessed of *वर्तुल*. Without *वृद्धि* parting with its original character it could not be said to be subject to *वृद्धि* and *वृद्धि*. And the moment it is admitted that the original character is lost and a new one acquired the operation of losing one and acquiring the other is *विद्* which makes *वृद्धि* *वर्तुल*—which is contrary to the Sāṃkhya tenets. The analogy of the crystal points in the same direction. If it be not due to a certain action in the crystal that it catches reflection how is it that an opaque stone does not catch it? Therefore, it is plain that *विद्* (*वृद्धि*) is *वर्तुल* and a *वर्तुल*—that is, a *वर्तुल* and a *वर्तुल* directly and not thro' *वृद्धि*. According to Rāmānandya, *विद्* is possessed of *वर्तुल* of itself, but of *वर्तुल* through *वृद्धि*—though both really and not notionally as Sāṃkhya holds *वर्तुलप्रतिबिम्ब* *वर्तुलप्रतिबिम्ब*—This, like the foregoing passage is not found in Patañjali's Sūtras, but in Vyāsa's Bhāṣya; and there again, it is introduced with the words “ *तत्तु वर्तुल* ” on

which Vācaspathi adds—"परिवर्तिते" i. e. by Paravartikāśrīya, an ancient teacher of the Bāṅkhya System. The passage is thus explained by Vācaspathi-Misra: "तथा चोक्तं परिवर्तिते अपरिणामिनी हि योग्यविरहत्वा । अत एव इदमप्यतिशयोक्त्या च परिणामिनि इदिरूपेणैव संबन्धेन वदुर्ति इति इतिप्रत्ययवपत्तिः । —Pat. Yoga 20 Com.

It is argued that योग्यत्ववृत्ति is in reality above परिणाम and प्रतिसंख्य = *i. e.* modification or activity but being reflected in बुद्धि which is subject to them, it itself comes to be regarded as subject to them. But how can that which is admittedly a mere वपचार, i. e. a false ascription, be of any use in the investigation of truth? Moreover if सुख-दुःख of which we are all undeniably conscious as belonging to ourselves that is to our व्यक्त्यन्त, do not belong to the व्याप्य, they will have to hang in the air so to say since बुद्धि is incompetent to possess them, it being held to be जड (dead, insensate thing).

2. अत एव च जडा एव etc.—We cannot very well predicate विषयान्वयत्वात् (knowledge of objects) of बुद्धि if the latter is जडा i. e. unconscious or insensate.

अथैव .सुखदुःखं सुखम् etc.—The explanation is reiterated that the neighbouring विषयवृत्ति is reflected in बुद्धि and thus बुद्धि becomes possessed of it as it were (चेतनावृत्तिव्यावभासते). But to it a reply may be easily made that a man is reflected in a mirror but that does not make the mirror living चैतन्य and अचैतन्य are inherent in things and cannot be altered even by an omnipotent being. Moreover the "इ" = "as it were" in your statement (चेतनावृत्तिव्यावभासते) is clear admission of unreality. Cf. Bāṅkara तदाहरोविद्याचेतनोऽपि तज्जल इत्येति चेत् परमावेतनवृत्तिरिव तज्जल इत्यापत्तिः । इदमप्यप्रयोगात् । Br Brāh. II. II. 10

अत एव च योग्यवृत्तिरपि etc.—Similarly the eight spiritual qualities and Egoism (अहङ्कार) belong to व्यक्त्यन्त, not to बुद्धि

3. अन्वयवृत्तिर्वा च etc.—That व्यक्त्यन्त and the other महावृत्तयः have sprung from the essences of their qualities is a doctrine contrary to all experience. Apart from the absurdity of matter springing out of the essences of qualities, there is the initial

paradox of calling वाक्य जगत् which all other schools of thinkers are agreed in regarding as मिथ. (The author is here overlooking the Vedāntin—See Ved. Sūtras II iii. and the Bhāṣya thereon.)

नित्यैकान्तवादिनां च ह्युक्तिरिति etc.—For the Bhāṣya claims to be a सारसंवादिन् as against the Nityāyika and Vaiśeṣika who are जगत्संवादिनाम्, and are, therefore, stigmatised as “जगत्संवादिनः”. Besides, how can the परिचायिका (i. e. the staff of which an effect is made) be a गुण (quality) of its कार्य? Or rather how can the गुण of a कार्य be its परिचायिका (i. e. be the very staff of which the कार्य is made)?

वाक्यदीर्घा च etc.—वाक् too, cannot be called इन्द्रिय as it appears or seems as distinguished from hands. The former are parts of the organism which perform functions which nothing else can perform. The functions वक्तुं वाक्यं, दिशन् ज्ञानेन etc. which are ascribed to वाक्, पश्चि वाक् etc.—called कर्तव्यम्—respectively can be performed by other limbs as well, for example we can communicate our ideas by finger-signs etc. Thus वाक् etc. are limbs and not gāṇa. If they are to be regarded as organs despite this, there will be no fixed number of इन्द्रिया, many other limbs being entitled to the same rank.

4. वचोऽन्तर्भाववाचक इति etc.—You admit that गुण combines himself with प्रकृति. This is exactly what one understands by वच. If that is not वच what else is वच? Therefore, it is best to deny—while making this admission—that वच belongs to गुण.

वच्यं साहचर्य इति etc.—The Sāṃkhya speaks of three kinds of वच्य—

(1) साहचर्य—that consists in the worship of प्रकृति by combining it with वाक्यम्. Of नवप्रधानात्मकवाचकं ये साहचर्यवाचकं तेन साहचर्यं वच्यं च पुराणि ब्रह्मिण्यान् प्रकृत्यन्ते नृणां सप्ततन्त्रं इति नान्यप्रकृत्यन्तम्—S. T. K. on verse 44 p. 290.

(2) वैचारिक—that consists in the worship of the दिवात्, etc. वच, इन्द्रियं वाङ्मनः and इन्द्रि म mistaking them for वाक्यम्.

OL वैश्वरूपो कण्ठलोचनं ये विद्यमानेषु ब्रह्मेन्द्रियादुत्पद्यमानेषु
 तान् ब्रह्मरूपम् एव दृष्टव्यमवस्थानीह विद्वन्मित्रिपञ्चिकाः । भीतिहास्यु व्यते
 र्वै सारं प्रविशति । बीजा इव सद्यश्च विद्यन्ति विगतमवस्था
 B T K Ibid.

(3) शक्तिः—that consisting in attachment to 'शक्ति' i. e.
 the sacrificial rites with their attendant fees, and the heaven
 sought to be obtained thereby OL इष्टार्थैव शक्तिः । पुनस्तत्प्राप्त
 मिदं हीनार्थं कर्तुं कामोत्पन्नमवस्था वक्षते ।—B. T. K. Ibid.

The passage in the text is reproduced from Gungarinas
 Com. Of also B. T. K.

In truth, all the three—साक्षरिक् वैश्वरिक् and शक्तिः—are
 modes of कर्म and कर्म. The resulting कर्म gives rise to सत्ता,
 and सत्ता too eventually belongs to the same द्रव्य to whom
 belongs the कर्म. Hence, it is absurd to hold सत्ताव्यवस्थे वैव
 द्यते वापि संसृति etc. See B. K 62.

प्रतिपुनरविवर्तनात् etc. —The Śāṅkhya explains: मोक्ष
 consists simply in the द्रव्य being restored to his original state,
 when प्रवृत्ति has ceased to act owing to the distinction between
 प्रवृत्ति and द्रव्य having come to be realized. But this explana-
 tion is evidently unsatisfactory. For is it not the very nature
 of प्रवृत्ति to be active, with the necessary consequence that the
 activity should never cease to exist and thus preclude मोक्ष ?

The Śāṅkhya would join. The activity of प्रवृत्ति origi-
 nates from द्रव्यार्थे; and, therefore when the द्रव्यार्थे is accom-
 plished, the activity ceases विरोधव्यति (discrimination between
 प्रवृत्ति and द्रव्य) being a द्रव्यार्थे

रूप इत्यादि—Śāṅkhya Kārikā 59. On the analogy of an
 actress who retires from the stage after her work is done.

Objection: First, the unintelligent प्रवृत्ति is not capable
 of such thought as is pre-supposed in the analogy. Secondly
 the प्रवृत्ति will repeat its activity even after विरोधव्यति has
 taken place, just as it goes in search of a विषय after it
 has once enjoyed it—a persistence which can be explained
 only on the hypothesis of the activity being of the very nature
 of प्रवृत्ति. Thirdly the analogy of the actress is fatal to the

point sought to be established; for, the actress will always have her part "once more" So the right view about योग is that it belongs to गुरु and that it takes place when all the karmas have been exhausted. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika agrees with the Jaina.

Unaccountable absurdities in the Sāṅkhya system. This supplementary portion in the text is based upon B. T. K. Cf. also B. T. B.

एकमन्त्रादि etc.—S. T. K. pp. 292-302, B. T. B. pp. 27-30 and M. M.'s Six Systems p. 268, where the Tattva-Saṁhita is fully translated.

Books of Reference :

1. Sāṅkhya-Kārikā
2. Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī.
3. Gaṇḍapāṇi's Sāṅkhya-Bhāṣya.
4. Sāṅkhya Tattva-Saṁhita.
5. Kapila-Sūtras and the Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya.
6. Patanjali's Sūtra and the Vyāsa Bhāṣya and Vācaspati's Commentary
7. Summary in the Śaddarsana Saṁuccaya and Guṇaratna's Commentary thereon.
8. Max Müller and Garbe.

Appendices.

कारणशक्तोऽप्याह । "बुद्धिर्बलवत्तत्त्वानुबलवत्प्रतिबिम्बवत् द्वितीयवर्तमानं
 ईश्वरप्राप्तयेति । तत्रैव योग्यत्वमस्य च सात्त्विको विद्यमानादिरिति " तथा
 आनुरि — " विविधे दृश्यविभक्तौ बुद्धौ योग्यमिव व्यप्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोरिव त्वच्छे
 दया चानुगतोऽप्यसि ॥ विद्यमानास्ते त्वेवं योग्यावहे — " इत्येतद्विद्वत्तत्त्ववि
 त्तनिर्णयमचेतनम् । न च करोति साविद्याहाराणि दृष्टिर्द्वयं च ॥ " इति —
 Generation's Com. p. 104.

एव चार्थोऽस्मिन् हेतुर्बलं कारणं दीरवदतिबलम् इति कृतोऽप्येकवर्तमानं व्यप्यते ।
 तत्रैव कारणं व्यप्यत्तु विद्यमानं हेतुर्बलवत् । तथा कारणं । एवं कारणार्थं इति
 वदन्ते हेतुर्बलं बुद्धये हि वदन्ति तद् इति । तत्रैव अद्यतनमुच्यते । तत्र

तयसी स्वयमधिकृतया स्वस्वकार्यवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षतीक्ष्णसी रजसोपहृष्ट्येते अवसत्तात्
 वक्ष्याम्य स्वकार्ये वत्ताहमकल कार्येति । तद्विरुद्धस्य उपहृष्टमर्कं रज इति ।
 कस्मात् इत्यतः अर्कं कम् इति । तद्वेन रजसः प्रहृष्टमर्कं रजितम् । रजस्य
 कञ्चया परितोषीत्यर्थं कञ्चयत् दुष्कृतानुवृत्ता च तयसा तत्र तत्र प्रवृत्तिवृत्तिवृत्त-
 येन कञ्चयेत् प्रवृत्तय इति तत्त्वतो व्युत्पत्त्यै तमोविद्यामकलकृत्य दुष्ट वरपकयेन
 तम् इति । The co-operation of the three Principles in spite of
 their mutual incompatibility is explained by means of the
 following analogies :—

“रजमेतद्—यथा वर्तित्वेनैकमविरोधिनी अथ च मिलिते लक्षणयेन क-
 म्प्रवासकथनं कार्यं कुरुतः यथा वा वातपित्तकेष्वप्याथ वरस्वरविरोधिनः क्षीरश्चात्म-
 न्मन्त्रप्रवृत्तिरित्येवं तत्त्वज्ञानस्य नास्ति मियो विरुद्धान्वय्यवृत्तयस्त्विति च स्वकार्यं
 परिप्लवितम् च —Others deny mutual conflict of the principles
 since the principles are combined in varying degrees of
 strength (दुष्कृतप्रमाणेन विरोधो नादुष्कृतप्रमाणम्).—

अहं शब्दे अहं स्वर्गं अहं कर्म अहं इति । अहं शब्दे अहं त्वामी वनवान-
 इत्येतत् । अहं बोली अहं वर्मोपविष्टोऽसी मया इति । अहं इत्येवै वक्तिमि
 पैरिस्त्रेमादिमि —अन्यथो क लोभद्वारा B T B. p. 6.—where it will
 be noticed that अमिमालम्भद्वारा is used in double sense—of
 egotism i.e. self-reference in the cognition of सत्य, स्वर्ग etc.,
 and egotism o pride as in अहं बोली etc.

अहंकारमते किञ्च दुष्कृतवाचिहृतस्य दुष्टस्य तदुपरातदेवस्त्वन्विहाते
 त्यचते । आध्यात्मिकमाधिवैदिकमविधीतिर्कं चेति दुष्कृतम् । आध्यात्मिकं
 द्विविधं क्षीरं वायुं च । तत्र वातपित्तकेष्वप्याथ वैदिकमविहितं यदुत्तमाध्यात्मं
 देहमविहात्तं अन्तरासीतापदि लघुत्वघटे तच्छापीरम् । वायुस्य च अमन्त्रोपश्ले-
 षोर्ध्वविकाराद्यर्थमनिवृत्तम् । अहं वैतरान्तरोपायवाध्यात्म्यास्थितं
 दुष्कृतम् । वायोवायुस्य दुष्कृतं द्वेषा आधिमीतिर्याधिवैदिकं चेति । तत्राधि-
 योक्तिकं मादृशपक्षपाद्विरुद्धरीत्युपस्थावरनिमित्तं आधिराष्टिकं वक्ष्यात्त-
 वसदायेवैतदुक्तम् । अनेन दुष्कृतयेन एवपरिणामयेनैव वृद्धिर्वातिनामिहृतस्य प्राप्ति-
 रत्तत्त्वानां विहात्तम् भवति दुष्कृतविहात्तम् । तद्वानि च यथावृत्तिर्भवति—
 Goparatan's Com on B. D. Sam. p. 97

द्वयप्रवृत्तिरिति चेति दुष्कृतः—तथा पदद्वयं प्रवृत्तेर्विहात्तस्ते च पक्ष-
 तन्ता दुष्टस्य च अपि नवन्तीति स्वकपाद्दुष्टस्यन्वित्वात् । प्रवृत्तिस्त्व-
 विहात्तं विरुद्धमवस्थते । ततो न कदाचिदपि सा स्वकपाद्भवति —Gopa-
 ratan's Com p. 102-3

Stanza XVI

Stanza : The relation of Cause and Effect cannot be one of simultaneity; nor can an Effect come into existence after the Cause is dead. Menism cannot account for knowledge being the knowledge of things. Thus, the jugglery of Sagia (Buddha) has been torn to pieces.

Here begins the Criticism of the Bandha doctrines :

I The First Half of the Stanza.

I. The Bandhas held that the प्रत्यक्ष and the वृत्त of ज्ञान are absolutely identical. Thus, says Buddhist writer "ब्रह्मचर्य etc."—In both cases, the ज्ञान itself is both the प्रत्यक्ष and the वृत्त, consisting as it does of परिनिष्ठा. In both cases i. e. in प्रत्यक्ष and अहमत्व; the ज्ञान is a. प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान; वृत्त—the effect. परिनिष्ठाकृतत्वात्—परिच्छेदकृतत्वात्—i. e. since the ज्ञान is परिनिष्ठा or परिच्छेद i. e. determination of the nature (an object). There is no वृत्त of ज्ञान except the परिच्छेद itself i. e. knowing an object to be such and such; and since the परिच्छेद is प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान प्रत्यक्ष or अहमत्व is the वृत्त of ज्ञान. But प्रत्यक्ष and अहमत्व are प्रमाण. Therefore प्रमाण is also the वृत्त of ज्ञान. न प्रमाणं ज्ञानं प्रमाणकृतम् N Band L 18.

Criticism

वृत्तं न वृत्तीकृतं etc.—Things which are absolutely non-distinct come into existence together e.g. वृत्त and its वृत्त. So if प्रमाण and वृत्त were absolutely non-distinct they would come into existence simultaneously. But this is contrary to the relation which is supposed to exist between them, i.e. the relation of वृत्त (Effect) and वृत्त (Cause). What the case of the left and the right horn of a cow which come into existence simultaneously: are they related as Cause and Effect? No Cause and Effect demand priority and posteriority of the two respectively [न तुल्यकालं वृत्तौ प्रमाणं].

Now take the other alternative, which is to regard the two—प्रमाण and वृत्त—as successive. This is also impossible. For in that case the वृत्त viz. प्रमाण would precede the वृत्त viz. वृत्त;

and as the Buddhist is a क्षणवस्तुवादी (holding that everything in the universe exists only for a single moment of time) it means that one has already passed off the stage of existence—absolutely without leaving a trace behind—before the other arrives on the scene.

किं च हेतुप्रसङ्गादिति etc.—Moreover the relation of Cause and Effect is a relation, and as such it must subsist in two things. Now unless both of them are at one and the same time, it could not subsist in them. Hence the alternative of succession is impossible. How can you say here is the cause and here is the effect, unless both of them are simultaneously present before you? As the verse (quoted in one place in the Ratnakaravaliṅkā) says: द्विपक्षवत्त्वमिति etc. i. e. the knowledge of the relation which subsists in two things cannot take place while only one of the things is known; the relation can be known only when both the correlates are known.

इदं विप्रतीतिरिति etc.—See अथापि with टीका p. 103 and p. 18-19 respectively. (Peterson's Edition, A. S. Bengal) The Buddha himself holds, as against the Naiyāyika, that when I see वीज object (e. g. वर), it is the वीज form or likeness (सादृश्य विमर्श) in the ज्ञान which occupies the place of प्रमाण (instrument of right knowledge) and not the दृष्टि such as the eye etc. [वीजविमर्शे हि वच् विमर्शे तस्यापीकृत्य प्रतीतिरवलीकृते । वेदयो हि कदापिचित्ते ज्ञापकत्वमस्ते न तद्व्यापकत्वमर्थं नीतत्वं तदेवमवस्थितमिति । वीजतया तद्वत्त्वमर्थं नीतत्वं तदेवमवस्थितमिति । B. B. T. p. 19]

An obvious objection to this view is that it makes ज्ञान and वच्—the Cause and Effect—one which is absurd. But the answer to the objection is: that, here प्रमाण and वच् are not Cause and Effect in the sense of कारण and फल but व्यवसायक and व्यवसाय्य—that is to say one explains the other not engenders it: it is rather distinguished from cause. Now this relation of व्यवसायक and व्यवसाय्य can very well subsist between two aspects of one and the same thing. In the present case, सादृश्य or सादृश्य is the व्यवसायक (determinant

or regulator), and नीलगात्र is व्यवस्थाप्य (determined) [See Appendix].

Objection. The one ग्राह्य which is कृत्रिम is too simple in its parts and so it is impossible that it be id possess a two-fold nature of व्यवस्थाप्य and व्यवस्थापक. The relation of व्यवस्थाप्य and व्यवस्थापक is after all relation, and as such must require two correlata to subsist in. The explanation that this is a case of व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभाव and of व्यवस्थापकभाव makes no difference to this requirement. Moreover one should like to know whether the अव्यक्ताद्वय which is said to be अव्यक्ताकार (नीलगात्राद्वय is नीलगात्राकार) is निश्चयवत् अव्यक्ताकार—that is to say whether it carries with it the conviction that the सादृश्यत्व is there or not. If it does not, how can that which is itself अव्यक्ताकार produce any निश्चय i.e. be व्यवस्थापक of the knowledge of reality (अव्यक्तावेद्य)?

Then, again, what is meant by the अव्यक्ताकारा ? ग्राह्य ? Does it mean the character that is impressed upon the ग्राह्य as the result of apprehending the अर्थ (the object)? Or does it mean that the ग्राह्य assumes the form of the अर्थ ? In the former case, it is all well wasted to prove viz. that there was the अर्थ which imparted its character to the ग्राह्य. In the latter case the ग्राह्य would become अर्थ; for the object into which it is supposed to turn itself is अर्थ. Therefore it is not proper to hold the doctrine that the ज्ञातृ and the ज्ञेय are absolutely one. Were they absolutely one, it would be absurd to draw any such distinction as ज्ञातृत्व and ज्ञेयत्व; for then we cannot say that सादृश्यत्व is ज्ञातृत्व and अव्यक्ताकार (ज्ञातृत्ववेद्य) is ज्ञेयत्व.

† The Bandha metaphysician is so ardently committed to the doctrine of कृत्रिमता that when he has to speak of अर्थ he often speaks of it as कृत्रिम—which is to be understood not in the sense of moment of अर्थ but अर्थ enduring for moment only. Thus, ज्ञातृत्व-कृत्रिमज्ञातृत्व.

Suppose you were to explain: There is but *one* reality of which साक्ष्य and अविवर्ति are but two forms—साक्ष्य being the name which we give to its असाक्ष्यव्यावृत्ति (=to be other than non-Sākṣya) and अविवर्ति the name we give to its अविवर्तिव्यावृत्ति (=to be other than non-Avivartī). Thus, साक्ष्य and अविवर्ति are not two positive realities, but mere negatives characterizing a single Reality.

Criticism: This is but a futile makeshift. The two व्यावृत्तिः—viz. the असाक्ष्यव्यावृत्ति and अविवर्तिव्यावृत्ति—cannot be two, without implying two समासः. But two समासः are an evident absurdity. Moreover as प्रज्ञा and वृत्ति are explained as अज्ञानव्यावृत्ति and अज्ञानव्यावृत्ति, why can we not say that अज्ञान is अज्ञानान्तरव्यावृत्ति and अज्ञानान्तरव्यावृत्ति—that is to say the व्यावृत्ति may be व्यावृत्ति not merely from things outside the class but also from other things of the same class? We must, therefore, admit some distinction between प्रज्ञा and वृत्ति, of which one is साक्ष्य and the other साक्ष्य Nīlakaṇṭha and Tīrtikā

एवं वीर्याभिप्रेतः etc.—The other extreme is held by the Nālyāyikas. They are equally wrong. प्रज्ञा and वृत्ति cannot be altogether separate from each other since they are *one* with the same प्रज्ञा o subject, the प्रज्ञा taking the form of प्रज्ञा in one case and of वृत्ति in the other. प्रज्ञा is the principle of unity the synthesizing principle of all its forms and activities. Thus, the same person that knows an object takes that object or abandons it or is indifferent about it. Unless this unity were recognised between the प्रज्ञा and the वृत्ति the प्रज्ञा of one person would produce वृत्ति in another person, and so everything would get into confusion. If the प्रज्ञा is to produce its वृत्ति it must be in the same person which means that we must recognise a principle of unity behind them and not treat them as isolated separate entities.

II Another Exposition of the First Half of the Stanza:

नर्त नरु वृत्तिः etc.—Everything is momentary (वृत्तिः), because everything perishes in the presence of the destroying

agent. And the same nature which it possesses at the last moment it must possess at the beginning on coming into existence. Thus, a hammer (गुण) cannot produce new nature in any when it destroys it the nature which it possesses at the end it must possess at the start—and thus, it should perish immediately after the start. In other words, it is *अस्थिर*. The argument is essentially this. A thing perishes. Nothing can make it perish, unless it were in its nature to perish. This nature is as much in it at the start as at the finish, and, therefore, all along the line. And nothing can prevent this nature from realising itself, i.e., the perishable thing from perishing at every moment. But a explanation may be offered by the *संस्तुति* (the doctrine of continuity or permanence). The thing acquires from its progenitor nature which keeps it *stable for some time*, and then allows it to perish. But this explanation proves too much. Even in the presence of the destroying agent it possesses the same nature, and will therefore remain stable in spite of those agents, and so will go on acquiring leases of life ad infinitum and will never perish. (This is illustrated by the analogy of a debtor who puts off his creditors from day to day and never pays the debt.) But it may be rejoined from the other side that thing is born to perish, but it eventually perishes when it is overwhelmed by the agent of destruction. This explanation, however will not mend matters. If a thing does not perish because it is by nature stable it is not open to say that an overwhelming force interferes with that nature and makes it perish, for nothing can destroy the nature of thing (It is like saying Devadatta is living and is dying.) If, however, as we see the thing does perish, it shows that it has not come into existence from its progenitor with stability stamped upon it. (If Devadatta dies, he cannot be born immortal, but was mortal from his very birth.) If thing is not perishable it can never perish. But we see it perish. Therefore we must suppose that when it was born from its parent, it was born perishable and not

stable. Thus, perishability being found to be the nature of things, thing must perish immediately after coming into existence. This is how the Buddhist doctrine of क्षणव्यवहार is established. Cf. Gunaratna's Com. on Śāṅg. pp. 23-30; [See Appendix].

प्रथमस्येवम् etc.—Syllogism is establish the position:—

That which is perishable will not endure after its birth, as, for example वर which is in its last moment does not endure thereafter द्य etc. are perishable at the time of their birth. Therefore they will not endure after the moment of their birth. This is known in the Buddhist Nyāya (logic) as the syllogism based on a स्वभावहेतु (Essential हेतु) as distinguished from a कार्यहेतु (Causal हेतु). The following passage will throw good light on the distinction: “स्वभावहेतुर्ब्रह्म ह्येतत् सिद्धत्वात् । कार्यहेतुर्ब्रह्म अपि न ब्रह्म । —Śāṅg. Gunaratna's Com. section on बौद्धग्रन्थ. Here is the first syllogism; सिद्धत्वात् and ब्रह्म are not related as Cause and Effect, but as Essences, whereas अपि and ब्रह्म of the second syllogism are Cause and Effect. The former is the basis of deductive, and the latter of inductive logic. In the case of the कार्यहेतु we argue from Effect to Cause; in the case of स्वभावहेतु we argue from one essence to another.

वृत्तव्यवहारो etc.—वृत्ति etc.—It now remains for the वृत्तिव्यवहार-वादि to explain how we happen to recognise persistent identity of वर from the first to the last moment of its existence, if as he says, a वर cannot bide for more than a single moment of time. विमलसरस्व etc.—the explanation which the Buddhist gives is that samānā is mistaken for identity: there is a constant flux of similar वर, of which every preceding वर produces every succeeding वर, and all of them are so alike and so close in their association that in spite of absolute break at every point we imagine that there is a single वर from first to last. This is owing to our अविद्या or ignorance. Cf. the doctrine of Heraclitus in Greek philosophy and see Gunaratna's Com. on Śāṅg. p. 80.

Criticism वृक्षवत् इत्यादि—According to the वृक्षवत्वादः, a number of क्षणः : e. क्षणवत्परः (See supra, note) may be compared to loose series of pearls—not a string as the Vedāntin holds but a loose series of absolutely loose units in which every preceding क्षण produces every succeeding क्षण. Now what we would like know about this theory is—whether the preceding क्षण produce the succeeding क्षण simultaneously with their birth or in the moments which succeed their birth. In other words, are the two क्षण which are supposed to cause each other simultaneous or successive? If they are simultaneous, one of them cannot produce the other any more than one hand can produce the other hand: वृक्षवत्परः वृक्षवत्परः—as the line in the Samsara runs. If they are successive, there can be no causal relation between them, inasmuch as one has already passed away into nothingness when the other springs into existence. At the same time, we cannot discard the causal bond, for without it nothing might spring out of anything. Therefore, says the Samsa, “विती वितीये व कृत्ये भव”

As to whether the causal relation is merely relation of Antecedent and Consequent, see Howe and his critics,—Kant etc.

वृक्षवत्परवत्त्ववादः—The Buddhist criticism of the doctrine of Permanence has no point against the Nyāyādin as the latter heartily endorses the criticism with the exception of one bit viz. विनश्यत्वाद i. e. such absolute destruction as leaves no trace behind of the thing destroyed. Hence the J has definition of वृक्ष—वृक्षवत्परवत्त्वोक्तं वृक्ष the word वृक्ष providing for the exception. The Nyāyādin's agreement with the Buddhist in the rest of the case may be seen in his doctrine of वृक्षवत्परवत्त्ववादः i. e. the destruction of the वृक्ष or seed at every moment. His difference lies in his recognition of the permanence of the underlying वृक्ष which the Buddhist denies. This double doctrine of Permanence-and-Evanescence the Buddhist has compared to such

propositions as "Devadatta is living; he is dying." But the Jaina Anekāntavādin sees no absurdity in such a proposition. According to him while we live we also die; for petals of life are falling away from us all the while that we are living. It may be argued that Death is the proper word not for the process of the gradual falling away of the petals of life, but only for the last state of extinction, so that we cannot be said to be dying while living. But this is wrong. Even at the time of the final extinction, what happens is that the last petal of life falls away. Thus, Death is a word which must apply to the whole process of the falling away of the petals of life and thus it is going on in the midst of life. Thus stands the Anekāntavāda of Life and Death.

III A Third Way of expounding the First Half of the Sūtra

According to a certain school of the Buddhists, *hetu* is produced by *pratyak*; and the same *hetu* which is the effect cognises the *pratyak* which is its cause. As a Buddhist Sūtra goes, *anārambhāyānāy* that is, nothing can be a *pratyak* of *hetu* which is not also a *hetu* of the same *hetu*.

Criticism. The whole theory is inconsistent with the Buddhist's favourite doctrine of *अविच्छेदता*. In the moment in which an *pratyak* just exists it cannot produce the *hetu* for one *hetu* must be fully taken up in the act of existing, and there is no time left for the second act—the act of producing the *hetu*. And in the next moment—the moment in which *hetu* comes into existence—the *pratyak* has already passed off according to the hypothesis of *अविच्छेदता*. Remember that the causal relation is a relation of antecedent and consequent. But your antecedent is incapable of entering into a causal relation; since it lasts only for a single moment of time in which it can do nothing beyond coming into existence.

Moreover the *hetu* will be found to be *विशिष्ट* (without a *pratyak*) according to the third theory of *अविच्छेदता*. For the *pratyak*

has passed away before the *ज्ञप्ति* comes into being, and when the *ज्ञप्ति* turns towards the object, it is more than one moment since it has been dead. And निर्दिष्टज्ञप्ति is a wrong *ज्ञप्ति* being like the *ज्ञप्ति* of the hairs of Ākāśa!

Suppose *ज्ञप्ति* and *अर्थ* to be simultaneous. Then, the latter will not be कारण; for a कारण is put to not simultaneous with, the effect, and therefore according to the principle you have yourself laid down it will not be an object too. Hence the line in the *Śāstra*: “*यत्तुल्यत्वात्. यत्तुल्यत्वात्*.”

अवधारणो यत्तुल्यत्वात्—Construction and interpretation of the first two lines in the light of the foregoing remarks—

Moreover the *अर्थज्ञप्ति* which is supposed to be the cause of the *ज्ञप्ति* having already passed off, the *ज्ञप्ति* will be found to be निर्दिष्ट *e. g.* निर्दिष्ट (See *supra*). Then, again, if that which causes *ज्ञप्ति* were to be regarded that account to be also the विषय of *ज्ञप्ति* इन्द्रिय would be विषय of *ज्ञप्ति* also; for they were indisputably causes of *ज्ञप्ति*. But they are not held to be विषय of *ज्ञप्ति*. Therefore the hypothesis of the identity of the कारण and the विषय of *ज्ञप्ति* breaks down. It may be contended that the *अर्थ* can be easily shown to be कारण of *ज्ञप्ति* owing to its holding *सम्बन्ध* and *प्रतिरोध* with *ज्ञप्ति* just as *अग्नि* is shown to be

कारण of *धूम* by *सम्बन्ध* (यस्य धूमः सन्ततः उत्पद्यते) and *प्रतिरोध* (यस्य यत्तुल्यत्वात्तुल्यत्वात् तस्य धूमः नास्ति). But the contention is wrong. *ज्ञप्ति* does not depend upon *अर्थ* as *धूम* depends upon *अग्नि*, *ज्ञप्ति* being found even without its corresponding *अर्थ* *e. g.* यत्तुल्यत्वात् without real *अर्थ*. Mark that the *ज्ञप्ति* is यत्तुल्यत्वात् not यत्तुल्यत्वात् *ज्ञप्ति*; for it is यत्तुल्यत्वात् which accounts for the *प्रतिरोध*: the man

the direction of the supposed water. You will perhaps say that in that case *ज्ञप्ति* exists without the *अर्थ*, because the *ज्ञप्ति* is *अर्थ*. An answer to it is, *अर्थ* or no *अर्थ* it is *ज्ञप्ति*, and the *अर्थ* has come into being without the *अर्थ*. This is all we want to prove, and it makes no difference whether the *ज्ञप्ति* is *अर्थ* or *प्रतिरोध*. The case of *अर्थ* being entitled to be regarded as a cause of *ज्ञप्ति* must depend not only upon the test of *सम्बन्ध* but also of *प्रतिरोध*. And that test *अर्थ* does not satisfy in relation

to ज्ञान : we cannot say ज्ञान अर्थावास्तव ज्ञानायाम् ; for in the case of दृग्गुणिक there is ज्ञानमात्र and yet there is अज्ञान. Moreover Yogins are able to know अर्थ before they are produced and also after they have passed away that is to say here ज्ञान takes place without the actual existence of the अर्थ. If, in this case, the अर्थ are somehow supposed to produce ज्ञान that activity would be evidence of their existence that is they would be present, and not past or future.

न विद्वज्जगता etc. न विद्यावता मया पुत्रो वास्तवान्ते । निर्मुक्ता येर विद्वन्ति जायते सर्वदेवता ॥

It may be said by way of further argument that a प्रकाशक (e. g. ज्ञान) acquires existence from its प्रकाश्य (e. g. अर्थ) and then becomes the प्रकाश्य of that प्रकाशक. (The effect reveals the cause.) The argument, however is fallacious. Witness the case of प्रदीप which is प्रकाशक of वर and yet the वर is not produced by it. That is to say the relation of प्रकाशक and प्रकाश्य (e. g. अर्थ and ज्ञान) does not necessarily imply the relation of अर्थ and कारण. Then, again, if ज्ञान is required to be produced by an अर्थ in order that the अर्थ could be its object, स्मृति which is not produced by an अर्थ could have no corresponding object and it would therefore be अज्ञमात्र. But स्मृति is ज्ञान. It is the very breath of अहमात्र (a प्रमात्र) which is founded upon the act of recalling to mind the relation (प्राप्ति) of ज्ञाय and तावत्. Next, if according to your theory the अर्थ (cause, कारण) alone is to be the ज्ञाय (object, विषय) how would you explain the case of स्वतन्त्रेय (self-revelation of ज्ञान) which is ज्ञायक of a thing (प्राप्ति) which is its very स्वस्व and not its अर्थक? For in the single स्वतन्त्रेय itself there is no room for causal activity which always implies the dualism of अर्थ and कारण ('स्वात्मनि विद्याविरोध'). Thus अर्थ and ज्ञान which spring from their respective sets of causes are related as प्रकाशक and प्रकाश्य not as अर्थ and कारण.

The Buddhist If ज्ञान is not produced by a particular अर्थ ('सङ्गरक्षि'), or does not bear the form or stamp of that अर्थ ('सङ्गच्छरत्न') it would be equally related to all the अर्थ in the

universe and so anything and everything would be the object of that *ज्ञप्ति*—which is absurd.

Reply : *ज्ञप्ति* is not produced by the *वर्त* and yet it reveals that particular *वर्त* because it possesses the capacity to destroy or keep down the obscuring veil of ignorance in the particular case. Even if you hold the view that *ज्ञप्ति* is produced by *वर्त* you will have to admit the doctrine of capacity for you will have to explain why a particular *वर्त* produces particular *ज्ञप्ति* which you can do only on the hypothesis of a special capacity. Then, again, the particular character of *ज्ञप्ति* you cannot explain by the hypothesis of *वर्त* imparting an *आकार* (form) to the *ज्ञप्ति*. For that would make *ज्ञप्ति* *नान्वार* and *वर्त* *निराकार* the latter being no longer required to possess *आकार*, the *आकार* of the former being sufficient to account for the variety of distinctions. What *सदृश्य* or likeness could there be between *वर्त* and *ज्ञप्ति* one of which is *वर्त* and the other *वर्त*? Therefore the particular *वर्त* of *ज्ञप्ति* must be supposed to be the *वर्त* (वर्त) of the apprehension of particular *वर्त*. Next, as regards your contention that *ज्ञप्ति* apprehends (*गृह्णाति*) objects because it springs from objects (*गृह्णाति*) and possesses the form of the objects, we would inquire whether these two causes operate together (*सदृश्ये*) or separately (*सदृश्ये*)? In the latter case, the first moment of *वर्त* would apprehend the last moment of *वर्त*, inasmuch as the one has produced the other (*गृह्णाति*); *सदृश्य* (reflection of the moon in the water) would apprehend *सदृश्य* (the moon in the sky) inasmuch as one bears the form of the other (*सदृश्यता*). In the former case (*सदृश्ये*), the second *ज्ञप्ति* of *वर्त* would apprehend the first *ज्ञप्ति* of *वर्त*, since it fulfils both the conditions, that of *गृह्णाति* and that of *सदृश्यता*. If, in accounting for the apprehension (*गृह्णाति*) of objects which belongs to *ज्ञप्ति* you add to *गृह्णाति* and *सदृश्यता* further condition *सदृश्यता* which none of the above examples satisfies, even then, one *ज्ञप्ति* would be the *ज्ञप्ति* of the next similar *ज्ञप्ति*, since it satisfies all the three conditions above laid down. Hence, the

only satisfactory explanation of why *अहं* apprehends objects is that it possesses *śīla* to do so while nothing else does.

II The Second Half of the Stanza:

It criticises a doctrine of a certain other school of the *Buddhā*, according to which *अहं* is the sole reality the external world being a pure fiction.

The Argument of the Buddhists *अणुसङ्ख्येति* etc.—*Ol. Śāḍ. Gṛha. Com. p. 40.* [See Appendix] Simple *अहं* unspotted by any such fictitious divisions as *पुरुष* and *प्राण* and hence free from the complexities of the external world, is the only Reality. For the external world is impossible. This may be proved by a series of dilemmas. Is the external world—the *वाच्य*—a heap of atoms or a single body? Not the former for there is nothing to prove these atoms—neither *प्रत्यक्ष* nor *अनुमान*. The *प्रत्यक्ष* of Yogins makes too great a demand on our faith; while our *प्रत्यक्ष* is out of the question, we ordinary mortals having never seen atoms even in a dream. Nor is there a possibility of an *अनुमान*; for *अनुमान* requires the observation of invariable concomitance of the *हेतु* and the *साध्य* which in the present case is impossible for want of *प्रत्यक्ष* of the atoms (the alleged *साध्य*). Another dilemma. Are the atoms *विरत* or *अविरत*? If *विरत* are they doing their work gradually or all at once? Not gradually, for that would mean that they are slowly undergoing change in their nature that is to say are *अविरत* which is contrary to our hypothesis. Nor all at once for in that case the whole universe would have been accomplished by a coup de force—in the twinkling of an eye—and there could have been no such gradual change as we actually observe; the atoms moreover would have ceased to exist the effect, viz., universe having taken their place. If *अविरत* are they only momentary or are they lasting only for a limited space of time? In the former case *अहं* are they caused or uncaused? If they are *अविरत* they would exist either always or never at all temporary existence requiring dependence upon a cause. If they are *अविरत*, are they caused by gross matter

or by atoms? Not the former because according to you there is no gross matter the external world being only atoms. If the latter will you explain whether the atoms are to produce their effects while existing or not-existing, or both existing and not-existing? If *existing* whether they are to produce those effects in the first moment of their existence, or in a subsequent moment? Not in the first moment, for it will be taken up in its own act of coming into existence. As has been remarked, Being, Acting and Causality would be all one in this case! If mere Being could be cause of the production, the atoms of *एव* would beget atoms of *एव* and would become the *व्यवहार* of *सत्ता*; for so far as Being is concerned there is no difference between the atoms of *एव* and the atoms of *एव* and there will be nothing to regulate the production of *सत्ता* from *एव* only and not from *सत्ता*. If *not-existing* they are to produce their effects, they would be perpetually producing their effects in moments other than those of their existence. The third alternative of combined *existence and non-existence* is no good; for it can fare no better than the two alternatives of which it is made up, and which have been already disposed of. We therefore conclude that the atoms are not *व्यवहार*.

Next, let us see whether they could be *व्यवहार* existing longer than one moment, but still for limited space of time. This alternative is liable to the same criticism as the one to which the other alternative—that of *व्यवहार*—was subjected.

Besides, we ask whether the atoms in this case are *व्यवहार*—i.e. doing something and producing some effect—or not? If *not* they are *nothing* no better than the fictitious sky-flower. If they *are*, the *एव* are three possible positions to take up first, that the effect which the atoms are producing is (a) existing or (b) not-existing or (c) both existing and not-existing. (a) If it is not-existing, the atoms may as well have produced the horn of hare that is,

Criticism: ज्ञान is a *क्रिया*—a action,—and it, therefore, presupposes a *वस्तु*—the object to which it is directed. Thus, the existence of an external world is a necessity involved in the very act of ज्ञान. It may be asked: Isn't a false appearance—an unreality—an object of ज्ञान as in the case of the hair in the sky (an optical delusion)? Answer: No; even in that case, one who has never seen a real hair cannot experience the delusion. Similarly dream implies the experience of a real world. Cf. S. 1-Bhāṣya (Khyāṭi), S. 2-Bhāṣya and Advaita-siddhi. उवाच च महामायावत् २.८ विमलमणि क्षयाचम author of ज्ञान्य called 'विमलमणि' on a portion of the ज्ञान्यवचन (AMP-foot-note). The 21th अहङ्कारविनिर्मुक्त्युत्पत्तिरिति वाच्येति च वा । एतत्त्व निमित्तानि पुनर्वा नत च समाच ३—(1703). ज्ञानमोक्ष—Cf. the criticism of Hegel's Idealism. If the gits were things, the the gift of a hundred pounds in my pocket would be the same as th possession of those pounds!

न चद्रव्यवैकल्यानि etc.—The S'yād ādīn admits the existence of both—the *परमाणु* and the *अवयव*. As regards the proofs of *परमाणु*, we have both *प्रत्यक्ष* and *अनुमान*: our *ब्रह्म* in the sense that we see the *परमाणु* in seeing the *वस्तु*; also the *प्रत्यक्ष* of Yogins. That we do not see the *तमा* (*अणुवर्ण*) is due to their being too small. There is also *अनुमान* proving the existence of *तमा*. Thus—Atoms exist, because without them we cannot explain the gross body. Of course, there is no such invariable rule that a gross body should be made of *तमा*. For gross body is sometimes made of gross parts, e.g. *पृथ्वी* *अणु* *अणु* and *अणु* are not made of any parts—*द्रव्य* matter at all. Where, however gross body springs from atoms the atoms somehow get combined by such forces as time etc. and thereby cause the gross body.

वयं विचारयन्नेकपरमाण्वार etc.—As regards the criticism that the atom of the body would be conflicting with one another and so on, we admit the fact, but we explain it on the principle of *Anekāntavāda*, according to which, body is one and yet manifold.

इवोपपत्त्यसं etc.—Next we regards the criticism that the body cannot exist in the atoms either wholly or partially and so on, we reject both the horns of the dilemma, and hold that the अवयविन् exists in the अवयव inseparably.

किंच यदि वासोऽर्थो etc.—We would call upon you to explain how we happen to have a definite experience of वीर etc. in the absence of a real external world of वीर etc. You will perhaps explain that the external world which we experience is in the form of ह्यव (सिद्धान्तवाक्येभ्यः). But this is contrary to experience, in which the objective reality is perceived as outside the ह्यव. If the objective reality were in us our experience would have been *I am वीर* not *This is वीर*. You will say: there are many forms of ह्यव—one of them is the perception of अव्य, while another is the perception of इत्य् & g.—This is वीर. In other words, both the external and the internal world are really *internal*—ज्ञानाकार. But this is wrong अव्य and वीर are not on the same footing. अव्य is not rigidly fixed like वीर. What is अव्य to me is इत्य् to you not so the वीर—which is the *same* for all. No doubt, what is वीर to one may be वीर to another owing to optical derangement. But this is obviously a case of वाग्मि not प्रमा and therefore outside our reckoning.

एतत् स्वस्य वीरत्वे etc.—The *Vijñāna* śāstra (the Idealist) explains. The ह्यव of अव्य and the ह्यव of वीर are on the same level. The distinction drawn between अव्य and वीर to the effect that the former is personal and shifting while the latter is universal and fixed is untenable for when a man thinks of himself, the self is *always* presented as अव्य and consequently there is no want of fixity in this case. To that the following answer can be made. You say when man thinks of himself but this implies that there is something other than himself (otherwise where is the point in restricting the object of thinking to himself? A self is correlative word which carries with it the *animus* a *not-self*. This is fatal to the *Vijñāna* śāstra. You will perhaps explain the not-self as nothing but the self

the perception of the distinction being pure hallucination. But we refuse to accept that explanation as sound. Here is *प्रत्यक्ष* bearing testimony to the distinction between self and not-self, between within and without, between subject and object,—and there is no room to think that it is a *वाग्दि*.

उत्तरं प्रत्यक्षं etc.—The *Vijñānavādīn* now endeavours to show that it is a *वाग्दि* and he relies upon the following *सूत्रम्* to prove that *ज्ञान* and *वर्त* are not separate: *एतदेव नृ* etc. If A is invariably found with B, A is not separate from B,—as, for example, an illusory moon is not separate from the real moon. Now *वर्त* is invariably bound up with *ज्ञान* and we therefore, conclude that it is not separate from *ज्ञान*. The *सूत्रम्* may be shown to be valid as follows: In a good *सूत्रम्* where there is no *व्यापक*, there should be no *व्याप्य-संश्लेषोपपन्न-वर्तित्वम्* which is the *व्यापक* of *वेद* (e.g. *वीज वीज* which are *सिद्ध* and are therefore not always *संश्लेषोपपन्न* that is, bound together) is not found in the present case; therefore its *व्याप्य* viz., *वेद* (*वेद* of *ज्ञान* and *वर्त*) is not possible.

Criticism. The *सूत्रम्* is faulty. The rule on which it rests, viz. wherever there is *संश्लेषोपपन्न* there is *वर्त* is not invariable. This may be shown as follows: *ज्ञान* performs the double function of revealing itself and its objects (See *Śāstra* and compare Rāmānuja's view propounded in his *S'ri Bhāṣya* against the Śāṅkara Idealism). In its latter function, it reveals *वीज*, in its former function, *वीज-ज्ञान*. Now these two viz. *वीज* and *वीज-ज्ञान* being disclosed together, there is *संश्लेषोपपन्न*. But where is *वर्त*? *वीज* and *वीज-ज्ञान* are not the same. Thus, there is no such invariable law that wherever there is *संश्लेषोपपन्न* there is *वर्त*. The *सूत्रम्* is thus shown to be based upon doubtful rule and is therefore vitiated by—*संश्लेषोपपन्न-वर्तित्वम्* *हेतुभावात्*. Secondly it may be shown to be vitiated by *वर्तित्व-हेतुभावात्* also—when the so-called *हेतु* is not really found in the *वृत्ति*. Thus, *संश्लेषोपपन्न* is not found in *ज्ञान* and *वर्त* between which *वर्त* is attempted to be established by means of the *सूत्रम्*. The *वर्त* is experienced externally in the form. This is *वीज*; the *ज्ञान* which is experienced internally is not experienced at the

same time as the *वर्तमान*. Moreover the *वर्तमान* will be free from *बाधित* *हेतुमात्र* only if the *वर्तमान* of *मेव* can be shown to be misleading; and the *वर्तमान* can be accepted as misleading only if the *वर्तमान* can be shown to be valid. Thus there is *असंभव* of the two *प्रमाण*.

Then, again, if there is no external reality (*वर्तमान*) to control our *ज्ञान* we cannot assign definite localities to things. For, in the absence of the external reality there will be nothing compelling us to assign one thing to this place and another thing to that place, and so on. The *Vijñānavādin* will try to explain this restriction by the hypothesis of *बाधबाधित* that is to say by the supposition that we assign A to a fixed place in the external world not because A possesses that place as an independent reality but because our *वर्तमान* has determined that it should be assigned to that place and no other. In other words, the explanation of the restriction is to be sought not in the external world, but in the internal mind.

Criticism : The explanation will not do (See *Rad. Com.*, p. 40). The *वर्तमान* cannot determine the places. There is the external world in which things have their definite places; our *वर्तमान* obeys external facts and our *वर्तमान* are determined by the *वर्तमान*. Thus, the final determining agent in our *वर्तमान* is the external world. The *Vijñānavādin* will perhaps attempt a clever escape from this difficulty in the following way. The specific characters of various experiences require to be explained. There is no external reality which we can draw upon for the explanation, for none exists. Therefore the only possible hypothesis which will provide the explanation is the hypothesis of *बाधबाधित*.

Criticism : Is the *बाधबाधित* the same as *ज्ञान* ('*बोधवार्त*') or different? If it is the same as *ज्ञान* how can there be *बाधित*? For in *ज्ञान* there is no *बाधित*. If it is different from *ज्ञान* the principle of *बाधित* is sacrificed and there is no reason why you should admit *बाधबाधित* and cherish such inveterate prejudice against *बाधबाधित*—to which our common sense bears witness.

तथा च प्रयोगः etc.—Malliyana next proceeds to lay down a syllogism to show that *ज्ञान* and *ब्रह्म* are two distinct realities. The syllogism is based upon the *हेतु* that *ब्रह्म* and *ज्ञान* do not possess the same character but are on the contrary opposed to each other. The points of opposition are the following: 1. *ज्ञान* is internal, *ब्रह्म* is external; 2. *ज्ञान* is posterior *ब्रह्म* is prior; 3. *ज्ञान* springs from *आत्मन्*, *ब्रह्म* from its own causes in the external world; 4. *ज्ञान* is luminous (*प्रकाश*), *ब्रह्म* is dark (*अंध*).

अथ ह्यहं सुनिवारः etc.—M I winding up his long commentary on this stanza shows how to construe the third line in the light of the above remarks.

संविद्वैतवदे—one compound word = *ज्ञानवैतनवदे*

वाक्यैर्निरूपितं—*ब्रह्मज्ञान* cannot be satisfactorily explained.

निवृत्तधीर्न—Another reading: *गुणित्वात्* (नी) *वसीर्ण*.

सुमती मातापुत्र—'माता'—the name of the mother of Gautama Buddha. On the significance of the name is founded the view that the whole story of the life of Buddha is an allegory. This view was accepted by several old orientalists, but is not held now by any responsible thinker.

वस्तुतत्त्वात् etc.—Reference to the three ways in which the stanza has been interpreted by M. The doctrines criticised are

1. *वस्तुतत्त्वात्*—The identity of *ज्ञान* and *ब्रह्म*.
2. *अवयवत्वं*—Momentariness of all things.
3. *ज्ञानात्* etc.—Monism of *ज्ञान* arising from *ब्रह्म* and *ज्ञान* being inseparable and therefore one.

Reference Books.

1. *Vijñānavāda* in works of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhism
2. Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" Ch. XIV
3. Examination of *Vijñānavāda* in Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the B. Sūtras II II.
4. Criticism in Nyāya books and in Śaṅkara's Com.
5. Idealism and Criticism of Idealism in Western Philosophy

Stanza XVII

In this Stanza, the author criticises the S'ūnyavāda—Nihilism or the doctrine of the Absolute Void—maintained by a certain school of Buddhists.

व्यापारिच्युत्तर etc.—The S'ūnyavādin denies the existence of (1) प्रमाण (2) प्रमेय (3) प्रमाण and (4) प्रमाणा

व्यापारिच्युत्तर etc.—The S'ūnyavādin has not even the bare chance of endeavouring to establish his position, which other heretical schoolmen have, inasmuch as he rejects the validity of प्रमाण altogether

अथ चेत् etc.—Explanation of the third line कृत्वेत् प्रमाणः—If he accepts प्रमाण to prove his own case, it will raise his Siddhānta against him, that is to say it will conflict with his fundamental principle viz. व्युत्पत्ति. If he relies upon शब्द—the word of the master—even then he so far surrenders his S'ūnyavāda. Put upon the word कृत्वेत् which means both (1) Siddhānta and (3) Yama the God of Death

किं च प्रमाणं प्रमेयं etc.—If प्रमाण be rejected प्रमेय will go with it, thus enabling the only logical position, that of absolute silence. If an assertion of S'ūnyavāda makes it प्रमेय and so far contradicts the S'ūnyavāda itself.

अथ च दृष्टिबाध etc.—कृत्वेत् means also Yama, the God of Death. Yamaraja will be angry with him & he will fall dead, caught in the snare of निरुत्तराव—self contradictions etc.

अमृत etc.—We have both forms, अमृति and अमृत from अमृत. The latter is used by Udayanākārya, the author of the व्या. वा परिहृति also.

एव व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्ध etc.—The position which the S'ūnyavādin endeavours to maintain is that the *four principles* generally asserted by the schoolmen viz. (1) प्रमाण (2) प्रमेय, (3) प्रमाण and (4) प्रमाणा have no more existence than the horn of a horse—in other words, they are a pure fiction. This may be shown as under:—

1. *There is no प्रमातृ or ज्ञातृ* For there is no प्रमातृ to prove him. (1) *Not प्रमातृ*: Because ज्ञातृ is universally admitted to be outside the range of इन्द्रिय, and प्रमातृ is the प्रमातृ working through इन्द्रिय. Then, again it is said that ज्ञातृ is known by introspection, through the consciousness of the ego (अहम्भाव). But the argument goes too far. Such consciousness arises with reference to the body also when one says, I am fair I am dark, and so on. Moreover if the ego-consciousness referred to ज्ञातृ, it would not be occasional, but perpetual since ज्ञातृ is a reality which is ever present to us. But the ego-consciousness arises as an occasional phenomenon (when I enter upon an act of introspection), and therefore requires to be explained by an occasional cause, as does the percept of lightning-flash. (2) *Not ज्ञातृ* Because there is no invariable mark from which one can infer the existence of ज्ञातृ. (3) *Not ज्ञातृ (ज्ञातृ)*: For ज्ञातृ are contradictory. Apart from the contradictions contained in the scriptures of each school, those which exist between the scriptures of the several schools must render this ज्ञातृ altogether precarious and unacceptable.

[For the language of this passage compare Śāṅkara's criticism of human reason.—Ved. Sū. Bh. II. 1. 1.]

2. *There is no प्रदेय i. e. the world of objective reality.* The absurdity of an external world has been demonstrated already (See supra).

3. *There is no प्रमातृ* For प्रमातृ is said to be knowledge which evades itself and others i. e. the world of objective reality (Or. स्वप्रत्ययतावि शब्दं प्रमातृ P. N. T. Jāṅkara I 3; also Bāṇaṇi Jāṅkara I 1. 1.) But, where is the objective reality in order प्रमातृ possible?

(4) *विशेषाद्वैतवादो* etc.—Here is a dilemma for the Realist in meet. Is the प्रमातृ synchronous with the ज्ञेय or is it subsequent? In the former case, all the atoms existing ज्ञेय of the universe being synchronous with it will have a right to be treated as its ज्ञेय—which is absurd. In the latter

case, the प्रमाण i. e. ह्य will have to be regarded as either विराकार or साकार. In the former case, for want of साकार II will leave the nature of each particular object undetermined. In the latter case, the साकार will have to be regarded as either identical with or separate from the ह्य to which it belongs. If it is identical with the ह्य II is simply ह्य and nothing more i. e. it will be the same as the hypothesis of निराकार ह्य which has been already dealt with and disposed of. If it is separate from ह्य, it should be either विद्य or अविद्य. If it is विद्य II would be वेद i. e. in the position of ह्य and would have to undergo the ordeal of the dilemma of विराकार and साकार which has been already shown to be unassailable. If it is अविद्य is it its revealer as अहम् or अहम्? In the former case, i. e. if it does not require to be known in order to be the revealer of the objective world, it would reveal the world to Mr Maitra as well as to Mr Chaitra, no matter whether one knows it or not. In the latter case i. e. if it has to become the object of ह्य it will raise the old problems of साकार and निराकार ह्य with all their attendant difficulties—अवस्था

4. There is no प्रमाण लोकोपपत्ति seems to be a work similar to the लोकोपपत्ति of Śrī Hara, Vedānta of the Advaita school or Mayā school.

Criticism अहम् etc.—The usual criticism passed upon the Sūnyavāda in Metaphysical Nihilism or the doctrine of a universal void. Cf similar criticisms of modern Agnosticism in the West.

Dilemma Is the Nihilistic proposition (अहम्) itself *aham* (ह्य) or not? In the former case II can prove nothing it cannot even make claim to establish itself. In the latter case II will destroy itself, as the Four Principles—प्रमाण etc.—will stand unchallenged. न साकार-प्रमाण-विचार-पद्धति-परम्परा

साकार-प्रमाण etc.—In accordance with the established practice of logicians or philosophers. Strictly speaking the above

criticism is sufficient to dispose of the doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism as unworthy of credence. Yet, out of courtesy to the opponent, and without prejudice to the argument here advanced, we shall enter upon a short criticism of each of the propositions laid down by him in the preceding paragraphs.

I First, as to the proposition that *सम्यक्* (*साम्यक्*) is not proved by *सम्यक्*. We agree on this point, in the sense that *सम्यक्* lies beyond the reach of the external *प्रमाण*. But we dissent to its proposition that *सम्यक्* is not perceived by *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* i.e. Introspection, i.e. the internal consciousness of the ego (*अहम्*). For such internal consciousness as 'I am happy' 'I am miserable' clearly refers to and proves the existence of *सम्यक्*.

सम्यक् *सम्यक्* etc.—The consciousness in 'I am happy' is not bare general consciousness of happiness, but of happiness belonging to the ego. It is not consciousness of the nature of *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* like that of *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* but it is a consciousness of the nature of *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्*.

सम्यक् *सम्यक्* etc.—The consciousness of one's being fair or dark in *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* etc. does not necessarily prove *सम्यक्* to be really the body. It is a case of the secondary application of the word *सम्यक्* to the body its primary signification being *सम्यक्*. Compare the master speaking of the servant as himself in the secondary sense of the word 'self'.

सम्यक् *सम्यक्* etc.—Mallinson explains how we happen to have occasional consciousness of the ego (See above).

सम्यक् is described as *सम्यक्* i.e. possessing the characteristic of going forth in consciousness—*सम्यक्*—which may be either *सम्यक्* (as in *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्* etc.) or *सम्यक्* (as in *सम्यक्*), and the common witness of the ego (the *सम्यक्*) is one kind of the *सम्यक्* which characterizes *सम्यक्*—*सम्यक्*—John technical term.

सम्यक् *सम्यक्* etc.—This *सम्यक्*—in the shape of *सम्यक्*—is determined by number of conditions such as *सम्यक्* *सम्यक्*

etc. which are regulated by the law of *Karma*, and are therefore occasional or caused and not perpetual although *ब्रह्म* i.e. *ब्रह्मण* is perpetual. This may be illustrated by the example of *बीज* which always possesses the *शक्ति* of producing an *अङ्गुर* and yet puts forth the *शक्ति* only occasionally when the accessories viz. water soil etc. co-operate. Thus, because *अङ्गुरोत्पादनशक्ति* is *आवृत्तिवन्* (occasional) it does not follow that *अङ्गुरोत्पादनशक्ति* is *आवृत्तिवन्* in the same way because *अङ्गुलप्रत्यय* (as *इत्यनेनविशेष* of *ब्रह्मण*) is *आवृत्तिवन्*, it does not follow that *ब्रह्म* (*ब्रह्मण*) is *आवृत्तिवन्*.

2. Next, as to the proposition that *ब्रह्मण* is not proved by *अङ्गुलप्रत्यय* since there is no certain mark or *चिह्न* on which the *अङ्गुलप्रत्यय* can be based, this is wrong. There are numerous marks or *चिह्न*s to prove the existence of *ब्रह्मण*—

(1) *इन्द्रियवर्तमानं लक्षणेन विवाच्यादिति विवाच्यात्* (ब्रह्मण इति वाक्यात्). The perception of the objective world requires an agent in the act of perceiving; because, perception is an action, and all actions require an agent, as, for example, an action of cutting requires a cutter. This agent in the act of perceiving, i.e. the perceptive, we call *ब्रह्मण*. Could the senses (*इन्द्रिया*) such as *चक्षु* etc. be the agents in the present case? No. They are instruments—like the hatchet in the act of cutting—which are dependent upon one who could wield them. That they are instruments requiring to be wielded by a person, follows from the fact that they are made of matter (*वीर्यिण*) and are therefore inanimate requiring to be put in motion by a *चेतन* without whose stimulus they are incapable of doing anything. If the *इन्द्रिया* were the real agents in the present case the following three things would happen:—

1st. I could not remember the experiences of particular sense after the sense happened to be destroyed, as in the case of subsequent blind eye. For the act of remembrance must belong to the same agent to whom the original experience be-

Another argument by analogy is furnished by the example of a machine-toy which opens and shuts its eyes as regulated by a voluntary agent.

(6) “ वरीरस्य वृद्धिस्तद-... -सरोद्भवस्त-... ”

Moreover the powers of growth and healing or repair clearly indicate the presence of an indwelling soul in the body. For we observe that a house does not grow of itself or repair itself without the agency of a mason. A tree will perhaps be cited as an example of spontaneous growth and repair. But as a matter of fact, the tree, too, is a living organism possessing one single organ and a indwelling soul. [For the doctrine of an indwelling soul in trees etc. M. refers the reader to Āchārāṅga Sūtra.]

(7) तत्रा प्रेक्ष्य स्या-... -स्य

स्या is capable of being directed towards a definite object, like stone aimed by boy at target. That which thus directs the स्या is आत्मा

(8) आत्मवेत्तव्यं etc ... -स्य आत्मा

आत्मवत्, चेतन, वेत्तव्य, जीव, पुरुष are synonymous terms which denote something some realit of which they are names. That something is आत्मा

(9) असत्त्वाद्या-... -स्य

All simple terms such as वर etc. de of realities; वरविनाश, वयोऽप्योदय etc. are unrealities, but then they are compound terms.

(10) वस्तुमीनि-... -स्य आत्मा

सुख etc. re qualities, which must abide in some द्रव्य and the only द्रव्य fit to hold them is आत्मवत्

3. As to आत्मवा, those that are self-contradictory are of course worthless. But those that are declared by आत्मा i. e. reliable authorities can easily stand the tests of वद, वेद, and ताव (See Infr. St. 12) and are therefor अवायव (Of तावप्येतावद्विद्वत्तावत् सुखं विदुः वदन्ति । परीरस्य विद्वत्तो अवायवो न तु गीरसाः) It may be

argued that an *atma* is one who is free from all infirmities (दोष), and since there is no one of whom we could say this, there is no *atma* and therefore no *ब्रह्म* *सत्त्व*. But the argument is based vitiated upon very narrow empiricism. No doubt, our minds are by *व्यभिचारेण* more or less but the very fact that the *चेतस* admit of being made more or less points to the possibility of their being eradicated altogether. An analogy is furnished in the thickening and thinning clouds which some time cover the sun.

विदधन्वरा—Being deprived of all parts or limbs i. e. the forces which feed them.

अद्य-भारिजगद्गारीम etc.—No doubt, the *चेतस* *सत्त्व* had no beginning but that is no reason why they should have no end. It is quite possible to destroy them by means of *सत्त्व* i. e. *ब्रह्म*, *हृदय* and *व्यभिचारेण*.

जीवरोवर etc.—When the *चेतस* are destroyed there rises *वेदमय* which means *सत्त्व*. *सत्त्व* is the state of perfection in the matter of *ब्रह्म*. Our imperfect *ब्रह्म* is capable of growth in the direction of perfection and the highest point to which it can be carried will be the point of perfection. [For similar argument in proof of the existence of God, see *Pat. Yoga-Sūtras* and *Vyāsa Bhāṣya* I 24 25].

तदा व्यभिचारेण etc.—Besides there are realities which are too fine or too remote for ordinary sight, but they must be present (*सत्त्व*) to some minds, e. g. fire in mountain caves.

Moreover how true are the astronomical predictions of authoritative writers! This fact may well be taken as one indication of *सत्त्व* being possible! the case of great teachers.

यतो ब्रह्म etc.—Quotation from *Thāna* ga I 1. *सत्त्व* prove the existence of *ब्रह्म*.

3. *सत्त्व* etc.—This has been already established. (See p.)

3. *सत्त्व* or *सत्त्व* etc. A *सत्त्व* is necessarily implied in a *सत्त्व*.

वस्तुवत् समकालवस्तुवत् etc.—If, admits both the alternatives. वस्तुवत् takes note of objects which exist simultaneously with the ज्ञान वस्तुवत् deals with objects which belong to the past. वस्तुवत् and वस्तुवत् treat of things belonging to all times, past, present and future.

निराकारं चैव—They are निराकार and yet the required definiteness in determining particular objects is possible owing to the law of इत्यत्रापि चैव—निराकार and इत्यत्रापि which make our world what it is.

चेत् —The remaining alternatives are discarded

६. प्रमितिः etc.—It is the वस्तु of वस्तुवत् and is revealed by self revelation. What is directly experienced or revealed as consciousness needs no looking or proof.

वस्तुवत् च द्विधा etc.—The वस्तु may be either immediate or mediate. वस्तुवत् चैव is the immediate वस्तु of ॥ वस्तुवत्. The mediate i. e. eventual or ultimate वस्तु of the particular वस्तुवत् viz. वेदवस्तुवत् is वीर्यावस्तुवत् i. e. freedom from worldly interest. That of the other वस्तुवत् is वस्तु वस्तुवत् वस्तुवत् वस्तुवत् Of Tarka-
bhāṣā.

वस्तुवत्—The Jaina philosopher rejects such absurd doctrines as वस्तुवत्—“Reality neither is, nor is not; nor is it both, nor is it neither.” He accords welcome to all and says Reality both is and is not etc.

वि चैव वस्तुवत् चैव etc.—Is the unreality of वस्तुवत् etc.—If ॥ is held to be the truth of philosophy—proved by वस्तुवत् or अवस्तुवत्?—i. e. negation of वस्तुवत् can prove nothing वस्तुवत् must be either itself real or unreal. If it is unreal ॥ can prove nothing real, not even the वस्तुवत्. If it is real ॥ contradicts the वस्तुवत् which is sought to be established.

वस्तुवत् i. e. observation of the truth; वस्तुवत्—arising from the observation of truth; untrue.

वस्तुवत् वस्तुवत् etc.—“वस्तुवत् वस्तुवत्” between the tiger and the prodder.

Stanza XVIII

Stanza Greatly to censure is that opponent of years who dares to hold (the doctrine of) *अवयव* (momentary perishing of everything), while remaining unmindful of the bad consequences which would thereby stare him in the face viz.—

(1) *कृतकर्मद्वय*—what is done passing away into nothingness, leaving no consequence behind

(2) *अकृतकर्मद्वय*—experiencing the fruits of acts for which one has not been responsible

(3) *अवयवद्वय*—impossibility of life hereafter

(4) *अवयवद्वय*—impossibility of emancipation from Samsara.

(5) *स्मृतिद्वय*—impossibility of memory

L. A short explanation of the Stanza

कृतकर्मद्वय etc.—The *द्वय* or evil consequences arising from *कृतकर्मद्वय*. Here if *र* is here mentioned. There is discrepancy & error between this and the explanation in the sequel, where *अवयव* and *अवयव* are taken as factors of *अवयव* and not a *स्मृतिद्वय* compound.

अवयव etc.—Discarding direct experience in the interest of mere theory

अवयवद्वय etc.—Shutting one's eyes to; not completely but partially like the elephant, who is supposed to keep only one eye open while looking this side or that. We say partially because we are not unmindful of the partial truth which is embodied in the *कृतकर्मद्वय*

अवयवद्वय to.—Annihilation immediately after truth.

अवयवद्वय etc.—The metaphysical Nihilist, follower of one of the schools of Buddhist metaphysics. (See Kern's *Indian Buddhism* and Karth "Buddhist Philosophy")

अवयवद्वयद्वय to.—a great and enterprising; reckless combatant.

II. Fuller Exposition :

(1) and (2). **बौद्ध बुद्धिप्रवृत्ति** etc.—**बौद्ध** according to the Buddhist is a plurality of discrete momentary ideas not the principle of synthesis and unity lying behind the ideas, like a string running through a number of pearls and making a single necklace of them.

सम्यग् etc.—One consequence of that position would be that the idea which was responsible for good or bad deed would pass away into nothingness, making the law of moral retribution impossible; and, similarly the idea which undergoes retribution would be as if it were without having been the author of the deed of which it is supposed to be the retribution—which is contrary to the essence of the law of retribution.

यस्य कर्मफलम् etc.—The word 'यस्य' of 'अदृष्टकर्मयोग' in the first line should be connected; thought with 'यस्य' of 'वृत्तप्रवास' also.

(3) **तथा मरणादुत्थेयम्** etc.—Moreover there would be none to go to the other world in obedience to the law of Karma. **यस्य**—becoming, transmigration not only to another life on the earth, but also to the other world of heaven and hell (**परलोक**).

यस्य मोक्षकारणम् etc.—**Mokṣikaragupta**, a Buddhist writer assigned to about 1100 A.D. by Dr. Satishchandra Vidyabhāṣṇa. He wrote work called **Tarkabhāṣā** following the system of **Dharmakīrti**.

विराजति etc.—An argument advanced by the Buddhist to prove life after death one **विराजति** (idea) refers to (**प्रतिपक्षवृत्ति**) another as does the present **विराजति** and the other is a **विराजति** at the moment of death, which must be referred to by both **विराजति** but this would be possible only on the assumption of a self after death.

Criticism—The argument is faulty inasmuch as one **विराजति** cannot refer to another **विराजति** if as the Buddhist holds, it perishes absolutely leaving no trace behind. In the argument and the criticism, we have assumed that the word **प्रतिपक्षवृत्ति**

means begets. If 'प्रसिद्धवत्' means 'calls to mind' according to the usual acceptation of the word the act of 'प्रसिद्धवान्' that sense also will require an abiding principle to connect one विद्य with another.

न च प्रसिद्धवत् etc.—It might be urged that 'प्रसिद्धवत्' means अवदति begets. It may be added that is truth प्रसिद्धवत् does not mean अवदति i. e. begets. For in that case the argument would be an अनुमान from कदाचिद्, whereas it is given by the author as an argument from सदाचिद् (For the distinction between कदाचिद् and सदाचिद् see Nyāyabindu II also B II T on the same). सदाचिद् presupposes सदात्म्य as in अद्वैतसिद्धिपात्रम् where सद् and विद्य are not two distinct entities, but one. But there cannot be सदात्म्य between two विद्वत् which belong to different moments of time. If the two विद्वत् belong to the same moment of time, how can they be identified as प्रसिद्धवत् and प्रसिद्धवान् i. e. that which is the object and that which is the agent of प्रसिद्धवान्?

अस्तु वा प्रसिद्धवान् etc.—Granting, however, that the word 'प्रसिद्धवान्' means begetting (अवद), the difficulty is not at all removed. For how can there be a relation of the 'begetter' and the begetten if the two विद्वत् are simultaneous? If the two follow one another still when the second is born the first is no more, which cannot therefore be the उत्पत्ति of the second.

4. अस्मिन्निर्वाणस्य etc.—For want of personal identity there would be impossibility of that complete and final liberation from the bondage of कर्म which is the goal of all philosophies.

सर्वज्ञस्य etc.—A attempt is made by the Buddhist to tide over the difficulty by setting up सर्वज्ञ stream of consciousness to do duty for an abiding ego. But the attempt must fail. For the सर्वज्ञ is either real, existing ever and above the ideas, or is nothing in addition to the ideas. In the former case, it is but an alias of वाचस्पति; in the latter the position does not improve.

अपि च शैला etc.—Further some of the Buddhists hold that शोक means the production of pure हृद्य relieved of all the disturbance caused by the forms of विषय when दास्य are eradicated. But this must be impossible, for there can be no कार्यकारणभाव under the conditions of क्षणमय

सत्यव्यवहारो etc.—शोक says the Buddhist, can be brought about by the intensity of यत्न (meditation or pondering) about the momentariness of things. But this, too is impossible. For according to the Buddhist, there is no abiding principle which can be the seat of the दास्य. Moreover an impure हृद्य according to the law of the homogeneity of cause and effect, can only produce another impure हृद्य and not a pure हृद्य—each lasting for a single moment of time only. And the series of impure हृदय thus arising must go on endlessly unless it is to be ended abruptly which is impossible.

किंच सत्यविच्छेदश्च etc.—Moreover the impure विच्छेदश्च having perished of themselves and a pure विच्छेदश्च having succeeded them, there is no continuity &c. no संतान

सत्यव्यवहारो च etc.—Besides, दास्य and शोक must belong to the same person in respect of the same विषय, that is to say the same person who is subject to दास्य is to prepare for शोक and the same fetters which bind one in दास्य have to be destroyed in शोक. Thus in a two-fold way identity is required for शोक

(5) तथा स्युतिमङ्गलोच etc.—Syllogism तथापि पूर्वदृष्टव्यं हृदयेर्षे etc.—On the hypothesis of क्षणमय recollection would become impossible. For the हृद्य that is experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the हृद्य that is memory. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical. A would experience a thing and B would remember it; in other words, a y man would remember anything irrespective of the need of previous experience. And, if the two have a common background constituting identity it means continuity from the point of experience to that of memory—and that is abandonment of the क्षणमय theory

Moreover if on the *अवयव* hypothesis, स्मृति (memory) becomes impossible प्रत्यभिज्ञा (recognition of something that was experienced before) becomes impossible too. For प्रत्यभिज्ञा involves स्मृति in addition to अनुभव.

पराधीनत्व etc.—The genesis and the nature of प्रत्यभिज्ञा.

अथ स्वस्मृति रोच etc.—An attempt is made by the Buddhist to explain memory by admitting causal connection—in place of a continuing back-ground—between experience and memory. If A experiences an object, it is at B that remembers it, because there is causal connection between A's experience and A's memory and not between A's experience and B's memory. The Buddhist makes the admission that there is a causal connection between संततिवत् (अवयवत्व) of the same संतति (continuation of consciousness) viz. अनुवर्तमान and स्मृतिवत्.

उत्पन्नवशात् etc.—Criticism: Apart from the impossibility of causal connection between things that are absolutely separated by time, there is the want of identity between the author of अनुभव and of स्मृति according to that theory—which leaves the position *in quo ante*.

इति वार्तिकरचनावत् etc.—Call for उत्पन्न which is acceptable to both the parties and is thus capable of supporting an argument. (See *भा. सू. I* 1. 25)

अथ इतिमन्त्रेय etc.—A verse giving the required उत्पन्न and quoted in many places. See *Sūtrakṛitā ga* etc.

A [particular stream of consciousness—संतति] experiences thing and remembers it, and not B [different stream of consciousness] because that संतति on which वर्तमानता is laid becomes the seat of its चक्षु (i.e. वर्तमानता), and not any संतति *s. g.* If you apply a red colour to a piece of cotton the red colour will produce its effect in the same piece of cotton, and not anywhere else."

वर्तमानत्व etc.—Criticism. The argument fails. For the example you have cited does not prove your case, nor

does it disprove mine. Thus, you cannot make कार्यकारणभाव the हेतु and argue as follows: यद्य यत्र कार्यकारणभावः तत्र तत्र सृष्टिः कर्पासे रक्तान्नम् (the example is not a case of सृष्टि), or यद्य यत्र सृष्टिर्न भवति तत्र तत्र कार्यकारणभावो न भवति.

अविज्ञानाद्यद् etc.—Recall the Syllogism. पूर्ववृत्त्यव्युत्पत्तेर्न नोत्तरवृत्तीनां सृष्टिः समवति । उत्तरेभ्यश्चात् संतापान्तरवृत्तिवत् ।

Now let us see whether the Buddhist's example कर्पासे रक्तान्नम् affects the validity of the syllogism. It does not. यद्य यत्र कार्यकारणभावः तत्र तत्र सृष्टिः सवति is not invalidated by the example of कर्पासे रक्तान्नम्, since the example is not a case either of सृष्टि or of समवति. That it is not a case of सृष्टि is obvious. That it is not a case of समवति is patent from the fact that under the क्षणवद् doctrine there is incessant change and कार्यकारणभाव too, according to the theory is not the same for any two moments of time.

द्वितीयवृत्तेर्न वि etc.—Besides, if सृष्टि could be produced by the causal relation without the necessity of recognizing a permanent background behind अद्यय and सृष्टि the causal relation which exists between the teaching of the master and the understanding of the pupil would make the latter सृष्टि, which is absurd.

अद्य यत्र प्रवृत्तिः etc.—Such an absurd consequence the Buddhist would try to avert by adding the condition of रक्तान्नान्नत्वे सति. Thus the understanding of the pupil does not become a case of सृष्टि inspite of कार्यकारणभाव between it and the master's teaching because the two are not parts of the same सतत or stream of consciousness one belonging to the stream of consciousness which you call the master and the other belonging to the stream of consciousness which you call the pupil.

निरासेरव्यवस्था etc.—Criticism: You will substitute a stream of consciousness (सतत) for momentary ideas (क्षणवत्), the संतापिन्. In order to connect अद्यय with रक्तान्नम्. But the old dilemma—Is the सतत the same as the

संज्ञाभिन्ना or different?—and the difficulty of answering the question will soon dispose of the defence. Let us put the dilemma in detail. Is the संज्ञा (consciousness) the same as the series of ज्ञानक्षयाः or something over and above them? If the former case (अधेदे), the position remains unimproved. In the latter case (भेदे), a question may be put whether the distinction of the संज्ञा from the ज्ञानक्षयाः—the ज्ञानपरम्परा—is real or unreal. If it is unreal (अपरमार्थिक), the position remains status in quo ante. If it is real (परमार्थिक) we should like to know whether the संज्ञा which is supposed to be really distinct from the ज्ञानपरम्परा is itself क्षणिक or otherwise. In the former case (क्षणिक) the position remains unimproved. (The attempt to seek shelter under क्षणिक संज्ञा is like that of going "from one robber to another"). In the latter case (अक्षणिक), the संज्ञा is only another word for a permanent आत्मन्.

उदयमे etc.—A consequence flowing from स्मृतिमय. That is to say the ज्ञानचक्रवार्त्त not only aims against psychology by rendering स्मृति impossible, but it aims against logic also by rendering अनुमान impossible, for अनुमान proceeds on the basis of स्मृति.

अरि च स्मृतेरबाधे etc.—Not only would psychology and logic be thereby outraged, but even our social and economic life would become impossible.

इत्येकवर्त्ते क्षणे etc.—Quoted in several other places. Gautama Buddha is there described as remembering one of his past lives.

समुत्पत्ति etc.—A modified form of ज्ञानचक्रवार्त्त. Things last for four moments only viz. those of (1) उत्पत्ति (2) स्थिति, (3) क्षय, (4) निरावृत्ति.

ज्ञानचक्रवार्त्तान्तर etc.—If things last for four moments only why should you go to dig up a deposit which you have laid underground long time ago? Is it not with the our consciousness that the treasure you will find is the treasure you have buried?

Stanza XIX.

Stanza That वासना (psychic impression) and that क्षणवृत्ति (series of grasp or ideas) do not fit in whether they are supposed to be identical or distinct or neither. Therefore, the opponents should rest upon your words, on the analogy of the little birds who fly away from the mast of a ship, yet, unable to see land, return to the same.

I

सा वादवपरि etc.—सा = That, i. e. the वासना maintained by the Buddhists, which is said to be like a thread running through the क्षण which without it are like so many loose pearls. वासना is defined as पूर्वज्ञानवशित्वा वस्तुभावे शक्तिः i. e. the power imparted by the anterior ज्ञान to the posterior क्षण

सा च क्षणवृत्तिः etc.—सा = That well-known in the Buddhist system.

क्षणवृत्तिः—A series of momentary ज्ञान which seem to be the same but which in reality are new every moment like the light-rays of a lamp.

(1) न वादवमिदं etc.—The two viz. वासना and क्षणवृत्ति cannot fit in with each other as identical inter se. For if they be identical, they are either वासना or क्षणवृत्ति; one must be merged in the other it cannot enjoy separate existence; *ग* वस्तुतत्त्व which is identical with वा

वेदनायां वासनायां etc.—If there is वासना alone, it is an admission of the principle of persistence.

वासनाभावे etc.—Beside: If there is वासना alone, and no वाच (क्षणवृत्ति) on which वासना is to operate the वासना would be no वासना. If on the other hand, you admit क्षणवृत्ति to be the sole reality the all difficulties stand as before (See the preceding Stanza and Comment)

(2) न च वेदेन ते पुराणे etc.—If वासना and क्षणवृत्ति are different, how can we know whether the वासना is क्षणिक or वस्तुविक? If it is क्षणिक why should it be recognised at all? The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle

of permanence which is wanting in the *अवर्तमानि*. If it is *अवर्तमानि*, it violates the doctrine of universal *अवर्तमानि* and the assumption that other *वर्तमानि* are *अवर्तमानि* becomes gratuitous.

अवर्तमानि etc.—This alternative is impossible. There must be either *ये* or *अये* between *वर्तमान* and *अवर्तमानि*; because *ये* and *अये* are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there.

अवर्तमानि etc.—Besides, if the relation is neither *ये* nor *अये* it means it is unreal (*अवर्तमानि*). According to all those who do not endorse the *अवर्तमानि* of the Jains, a thing must be either *सिद्ध* or *असिद्ध*; a third alternative is not possible any more than the child of a barren woman.

एवं विवक्ष्यते etc.—The author therefore concludes that the opponent must endorse the Jain doctrine of both *ये* and *अये*. (Note that this is not the same thing as *अवर्तमानि*.)

य च प्रत्यक्षं etc.—*ये* is not the sum-total of *ये* and *अये* with all their difficulties only added together and remaining intact. [This is the weakness of the *ये* doctrine which is maintained by certain sections of Vedāntins.] It is a distinct category of existence—a kind of complex reality like *सर्पमनुष्य* or *वृद्धि*; a cock serpent or man-lion.

अवर्तमानि etc.—*वेद्यं* etc.—The Jain does hold that a series of *वर्तमानि* which are as every moment goes as *सोऽस्मिन्* every day while the *अवर्तमानि* is the permanent principle which connects the past, present and future *वर्तमानि*. The series of *वर्तमानि*—the *वर्तमानि*—is in a way identical with the constant factor viz., the *अवर्तमानि* and is in a way distinct from it. Since the *वर्तमानि* are designated by separate terms, and are the objects of separate cognitions they are separate from the *अवर्तमानि* and since the *अवर्तमानि* undergoes modification and assumes these various forms—the *वर्तमानि*—they are not with the *अवर्तमानि*. Both propositions are true from different points of view. For farther light on this doctrine see the exposition of *सर्वज्ञ* and *विज्ञान* in the seq. ch.

अग्नि च पीतवस्त्रे etc.—Furthermore in the Buddha system there is no room for वासना वासना according to the Buddhist, may be defined as पूर्ववृत्तेनोत्तरवृत्तमन्व वासना—i. e. an impression produced by an anterior वृत्त on a posterior वृत्त. But in a system where everything is momentary and the वृत्त are not synchronous and there is nothing in connect them the relation of वास्य and वास्य is impossible. Musk produces its वासना in a piece of cloth because the cloth is an abiding substance and is connected with the musk.

अथ पूर्वचित्तसदृशत्वात् etc.—Another attempt on the part of the Buddhist to get over the difficulty. A certain चेतना (consciousness) born with an anterior चित्त (idea) produces a posterior चित्त possessing the power of the anterior चित्त and this is वासना. In other words, वासना is the name of the particular चेतना which acts like a bridge between the anterior (वासक) and the posterior (वास्य) चित्त.

तथाहि पूर्वचित्तं etc.—The above definition of वासना is further explained. The पूर्वचित्त—the anterior चित्त— which has for its object रूप etc. is called ग्रहचिन्ता— which is of six kinds: viz. the five कर्मादिचिन्ता (sensuous cognitions) and the sixth विमलचिन्ता (conceptual चिन्ता). Synchronous with the पूर्वचित्त is born a certain consciousness of the ग्रह, which is called आत्मचिन्ता and this आत्मचिन्ता produces the next चित्त invested with the शक्ति of the former चित्त. The आत्मचिन्ता is वासना. आत्मचिन्ता a receptacle intelligence is so called because it is like ग्रहचिन्ता (आधीनमे ग्रहचिन्तानात्मचित्तिविधि) and the ग्रहचिन्ता are so called because they represent the active side of consciousness (See Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" p. 203.).

तद्विदुः etc.—No amount of mere change of phraseology will help the Buddhist in his predicament. The difficulty of connecting the पूर्वचित्त with the उत्तरचित्त (call them ग्रहचिन्ता) is not lessened by using the आत्मचिन्ता (another name for वासना) between them, since that आत्मचिन्ता is limited in its power as a permanent factor capable of connecting the two. But in the

Buddhist system of universal impermanence (अवयवज्ञानं) there is no room for a permanent factor of consciousness.

वर्तमानो वेदनाविशेष इति—Orlikoff's: The particular वेदना which accompanies the anterior विज्ञान cannot influence a present विज्ञान because the present—which according to the Buddhist lasts for a single moment only—can never be influenced in any way—it perishes just as it was born, without any change whatsoever—for the plain reason that it lasts for a single moment only. Nor can the particular वेदना influence future विज्ञान inasmuch as it is unconnected with it, unless you suppose that the वेदना (आवयवविज्ञान) is an abiding reality which in the Buddhist system it is impossible for it to be.

अथ च अविचारोऽपि इति—In spite of the impossibility of वास्तव्य the author of the Stanzas discussed the alternatives of its वेदना अविचार इति—This was only with a view to leading the reader to realise the necessity of recognising element of permanence in our consciousness.

II

अथोच्यते इति—Second Half of the Stanza.

मातासुता—The Buddhists, the followers of Gautama son of माता माता the name of Gautama's mother. Pan speaks the word माता suggesting deceit.

सागरा—Ocean. अथवा अथवा—The mast of ship

नीति—The Science of Politics; political prudence

एतन्मात्रं वास्तव्य इति—Otherwise, there would be a grasp of half-truths only such as the blind men had in the famous parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men. एतन्मात्रं वास्तव्य—catching only fringe of the total reality

अथवा इति—Bosch read अथवा for अथवा

Appendices.

1) तत्र चत्वार्युक्तं ज्ञानमङ्गलप्रसाद इत्यादि [ज्ञानमङ्गलप्रसादम्यतिरेकेण कस्याप्यारम्भोऽभावात् कस्य ह्यप्ये ज्ञानादित्यभावः प्रसादम्यते ।] तद्विचारित-
विधिविषयः । ज्ञानमङ्गलप्रसादम्यतिरेकेण मुख्यकृतानुसूतमुपोपममन्त्रिमाप्यम-
न्त्रेण इतनासात्तागमप्रतिरोधवशतेः स्वरूपप्रत्युपपत्तेः ।— अदि ज्ञानमन्त्र-
प्रसादमेवावर्तमानम्यतिरेकेण प्राप्तवानुपपत्तेः । तथा यो हि निगद्यतिमिर्बद्धः
तस्मै तन्मन्त्रिप्रकारमपि ज्ञानाद्विषयमिति सिद्धिमापते अति मोक्ष इत्येवादिप्रकारेण
तन्मेव ज्ञानमोक्षमन्त्रस्य लोके प्रसिद्धः । इह स्वयम् ज्ञानो बद्धोऽन्वयस्य च
तन्मुक्तिवारणपरिहामन्त्रस्य बाह्यप्रभित्तयेर्वापारमेति वैश्विकरूप्यात् सर्वत्र-
बुद्धम् । किं च सर्वो हृदिमाह हृदिपूर्वं प्रवर्तमानः किंचिद्विरमतो मम
स्वादित्वहर्तृत्वमद प्रवर्तते । इह च करतपाविभो मायाम्याते प्रवर्तमानो मोक्षो
मम स्वप्नित्वहर्तृत्वमाह ? क्वचित्तमो वा । न तत्रानु क्वच । तस्मैकस्य
स्वप्नित्वा विविक्तत्वतया वैद्यारण्ये व्यपाराह कर्तुमसमर्थमाह । नापि सत्त्वम् ।
तस्य सत्ताविप्यतिरिक्तस्य सौम्यैरवम्युपममाह । किं च निरन्तरविद्वन्मत्स्ये च
तस्मात्तत्त्वमोक्षार्थः प्रसादो ज्ञानेनैव स्वस्थात् यतो यत्तापुत्रयो हि प्रत्यमते
मोक्षं उररमत्र विनाशः स च निर्मुक्तताम्यलसिद्धः । तद्वत्तत्त्वमोक्षमपि
यतो निन्दत इव ॥ *Goparatantra & Com. on Padgata and Samgraha*
p 194-9

2) इत्येवमपि च पूर्वविरोधात्— ज्ञानमङ्गलप्रसादम्यतिरेकेण ज्ञान-
सिद्धिश्च ज्ञान इत्यत्राने पूर्वः ज्ञानो विद्यमान इति । न वै ज्ञानमङ्गलप्रसादता पूर्वोत्तरयोः
ज्ञानयोर्निर्मुक्ततायां कस्यचिदंशविद्युत् । निन्दताम्यस्य निन्दत्स्य वा पूर्वज्ञानस्या-
भावात्तस्यानुत्तरकर्महेतुतामुपपत्तेः । अथ मातृजन्तु अपि विपरिवातस्य पूर्वज्ञान
इत्यत्रानेव हेतुरित्यभिप्रायस्तथापि नोपपत्तेः । अथानुमत्येव पूर्वज्ञानप्रसादप्रसादा
ज्ञानमन्त्रप्रसादप्रसादात् ॥ —*Śaṅkara's Com. on B. S. II ll. 20*

“अनुसूतेय—अपि च वैश्विकः सर्वस्य बलुष कश्चित्ताम्यम्युपबन्धु-
म्युपि कश्चित्ताम्युपेवाह । न च सा संयतिः । अनुसूतेयः । अनुमन्त्रमुरति-
नरनयनार्थं स्वरूपेवाहम्यति । सा चोपनयनेककर्मणा सती सप्तमतिः । उपन-
यतेनानिधिविषये इत्यत्रान्वयस्य इत्युत्तरमाह ॥ *Ibid Br. S. II ll. 25.*

Stanza XX.

इह विचारितं etc.—The systems hitherto dealt with were those of the द्विपादविद्, and they howsoever wrong in many important points, had one merit at least viz. that they all embraced द्विपाद The system which is next going to be

examined in that of the *Cārvākas*—the *Lokāyatikas* or *Nāstikas*—atheists and materialists, who re अविद्याचारिणः.

What is meant by विश्वास and अविश्वास? One should have the right that विश्वास meant belief; the voluntary activity and therefore in the moral responsibility and future life of जन्म and अविश्वास denial of the same and in this sense the *Cārvāka* could well be called अविद्याचारिणः. Now it is probable that the word did mean that originally. But the traditional explanation as given by the Jīna commentators is different and the words in the text would show that the same is followed by our author. By विश्वास they understand the act of existence (not a very probable meaning originally); thus, विश्वाचरिणः means he who asserts the existence of जन्म and 'अविश्वाचरिणः' he who denies it. Cf. etc. Śil. Com. on Utt. XVIII, 23, p. 442, Devchand Lalbhai Series—*शिव अस्तित्वेनैव*। अविद्या अविश्वाचरिणः। Śil. Com. on Uttara XVIII. See Appendix.

See Jacobi, B. D. K. Jaina Sūtras, Part II Introduction p. xxxv where विश्वास is explained as the view of those who maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions etc.

For the name अविद्याचारिणः to see Guerin's Introduction to the Section on *Cārvāka* in Sed. 80-86; Max Müller's "Six Systems" and Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. II pp. 166-172. According to Rhys Davids, in the old texts of Buddhism the word अविद्या means Nature-love.

तत्त्वज्ञानं etc.—The gravamen of the criticism is that the doctrine of the *Lokāyatikas* is based upon the recognition of प्रज्ञा as the only means to the exclusion of वेद ज्ञान.

Stanza: II the *वर्णिक*, who cannot know the mind of others for lack of अनुमान recognised as प्रज्ञा, it is not open to speak. What gulf between वेद—significant movement of limbs which implies अनुमान—and प्रज्ञा! Alas! what folly to deny अनुमान!

प्रत्यक्षमेवैतं etc.—अनुक्त is the only समाच says Cārvāka. See Śaṅ. and Sarvaśāstra Samgraha.

For 'आनोक्त' See M Bh. and Max Muller's "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" and Guṇaratna's Com. on Śaṅ. p. 300 आनोक्त from आनवाह (one who speaks pleasantly and therefore temptingly) seems to be the more plausible derivation of the word.

संयत्ने from सं+यत् to bind, to gird up one's loins, to put on one's armour and go to war

अह वस्तु etc.—अनुमान—from अनु—after and मा—to measure, and hence to know—is so called because by means of that particular kind of knowledge, a thing, though remote in time space and nature, is measured out to the mind, after one has recollected the relation of invariable concomitance (आति) between हिङ्गु (हेतु e. g. चूना) and निङ्गिङ्गु (लाघव e. g. बहिः).

प्रस्तावाद्—The context requires that by अनुमान is the first line we should understand स्वाधीनानुमान. अनुमान is of two kinds: स्वार्थानुमान and परार्थानुमान. The former is the अनुमान which is conducted for one's own enlightenment; the latter for the enlightenment of others. See Tarka manuals; also Pt. N T II. 9 (अनुमानं द्विवर्तनीयं स्वार्थं परार्थं च). The division is still in the origin in the Buddhist section of Indian Logic. See Keis's "Indian Logic and Atomism" and Vidyābhūṣa's "History of Indian Logic."

अनुमानेय etc.—अनुमान paraphrased as निङ्गिङ्गु समाच : e. वस्तु based upon हेतु

वाचिण परामेयः etc.—Etymology of the word वाचिण See Com. on Śaṅ. St. III

वचन हि परमत्वापवाद etc.—Unless अनुमान is recognised as a समाच there will be no possibility of our knowing what others know or do not know and we cannot employ words to enlighten them, there being no objective in view. For want of such a objective all our talk will be chatter and mere-logism : that of a madman.

हेति etc.—इ—इ signifies a vast gulf or difference as in इ सर्वप्रमते ईदः इ चात्यरिषया मतिः (Raghu.). See Apte's Guide to Sanskrit Composition.

इहमार्थं etc.—प्रत्यक्षमार्थं etc.

महि प्रत्यक्षेण etc.—By mere वाच्य we cannot know the mind of others. But we do know it somehow from such marks as a cheerful face etc. Therefore we must recognise a प्रमाद्य other than mere प्रत्यक्ष viz. अनुवाद्य

तवादि etc.—This man desires to hear my words; other wise there would not have been such marks as I observe on his face.

अथ च ईदृश्यं etc.—How is it that ई-दिग् which is Atman padin only when it is used intransitively is here so inspite of its being used transitively? Answer: ईदृश्यः one able to know as per rule अथः अद्वितीयं (Hema-V il, 24).

तथा प्रकाशमन्तरेण etc.—Next follows set of arguments to show that (1) we cannot determine the प्रमाद्य of प्रत्यक्ष without admitting the प्रमाद्य of अनुवाद्य; and (2) that there is the same ground for admitting the प्रमाद्य of अनुवाद्य and अनुवाद्य as that which exists in the case of प्रत्यक्ष

चारीकः अग्निः etc.—The Cārvāka and certain cognitions—which are based on the senses—to be always in harmony with reality and certain others—such as those based on inference or the word of teacher—to be sometimes out of harmony with reality; and so, whenever after that experience he came across similar cognitions of the first type he considered himself justified in regarding them as true, and those of the second type as false. This could never be accomplished by mere प्रत्यक्ष—whose operations are confined to present objects and has no power to relate cognitions belonging to different times See Sarva D B., Criticism of the Cārvāka by the Bandha (see Appendix).

एवाप्य स्वमतीति etc.—Besides, he cannot so much as ask another man to accept proposition as true or false inasmuch

as that proposition though *प्रत्यक्ष* to himself is not *प्रत्यक्ष* (but only *अनुमेय*) to the other person.

तस्यापवाद इति etc.—Therefore one must accept a *प्रमाण* called *अनुमान* whose business it will be to prove a certain present *ज्ञान* as true or false on the basis of its similarity to previous experience (*प्रत्यक्ष*)

परमावृत्ति इति etc.—On the mere ground of *प्रत्यक्ष* you are not justified in denying life after death. For *प्रत्यक्ष* can address itself to the present only neither to the past nor to the future.

परवाच्यारि इति etc.—It is but a piece of childish folly to feel unhappy unless life after death is denied, and also to reject the validity of *अनुमान*. If the problem of life after death is to be dismissed at all it can only be on the basis of *अनुमान* (or *आयम*) *प्रमाण*, the problem being outside the range of *प्रत्यक्ष*.

किं च प्रत्यक्षस्यापि इति etc.—Moreover the very validity of *प्रत्यक्ष* will have to be established by *अनुमान* only. For why is the water of a mirage which does not serve the purpose of bath drink etc, regarded as false in spite of its being *प्रत्यक्ष*? The reason is—*प्रत्यक्ष* is reliable where it agrees with Reality not everywhere. Thus, it is reliable where the water you perceive serves your purpose of bath and drink; it is unreliable where it fails you, as the water of a mirage. Now we want you to realise that the same applies to *अनुमान* and *आयम*. Where they agree with reality they are reliable; where they do not, they are not. In other words, *प्रत्यक्ष*, *अनुमान* and *आयम* all stand on the same level in the matter of reliability.

अविद्यारिजोत्पन्नयो इति etc.—If you say that *अनुमान* and *आयम* are sometimes discovered to be discordant with Reality and are therefore unreliable we reply that the same is the case with *प्रत्यक्ष* also. For we do sometimes see (*प्रत्यक्ष*) two moons owing to disease in the eye. And just as we have a false *प्रत्यक्ष* we may have a false *अनुमान* or a false *आयम* also.

हं च प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण इति etc.—So you cannot rest your knowledge on the reliability of *प्रत्यक्ष* only and so all your doubts

जीव रूप अणु and अणु based on अणु must fall to the ground.

एव वादिकः etc.—Similarly one may reject the doctrine of materialism held by the *Ārvākas*.

तदा च द्रव्यसंग्रहः—Its criticism has been set forth very well by Rāmachandra, author of *Dravyasāhita* (See Peterson's Report), while dealing with the subject of उपनिष्ठा : i. consciousness which belongs to Ātman.

एव च द्रव्यसंग्रहः—Consciousness says he, is not a property of matter. Were it property of matter we should have found it in every particle of matter just as we observe the property of intoxication in intoxicating drugs.

अणुवादः etc.—*Ārvāka*: When matter assumes the form of living body consciousness originates therein. Criticism. If the modification of matter which you call the living body be matter itself and nothing more, then we should expect the living body to be continuous with matter and not an occasional phenomenon in it. If, on the other hand the living body be regarded as something other than matter it amounts to a recognition of non-material principle, and that would be only another name for *ब्रह्म*. If *ब्रह्म* had no causal connection with consciousness, consciousness would not necessarily be limited to the place where *ब्रह्म* is. It would rise even in dead body. If you say that certain conditions such as the presence of blood (as in a living body) is necessary it may be replied that the blood exists in dead body and yet there is no consciousness. Next, *ब्रह्म* is not born. If ye say *ब्रह्म* exists and yet he is originated by the *गुण* (modified form of pure materialism) it would involve permanently recurring origination of *ब्रह्म* in spite of its existence; for existence is, then, no bar to origination. If, on the other hand ye hold that *ब्रह्म* did not exist before and is only come into existence when matter is become living body the question arises: How can that which is a momentally perform the act of creating

into existence? For coming into existence is after all an act, and requires somebody or something to perform it. That which is not, and is, therefore, devoid of every conceivable power cannot perform the act of coming into existence. Therefore *ब्रह्म* or consciousness is not a property of *मृदा*, that is, matter.

दुर्गति etc.—Explain how a man rising out of sleep comes to possess consciousness, while *ब्रह्म* had been absent owing to want of consciousness during the sleep. Answer: We only remember what we had experienced before in the waking condition. The unconsciousness of sleep was due to the impellment caused by sleep. Then how is it, you will ask, that *ब्रह्म* suffers with the suffering of the body? We answer: It is not the rule: A fine mind is often found in a wretched and diseased body. Even when the body remains the same we rejoice or grieve according to our mental attitude. The mind is distorted by grief and yet no change is observed in the body. There must be some cause you will admit, to which the change of mind should belong namely the mind or *ब्रह्म*. You will perhaps say: the matter undergoes change and becomes consciousness. Answer: It cannot, because the two are so unlike. Properties such as hardness etc. do not belong to it. The atoms when they become gross enough are apprehended by the *ग्रन्थि*.

ब्रह्म ब्रह्म etc.—What is the definition of *ब्रह्म*? Answer: That which you attack. The *ब्रह्म* is self revealed. If *ब्रह्म* were but matter it would be presented as this (external), not as "I" (internal).

Books of Reference:

1. *S'āṅkya Tīkā on Sūtrakṛitī ga II. 1. 1.*
2. " *Uttara. XV III 23.*
3. *Radhakanya Samuccaya, Gujarati's Commentary*
4. *Pramāṇa-Nya Tīkālekāṣhaka.*

एकसंख्येति etc.—Here एक does not mean numerically one, but identical.

वर्णानाम्नि etc.—In view of this इत्यार and विचार the वर्णान् (the changing modes or forms) are many ; the रूप is one.

ब्रह्मं etc.—ब्रह्म from ब्र = completely in all its varying forms + ह्म = to know means the teaching which gives a complete knowledge of the परार्थ—वीर्य बलीर्य etc.—in all their numberless aspects or attributes. आत्मा-आत्मन-आत्मनः

बुद्धी—Suffering from mental windiness or flatulence ; a fool. For the grammatical formation of the word, see Hema. VII. II. 61

विचारणी—possessed by a विचार or devil

एकान्तचारुपरस्पर etc.—Epilepsy of metaphysical one-sidedness or absolutism.

एव—The Lord who accomplishes the बोध-क्षेप of the spiritual well being of his followers. The बोध consists in furnishing new light to his followers, and क्षेप in confirming the same by means of repeated sermons.

वस्तुनर्तकं etc.—Reality consists of उत्पत्ति, व्यय and दीप्त i. e. Production, Destruction and Permanence. (“ उत्पत्तिव्ययदीप्तिवस्तुनर्तकं ” Tatv 32) As रूप, nothing is produced or destroyed ; it persists, as is indicated by our sense of identity in the midst of change. It may be argued that a false sense of identity is sometimes experienced as in the case of hair and nails—which though replaced by new products of the same kind from time to time appear to remain identical. The answer to that objection is that in their case there is sufficient contrary evidence to show that the hair etc. are not the same ; whereas in the case under consideration, the identity of रूप is the midst of उत्पत्ति and विचार is easily established by स्मृतिविचारनान्न i. e. the sense of recognition of a thing as the same as that which was seen before.

सर्ववर्ण्येति etc.—Found quoted in the Tatva. Dh. on V 22 (See Appendix). All individuals are certainly changing every

moment and yet there is no change in the midst of production and destruction (विविधता and अविविधता): this fact of change in the midst of permanence has its analogue in the relation of व्यति and आवृत्ति—when in individuals (योगे) come and go, but not their लक्ष्य (योग्य) or universal which remains the same.

सतो ह्यवस्थायाम् etc.—Mark that permanence and change are not attributed to thing in one and the same capacity but in different capacities—'ह्यवस्थायाम्' and 'पर्यायवस्थायाम्'. Mark, further that the Jainas does not regard change to be mere show or illusion as does the Māyā-Vedāntins; with him it is as much a reality as permanence which is the other half of the truth.

अवस्थानि etc.—Because we perceive change of the पर्याय and there is no reason to distrust the truth of the perception.

न चैव एते चक्षुः etc.—That we have certain perceptions may not be conclusive. For if we not perceive a yellow colour in a white conchshell, who we are suffering from jaundiced eye? Answer: But that is because the perception itself is false. It is not so, however in the case of the innumerable पर्याय of दृष्टे, अवस्थे etc.—which we experience in our soul.

वत्पञ्चाशद्वत् etc.—Objection to the theory of the Three is—One viz. इत्यत्र, स्थित and स्थित in one Reality. Are the three different *color* *as* or not? If they are they are three in number; and, then, how can one be three? If they are not, they are not three, but one; and then one is one, or three is one.

अवस्थानि वर्णयन्ति etc.—Reply to the objection. They (इत्यत्र etc.) are in a certain sense different from one another because their स्वभाव characters are different from one another.

इत्यत्रस्थितवत् etc.—Syllogism to prove that इत्यत्र स्थित and स्थित are different *inter se*.

न च निवृत्त्यवस्थाम् etc.—निवृत्त्यवस्था is the हेतु which can be thus shown to be true of the वस्तु इत्यत्र स्थित and स्थित has each nature of its स्वभाव which is not the same as that of the other two. इत्यत्र is defined as अवस्थानि अवस्थायाम्—i. e. coming into

being of a thing that was not; विनाश is defined as लुप्तभावादिप्राप्तिः i. e. loss of existence in a thing that had it before; and प्रीत्य is defined as दृढवशादवर्तमानम् i. e. persistence as the substance. The three definitions differ *inter se* and so do the notions defined.

४ चासी विच—Note that different as they are in their nature, the three are not mutually independent—वशात् can never be without विनाश (विनाश) and स्थिति (प्रीत्य) any more than hair could exist on the back of a tortoise; that is to say वशात् without the others is a pure fiction, a nothing. The same as regards विनाश and स्थिति.

वर्णयति etc.—Āptamīmāṃsā verse 59. A commentator relates a story to explain the meaning of the verse. A certain king had a son and a daughter. The latter possessed a jar made of gold, which at the instance of the prince the king ordered to be turned into a crown. This pleased the prince, but displeased the princess: the king himself remaining neutral all along, being the owner of so much gold whether in the form of a jar or a crown.

एवमेव etc.—Āptamīmāṃsā verse 60. This is simple. He who has vowed to live on milk does not take curds; he who has vowed to live on curds does not take milk; he who has vowed to live on food other than that supplied by cow takes neither milk nor curds—so there may be वशात्, विनाश or प्रीत्य according to the several points of view.

Books of Reference :

1. Tīttvārtibhāṣya Bhāṣya on v. 29 and Commentaries thereon.
2. Pramāṇa-Naya Tattvālokaśākhā.

वत्प्रादिनामप्रैष्याभि स्पादिनाभि मिमङ्गलान्वात् अत्रादिन् । न च मिम-
ङ्गलमन्वयमित्युं अस्तु नाममात्रं वत्प्राद्, तत्र सत्ताविषयो विनासा । इत्य-
न्यत्राप्युक्तं तत्र प्रौढमिदं देवमन्वयिर्नान्वात् तेषां नैकं प्रतीते । न चात्र
परस्परान्वेष्टयनमिवा एव परस्परान्वेष्टयानां आश्रयान्वयत्वापत्तेः । तथाहि ।
वत्प्राः केवलो नास्ति स्थितिविगमच्छेदनात् कर्मरोगवद् । तथा विनाशः
केवलो नास्ति स्थित्युत्पत्तिच्छेदनात्, तद्वद् । अत्र स्थितिरपि केवला नास्ति,
विनाशोत्पत्त्युत्पत्त्यात् । तद्वदेवेत्यन्वयोन्वायेष्टायामुत्पादादीनां वस्तुनि सार्धं
प्रतिपत्तयम् । तथा च कथं नैकं प्र्यात्यकम् । तथा बोध्यम् ।

अवस्थे कथये ह्येवमेव तत्रा नोले समुत्पत्तिरे
पुनः प्रीतिमुवाह नायपि ह्य सिद्धाव पश्यत्वात् ।
पूर्वाकारपरिग्रहस्तत्त्वचारात्तत्त्वस्तद्गुणा-
वारमेक इति रिक्तं अवयव तत्त्वं तथा प्रापयान् ॥
अन्वयैदिहवर्णनीं नाशोत्पत्तिस्थित्युत्पत्त्यम् ।
लोकप्रयोगप्रत्यक्षं त्रयो वाति नोदुष्यम् ।
अथैवमेव न दम्बि न पयोत्रि स्थितम् ।
अगौरुमतो नोमे तन्वाहस्तु त्रयावयवम् ॥

Stanza XXII

Stanza: Reality is possessed of innumerable characters ;
it is not possible to explain it in any other way. So, your
proofs are like roars of a lion which frighten away antelopes,
namely heretics.

तत्त्वं वत्प्रादिनून् etc.—तत्र is the stanza-परमार्थनून् वस्तु i. e.
Reality vis. जीव and अजीव

अवयववर्गीयवद् etc.—The word अवयववर्गीयवद् explained :
अवयव—Belonging to the three times and therefore soless.

वे चनोः etc.—वर्ग्ये or attributes are of two kinds नद्वयविनः—
synchronous or co-existing or समयवाचिनः—successive.

तद्वत्प्रा etc.—Which is characterized by infinite attri-
butes, some of which are नद्वयविनः and some समयवाचिनः.

एवमेव etc.—That is the character of Reality and no other

अन्योऽवयव etc.—Hence no other character can well be
established in regard to the Reality

case was applied generally to all cases of Inference, and that which was originally a generalisation from particulars was treated as a generalisation above and therefore, independent of, particulars.

Earlier logicians, however had continued to follow the older logic of *बुद्ध्याय* as based on generalisation from external data, viz. the *व्याप्ता*. This the new school rejects *सर्वे [In हविर्के व्याप्ता] वेदमं प्रविविक्तमेव विवक्ष्ये व्याप्तापेक्षं तावन्मयोगः । परिशेषाय जायते । तेषामेवाव्याप्यार्थमाचार्यो व्याप्तामुपादधे । यत् सत् सत् हविर्के व्याप्तापेक्षं जायते । पदमस्तस्य वेदं व्याप्तापेक्षंते ॥* —“ *अन्तर्मासिसमर्थवत्* —by Ratnākara Śānti.

(See “The Six Buddhist Treats” including one on *अन्तर्मासि* by Ratnākara Śānti, edited by M. M. Haraprasad Sāstri). “The work argues that the inseparable connection between the middle term and major term can be conceived without the aid of an example in which the things signified by the two terms co-abide, nay without the aid even of a minor term in which we are to prove the co-presence of the things, *e. g.* fiery because smoky ” (Dr Vidyābhūṣa’s “ H. I. L. ”).

A further refinement of logical doctrine is contained in the *Astavyādharmakārikā* of Ratnākara Śānti in the tenth century [? 1045 A.D. i. e. eleventh century—Dr Vidyābhūṣa]. It is necessitated by considerations affecting the proof of the momentariness of things. Normally an inference gives us in the example the concomitance of the middle and the major in some object; for instance, fire on the mountain is proved from the presence of smoke with the aid of the example of the kitchen where smoke and fire co-exist. But this is impossible in the case of momentariness *ex et terminis*. Moreover the conclusion in the normal case takes the form of the presence of the invariable relation in some subject, *e. g.* the relation of smoke and fire in the mountain, and the inference *■* establish momentariness cannot be given such form. The new doctrine insists that it is possible to prove the relation within (*antar*) that is simply between the thing to be proved and the thing

by which it is to be proved without the intervention of something external (*bahe*) in which the relation is to exist.”
—Kaith's Buddhist Philosophy pp. 316-17

वदन्तमनोरथं etc.—A negative *vyāpti* i. e. a negative universal major premise. Its example, however by the very nature of the case cannot be real. Therefore, the example, विरिणीं वदन् —a sky-lotos. The हेतु here is हेतुव्यतिरेकी i. e. capable of entering into a negative *vyāpti* (वद साध्यावाचकं एव साधनवाचकं) only कन्दर्प i. e. positive *vyāpti* being evidently impossible shows every दृष्टान्त that you can think of to illustrate the *vyāpti*-वद वद सत्त्वान्वयवद्वयवदि (लक्ष्यं) एव एव अवयवमनोरथं वदन् still is found included in the वद वि. वदन् i. e. all Reality

अपत्तः etc.—The list of लक्ष्याविशेषा of आचार्य इव etc.—The list of the लक्ष्याविशेषा of आचार्य See Pravacanasūtra and Dravyasamgraha.

वर्गस्तिवाचरि—

See जीवा दुष्टलक्षणा जन्माद्यन्ता अत्रैव आचार्यः ।
अविद्यमानि च विद्यता अवयववत्ता अनुसर्गद्वय ॥
(जीवाः दुष्टलक्षणा वर्गोक्तिर्नि अत्रैव आचार्यवत् ।
अस्तित्वे च विद्यता अवयववत्ता अनुसर्गवत्ता ॥)

—Pascakārikā, 4

वर्गकर्मप्रदेशावकाश—

See जीवा योग्यलक्षणा जन्माद्यन्ता दुष्टो च आचार्यः ।
देहेति कर्मकारा अस्मि वदेत वि वदन्त ॥
(जीवाः दुष्टलक्षणा वर्गोक्तिर्नि इत्याचार्यवत् ।
प्रदेशैर्लक्षणाया च लब्धि प्रदेशा इति वदन्त ॥)

—Pravacanasūtra II-45.

अव चायवदन्तेन is—I the predicate अवयवमनोरथं of the line the आचार्य (—अवयव) suggests that Reality is not a mere panorama or cinema show of कर्मवत्, but that there is principle of permanence (*धीन*) also in the midst of change (*अवयव* and *अव*) Thus *वद* or Reality may be defined as अवयवमनोरथं वदन् (See Tattvārtha V 29.)

अवयवेति etc.—A list of the parts of अवयव (See Prātibhāṣya).

अथ हेतोः etc.—The author does not go into the tedious process of showing that the हेतु in the above syllogism is free from all the हेतुभङ्गादि विषयः असिद्धि etc.

कुमारि etc.—The master is compared to the Don, the heretic to so many deer.

अथ अत्रापि etc.—The plural number suggests that endless are the proofs which support the Lord's doctrine.

Stanza XXIII.

Stanza: When integrated, Reality is without character; when differentiated it is without a substance. You have fully seen the truth of Seven Modes which is expressed according to different points of view—a truth which is known by supremely wise men only.

अवयव इति etc.—In the last stanza, Reality was described to be अवयवबोधः i.e. possessed of an infinite number of predicates. The same truth is now going to be formulated in the shape of the great Jaina doctrine of सप्तमयी or the Seven Modes : सुकुक्षितम्—in a brief or condensed form.

I

Reality described *synthetically* is a गुण without reference to वर्तमान; the same described *analytically* is वर्तमान without reference to their गुण.

अवयव—अविच्छिन्नवर्तमान—devoid of वर्तमान or वर्तमान, that is to say described without reference to वर्तमान, not that a thing can really exist without the वर्तमान.

वस्तु from वस्तु is dwell; that in which dwell the वर्तमान or properties, the Reality consisting of the six dravyas viz. पद्वि etc.

अवयवसंज्ञा—In which the वर्तमान have been rolled up into a गुण. When we say अवयव or वस्तु, we think of the वर्तमान as non-distinct from the गुण.

द्वय्यास्तित्वमवाः सहसंयुतादवाः etc.—The point of view of *synthesis*, which believes *द्वय* and *तत्वा* *पद* as non-distinct from *द्वय*. **द्वय्यास्तित्वम** is also called **द्वयवर्तित्वम** i. e. the point of view of the reality (*वर्तित्व*) or existence (*वर्तित्व*) of *द्वय*. [For full exposition of the *द्वय*, see *Tattvārtha Śāstra* on I. 24-25.]

पदवैयर्थ्य-पदवैयर्थ्य—more usually th last two. The first gives the *Prākṛti* *वचन* and is itself *Prākṛti* substrate for *पदवैयर्थ्य*.

वचन-वचन—Whereas (*पूर्वस्वादिशेषोपलब्धे*).

विचक्षण-विचक्षण—Constructive *विचक्षण* *वचन*.

अज्ञानमय-अज्ञानमय—In which the underlying *द्वय* is ignored.

पदवैयर्थ्यमवाःपदवैयर्थ्य—Those who adopt the *पदवैयर्थ्यमवाः* i. e. the point of view of the existence of the *पद* only.

वचनं दृष्टिं वाच्यते etc.—Only the parts or modes appear located in different ways; there is no *द्वय* anywhere apart from the parts or modes.

वचन-वचन—So the statement depends upon what is going to be presented (*वर्तित्व*) or suppressed (*अवर्तित्व*). Sometimes the *द्वय* is presented and its *पद* suppressed sometimes, vice versa. **अत एवार्थवर्तित्वमिति**—See *Tattvārtha-Śāstra* V 31.

द्वय अन्वयवैयर्थ्यमवाः etc.—Objection: The word *द्वय* is different from the word *पदवैयर्थ्य* and so also the idea of one is different from the idea of the other. How can Reality be said to be both *द्वय* and *पदवैयर्थ्य*?

वचन-वचन—The answer to that is to be found in the words of the text *वचनं* i. e. wing to statements being of two kinds—*वचनवचन* and *विचक्षणवचन*—synthetical statement and analytical statement on which is based the doctrine of *वचनवचन*.

द्वयवचनवचन—which only the wisest can know *द्वयवचन* = *अज्ञेय* *वचन*—Supremely wise cf. *Piṇ* V III, 60.

* Not used in the Kantian sense of synthetical and analytical propositions of Logic.

वेत्सर्गिक—Right knowledge which is either innate or acquired.

न पुरा etc.—Teachers of other schools may be possessed of a highly trained intellect & a *gya* yet they are not *gya*—eminently wise.

तथा चान्न etc.—*गहान* may arise from (1) failure to distinguish between true and false or right and wrong; (2) from the position which springs from the misuse of *śāstra* & Karma (3) from *Jñāna* not producing its fruit and (4) from a false view (*विप्लवदृष्टि*).

अथ एव सारविप्लवित etc.—Hence, in consequence of *विप्लवदृष्टि* or wrong vision, even a study of the Twelve Jain Scriptures [See "Outlines of Jainism" pp. 125-146] will become *मिथ्यागुरु* & a wrong study in the case of heretics who see, even the study of heretical works will prove *सम्यग्गुरु* or right study in the case of those who possess *सम्यग्दृष्टि*. The reason: that heretics when they read Jain scriptures do not try to understand them (*अवगच्छि-मिरेणु* etc.), but interpret them in *eva* they *plava* (*वप्लव*); whereas the full force of the Jain Āgama bring to bear the right kind of vision upon the meaning even of heretical works. Thus, the latter have then succeeded in discovering the right *विधि* and *विशेष*: Brahmanical works, which have escaped the understanding of Brāhmaṇa commentators *दृष्टि*=*दर्शन* primarily meaning vision, comes to mean the faith which gives the vision. *दर्शन*=*सर्वार्थज्ञान* (*Tattvarthā dhigama* I 2)

तथा हि etc.—A few examples may be given

(1) There is passage in the Veda *अग्निदेवस्य*—which the Brāhmanas understood as referring to the sacrifice of goats (*वरा*). According to Jain scholars, however it refers only to the offering of corn which has become incapable of germination owing to lapse of time (*अन्नमज्ज्यापरोक्ष*). Their reason for the latter interpretation is that it does not stand to moral reason to regard animal sacrifice as good—a point of view

which is given by *सुखदृष्टि* i. e. faithful adherence to the Jain creed and the consequent right vision.

(2) *अहं एव च अमर्त्या* etc.—Another example. There is the famous passage of the Br Up. “*विष्णुपवन* etc.— (“Full of consciousness, it springs from these material elements and sinks back into them—there is no consciousness after death.”) which was the subject of a sermon by Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) to Indrabhūti. The latter who before his conversion was Brāhmanā understood the passage as denying the existence of Jīva (जल) and Hī after death and thus propounding materialism. Vardhamāna knew better and he understood it as referring to the temporary eclipse of the soul's consciousness and not its absolute annihilation. Śāṅkara rejects the view that the passage is intended to teach materialism (See Br Sūtra, Bhāṣya. See Hem. Trl. Ch. X, verses 77-78 Sūtrakṛti Bk. II Brāhmaṇa Sūtra, Ch. III; Avasyaka with Har. Vṛtti).

(3) *एषा स्मार्ति ऋषि* Next, there is a passage of the Māṇḍūkya which runs as follows *एषा स्मार्ति ऋषि* etc. (Māṇḍ. V 36). It is literally self-contradictory. If there be *śānti* in meat-eating, how can abstention from it be declared to be *एषा स्मार्ति*? If abstention from such sinless act as meat-eating is to be deemed highly beneficial, on the same principle abstention from other sinless acts such as worship, study, charity should also be deemed beneficial! Be the passage requires to be interpreted in some other way. Tak *एषा स्मार्ति ऋषि* (अ-*शान्ति*) (अ-*being* elided according to sandhi rules), *एषा स्मार्ति* *शान्ति* and *एषा स्मार्ति* *शान्ति* etc.—not in the sense of “It is the way of all creatures” but in the sense of “It is the breeding ground (animalcules germs or bacteria).” Mallikāra next proceeds to show how an infinite number of animalcules spring into life and then perish in the process of meat-eating, wine-eating and sexual enjoyment. [It is worthy of note how *एषा स्मार्ति* which was at first only one, even though the foremost, of the Five Vratas of the Jains, along with those of the Brāhmanas and the Bauddhas, came to acquire the position of an all-embracing vrata with the Jains. Thus, in the Jain Ethics, all the

other vratas including Brahmacharya are recommended not on their own account, but on account of their violating the great Law of Ahimsa.]

Another suggestion made in order to remove the contradiction in Manu's verses and also to bring it into harmony with our moral reason is to take कृतार्थान्विद्यावशात् (the way) of the devils ; कृतार्थ alone (See Amara III, 239). This interpretation is further supported by other passages quoted from the Manusmṛiti, M. Bhārata etc.

आमास्य च पक्षास्य etc. आमास्य च पक्षास्य च विपश्चमानास्य मातपेक्षी ।
आत्मन्येव अपादो वसितस्तु विगोचरीयात् ॥ १ ॥ यत्ने मनुष्ये माते वदनीते
कृतार्थे । इत्यप्येवमन्तर्याम्युक्तं च आत्मन्येव ॥ २ ॥ मैत्रुदंष्ट्रादप्येव न वदनीते
इति सूत्रमीयात् । केचिन्मा प्रहयिष्य च द्वाकम्वा सद्व्यप्यम् ॥ ३ ॥
—Quoted from the Bāmbodha Saptatīka of Hatras khara Sāri
(Gsthās 66, 65, 63)—See AIMP edition of the Śyādvādamanjari.

जीवो नो सममन्ति इति विदितं ये जीवाः पक्षो वा ह्वा वा पक्षो वा मनुष्यं
चोक्तम् ॥ ४ ॥ पुनरेव समाप्तं तेषां जीवानां वसति इत्यप्यम् । देवदत्ता-
न्तेन तन्वावत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत् ॥ ५ ॥ पक्षेन्द्रिया मनुष्या एकत्वात्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत् । इत्युक्तं
न वदनीते आत्मने पक्षेन्द्रियात् ॥ ६ ॥ वदनीत्यां यत्ने आत्मने एकत्वात्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्
नमासि । येषां पुनरेवमेव च विदितं वसति तत्तत्तत् ॥ ७ ॥

—Some illustration of modern sexual physiology

II.

अथ केचिन्मन्त्रा ॥ १०.—It will be borne in mind that the discussion of the Ahimsa and other texts was only by way of passing. The main point under consideration is the Doctrine of the "Seven Bhāngas or Modes" and the Two Aśwas (See supra) to which we now revert.

एवम् जीवानी—सप्तमङ्गलि जीवते—See Pr N T IV 14
p. 59 Taken almost verbatim from its Commentary
Hatakarāvatīrikā.

"एवम् जीवानी etc.—For a detailed exposition of the meaning see further "सप्तमङ्गलि जीवते" Ibid pp. 59–60.

The point of the last remark in the passage above quoted will be explained in the sequel.

Saptahangī had lined as a statement (वचनविधानः) in seven different ways (सप्तभिः वचनैः) — I mention it hereafter — of affirmations or negations (विधिविरोधयोः), with the use of the word *स्यत्* (स्वात्मस्वरूपनिष्ठताः) singly and jointly (एकाग्रतया सप्तविधयोः) without incommensurability as that arising from conflict with *ब्रह्म* (अविरोधेन ब्रह्मसाक्षाद्विवाच्यविरहितेन), as the result of inquiry (ब्रह्मज्ञानं) about each of the different predication (वचनैः) of the *g* substances *सत्त्व* (existence) etc.

नवधा च — From *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन सत्त्वं* the *नवधा* taken verbatim from P. V. T. III 14 to 21:—

(1) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन सत्त्वं* — Statement of affirmation made singly (इति विधिवन्मवदा वचनो बहु ॥

(2) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन सत्त्वं* — Statement of negation made singly (इति विरोधवन्मवदा द्वितीयः ॥

(3) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन स्वात्मस्वरूपेन* (इति द्वयोः विधिविरोधवन्मवदा तृतीयः) States that affirmation and negation made conjunctly but in such way as to avoid inconsistency which can be done by making the affirmation and the negation one after the other (क्रमतः ॥

(4) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन* (इति गुणस्य विधिविरोधवन्मवदा चतुर्थः) Statement of indescribability arising from making affirmation and negation conjunctly and too simultaneously — thus involving contradiction which can be got over by making the statement of indescribability

(5) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन स्वात्मस्वरूपेन* (इति पञ्चमः) Statement of affirmation and indescribability made conjunctly the latter which arises from combining affirmation and negation simultaneously and yet without running into the absurdity of self-contradiction being added to the former affirmation.

(6) *स्वात्मस्वरूपेन स्वात्मस्वरूपेन* (इति विरोधवन्मवदा गुणस्य विधिविरोधवन्मवदा षष्ठः) Statement of negation and indescribability made conjunctly the latter which arises from combining affirmation and negation simultaneously and yet without the absurdity of self-contradiction, being added to the former negation.

(7) स्वास्त्येव स्वास्त्येव स्वास्त्यस्त्येवेति (इति क्यतो विविचिरेव कल्पया इयमहिधिविरेककल्पया च सप्तमः) Statement of affirmation and negation made conjointly but successively joined with that of indescribability arising from combining affirmation and negation simultaneously and yet without the absurdity of self-contradiction.

III.

Fuller Exposition.

(1) तत्र स्वात् कर्षित् etc.—From स्वात् कर्षित् to स्वस्त्येव प्रपञ्चः taken verbatim from the Ratnākaraśāstrī except that M. omits स्वास्त्यस्त्येवेति and inserts the prefatory तत्र

A thing may be in one way in vi w of its own इव (substance), क्षेत्र (place) काल (time) and जात (nature or property); but the same may not be in another way in view of the इव क्षेत्र काल and जात of another thing. Otherwise, the thing would lose its individuality its own self. The illustration in the text is clear.

अवधारणं चात्र—एव (only which expresses exclusion) means that, and that only that is, the particular statement which we wish to make and no other.

स्वास्त्येव to—अस्ति would connote absolute unrestricted existence, while what is meant to be conveyed is a particular existence, an existence of the thing as such and not as another thing. This is why we use the word स्वात् instead of अस्ति. One connotes absolute, the other modal or relative existence. For it, another word is कर्षित्. In ordinary parlance, we do not use the words स्वात् or कर्षित् in every proposition, but it is always understood.

स्वात् कर्षित् etc.—A thing is, in its own substance not in another's substance; e.g. वर is as वारिष्ठ्य object, not as कर्षित्य object; that is to say in certain way and not in any other way. Hence कर्षित् which is the same as स्वात्.

(2) Bhāṣya II. स्वात् कर्षित् वास्त्येव etc.—From स्वात् कर्षित् to स्वात् कर्षित् वास्त्येव borrowed from the Ratn. Bī, 16

(See also S. R.) with a few unimportant changes. *सत्त्वमि-
मिरिष पञ्चम्यारिमिरिषि वस्तुबो-मिरिषमिह्री-----वस्तुमिहिरिषमिह्रीष --
सिद्धमिरिषमिह्रीषमिह्रीष । साध्यावास्तवमिरिषमिह्रीष ।* Haind. the rest
being omitted by M.

The reading adopted in the Text belongs to most of the Mss. and is evidently the correct ending. For it agrees with the original of the *Ratnakarāvatārikā* and gives the sense as required by the author's exposition of the affirmation and negation as contained in the *Syādvāda* doctrine. See supra note on *Śāstra XIV* p. 165 "तत्र कस्य न वदितुं न पुनः पञ्चम्य" etc.—असत्त्वेन वदितुं न पुनः पञ्चम्यमिह्रीषः where असत्त्व is predicated of thing not 'सत्त्वमिरिष' but 'पञ्चम्यमिरिष' which requires पञ्चम्यमिरिषमिह्रीष वस्तुबो-मिरिषमिह्रीष in the present passage. In fact, it is at the very point which the critic of the *Syādvāda* often misses and which the *Syādvāda* makes a *li* defence of his position. Of course, it is not denied that the *Anekāntavāda* असत्त्व belongs to the thing itself and not to the other thing, and that is what distinguishes the *Anekāntavāda* from *Ekāntavāda*. But, be it noted that the असत्त्व is nowhere said to belong to the thing सत्त्वमिरिष or 'सत्त्वमिरिष' but only पञ्चम्यमिरिष or 'पञ्चम्यमिरिष'. Thus, does the *Jaina Anekāntavāda* stand distinguished from the Buddhistic nihilism, and the *Jaina* may well claim that it is the only *li* in which the Buddhistic nihilism could justify itself to common sense.

A thing cannot be असत्त्व 'सत्त्वमिरिष' but if it is not going to be regarded as असत्त्व even पञ्चम्यमिरिष no thing would be every other thing. i. e. nothing would be anything, and there would be nothing like thing whatever.

न वदितुं न पुनः पञ्चम्यमिरिषमिह्रीष etc.—The necessity of recognizing असत्त्व and वदितुं along with सत्त्व either (though in different capacities such as सत्त्व and पञ्चम्य) may be thus shown. If you want to prove anything say असत्त्व by means of सत्त्व (हेतु), say सत्त्व then that सत्त्व will have the condition of good सत्त्व viz. because from the सिद्ध ५. १ दत्त अस्मिन् सत्त्वमिरिष सत्त्वमिरिष वदितुं (वदितुं सत्त्वमिरिष) दत्त as

much as presence in the सप्तमः thus in giving वास्तव्य of the सप्तम along with the अस्तित्व of the same, and vice versa. The doctrine of absolute अस्तित्व or वास्तव्य thus breaks down. Of course, we may wish to give prominence to one or the other and so may mention one and remain silent about the other (अपिवाचयितुमिच्छे as Uṃśvāti says Tattv V 31).

अपिवाचयितुमिच्छे :—For further explanation see the Tattv Artha Bhāṣya and the Bāṣyavārtika (V 31) and Ratnā. IV p. 61. अथ चेद्वै . . .

(3) द्वीपः सप्त एव—See above वास्तव्यस्य . . . etc.—From वास्तव्य to सप्तमः वास्तव्य reproduced from the Ratnā. on Pr N T III 18; the rest of the passage substantially agrees with the rest of its original which is cited in the Appendix. The gist of the passage in the text is to show how अवयवत्व arises from attempting to combine simultaneously and with equal prominence the सप्त and the अस्तव्य. There is no word in the language to do this the word सप्त will connote सप्त and not अस्तव्य; the word अस्तव्य will connote अस्तव्य and not सप्त. If may be asked Is there no single word which could present both सप्त and अस्तव्य, just as there is the single word सूर्यस्य presenting both the sun and the moon. Answer: as a matter of fact, there is not. But supposing there were such a word, still it would present the two to the mind one after the other. Question Does not the technical name सप्त as declared in the Sūtra अस्तव्यस्य सप्त (Pāṇ. III II, 27) stand for both the सप्त and अस्तव्य terminations? Answer: It does, but even then it does not present both the terminations to the mind simultaneously but only one after the other. As there is no single word to express सप्त and अस्तव्य simultaneously combined, so there is no Dvandva compound, nor Karmadhāraya compound, nor sentence which could give expression to the idea of

The paragraph in the Ratnākarīvatīkā concludes with an important piece of information that 'अथ च द्वीपः' द्वीपः द्वीपः द्वीपः पञ्चमे द्वीपः द्वीपः एवमेव । न द्वीपः द्वीपः द्वीपः । अथ च द्वीपः द्वीपः ।

also the same combination of सत्य and असत्य वृत्ति-समाप्तम् as in K. Pr. 'अर्थोपपन्नमर्थोपनि वृत्ति वाच्ये च दृश्यते

न च सर्वदा etc.—This is a very important note *Acua*. The अवयवकार्य here laid down is not *absolute* अवयवकार्य—which would mean only अवयविषयकार्य which is absurd—but only अवयवकार्य as an element in the *Anekānta* position.

वेदाद्यहं ह्युपनिषदाः—The last three are explained in the *Ratn.* on P. N. T. til. 19-30-31: "राज्यादिनि etc."

न च वाच्यं दृश्यं वस्तुनि etc.—As against the *seven* Bhāṅgas, it may be urged, there will be an *infinite* number of वाच्य about every thing in consequence of the infinite number of वद्वे which can be affirmed or denied about that thing (see also St. XIV "अनन्तवर्माणवद्वे वस्तु—"). The answer to that objection is—Reply if you take *all* the infinite number of वद्वे as वद्वे, the number of वाच्य will be infinite. But if respect of each of the वद्वे the वाच्य will be *seven* only. That is the point. The passage in the Text from दृश्यं वस्तुनि to सर्वकार्य is reproduced from Pr. N. T. til. 37-38. See Appendix.

यथा हि सत्यसत्यानां etc.—M. shows how the सत्त्वज्ञी principle can be applied to वद्वे other than सत्य and असत्य also, such as सामान्य or विशेष. Of the सामान्य and the विशेष the first may be taken as the affirmative and the latter as the negative; if you treat the two correlatives as standing on an equal footing it may depend upon which of them is going to be made the principal and which the subordinate the principal being presented as the affirmative and the subordinate as the negative.

प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तिः etc. वद्वेति ति etc.—Reproduced from the Pr. N. T. til. 39 to 42. See Appendix. The reason given for the number *seven* of the वाच्य is that the वद्वेष्टोक्त्यः (questions) in respect of each वद्वेष्ट are seven; and the वद्वेष्टोक्त्यः are seven because the सिद्धांतः (owncertainties) from which they spring are seven; and the सिद्धांतः are seven because द्वेष्टः (doubts) which give rise to them are seven; and the द्वेष्टः are seven because वस्तुवद्वेष्टः (abstractors of things) in regard to which doubts may exist are seven. See *Śaṅkharāṅgīyā* quoted in the Appendix.

इयं च सप्तमद्वी लक्षणरेखे etc.—The सप्तमद्वी in respect of each of the मद्रू is either *Synthetic* (सकम्यरेखे) or *Analytic* (विकम्यरेखे). The former refers to the entire, undivided Reality and the latter to a fragment or aspect of the same thing. The former is, therefore, known as प्रमाणवाक्य or Proposition of the Truth i. e. the whole Truth, while the latter is called नववाक्य or Proposition leading to the Truth i. e. the proposition of particular viewpoint. (तत्र सकम्यरेखे प्रमाणवाक्यम्—विकम्यरेखे नववाक्यम्). For the rejection of this view see Baptabhāgītārāṅgī.

लक्षणं चेत् etc.—सकम्यरेखे i. e. Statement of the entire, undivided Reality is thus defined “प्रमाणप्रतिपत्ताकृतवर्णवाक्यसूत्रं वाच्यमिति। अनेकविधप्रमाणवाक्यम् अनेकविधवाक्यं वा वीक्षणयेन प्रतिपादकं नव लक्षणरेखे” The definition is taken verbatim from P. N. T. II, 41, and so too its explanation वाच्यमिति. सकम्यरेखे from Ratn. thereon. See Appendix.

The points to note in the definition are (1) If we bring प्रमाण to bear upon the Reality before us (and be it noted that we are here dealing with Reality), we shall find that it is possessed of an infinite number of वर्ण (प्रमाणप्रतिपत्तयः). (2) Now these वर्ण can, by an act of synthesis, be united together which is rendered possible by certain bonds of union among the वर्ण such as वाक्य etc. (3) The synthesis may be due either to emphasis laid upon the identity of the common elements (वाक्य etc.) or to a supposed identity of those elements in the case of all the वर्ण. (अनेकविधप्रमाणवाक्यम्—). Lastly (4) It is necessary that all the वर्ण should be sewed together simultaneously (वीक्षणयेन).

वीक्षणयेन अनेकवर्णोन्मेषं वक्षु etc.—नवाक्यवाक्यम्—Reproduced from the Ratn. (See Appendix) except the last word, which in the Ratn. is “नवाक्यवाक्यम्.” The points of difference between the two adās are (1) In the former the entire Reality is comprehended synthetically i. e. with all its वर्ण taken simultaneously; in the latter the Reality is treated analytically i. e. with its वर्ण taken one by one. (2) In the former emphasis is laid

on the unity of the object (अभेदवृत्ता); in the latter on the *difference* (वेदप्रामाण्यत्वाद्), or the difference is superimposed upon the unity so that the unity is lost in the difference (अभेदोपचारेण), or the unity is superimposed upon the difference, so that the difference is lost in the unity (अभेदोपचारेण). (3) सत्त्वतरेण depends upon प्रमाण i. e. the view of Truth or full-orbed Reality; विकल्पतरेण = नष्ट i. e. single point of view which takes note merely the broken lights or fragments of Reality.

कं पुन इति?—सौम्यवृत्त—Taken verbatim from the Ratna (See Appendix). When one desires to emphasise the difference of the वद्वे such as अस्तिवत् etc. in point of वद्वे etc. he will find no single word to express the separate वद्वे, which will, therefore, have to be done by separate words, and therefore वद्वे or *succession* in the use of word will be inevitable. If, however, it is not the difference of वद्वे to which attention is to be called, but their synthetic unity one word may originally express a single वद्वे but through that वद्वे it will express the whole object with all its वद्वे taken simultaneously.

के पुनः वाक्यवत्?—इत्येवाभेदवृत्तिः—It is comes the much wanted explanation of इत्येवाभेदवृत्तिः in the definition. This, again is taken verbatim from the Ratnakarivāṭikā where the manner in which अभेदवृत्तिः or अभेदोपचारः is lost through वद्वे (Time) is thus shown.

(1) वद्वे—Time. When we say इत्येवाभेदवृत्तिः वद्वे वद्वे (as in the first vṛtti) we know that in the time (वद्वे) when अस्तिवत् is there there are also numberless other qualities belonging to the object thus, owing to the sameness of time, they may be all treated as one.

(2) वाक्यवत्—Nature. That which is the nature of अस्तिवत् viz. to be one of the वद्वे of the object, is also the nature of every other वद्वे of the object; and so, owing to it, all the वद्वे may be treated as one.

(3) वद्वे—Substratum. That which is the substratum of अस्तिवत् viz., the dravya, the same is the substratum of all the

other वर्ये; so, owing to this fact, all the वर्ये may be treated as one.

(4) संबंध—Relation viz. that of identity with the object. As अस्तित्व is non-distinct from the object, so are all the other वर्ये. Thus owing to the sameness of their relation to the object they may be all treated as one.

(5) प्रभाव—Influence. The influence which अस्तित्व exercises upon an object viz. to tinge it with its self is also the influence which all the other वर्ये exercise upon that object. So owing to the sameness of the influence they may be all treated as one.

(6) स्थिति—The locality of the substance. Moreover the locality of the substance of all the वर्ये is the same, and so, owing to it, they may be all treated as one.

(7) संबंध—Contact or relation. The relation which अस्तित्व bears to an object is also the relation which other वर्ये bear to it. So all the वर्ये may owing to this fact, be treated as one.

[The distinction between संबंध (अधिपत्य) and संबंध may be pointed out. The former leans towards अस्तित्व the latter towards वर्ये]

(8) शब्द—Word. The word which denotes an object with the वर्ये अस्तित्व, say वर्ये, is the same as the word which denotes the object with the other वर्ये. So all the वर्ये may be treated as one realising their unity in the वर्ये.

पञ्चावधिकार—अवशिष्टपक्ष—It must be carefully noted that this अवशिष्टपक्ष—recognition of unity is possible when emphasis is laid upon अवशिष्टपक्ष as opposed to पञ्चावधिकार. The difference between the two is this in अवशिष्टपक्ष it is the central अव्यय that is adverted to or kept in mind; in the पञ्चावधिकार, it is the वर्ये. Now when the अवशिष्टपक्ष is subordinated to the पञ्चावधिकार, which is the same thing as saying—when the वर्ये are considered rather than the अव्यय, the principle of unity retires into the background, and since

the *वर्तमान* are many the *अनेकवृत्ति* (unity) in question is impossible. For from this point of view there cannot be many *गुण* belonging to one and the same object at the same time. You will ask Is this not contrary to our experience that many *गुण* do belong to the same object at the same time? viz., *आम* or *न*; not without creating a pretext to breach in the unity of the object, which thus becomes really as many as the *गुण*. This may be shown by consideration of those points on which *अनेकवृत्ति* was shown to rest in the case of *इत्यविवक्षित*.

(1) Take *वृत्ति*. The several *गुण* do not belong to the same object at the same time. If they do, by that very act they would create breach in the unity and there could be as many different substrata as there were *वर्तमान* and also as many moments of time characterising them. The *गुण* being many they cannot belong to the same object at the same time. If they did, they would create a breach in the unity of the object and also the time. Thus there would be as many objects as there are *वर्तमान* characterising them, and these *गुण* would belong to different moments of time. So the unity of time on which the synthesis was based in the previous case (*इत्यविवक्षित*) is not valuable in the present case (*वर्तमानविवक्षित*), and here therefore there is no possibility of *अनेकवृत्ति* (real synthesis).

(2) *न* is, tak *अनन्तर*. The *अनन्तर*, that is *अन्तर*, being different, there is no possibility of the *गुण* coming to unity. If they had all the same *अनन्तर*, that would militate against their plurality.

(3) Similarly, the *वर्तमान* or *अनन्तर* of the several *गुण* is not the same, every *गुण* having its own *वर्तमान* or *अनन्तर*. And so there is no possibility of *अनेकवृत्ति*.

(4) Moreover the *वर्तमान* or *अनन्तर* of the several *गुण* being not the same, this principle of unity is also wanting in the present case. If *वर्तमान* or *अनन्तर* of the several *गुण* were the same, this would ipso facto make for the unity of the *गुण*—which is contrary to our hypothesis of plurality of *गुण*.

(4) संवन्धः, too, are many corresponding to the many संबन्धिनः. For a plurality of संबन्धिनः must involve a plurality of संबन्धः. So this principle of synthesis (unity of संबन्धः) is also wanting in the present case.

(5) Each गुण exercises its own peculiar व्यवहार (lofti soce) and so there are as many व्यवहारः as there are गुणः (व्यवहारिनः). Thus there is no unity of व्यवहार to effect the required synthesis (बोधोद्दिष्टि).

(6) The द्विविधता, too, vary with the गुणः. And since they vary this is another principle of unity which is wanting in the present case.

(7) सत्ता again, differs with the संबन्धिनः. And therefore, no unity of सत्ता is possible in this case. So this is another principle of unity that is wanting for the synthesis.

(8) Lastly शब्द differs with each object. All the गुणः could be expressed by a single word, one word in the language would do duty for all, and all the rest of the vocabulary would be superfluous. This is evidently absurd. Therefore, there are as many words as there are गुणः. And so the unity of word is also wanting in the present case to effect the synthesis.

सम्बन्धः etc.—Summary in the words of the Ratnakāśī valīkī with slight variation. It means Thus, the व्यवहारः differ in व्यापक, व्याप्य etc., and therefore their unity can not be real, but only some imposed upon their difference. The reader will now understand the reason for introducing 'बोधोद्दिष्टि' in the definition of संबन्धोद्दिष्टि.

अवधारणाय व्यवहारः—The संबन्धोद्दिष्टि is otherwise called अवधारणाय व्यवहारः. See supra. Ratn. adds बुद्धि विवक्षितम् and then concludes with a kārīkā giving the list of 'व्यवहारिनः'. Thus:—

व्यवहारमवधारणाय व्यवहारिनः इति चेत् ।

बुद्धिोद्दिष्टिः व्यवहारोद्दिष्टिः व्यवहारः इति चेत् ॥

व्यवहारोद्दिष्टिः etc.—In this partial view of things which is called विवक्षितम् or व्यवहारोद्दिष्टि or difference is real and pro-

इह च तत्समद्वीनङ्गत्वं प्रमाणवयस्तद्वद्भूयो । तावत्तत्रावधारणीयम् ।
विशेषतश्चार्थं पुनरप्येवमेव वक्ष्यते ।

स्वाध्यासेन सर्वमिति विविचक्षणया प्रथमो मङ्गः—

स्वाध्यासपञ्चमनेकमहाप्रयोगश्च । स्यात् कथंचित् सत्यत्रज्ञेयत्वाकमात्र
रूपेणास्त्वेष सर्वं कुम्भमिति न श्रुतः परम्पराज्ञेयत्वाकमात्ररूपेण । तथाहि—कुम्भो
इत्यत्र पारिवर्त्येनास्ति न अकारिकरूपेणा ज्ञेयत पाठतिपुत्रकत्वेन न वाक्य
कुम्भत्वेन ; कल्पतः हेतुसिद्धत्वेन न वागमिकारित्वेन यावत् इयमप्येव न
एवधारिता । अन्वयेतररूपपाठ्या एकरूपत्वनिमित्तम् इति । अथकारणं चात्र
मङ्गोन्मथितार्थेनानुरूपमप्याहम् । इतरथाऽनविहिततुल्यवैवात्य वाक्यस्य
प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतियोगित्वान्नान्वयिवाणात् । तदुक्तम्—

अनन्तरावधारणं तावद्विधार्थविशेषे ।

कर्तव्यमप्यत्राहम् तत्तत्त्वात् तत्पुत्रकचित् ।

तत्राप्यस्येव कुम्भ इत्येतावन्मात्रोपाह्वये कुम्भस्य तत्त्वमावस्तिवापि
सर्वमकारेणारित्यत्राहम् प्रतियोगित्वस्यैकपाठ्यपक्षिः स्यात् तत्पुत्रकचित् स्वाध्यासि
प्रयुज्यते स्यात् कथंचित् सत्यत्राज्ञेयविशेषावस्थिति न परम्परामिदिरपीत्यर्थः ।
अथपि आद्या न प्रयुज्यते तथापि व्यक्त्येवैकत्वेनकारणम् इतिमतिः । इत्येवम् इति ।
ननुक्तम्—

नोऽप्रयुज्येति वा तद्वत् सर्वथाहीनं प्रतीयते ।

अथैवमात्रां व्येयारिप्यवच्छेदप्रयोगम् ॥

अथ द्वितीयमङ्गलेन कथावयमिति—

स्वाध्यासेन सर्वमिति विवेकान्वयया द्वितीयः ॥ स्वाध्यासिभिरिव परम्परा-
दिभिरपि वस्तुतोऽनुरागिणी हि प्रतिनिधित्वव्यवस्थायास्तद्वस्तुप्रतिनिधयमविरोधः ।
न अस्मिन्नेकमहाप्रतिनिधिरिव गारित्यत्र अतिद्विभिरविविधानीयम् । अथचित्
तस्य वस्तुपि बुद्धिमिद्वत्त्वात् साधनम् । न हि अविनिमित्तप्राप्ती साध्ये
तत्पुत्रिद्यवधारितायां विना अस्मिन्प्रयत्नस्येवोपपन्नम् । तस्य साधनानामप्य-
वगतत्वात् । अथ वदेव विवर्त साधनप्रामाण्यमित्यत्र तस्य साध्याद्यदे तावत्स्य
गारित्यवधिमिधीयते तत्कथं प्रतिवेध्यम् । स्वकृतस्य प्रतिवेद्याहपक्षः साध्य-
वगाध वागित्यं तु पक्षानिवेध्यम् । तेनाविधावधिव्ये साध्यवगाधगारित्यस्य
व्यावृत्तावधेयः स्वकृतोऽस्ति वासिन् चेति प्रतीयमावधारिति चेत् तद्वत् ।
इह हेतोःस्वकृतत्वविरोधात् विपक्षानुसरत्य आतिविरक्तमानात् । यदि चार्थ-
वावावाप्येवैकमहाप्रतिनिधिरिव सर्वथा न कथितं वक्ष्यते तर्हि कृतविधिवर्तेत ।
अतुतिविशेषविषयस्य वाच्यवावावपरिहारेणार्थवत्त्वात् अथावत्त्वं च मात्र-
परिहारेणेति वस्तुतोऽस्तिअनुरागित्वयोः कथमनुरागदेवद्वयम् । तथा वागित्यं
वासिन्त्येव प्रतिवेध्येनाविधावधि विज्ञम् । अथ च प्रतिवेध्यं मलितत्वं वागित्यं
तथा अथानुसारताः अन्वयितोऽवधारित्वमनुरागमि वस्तुतार्थं कथनीयम् ॥

वाक्येनैवार्थं तावद्विद्यार्थनिवृत्तये ।

अतएवमप्यपाहकतमत्वात् तस्य कुर्यात् ॥

Baptabhaṅgi-taraṅgiṅi pp. 2-31.

IV एकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमानविधिष्वभावावन्तत्पर्याङ्गुपमेवानन्तवद्भिन्नत-
द्भावात्तर्कस्य सम्यग्भूतिरिति न चेदसि निवेद्यम् । विधिविधेयव्यपदेश्या प्रतिपत्तीर्षं
वस्तुम्बन्तावामपि सप्तवद्भावामेव संभवात् । प्रतिपत्तीर्षं प्रतिपाद्यपर्यङ्गयोगात्
समावामेव संभवात् । तेषामपि सत्त्वं सप्तविधताभिज्ञाताविद्यमात् । तस्या अपि
सप्तविधत्वं सप्तैव तत्सिद्धिसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तवद्वारणविधयः । एवोचर
वस्तुवर्माणां सप्तविधव्यत्येवोपपत्तेः ॥ एवं सम्यग्भूति प्रतिपत्तुं एकान्तरेकस्वभावा
विकल्परेकस्वभावा च । प्रमात्रप्रतिपत्तावन्तत्पर्याङ्गवस्तुन कान्तरेनिरमेव
इतिप्रमात्रावन्तरेवोपपत्तात्ता नैवापत्तेरिति प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलारेकः । तद्विपरीतस्य
विकल्पद्वयम् ॥

P N Tatvālokālabhāra Ch. IV Sutra 37-45

Stanza XXIV

Next, the author shows how the *Syādvāda* is sound, not
withstanding that it predicates such mutually contradictory con-
cepts as सत् and असत् and अवयव्यत्वं of one and the same sub-
ject. His explanation is that the different predicates refer to
different aspects of the same subject (*व्यपदेशेन*) and therefore
the so-called contradiction is really no contradiction at all.

सद्वाच्यते च—The ता termination to be construed with
सद् and अवयव्य . Therefore सद्वाच्यते-सत्ता and अवयव्यता-अस्तित्व
and अवयव्यत्वं

उपपत्तिः—The supposed contradiction is, first, that which
exists between अस्तित्व and वास्तव्य (अस्तित्वं वास्तव्येन नरः); secondly
that between विधि and निषेध that is, affirmation and denial of
the same predicate of the same subject—such as अस्ति and नास्ति
—in which consists the अवयव्यत्वं (‘अवयव्यत्वमपि विधिविधेयव्यपदेश-
न्योर्ध्वं’); thirdly that between अवयव्यत्वं and वस्तुत्वत्वं—the वस्तुत्वत्वं
which is necessarily implied in the very statement of *Syādvāda*
—*सद्वाच्यते* etc. (*अपवा अवयव्यत्वं वस्तुत्वत्वेन साध्यम्*).

अनेन च द्वाविंशत्या शब्दः.—Of the seven *vyākhyāna* i. e. terms or excellent propositions of the *Byādvāda*, द्वाविंशति शब्दानि अत्र द्वाविंशत्यः are the 22 *primary* *vyākhyāna*; the rest are derived by compounding 2 or more of these three :

अनेने चर्चाः परस्परं विपरीतः शब्दः.—विरोधव्युत्पत्तेः—द्वयविरोधोक्तिः
is a *हेतुवर्धविरोधव्युक्तिः* i. e. an adjective which constitutes the reason for the statement that the *Byādvāda* involves no contradiction. The reason is that no predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject absolutely : but only under definite limiting conditions which thus provide the different standpoints from which the same subject may be viewed.

अवयवविपरीतः शब्दः.—The test of contradiction is this : Do the two things exclude each other—as do *हृत्* and *वृत्* (cold and hot) which never subside together? Applying this test, we do not find that *सर्व* and *असर्व* are contradictory. The *सर्व* is a *वृत्* does not exclude *असर्व* in that *वृत्*; if it did, we could not say *वृत्* / *not वृत्* whereas we do predicate *असर्व* ('is not') of the same *वृत्*. But the fact is that the *वृत्* exists (*सर्व*) in itself and does not exist (*असर्व*) as other-than-itself—*सर्व* (existence) being predicated of it from one standpoint and *असर्व* (non-existence) from the other (that of things other than itself); and neither of them absolutely without reference to definite aspects such as *सर्व-वृत्* and *वृत्-वृत्*. The *वृत्* would not only exist as itself but as everything even as things other than itself (*वस्तुवैयर्थ्य*) if existence were absolutely predicable of it; and in that case, no *वृत्* *वस्तुवैयर्थ्य* etc. would be needed *वृत्* being everything!

न च सर्ववैयर्थ्यः शब्दः.—If on the other hand you lay hold of the negative predicate (*असर्व*), as in *वृत्* is not *वृत्* and regard it as absolute, the thing itself would be nothing, everything would be nothing, all universal void! But the fact is, you cannot regard it as absolute, the negation in the present case being only from the standpoint of its relation with other things (*वस्तुवैयर्थ्य*). See *Dravyasūtravākyā* xi, 13-14.

॥ वेदस्मिन् etc.—The view of the Naiyāyika on this point is different from both. He does not hold that the two colours belong to the two parts of the qr and there the story ends. Nor does he hold that contradictory as they are they belong to the same qr in its different aspects viz. the two parts. But he holds that the two colours produce one विग्रह and the latter belongs to the one—whole—qr while the former belongs to the parts. See Tarka Saṃgraha Dīpikā p. 11.

उदा विरोधा रसाद् etc.—O. Ratnāk. p. 85 on P N T III. ॥

It should be noted that the Jaina doctrine of "Vyāvahārika" is not a statement of the absolute identity of Being and Non-Being but only a statement of their relation to the same subject from *different viewpoints*. Thus a thing is from one viewpoint viz. from the viewpoint of itself and is not from another viewpoint, viz. the viewpoint of things other-than-itself. Mark that according to this explanation Being and non-Being are not implicitly contained in each other and so reconcilable—as in Hegel's system—but are to be referred to different aspects of the thing, and so there is no contradiction whatsoever. According to the Vyāvahārika, the contradiction is not a fact transcending or conforming the laws of logic that is to say a fact which because it is a fact has somehow to be accepted whatever the difficulties of thought—as is done in the *Anuvācayādvaita* of the Śākhara school—; it is a fact perfectly amenable to the laws of logic, a fact which logic easily succeeds in showing to be no contradiction at all, inasmuch as the supposed contradictory elements refer to two different aspects of the same reality. O. उदा विरोधा रसाद् (Text) O. उदा विरोधा Ratnāk. Parl. V pp. 85-86. Mark three points in the Jaina doctrine: (1) The Jaina does not hold that Being and Non-Being are absolutely the same "एवम् Ratn. III. ३. p. 85. (2) Nor does he hold that Non-Being exists as inseparable from Being (ibid p. 86). (3) What he holds is that Being and Non-Being

लव च विरोधयोः etc.—The charge expressly laid against the Sādhvāda and answered in the *Stānzi* is that of विरोध or contradiction. It stands however for a host of other faults also (‘अपमृच्छन्त्यात्’) viz.—(१) द्वैविध्यरूप (२) अनवस्था (३) संकर (४) व्यतिहर (५) लक्षण (६) अप्रतिपत्ति (७) विषयव्यवस्थाद्वयः each of which is explained and answered in the sequel (See *Saptabhaṅgi-Taraṅgi* pp. 81-83).

द्वैविध्यरूप Dislocation, absence of a common abode: सामान्य and विदेव—one positive and the other negative in character—are opposed to each other and cannot have a common abode or location, any more than heat and cold which never subsist together. You will perhaps explain that in a certain aspect a thing is an abode of सामान्य and in another aspect it is an abode of विदेव. But, then, we are entitled to ask: Is this done by a single nature of the thing or has that thing two natures corresponding to the two aspects? In the former case, the difficulty of द्वैविध्यरूप remains *status quo*. In the latter if two natures are required for the two aspects two again will be required for each of the two natures and so on ad infinitum. This is the अनवस्था mentioned above as fault No. 3.

Moreover there is संकर or confusion fault No. 4.—Thus: That nature by which the thing becomes an abode of सामान्य by it it becomes an abode of both सामान्य and विदेव—which is absurd, for the reason that it involves संकर or confusion between सामान्य and विदेव in a common abode. (सर्वैषां युगव्यभिक्तिः संकरः ” B. T).

Next there is the fault of व्यतिहर or exchange of natures. Thus: by that very nature by which thing is the abode of सामान्य it would be the abode of विदेव also, and vice versa. This, however is absurd, since सामान्य and विदेव would in that exchange take each other's place (परस्पर विषयव्यभिक्तिः व्यतिहरः ” B. T).

Next there is the fault of लक्षण (No. 6)—do arising from the difficulty of ascertaining the exact nature of thing in

regard to *सामान्य* and *विशेष*. And from the same arises *अवतिरक्ति* (No. 7) or failure to understand the position, thus throwing the whole science of logic into confusion *विषयभ्रमस्याहमिति* (No. 8).

The reader if he carefully compares the explanation of *संज्ञ* and *अवतिरक्ति* here given with those given in the *Śyādvāda-taraṅgiṇī*, he will perceive some slight difference.

All these faults fail to apply to *स्वाङ्ग* which is a philosophy of different kind altogether. For the *सामान्य* and *विशेष* in Jain philosophy are not independent concepts as in Nyāya and other systems. The word *विशेष* in the stanza may perhaps signify the particular *ज्ञेय* called *विशेष* in the narrow sense of the term and then indicate by way of *व्यवहार* the rest of the series of *ज्ञेय*s beginning with *वैचित्रिकरूप*. Or the word may be taken in the general sense of *ज्ञेय*, and may thus include the whole group of *ज्ञेय*s viz. *विशेष* *वैचित्रिकरूप* etc. For full answer to the objections see *Śeṭṭha-bhaṅgi-taraṅgiṇī* pp. 81-82.

अतः *स्वाङ्ग* is — Further elucidation of *विशेष* and its kindred *ज्ञेय* vide the excerpts given in the Appendix from the *Śeṭṭha-bhaṅgi-taraṅgiṇī* pp. 87-88.

Books of reference

1. *Āptamīmāṃsā* and *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
2. *Śeṭṭha-bhaṅgi-taraṅgiṇī*.
3. *Rāja-Vārtika* with Commentary.
4. *Rāṭhākarāvatārikā* on P. N. T.
5. G. naratna's Com. on *Śaddars'ana-samuccaya*.
6. *Anekāntajayapatākā*.

Appendices

1. अवतिरक्तीकस्मिन् वस्तुनि अवतिरोक्तेन विविधविशेषजनना सहजम् ।
अनेकान्ते वस्तुनात्म्याभिरिति येन वस्तुनि बहुपक्षे । अन्त्यात्मनेक्यम्

मिच्छता प्रचारिता हेतुः प्रयोक्तव्यः, यद्विद्यावाच्येवास्मिन्नेवमाहत् । त च हेतुः स्वरूपस्य सापेक्षः सापेक्षस्य दूषकश्च । येन कथेन हेतोरनावधार्यं येन च कथेन दूषकत्वं न सापेक्षं कथे हेतोरसम्भवादिहेतुः तयोर्हेतुवर्पणेन हेतुवेकता कथञ्चिदभिप्रायात् । न हि तयोर्हेतुवेकताऽसम्भवादेन कथेन सापेक्षत्वं तेन कथेन दूषकत्वं च सम्भवतीति संकटं । येन कथेन सापेक्षत्वं तेन कथेन दूषकत्वमेवेति व्यतिरिक्तो वा नावयवदूषकत्वयोर्विरोधो वा सम्भवति तथाऽप्येकान्तप्रविकारा मपि विरोधविरहितोपायवतारः ।

वस्तुतस्तु—अनेकान्तप्रविकाराणां नर्तेषां प्रचारितावपि व्यतिरिक्तोऽह । इयं नेहाजकस्य वस्तुतस्तुसर्वसम्भवात् ।

—Sapta. pp. 81-90.

Stanza XXV

स्वाधित्वञ्च—स्वाद् originally pot. 3rd sing. of अह, is here employed as an adverb. This means that the word will not change its form even if the subject and the predicate be in the plural number; thus स्वाधित्वावि नोत्तुमिच्छामि. This conversion of a verb into an adverb seems intended for fixing the title by which the essential character of the doctrine may be designated.

अहस्यवि—स्वाद् to be construed with—(1) वाक्, (2) मितं, (3) सङ्घं (4) निरूप्यं (5) वाच्यं (6) व वाच्यं (7) सत् and (8) अहम्— which make 8 Byādvāda propositions :

(1) स्वाधित्वञ्च, स्वाधित्वञ्च—the two together making single proposition

(2) स्वाद् साधित्वञ्च स्वाधित्वेन

(3) स्वाद्धित्वञ्च, स्वाधित्वञ्च

(4) स्वाद् सत्, स्वाधित्वञ्च

अप्रत्ययविशेषिता वाच्यसङ्ख्यायां तुल्यं Chief of the wise-
अप्रत्ययविशेषिता वाच्यसङ्ख्यायां etc.—This is why the Truth of Jain philosophy is compared to meeter

यथा हि वाक्यसङ्ख्यायां etc.—The utterances of the Master are compared to annotations which follow upon his having drunk to his fill the meeter of Truth. The suggestion is—When the

very crucialness of nectar are so fragrant, how much more fragrant must be the nectar !

अथवा—P rhaps the commentator realized that his analysis of the simile made it a bit coarse. एवोहृत्—to their heart's fill

एते चत्वारोऽपि—Of the propositions mentioned above No (1) is वाहीरमाप्नोमः St. V No. (2) is अनेहः St. XIV Nos. (3) and (4) is जगदेव वस्तुः St. XXIII which deals with the लक्ष्यगती doctrine.

ॐ नमः शिवाय

Stanzas XXVI

य एव रोषः etc.—The destructive criticisms of the *Nityavada* and the *Kṣayavada* destroy each other and thereby lead to a higher synthesis in the same way as the enemies of a king may destroy themselves by mutual warfare and thereby serve to bring about his undisputed sovereignty

I Untenability of क्षयिष्य (क्षयिष्य) वाक्—निवृत्तवारी प्रजापति etc.—The *Nityavada*s (*Eternalists*) criticism of his opponent. He thus argues his case: If all things be क्षयिष्य the cause and the effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so at the moment when one is the other is not. Now how can that which is not upon that which is not? And if a thing cannot act it cannot be for to be is to act (अर्थाद्विचारितं लक्ष्यम्). Thus it may be shown that things can never be क्षयिष्य. That a क्षयिष्य thing is incapable of acting (अर्थाद्विषय) may be thus shown by means of a dilemma: Is the क्षयिष्य thing सत् while it acts or is it असत्? Not the former. For in that case, the क्षयिष्य thing would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible all things being contemporaneous with one another would be causes of one another which is absurd. Nor will the latter alternative do. For how can a thing that is असत् possess causal power any more than a शरपिपाक (the horn of a hare)? And no third alternative is possible. Therefore the

original hypothesis of *अविद्य* breaks down, and that of *विद्य* rises in its place.

II Untenability of *निराद*—The *Kṣāṇikavādin*:
criticism of Aistya:

The *Kṣāṇikavādin* argues his case thus:

सर्वं कश्चिद सत्यम्—All things are *अविद्य* because they are possessed of *सत्य* *अविद्य* being a necessary condition of *सत्य*. That *अविद्य* is a necessary condition of *सत्य* may be thus proved: First, remember that *सत्य* means *अर्थविवाचरितम्* (Of James's Pragmatic Theory of Truth), for that is the very definition of *सत्य* and so when *अर्थविद्य* is impossible *सत्य* is impossible. Now let us consider whether a thing that is not *अविद्य*, i. other words what is *विद्य* can ever be *अर्थविवाचरितम्*. That it can never be may be shown by means of the following dilemma. Does the thing that is supposed to be *विद्य* exercise *अर्थविद्य* step by step (*कृत्वा*) = all at once (*वैषम्य*)? It cannot do so *step by step*, for that involves the loss of *विद्य*—the thing having already changed, i. e. ceased to be *विद्य* the moment the first step has been taken. If the thing continues to be the same even after the first step is taken there will be no cessation of the acting suited to the first step and thus there will be no possibility of second step ever being taken. If, on the other hand the thing is supposed to change by the first step it loses its *विद्य* by so doing. For to be no longer in the former state means to be *अविद्य*. There is possible way out of this difficulty. Suppose it is held that the thing remains the same all along the steps, but waits the arrival of *सहायक* or auxiliary cause in going from step to step; thus the changes are rung out not on the original thing which remains its sameness and therefore *विद्य* but only on the series of *सहायक*. If this makeshift does not really remove the difficulty but only pushes it little farther on. Thus, if the thing remains the same in spite of the arrival of the *सहायक* it means the *सहायक* has exercised no influence upon the original cause. Now we ask why has it not? Is it

that it was waiting for another लक्षारिक् to come to its aid ? If so it only launches you upon अवस्था a regressus ad infinitum. Let us now take the other alternative viz., that of action *all at once* (समयम्). It will be readily seen that this is impossible. Nothing can put forth activities in all directions and accomplish its effects all at once in a single moment of time. Supposing it can, all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without विद्य and therefore different from what it was before—which amounts to a confession that the thing is अवित्य.

वदेवमेवानुद्वेष्टि etc.—The logical result of the above conflict is that the हेतु put forward by each of the two parties is found to be vitiated by the हेतुनाश called 'विद्य' i. e. the हेतु ('सत्त्व') which proves the very opposite of what it is intended to prove.

अथ च निरावित्यिच्छाम्य etc.—The above line of reasoning with respect to निय and अवित्य is to be applied mutatis mutandis to the dogmas of सामान्य and विशेय as held by the other schools.

सुप्तोपसृग्वय—Mutual destruction like that of the two demon-brothers Benda and Umasunda.

Here is the story लनस्त्रिज्योत्तमा तव वने पुण्यानि चिन्वती । देवनाक्षिद्रमात्राव रक्षेयिष्य वासता ॥ गरीतीरेषु ग्राह्यत् ता कर्मिष्यरात् चिन्वती । सन्निधेयाम त ईक्षं वचास्तौ नौ मराहरी ॥ ती तु पीता वरं चाने मारकाभयोक्ष्मी । इषुष ॥ वरातोहां व्यपिषी संवत्स्रगुः ॥ तादृश्यायात्तर्न रित्वा जागनुर्वेच सा दिपता । वसी च कामसंयत्तादृशी धार्यवत्तथ तात् ॥ इतिमे तां करो ह्यु तन्मो अचयानिना । उपहन्तोऽपि अग्रह वाने वापी तिजोत्तमात् ॥ वरमरात्मक्षी तावाराणेन कलेच ॥ अवरलमरात्मा च तारावाममरेच ॥ ॥ लक्षितेर्मदेवसाधन्योन्वं कुकुरीहरी । मरुकायनमरिहरी वरम्पमयोक्ष्मी ॥ मम वासी नर एतति ति सुन्दोऽन्वभाषण । मम भावो तव वरुचतुन्दोऽन्व भाषण ॥ मैत्र तव वर्यदेदि तवरी मन्त्रानिचय । तवरा कलेच संयसी विगत केरुतीहरी ॥ तवरा वेतोर्गदे बीमे लपुलीनामुनी तवरा । मरुच च गोरे बीमे तन्मो ती काममोदिनी ॥ अहं वृत्तं वृत्तमित्यन्वोन्वं विमन्त्र ॥ ती मरानिहरी बीमे वेतुर्गदेत्तमीने ॥ वरिरेवावतिच्छाही हविवासी नमवदुनी ।

हरिवाङ्मय—For the Jaina canon and its divisions see Weber's article in Ind. Ant. (1888 and 1892), Enc. Rel. et Ethica, Art. on "Jainism" Jain's "Outlines of Jainism."

वचनं कृतम्—Hem. V vi 35.

Stanza XXVII.

The doctrine of स्वाहार or अपेक्षान्वय as it is otherwise called is not a doctrine of mere speculative interest—it is intended to solve more ontological problems—but has a bearing upon man's psychological and spiritual life. This is the point of Stanza XXVII in which the author shows how it is impossible to explain सुख-दुःख (joy), दुःख-वत् and वत्-वत्—except on the hypothesis of अपेक्षान्वय.

I

1. स्वस्वतन्त्रे *etc.*—If स्वाहार be exclusively *स्व* the experiences of happiness and misery will thereby be rendered impossible. For to be *स्व* means to be unchangeable, and there cannot be experiences of happiness and misery one after another unless स्वाहार could pass (change) from one state to another. It will be said by way of a defence of the *स्व* स्वाहार that the स्वाहार does not change, only its states change. This however may be met by asking: Do the states remain separate from the स्वाहार or are they one with the स्वाहार? In the former case how could they be associated with स्वाहार? Besides, they would be entire strangers to स्वाहार, as foreign to it as any other thing in the universe. In the latter case they are as good as not, and the old difficulty of accounting for change consistently with the *स्व* स्वाहार remains the same. Moreover if स्वाहार is exclusively possessed of a particular nature, how can there be any difference or change of states such as one from दुःख to सुख?

(2) दुःख and वत्, too, are impossible on the hypothesis of exclusive *स्व* स्वाहार. For the experience of सुख and दुःख are

brought about by *गुण* and *पाप*—which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible if *आत्मन्* is *वृत्त्य निर* : *a.* unchangingly eternal. Remember that the Jaina does not deny the eternality of *आत्मन्* provided it is eternality-with-change.

(3) *बन्ध* and *मोक्ष* are similarly impossible on the hypothesis of exclusive *निश्चय*. *बन्ध* is the union of karmic matter (*बन्धुत्वा*) with every portion of *आत्मन्* like that of fire with a piece of iron while *मोक्ष* is the annihilation of all *बन्धु*. Now both of these would be impossible under the hypothesis of exclusive *निश्चय*. Thus:—*बन्ध* is a kind of *संयोग* and *संयोग* is *अप्राप्तता प्राप्ति* : *a.* obtaining what has not been obtained already. Thus, there are two distinct states involved in the action of *संयोग*—the previous absence and the later presence which are inconsistent with the hypothesis of changeless *निश्चय* of *आत्मन्*. Moreover we would ask: How does a changeless and uniformly enduring *आत्मन्* suddenly happen to incur the trammels of *बन्ध*? Again, was he not *गुण* before the chains of *बन्ध* came to be put on him? Then, again, does the *बन्ध* make any change in the *आत्मन्* or not? If it does he is *अनिश्च* like any other mortal thing such as a piece of hide. If it does not so as to keep the *आत्मन्* indifferent to the presence or absence of the *बन्ध* matters nothing to him who remains as unaffected as *अक्षरा* by the change.

2. *इत्यनित्यैवाम्बुजादेरिति* etc.—The doctrine next criticized is the other side of the Truth regarded as the whole Truth viz absolute *अनिश्चय* of *आत्मन्*. An absolutely *अनिश्च* thing is that which is *अन्तस्तोषोत्पत्त्येव* : *a.* that which undergoes absolute annihilation.

(1) If *आत्मन्* is so absolutely *अनिश्च* as to undergo such an annihilation it means an end to the law of Retribution—which requires personal identity of *कर्तृ* and *वीर*.

अथ इतिमोक्षेति etc.—Supposing the doctrine of the absolute *अनिश्चय* of *आत्मन्* is so modified as to substitute *अक्षरा* of *आत्मन्* : *a.* continuity for identity: thus, not the identical *आत्मन्* but

the continuous stream of consciousness which we call *सत्त्व* is both *कर्तृ* and *बोधि* karma being transmitted from one life to another in the shape of *कर्मवृत्तयः* i. e. as impressions left on the *बान्धव* by karmas—on the analogy of colour which transmits itself from one piece of cloth to another. But the second position is no more tenable than the first. For the *सत्त्व* and the *बान्धव* which are postulated for *बान्धव* and *कर्तृ* are pure fictions, and so they have been shown in the commentary on St. XVIII.

(3) Similarly under the hypothesis of absolute *सत्त्व* of *सत्त्व*, the resulting lack of personal identity and the passing away of the original *कर्तृ* make *कृत्य* and *कर्तृ* and their consequent *कृत्यबोधोपपत्ति* impossible; in other words, they take away all sense from the law of Retribution. Moreover if *सत्त्व* is *सत्त्व* the sense of *कृत्यवृत्तयः* i. e. existing only for a single instant he cannot be the author of *कृत्य* and *कर्तृ*. For the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into existence, and there is nothing left to spare for doing *कृत्य* or *कर्तृ*. [Note that a *कृत्य* is by hypothesis and definition an infinitesimal division of time, and so one *कृत्य* one act.] Ye will say: Suppose the *सत्त्व* of the first *कृत्य* produced the *सत्त्व* of the next *कृत्य* and so on, so that there is continuity—mark not its identity—of being. But this explanation will not do. The law of homogeneity of Cause and Effect would require that happy *सत्त्व* should beget only a happy *सत्त्व* and so the vicissitudes of happiness and misery in the *सत्त्व* would become impossible.

(4) Lastly under the hypothesis of the absolute *सत्त्व* of *सत्त्व* of *सत्त्व*, *कर्तृ* and *बोधि* are correlatives which have no meaning unless they are predicated of one and the same *सत्त्व*.

Thus, rejecting the doctrine of absolute *सत्त्व* of *सत्त्व* on the one hand, and of absolute *सत्त्व* on the other, the Jaina philosopher lays down the doctrine of the *सत्त्व* of *सत्त्व* which represents the synthesis of the two extremes

(अनेकान्तवाद) - It is the doctrine of *identity-in-change*, of *unity-in-difference*, of *one-in-many*

वसिष्ठोऽपि—वसिष्ठम् defined

वातज्ञतटीवापारोऽप्याह—See *Yogasūtra Vyāsa Bhāṣya* III-12

The quotation is made from Vyāsa's commentary on Patanjali's Sūtra, and so Mallikarjuna is quite right in saying "वातज्ञतटीवापारोऽप्याह" The foot-note in AMP edition of the *Syādvāda Manjari*—अथ प्रसङ्गता टीवापारोऽप्याह इति वक्तुं तद्विपर्ययः। इत इति पक्षज्ञप्तिरुक्तः। is evidently a mistake.

एवं सामान्यविशेषः—Similarly it may be shown that it would be impossible to explain सुखादयः पुष्पवत् and इन्द्रजालम् if we held the doctrines of absolute सामान्य and absolute विशेष absolute सत् and absolute अजगत् absolute सत्त्ववत् and absolute अजगत्त्ववत्

II

अपेक्षारहितत्वम्—

वैः It has the double sense of "others" : १. non-Jain-heretical-philosophers, and of "enemies" The word has been used before in this double sense वैशिष्ट्यम्; such doctrines as give only a part-view of Truth (नैकते एकदेशविशिष्टोपेक्षेः प्रतीयते विषयमपेक्षितम्) पुर्वतिष्ठति-पुर्वम्

अविच्छिन्नम्—Continue अपेक्षामपि जगत्

तात्पर्यात् तत्पररेण—By *lakṣaṇa* as in मन्त्रा अपेक्षन्ति where मन्त्राऽप्यत्रयतां दृष्ट्वा See *Kāya P. II.*

सम्पत्तावाप्तौ etc.—सम्पत्ताः and other psychic qualities are the *saṃpattāḥ* of Siddhas i. the mental qualities which have become their very breath. Hence, Siddhas are classed among जीवन्, notwithstanding the absence of ordinary vital airs (*guṇavāyāḥ*) in their case. The root जीव् means to possess vital airs or life. The vital airs in the case of Siddhas are the *sāṃpattāḥ* and similar qualities.

एवमिदं प्रमाणम्—These have been enumerated in the foot-note of AMP edition: अपेक्षितानि चान्येषाम् आशुष्यन्, अनोक्तं वचनम् and धातोरवयवम्.

Stanam XXVIII

संज्ञते etc.—The *thor* is next going to explain what is meant by (1) दुर्बल (2) नव and (3) ब्रह्मण

ब्रह्मणमर्थेऽपिपय—T *tivārtha* Sūtra I 4.

जीवादीवारिधय—The re (1) जीव (2) अजीव (3) जगत् (4) दग्ध (5) संशय (6) निर्दिष्ट and (7) बोद्ध See *Tattvārtha* I 4.

अपेक्षे etc.—अपेक्षे deriv'd from the root अ्, means that which is determined or known; all knowables.

निश्चि लक्षणी II as दिह उदाह निश्चि, i. e. in the sense of common consent, that is, in the sense of 'must be not—may be'

नव दैवतार्थः—Naya are the points of views which disclose only partial truths. See below

प्रसीक्ये ब्रह्मणम्—*Prasādye* is the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, which lays bare the whole truth which is the synthesis of two and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths. It in *ब्रह्मण* suggests completeness of view. For the two varieties of *ब्रह्मण* viz. *ब्रह्मण* and *वदोक्त* see *Tivārtha* VII 12. Pr N T Part II 3 etc. and III 1 etc.

सदेव—When a partial truth is put forward as the whole truth e.g. सदेव—It is, and is only. It is *दुर्बल* : i. e. a false proposition.

अव्यक्तस्वरूपं ननुतत्त्वम्—X st. good. That is I 'सद्' When we do not know the sex (अव्यक्तस्वरूपं) of the child we use the next good e.g. when we say किं तस्या लिंगं वाच्यम् I'

सद्—When partial truth is put forward as in the proposition 'सद्' = It is, without excluding, that is, declaring its contradictory by an 'न' It is नव i. e. partial truth then, अलिख is illustration of नव. But to say सदेव and then exclude the element of असद् absolutely is *दुर्बल* *ब्रह्मण* is synthesis of सद् and असद् which is expressed in the *स्वार्थ* which is the only *ब्रह्मण* view. Thus, (1) सदेव is *दुर्बल* सद् is नव *स्वार्थ* सद् is *ब्रह्मण* नवनिर्दिष्टता—One-sided vision of the elephant, the idea is that the elephant does not keep both his

eyes open, but only one or the other as he turns this way or that.

एवात् सत्—असत्—(कथंविद्) सत् (बलु). It is from a certain point of view implying that it is not from another point of view. This is a statement of the *sole's* Truth. There is nothing 'सत्' or 'असत्' (which we see or which we should like to see) which contradicts it; while there are objections in the other case (विपक्षे) i. e. the case of laying down absolute propositions like those discussed in the preceding stanza.

उपनि विद्वद्वा—Here we have exemplified दुर्गन्ध वद and दयाव in the case of (1) सत्. Similar examples may be framed with respect to (2) असत् (3) विद्वत् (4) अविद्वत्, (5) दयस्वत् and (6) अदयस्वत् (7) सावान् and (8) विद्वेत्. These are the eight वद mentioned supra—See St. XXV and Commentary.

दुष्टमदस्य etc.—Construct the words in the Stanza thus लद्वेद आसत्, आसत् from अद् to throw or cast off i. e. reject, refute. For the grammatical form see below लद्वेद—you and you alone, व तीर्थान्तरैर्गन्तव्यं not even the gods of the other schools.

तीर्थान्तरवास्तारस्य etc.—That is to say they fail to see the whole truth through समुद्भव.

इदं दृष्ट्वा अस्ति—यदा क्विन् etc.—One who knows the Path of Truth and is benevolently disposed towards others makes travellers find the path which is beset with 'thorns' ('दुर्गन्ध'); next, he shows them the Path which is possessed of at least the negative virtue of being not bad though it is not positively good (i. e. दय); and, lastly he points out to them the path which is not only not bad but positively good (i. e. दयाव).

आसत् इत्यस्य ते —A r of अद् (Hema 78 विचारिणः). See Hema III. iv 60. IV i. 103, and IV iv 31. अवनदी—नगरः.

दुष्टमदस्य etc.—Strictly speaking दयाव alone is Truth and को दय. For दय is the extent that it does not disclose the whole truth may be said to be Error.

अद्वैतोद्धारः—In the journey from अनुसौधद्वार to प्रज्ञावना (names of *Āgamas*) i. e. from Inquiry to Establishment of Truth.

चत्वारि हि etc.—वचनब्रह्मयोग—Disposition of the word

इतेषां च स्वस्वम् etc.—See विशेषाद्वचन भाष्य on B4. 17 1:

अहमोत्पत्तिं महापुरुस्तेषु तस्य चत्वारि । etc.

See also B's Com on Adv 1. 1. p. 3.

अथ द्वेन कृतप्रत्ययत्वम् etc.—Here are two words of the same form ('य'), one being form of एति at the end of the compound the other a noun ending in य. The commentator need not have made this attempt to explain why अदितिरूपे (See K. Pr VII) which is after all not a very serious fault in a work of logic or philosophy.

उत्पत्तिं अथ नवस्वस्वम् etc.—The author of the Brahma has arranged the three subjects पूर्व etc. in the order of their degree of importance or ascending values; Mallikaraja's business as commentator is to explain the terms, and so he will take up नव before पूर्व, knowledge of the latter being hardly possible without that of the former.

अथ प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षवैकल्येन —Definition of नव नव may be defined as "प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षवैकल्यपरत्वं" i.e. apprehension of part of the object, the whole of which is revealed only by प्रमाण. Take प्रमाणप्रतिपक्ष with नव and not अवैकल्येन i.e. what distinguishes प्रमाण from नव is that it reveals the whole truth while नव reveals but part of the whole truth. (Further support of this, see Devastuti's definition of नव (P B T Ob VII) quoted in the sequel. नीलस्य येन ज्ञानाद्यवयवाविवर्त्तकप्रत्ययैर्ज्ञानाविवर्त्तकप्रतिपक्षवैकल्येन i.e.—Where प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षवैकल्येन qualifies नव and not अवैकल्य. Note I rather that नव is not simply अवैकल्यपरत्वं but प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षवैकल्यपरत्वं that is to say knowledge of part of the Truth and not merely of a part of any object whatsoever whether real or imaginary. Thus, नव so far as it goes, deals with Reality though with only part of Reality. Is not नव, then, प्रमाण *pro tanto*? The question and the answer will be found in passage of Pr B T Ratna, quoted in the sequel.

एकदेशः—A part or a fragment, not necessarily one part or one fragment. **अथ**—‘अथैकवचनप्रत्ययं तेषामेवावयवा वा (Pr. N T)

अवयवव्यतिरेकवस्तु—एव is so called because it conveys (from वी) is the mind Reality as possessed of that particular वस्तु or वस्तु to which one desires to ad. art, although as a matter of fact that Reality is possessed of numberless वस्तु (cf अवयवव्यतिरेक I. 1. p. 3). Since एव operates upon a Reality which has been already revealed by प्रमाण एव follows प्रमाण. Of प्रमाण... Rāj. p. 85 Besides, numberless are the वस्तु, because numberless are the वस्तु belonging to a thing, and any one or more of them may be adverted to by the speaker.

According to the explanation here given एव conveys the Reality to the mind (वस्तु वस्तु प्रारब्धति एवैकवचनप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकवति) ; in the Bhāṣya, on Tr Sūtra, एव is explained as conveying the mind to the Reality.

एव च इत्यादि—The quotation is made from the सूत्रविवरण of Biddhāsena Divākara.

अवयवा इत्यादि—As many are the statements of एव as are the ways of speaking about a thing.

एवैकवचनप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकवस्तु इत्यादि—The infinite number of एव has been reduced to the following seven वैयास इत्यादि. The Tatp Sūtra enumerates five एव viz. वैयास, संप्रदा, अवयव, बहुवचन and एव (वैयास-संप्रदा-अवयव-बहुवचन-एव एव T. V. 1. 24) and afterwards divides वैयास into two and बहुवचन into three (अवयवव्यतिरेकवस्तु—Tr. 1. 30). The two एव the Bhāṣya, are देव एवैकवचन and सर्वपरिवर्तव्य ; the three are साक्षात् सम्बन्धित and सर्वव्युत्पत्त. (For explanation, see below)

अवयवव्यतिरेकवस्तु—The अवयव or the point of view of the speaker may have reference either to अवयव or to एव = a. thought, or the word I which the thought is expressed. Since these are the only ways in which the mind can approach Reality we may take it that a division of एव which is founded upon them, so far as their foundation is concerned, is exhaustive. The points of view which have reference to

ॐ वैश्व will be found in the Tat. Sūtra-Bhāṣya and the Rājavārtika with its Oom. where वैश्व is said to be "अपेक्षकस्याप्यपेक्षणी वैश्वः"—according to which a वैश्व view consists in apprehending thing which is intended. See also its Illustration. A third explanation will be found in the passage quoted from Pr N T of Devastūri, for which see *Infra.* and Appendices. Dr Batischandra's explanation agrees with the one expressed in the text, except in one point, for which see his *History of Indian Logic.*

2. संप्रत्यक्ष etc.—It is the view which ignores all विवेक and takes note of सत्यत्व only

3. व्यवहारस्य etc.—The Vyavahārik view point presents things as they appear to the 'vulgar' eye i. e. it does not care for the logical or scientific method of ascertaining Truth and does not believe in things unseen, that is, such as lie beyond the range of human experience. All सत्य according to it must be subordinated to experience and that, too, common experience. Accordingly it sees no reason to admit either सत्यत्व or विवेक, both of which it regards as contradicted by common experience. The category of सत्यत्व if it existed, inasmuch as it embraces the whole world, would make us all omniscient! [The criticism would apply with special cogency to the Naiyāyika's doctrine of Bāhānyalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa]. Nor is the category of विवेक justified by our actual experience; for, what we perceive is a *vyākṛ* and not the ultimate particulars (विवेक), which are supposed to consist in *ś* or belong to atoms or perish every minute.]

The only reality is the reality of what actually exists, what we all feel and handle, what exists in the living present, not in the dead past or the imaginary future, both of which lie outside the range of सत्य and therefore of the real.

§ The Buddhist view † The Nāy. Vais. view

‡ The Buddhist view. The atoms and their विवेक are *ś* according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika.

तथा च वाचस्पत्यः etc.—See the Tr. Śāstra Dhātus I. 3.

लौकिक etc.—It is the point of view such as belongs to the common folk; it is not strictly correct; it refers to reality such as is accepted and understood by the vulgar mind.

(4) अद्वय—It agrees with the अद्वय point of view in recognising the reality of the present only—either of the past or of the future as the two latter are no more real than the horns of a hare—which do nothing and therefore are nothing. Besides, the real is the simple—which does not admit of any division. Thus, the indivisible atoms are the only real; they coagulate and act and not the so-called bodies or gross reality. That which is its own, and not what is foreign to it, is the real in a thing.

(5) वर—It is the point of view which finds single object denoted by a variety of synonymous terms. At the same time, it recognises differences of objects arising from differences of gender, number, tense, agent (mood), person or—

(6) लक्षित्व—This view-point recognises differences of sense as in the case of synonymous terms, corresponding to the etymological suggestions of differing connotations, and is thus contrary to वर. For example इन्द्र, वर, वृक्षर—although synonymous, conveyed different meanings owing to the differences of connotation suggested by their several etymologies. Thus इन्द्र signifies the lord of gods, वर the powerful god, वृक्षर the destroyer of the cities, and so on, notwithstanding they are वर from the वर point of view. In other words, while the वर considers the denotative aspect, लक्षित्व considers the connotative aspect of words.

(7) वस्तु—This point of view recognises the propriety of applying a word to an object only while it is justified by the then character of the object. Thus, वर which means that which does (√वर) and performs the work of carrying water is applicable to the object only while it is actually performing the work on the head of a water-carrier, not while it is lying idle.

The mere capacity to perform that work, such as belongs to a वर before it is used or after it has been used and laid aside does not justify the application of the word to the वर in either of the two latter states. For capacity after all is nothing, no better than 'the horn of a hare'. It is the actuality that counts. If we were to allow such an extension of the correct explanation of the word, the word वर would apply to the shells or the lump of clay even before the वर has been actually made or after it has actually ceased to exist.

वत् सर्वद्वन्द्वेकः, etc.—(1) The वैतथ्यम् distinguishes between नान्यत्वं and निबोध, and recognises both. The former is regarded as the principle of unity or co-ordination—वसिष्ठानन्दकारण—by which we know things as one belonging to the same class; the latter is its opposite.

(2) The सर्वज्ञम् comprehends the whole universe in a single concept—that of Being or Existence—which covers everything.

(3) The व्यवहारम् accepts Existence as it finds it embodied in each particular object. Men in their daily avocations of life are guided by this point of view.

(4) The ब्रह्मज्ञानम् refers to the changing पक्षी only as distinguished from the abiding द्वय. For all Reality according to it is perishable, constantly departing from the state of existence.

(5) The व्युत्पत्तिम् recognises differences of connotation (but not of denotation) in accordance with the differences in the forms of words, such as द्वय, वत्, द्वयम्, etc.

(6) The लक्षणावधारणम् goes farther and recognises differences of वत्, that is denotation, corresponding to those of their different etymologies.

(7) पदवृत्तान्तम् declares that thing bears a particular name only while it performs the क्रिया which entitles it to bear that name not always.

Note that these partial view-points become positively false and therefore गुरु when they make not only statements of

वदुःखानुपपत्तेः। नाप्यस्य दोषाद्यानामप्यवस्तुत्वेन कश्चिदपि वस्तुम्यवस्था
नयेत्। किं यदि वस्तुसंघे कश्चिन् तादृशप्रतीतिर्वाचकमायात्। ततो वस्तुसंघे
प्रवर्तमानो न कश्चिन् स्यादेवमवस्थावस्तुत्वेन न वस्तुम्यवापि सिद्ध्यतीति।

Taken individually there is no end to वस्तु (व्याप्ततोऽनेक
रिक्तत्वाः); but in a condensed form (समासतः) that is, generically
they may be divided into two: (1) द्व्यर्थार्थिक and (2) वस्तुवार्थिक.
The former takes note of the द्वय and the latter of the वस्तुवत्.

इति द्व्यर्थार्थिकं अनुवृत्तं तांस्तां वस्तुवार्थिकं द्व्यर्थार्थिकं। तदर्थार्थिकं। तदर्थार्थिकं
वस्तु विवक्षयेन च द्व्यर्थार्थिकं। वस्तुवत्तादृशविनाशो प्रतीतिरिति वस्तुवत् न वस्तुवत्
तदर्थार्थिकं वस्तुवत् वस्तुवार्थिकं। वस्तुवत् च द्व्यर्थार्थिकवस्तुवार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं द्व्यर्थार्थिकवस्तुवार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं च द्व्यर्थार्थिकं।

—Pr N T Ratn.

The first of these viz. द्व्यर्थार्थिकवत् is subdivided into
(1) वस्तुवत् (2) समास and (3) व्युत्पत्ति

(1) वस्तुवत् etc.—वस्तुवत्-which may be said to be an
abbreviated form of 'वस्तुवत्' says Devasūri,—is the statement
in which of two वस्तु or two वस्तुवत् or one वस्तु and one वस्तुवत्
one is subordinated to the other

वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं प्रतीतिरिति वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं न वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
—Pr N T

वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं etc.—Illustration of वस्तुवत् in which, if two
वस्तु one is principal and the other is subordinate वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
(i.e.,—in वस्तुवत् there is (न) connection (वस्तुवत्) here
वस्तुवत् and वस्तु both are वस्तु, but one of them, viz. वस्तुवत् is the
subject of therefore principal. वस्तु (i.e. 1st sg) is subordinated
(bring in the विवेचन that is, predicate) to the other viz.
वस्तुवत् (which is विवेचन—the subject) वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं।

न वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं
—Pr N T, Ratn.

वस्तुवत्तदर्थार्थिकव्यतिरिक्तं etc.—In the illustration of वस्तुवत् in which of
two वस्तु one is principal and the other is subordinate. The

passing may be construed in 2 o ways: (1) पर्वोपबन्धनं वस्तु or (2) वस्तु पर्वोपबन्धनम्. In (1) इष्य and वस्तु are the two वर्तमान of whole इष्य—the subject—is the principal and वस्तु—the predicate—is subordinate. O (2) of the two वर्तमान, वस्तु (Reality)—the subject—is principal and पर्वोपबन्धनम् (इष्य with its attributes)—the predicate—is subordinate.

वस्तु पर्वोपबन्ध इत्यमिति वर्तमानोः ।

अत्र हि पर्वोपबन्ध इष्यं वस्तु वर्तते इति विवक्षाया पर्वोपबन्ध इत्याकम्बन्ध वर्तमानो विवेकपक्षेण प्राधान्यम् । वस्तुवाक्यस्य तु विवेकपक्षेण न प्रोक्तम् ॥
ब्रह्मा । किं वस्तु पर्वोपबन्ध इत्यमिति विवक्षाया वस्तुनो विवेकपक्षेण प्राधान्यम् । पर्वोपबन्ध इत्यस्य तु विवेकपक्षेण प्रोक्तमिति वर्तमानप्राप्तेः नैवमस्य द्वितीयो वेदः ।
—Pr N T, Batak.

उपमेयं etc.—A third Illustration of वेदम्—in which of one वर्तमान and the other वर्तमान one is principal and the other subordinate. Here विवक्षाकक्षणीय—the वर्तमान—is principal, and उपमेयं वृत्ती—the वर्तमान—is the predicate and therefore subordinate.

उपमेयं वृत्ती विवक्षाकक्षणीय इति वर्तमानोः ।

अत्र हि विवक्षाकक्षणीयवाक्यस्य वर्तमानो वृत्तमस्य । विवेकपक्षेण । वृत्त उपमेयं तु वर्तमानप्राधान्यता । तद्विवेकपक्षेणोपाकम्बन्धम् । इति वर्तमानप्राप्तेः नैवमस्य द्वितीयो वेदः ।
—Pr N T, Batak.

वर्तमानम्—When the principal and the subordinate are regarded as absolutely separate, we drift into व्यापारः.

वर्तमानवादीनामैवात्मिकपार्वण्यमिति वर्तमानवादात् ।

आदिशब्दम् वर्तमानवर्तमानवर्तमानोः परिग्रहः । वेदमिति वर्तमानवादिनामि अग्निदीपवात्मिकमेवमिष्यो वेदमिति वेदमिति ।

वर्तमानमिति तत्त्ववैतन्ये वर्तमानमिति वृत्तमिति इत्यादि ।

आदिशब्दाद्वस्तुवाक्यपर्वोपबन्ध इत्याकम्बन्धोवर्तमानोः तर्तमा पार्वण्येन वर्तमानं व्यापारपक्षेण इत्यम्बम् ॥

वेदमिति वर्तमानवर्तमान वेदमिति वेदमिति ।

वर्तमानम् तत् तत् तत् वर्तमानो वेदमिति ।

आदिशब्दाद्वस्तुवाक्यपर्वोपबन्ध इत्याकम्बन्धोवर्तमानोः तर्तमा पार्वण्येन वर्तमानं व्यापारपक्षेण इत्यम्बम् । न पर्वोप न द्विविधः व्यापारो लक्षणातीति । वर्तमानो

वीचः स मुक्तः संसारी च । यः स्वमात्री परीक्षः स विद्याकृपा जडविद्याकृपा-
बोधादि । Pr N T ; Ratn.

वयाम्नि० etc.—Illustration of नयामास To regard सत्य
and वैराग्य or ह्य and वीच in the above illustrations as *absolutely*
separate is नयामयामास

(5) सामान्यमात्रः—सामान्यमात्रपात्री परामर्शः संग्रहः ।

सामान्यमात्रमवेष्टविशेषरहितं सत्यव्यवहारिकं पृथगीत्यर्थं वीच सत्य
एकीभावेन निर्वीर्यतया विशेषरहितं पृथगीति संग्रहः । अवयवः स्वमातेरप्ये
ह्यव्यवहारिणेन विशेषाभावेऽप्यतया ह्य शब्दे ह्य संग्रह इति ।

—P N T Ratn.

संग्रहः is one in which only the universal is taken note of
the particular being quietly overlooked.

अवयवः etc.—It is of two kinds पर and अपर (correspond-
ing to the पर and अपर सामान्य of the Vaisesikas).

परसंग्रहः is one in which pure ह्य is apprehended in
its highest universality that is as pure सत्य, all the विशेष (par-
ticulars) being overlooked ; अवयवविशेषेऽपीरातीत्यर्थं अवयवः सत्य
इत्यर्थं सामान्यमिदं सामान्यः परसंग्रहः III. निश्चयेऽप्यविशेषः

संश्लेषः etc.—When, however an *exclusive* statement
is made denying the विशेष we pass from ह्य to नयामास

III. संश्लेषः स्वीकृतीनां सत्यविशेषाविच्छेदनात्संश्लेषः । यथा
सत्यं तत् सत्यं ह्यमयमूलाया विशेषाभावात् । अद्वैतवादिद्वैतवादादिभिः
संश्लेषः नैव सामान्यतया प्रत्यक्षः ।

इष्टादीन्व्यापारः etc.—अपरसंग्रहः is one in which a ह्य is
apprehended under any of the lower universals. इष्टादीन्व्यापारः
सामान्यमिदं सामान्यतया नैव सामान्यतया पुनरपरसंग्रहः ।

वर्गार्थः—III when the ह्य viz. वर्ग अवयव to are pre-
sented under the no head of ह्यव्यवहार and their particular
features viz. वर्ग अवयव etc. are overlooked, it is a case of
अपर-संग्रहः.

इष्टादीन्व्यापारः etc.—When, however you do not rest content
with grouping वर्ग अवयव etc. together in one class viz. ह्य, but

go a step farther and deny their particular distinguishing traits (विशेष), you fall into अवसरप्रमाण

यथा इन्द्रजित्वा etc.—III. of the above यथा-इन्द्रजित्वा तां ततोऽर्थात्तरमृतायां इन्द्रजित्वा इन्द्रजित्वा । अथ हि इन्द्रजित्वा तां ततोऽर्थात्तरमृतायां इन्द्रजित्वा इन्द्रजित्वा । अथ हि इन्द्रजित्वा तां ततोऽर्थात्तरमृतायां इन्द्रजित्वा इन्द्रजित्वा ।

(8) लक्षण...अवधारणा etc.—When things which are brought together by लक्षण are affirmed as then distinguished as from an ordinary conventional point of view—it is अवधारणा

लक्षणपूर्विकात् अवधारणा विचार न तु विविध वा यथावर्तमानेन विचारते तु अवधारणा ।

यथा यत् सत् etc.—III. That which exists (यत् Reality) is either इन्द्र or अर्थात्. Now as matter of whole truth, इन्द्र and अर्थात् are not separable, and yet सत् (got by लक्षण) is here divided into the two—इन्द्र and अर्थात्.

न पुनः etc.—If you go farther and insist upon an absolute distinction of इन्द्र and अर्थात् you commit अवधारणा. For in reality there is no such absolute distinction. That is, from the ordinary or अवधारणा point of view we can show you to speak of इन्द्र and अर्थात् but if you insist upon their absolute distinction we must point out that you are going beyond your rights. You are setting up अवधारणा for यथावर्तमाने that is, न for इन्द्र

The philosophy of the materialist (अर्थात्दर्शन) is good example of अवधारणा. For, while he adopts the common people point of view in affirming the existence of matter (as constituting or self) we may not object, but when he goes farther and claiming to be philosopher he denies the existence of अत्मा (our spiritual self), he falls into अवधारणा

यावन्तो हि प्रमाणप्रतिपक्ष आवागम्यार्थादिति विचार्य न स्यात्तेन विचार्य वदते । अतिवर्तितमर्थं कृतवतुहवर्तितमर्थं न तु लक्षणोऽवधारणा विचार्य वदते । इन्द्रजित्वा इन्द्र अवधारणायावत्तत्त्वोपरि विचार्य ।—Buddha

अर्थात्परिचयानुसारं etc.—Four more variations of यत् are added. These are sub-divisions of अर्थात्परिचयः—(1) अवधारणा (2) अवधारणा (3) लक्षणपूर्विका and (4) अवधारणा.

सर्वे चत्वारः etc.—Another principle in divisions of the seven, the first four are सर्वव्यापक, and the last three सम्प्रदायक.

पूर्वः पूर्वं etc.—every preceding वचन is wider than every succeeding वचन, every succeeding वचन is more limited in extent than every preceding वचन. This may be shown as under :

सम्प्रदायकोपपन्नः etc.—It may be objected that, according to the above, वैश्व should be wider than सर्व but as a matter of fact, सर्व is the widest, inasmuch as it deals with all that is (सम्प्रदायक). But the objection can be easily met; सर्व deals with only Being; वैश्व with both non-Being and Being. वैश्व is thus, wider.

परिप्रेक्ष्यः—व्यवहार deals with particular forms or entities of Beings while सर्व with general Being. सर्व is, therefore wider than व्यवहार.

वर्तमानपरिवर्त्यः—कालवृत्त is concerned with the present only व्यवहार with the past, present and future. व्यवहार is thus wider than कालवृत्त.

वाक्यपरिप्रेक्ष्यः etc.—सर्ववचन deals with सर्वे which it regards as differing according to the difference of time (तत्त्व) etc. कालवृत्त makes no such distinction, and is therefore wider.

प्रतिपक्षीयः—समधिकृत दत्त guesses between the सर्वे of even synonymous terms e. g. इन्द्र, वायु etc. according to their varying etymologies. सर्व does not do that. सर्व is, therefore, wider than समधिकृत.


प्रतिपक्षीयः—सर्ववृत्त is confined to सर्वे only while they perform particular कृत्या and thus it distinguishes between सर्वे according to the कृत्या connoted by the term. समधिकृत distinguishes इन्द्र from कालीपति but it applies the term to Indra even when he is not engaged in destroying cities. सर्ववृत्त is thus wider than सर्ववृत्त.

व्यवहारपरिवर्त्यः etc.—Just as there is प्रपाकसमुदायः so also there is व्यवहारसमुदायः—the difference being that the former is of the nature of लक्ष्यकारेण the latter of विषयकारेण (See ante.)

साध्यबोधेति etc.—Tattvārtha Bhāṣya etc. are the principal sources of information regarding न्याय.

प्रमाणं तु etc.—प्रमाण or the view of the whole truth embraces all the न्याय. The न्याय become प्रमाण when स्यात् is added unto them of Samantabhadra : न्यायस्य .etc."

तत्र द्विविधं etc.—See Tattvārtha Sūtra, Bhāṣya and Com. I, 15-16.



Appendices.

I. The authors of the संमतिवर्त and its commentary divide the schools of न्याय into two kinds: (1) दृष्टान्तिक and परोक्षान्तिक i. e. (1) those who believe in substance, and (2) those who believe in modes. The first believe in the principle of unity or permanence the second in that of duality or change—corresponding respectively to the two categories of सामान्य and विशेष—to use the language of संमति संवाद (संवाद) and विशेष (विशेष). [संमतिविशेषी दृष्टान्तिकी सामान्यविशेषद्वयवाच्य—Com.] These are the only two fundamental न्याय, the other न्याय

पार्थोऽन्व न ह्यन्वर्तनीयं तद्वत्त्वात्प्राप्तिरिति श्रुत्यार्थिकः । पार्थोऽन्व पार्थोऽन्व
 वायुधोपचारिकश्चकारिकश्चो न ततोऽन्व इत्यमिति पूर्वोक्तार्थिकः । अथवा
 ते गन्तव्ये निष्पाद्यत इत्यर्थः । कार्य इति गन्तव्येति शब्दं कारत्वम् । श्रुत्य-
 र्थोऽन्व कारत्वमेव कार्यं पार्थोऽन्व, न च कार्यकारणयोः कश्चिदप्यन्व । तदुक्त-
 मेवकारमेव पार्थोऽन्व इत्यमिति श्रुत्यार्थिकः । परि समन्तात् गन्तव्यं पार्थोऽन्व ।
 पार्थोऽन्व कार्यमस्य न श्रुत्यमतीत्याशान्तयोर्विवादात्पक्षत्वेन व्यवहारात्प्राप्तात्
 त एवैव कार्यकारणत्वपरोक्षमिति पूर्वोक्तार्थिकः । अथवाऽन्वमर्थं प्रयोगं
 श्रुत्यमर्थोऽन्व प्रत्यक्षमिच्छामात्रप्रवृत्तिरुक्तमेव निश्चितप्रवृत्त्यपत्तिरिति श्रुत्य-
 र्थिकः । पार्थोऽन्व प्रवृत्त्यमस्य वाग्विज्ञाप्यत्वात्तन्निबन्धनव्यवहारप्रतिषेधेति
 पूर्वोक्तार्थिकः ।

Next the words are classified and defined as follows:

(1) अर्चयितुं गन्तव्यं विनाश—which is explained thus
 निगम्यन्त्यविधिति नियमनवाच वा विनाशं विनाशे कृच्छ्रे यत्र वा नैममा
 तस्य त्वेवे व्यवहार निगम means that to which one goes, i.e.
 object aimed at, the idea of an object (अर्चयितुं गन्तव्यं) as
 distinguished from its accomplishment; the end, purpose
 intention objective. नैममव—a statement with reference to
 the object e. It is illustrated thus: अर्चयितुं गन्तव्यं प्रवृत्तिं प्रवृत्ति-
 पूरणमवतिष्ठ—तथा वा कश्चिद् मय्यत्र पार्थोऽन्व इत्यमन्तमवित्तनीत्याह निगम्य
 गच्छति अथवा इति त तस्य व्यवहारे प्रत्यक्षमिति । तथा इत्यप्राप्त्यापि । तथा
 कतरोऽन्व गन्तव्ये वाच्ये अर्चयितुं गन्तव्यं तत्प्रवृत्त्यपत्तिरिति यदीति व्यवहारः
 e.g. A man goes out, axe in hand, to fell a tree, take some
 wood out of it and make a मय्य (woods measure for
 measuring grain). When asked why are you going? he
 answers for a मय्य Now here the immediate object of going
 is to cut tree, but he says for a मय्य—which is done
 with reference to the final purpose of going.

(2) स्वभावविरोधेनैकत्वात्प्राप्त्या समस्तप्राप्तं यथा—'संप्र' is that
 in which many are collected etc one without contradicting
 their own nature & when one says संप्रवृत्तिं यथा—the श्रुत्य
 (स्वभाव) of यथा is not denied, but it is subsumed under the
 higher category of संप्र । Similarly all the यथा whether made of
 gold or clay may be called by the class-name यथा which does
 not deny the individual natures of different यथा and yet brings

येदेवाप्यवश्यं भवितव्यमिति । नागार्चनमपि रोहतासु सममिच्छतः । इन्द्रनागिन्द्रः
 अस्मान्पुच्छं पृथोरन्तात् पुरन्तर इच्छेत् सर्वत्र ॥ जगता यो यत्रामिच्छतः स तत्र
 लयेत्यामिसुच्छेनारोहात् सममिच्छतः ।

Synonyms connote differences of meaning and so they should be employed with strict adherence to their connotation. This is the point of view of समसिद्धि — i. e. the presentation of the connotation before the mental eye.

[illegible]2. The author of the *Tattvartha-S'loka-Vārtikā* observes:

सायान्पादोन्नतस्तम्बरेक एव नमः सिद्धता ।

स्यात्तद्विषयस्यैव विवेकस्य प्रयोजकः ॥ L. 23

—In its most general form *nyāsa* is but one, and it consists of the presentation of a particular truth—which is part of the comprehensive truth which is expressed in *svādhyāya*. He next divides them into two main types—*śloka-pāda* and *viśeṣa* (the latter including *nyāsa*)—of which the first comprises the three *śloka*, *śloka* and *śloka*, and the second the remaining four *śloka*, *śloka*, *śloka* and *śloka*. The term '*nyāsa*' is explained thus—*nyāsa* is that by which part of the truth is conveyed. The different *nyāsa* mentioned in the *Tattva-Sūtra* (I. 23) spring from the two primary *nyāsa*, *śloka* and *śloka* (*śloka* and *śloka*). The author rejects the view of those who hold that there are four *nyāsa*, *śloka* and *śloka* being added to *śloka* and *śloka*. The ground for the rejection is that they are not added to *śloka* and *śloka*.

the strange doctrine that as a matter of absolute or scientific truth every object—e. g. even a black bee—possesses all the five colours but only one of them is patent—the black in the case of the bee—while the rest are latent. A similar doctrine regarding the constitution of matter is held by Rāmānujācārya who says that when a piece of mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver it is because the silver is in the mother-of-pearl and so is even a serpent in a rope !

7 नमि नवेर्दि विदुर्न दूयं असीय विमयः किंचि ।

आसत्तु व सोपारं नवेनय नितारणी दूया ॥

[—आसित नवेर्दिर्दिनं नृपमर्षक विमये किंचि ।

आसत्तु व सोपारं नवेन य नितारणी दूयात् ॥]

इति वचनान्निमित्तं लोकेऽपि पदार्था नवेर्निवारणीया । इत्यती इत्यमरः—
नवेर्निवारणाय—

एतो नहुकमेतं वेत्ता वेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त ।

एतद्वयत्त एव तस्य विव वेगलं दोष ॥

[—एतो नहुकमेतमवेत्तावेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त ।

एतद्वयत्तमेतं लवेय नहुकं दोष ॥]

इत्यमरः—एतो वेत्ता वेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त । एतद्वयत्त एव तस्य विव वेगलं दोष ॥ [—एतो नहुकमेतमवेत्तावेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त । एतद्वयत्तमेतं लवेय नहुकं दोष ॥] इति गार्ग्यः ॥

एवं नितं निरवयवविधेयं ज्ञानं च तावत्तु ।

निरवयवविधेयं नितं नितं नितं नितं ॥

[—एवं नितं निरवयवविधेयं लवेयं च तावत्तु ।

नितं निरवयवविधेयं नितं नितं नितं नितं ॥]

इत्यमरः—एतो वेत्ता वेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त । एतद्वयत्त एव तस्य विव वेगलं दोष ॥ [—एतो नहुकमेतमवेत्तावेत्ता वेत्तामयत्त । एतद्वयत्तमेतं लवेय नहुकं दोष ॥] इति गार्ग्यः ॥

तन् सामान्यविरहितं न भवति यथा वरा । तस्मादेकस्माद् इष्यमद्वयसामान्या
व्यतिरिक्तत्वाद् तद्व्यतिरेके चाप्यवयवकृतापेक्षया सामान्यस्य न विद्युद्वैज्ये
कस्याप्येकमेव संश्रयवदने इष्यमद्वयम् इति स्थितम् ॥ इति भाष्यार्थः ॥

अत्र विशेषपरिवन्धमात्रत्वेना कथिहाह—नह कथमनेकानि इष्यमद्वयानि न
सम्यक्निधय यथा हि वनस्पतिरिच्छके वृक्ष-पुष्प-जला बीजान्येव विधेया एव
प्रतीक्यन्ते न पुनस्तद्विरहितः कथिद् नवत्यति वयमिहापि इष्यमद्वयमित्युक्तेऽत्र
पञ्चकतत्परकपञ्चकना विधेया एवावयवमन्वये न तु तद्विच्छेदं किञ्चित् सामान्यम्
अत्राऽऽति कल्प इवास्मिन् अगत्येयमभिधीयते— निस्तान्नसामान्यो नपि विधेयो
तद्वच्छेदं न इति । इति विशेषपरिवन्धमात्रेण सामान्यवती संश्रयः प्राह—नह वत
एव वनस्पतिरिच्छके वृक्षादयः प्रतीक्यन्ते अत एव हे तदनर्थान्तरमूलाः इत्यस्यै
वाहुल्या इव वसिष्ठोप्यवयवे वद् प्रतीक्यते तन् ततो व्यतिरिक्तं न भवति यथा
इहा इत्युक्तेऽप्युत्पादय प्रतीक्यमाना इस्ताद् न व्यतिरिक्ताः प्रतीक्यन्ते न वनस्पति-
रित्युक्ते इकारवा इक्ष्मी न वनस्पतिव्यतिरिक्ता ततो न सामान्यव्यतिरिक्ता कोऽपि
विधेया समस्ति । इत्येकमेव सर्वत्र इष्यमद्वयमिति । अनेकपरत्वान्तराद्यपि सामान्य
प्रायेव इकारादीनां सर्वेषामपि व्यवस्थितसामान्यकृतां समर्थवशाद्—

पूतो नवस्तद्विधयः स्याद्विधुषी ति तत्तद्विधुषी च ।

पुष्पाद्विधौ वि धौ ततो न वनस्पतिव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥

[= पूतो वनस्पतिरेव पुष्पाद्विधुष इति तत्तद्विधुष इव ।

पुष्पाद्विधौ विधौ ततो न वनस्पतिव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥]

पुन आसी वनस्पतिरेव वनस्पतिसामान्यं न व्यवस्थितसामान्यं इति प्रविता ।
हृत्-कन्द-रत्न-रत्न-आका-प्रकाश-यव-पुष्प-बीजानिपुष्पत्वादिनि हेतुः पून
तद्विधुषीति दृष्टान्ता इह बी बी वृत्तिरित्युक्तं त एव वनस्पतिसामान्यकृता एव
यथा वृत्ततद्विधुषः वृत्तिरित्युक्तं वृत्ता तस्माद् वनस्पतिसामान्यकृता एव । पुष्पा-
द्विधौ चैव आकाशः । तस्माद्—विशेषपरिवन्धमात्रेण विशेषतयाऽत्रुपनम्भमात्रेण पुष्पाद्वि-
धेयव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यकृता एव वृत्तिरित्युक्तत्वात् पुष्पनववृत्तत्वं इति । एवमन्येषामपि
नववृत्तिवैधेयान् वनस्पतिसामान्यकृता इत्यतिरिक्तत्वं साधनीयम् । तद्व्यतिरेके तत्रैव
इष्यपरादिप्रकृतौ वाचकं प्रमाणम् । तस्मात् सामान्यवैधेयस्य न विधेयम् ॥
इति भाष्यार्थः ॥

किं च—

सामान्यान् विधेयान् आसीम्यो न हीनं नह भवन्ती ।

तौ नपि आसीम्यो विधेयमन्यो सामान्यदेव तव ।

[= सामान्यान् विधेयान् आसीम्यो वा भवन्ती वनस्पताः ।

त नपि आसीम्यो नपि नववृत्त सामान्यदेव तव ॥]

बी विशेषपरिवन्धमात्रेण सामान्यान् विधेयान् आसीम्यो वा एवान् वनस्पती वा इति
निरुद्धम् । यथापी निरुद्धः तर्हि नाल्पेव विधेय विन्यासात्तद्विधुषः तद्विधुष-
वद्—इह वद् वद् सामान्यवैधेयस्य तन् तद् नपि यथा वनस्पतिव्यतिरिक्तम्

इतिविशेषनिर्णयोऽत्राह (IL 9) । स एव दत्तमावत्वापत्तौ चारुचा (IL 10) ।
 पारमार्थिके पुनरुक्तत्वात्पक्षमाचारोक्तम् (IL 18) । [अत्र-अन्वयेन
 विशेषविशिष्टमात्रप्रत्ययेराज्यवर्तिनं समाधित्य पारमार्थिकमेतत्त्वधारितत्वं
 दृश्यमिति न पुनः सांप्रदायिकरिमिश्रवद्विषयवित्तमानप्रमाधित्वेति
 भावः—Com.] तद्विषये उक्तं च (IL 19) । तत्र विक्रयनवधिवत् सर्वो-
 द्धारकपक्षे हेतुः (IL 20) । अत्रविज्ञायावद्विषयविशेषस्तद्विषयं पराप्रमाणत्वं
 कश्चिदप्यन्यथावद्विज्ञानम् (IL 21) । तत्रमविशुद्धिविषयवत् विविधतरण-
 विच्छेदाभाते मयादृश्यवर्णनमात्रं एव पूर्णव्यापकम् (IL 22) । उक्तं इ-
 तावदीतिविशेषतः तद्विषयवत्तत्त्ववत्त्वापत्तेः विविधप्रमाणवर्णनमात्रात्परिष्कार-
 नेवव्यापकम् (IL 23) ।

The subject goes back to the *Tattvārthasūtra*—*Sūtra*,
 (See T. Sūtra and T. Rāja Vārtika)—where *प्रतिज्ञा* is divided
 into *इन्द्रियनिमित्त* and *अनिन्द्रियनिमित्त* (*अनिन्द्रियनिमित्तनिमित्तम्*—
 L. 14) *इन्द्रियनिमित्तं स्वर्णवाहीनां वज्राणां स्वर्णसिद्धे वज्रफले स्वसिद्धे
 अनिन्द्रियनिमित्तं शरोरुत्तरोपहार्यं च* । This is further subdivided
 into *अवयवहावावधारणाः* (L. 15), and each of these four is defined
 as follows *तथाप्युक्तं अथात्यमिन्द्रियैर्विषयाणां लोकावधारणमवयवम्* ।
*अवयवे बहु प्रहमल्लोकावधारणमित्यवयवोन्तरम् । निवर्तनेतिप्रतिज्ञाया वेदा
 ईहा । ईहा आत्मा तर्कं परीक्षा निवर्तना विज्ञातेत्यवयवोन्तरम् । अवयुर्हिमे विषये
 लोकावधारणमिति ह्यन्योऽन्यथावा लोकावधारणोऽप्युक्तः । अथावेत्यप्य-
 न्यथोऽप्यवयवम् अनेनप्यभिहितमवयवमित्यवयवोन्तरम् । चारुचा प्रतिज्ञापरिष्कार-
 त्वावधारणमवयवोन्तरम् च । चारुचा प्रतिज्ञापरिष्कारावधारणं निवर्तनेत्य-
 न्यथोऽप्यवयवोन्तरम् ।*

स्वल्पप्रमाणमिहावतर्कहृत्वात्मन्येवतत्तत् वज्रप्रकारम् (P. N. T. IL. 3) ।
 तत्र तत्त्वप्रमाणोपकर्तृत्वमवयवोपनिषत् तद्विज्ञातारं वेदने रमणम् तद्वि-
 कल्पनिमित्तमिति वक्तुं (IL 3, 4) । अहमवयवमितिद्वयं तद्विषयतात्वात्पारि-
 योचनं तद्विज्ञातारं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षिज्ञानम् । वया वज्रमपीव स्वार्थं वेदित्वा
 योतद्वयोऽवयव तद्वार्थं विमर्श इत्यादि । (IL 5, 6) [तद्विज्ञातारं च
 मयादि गोप्यवित्तवत्तद्विज्ञातारमात्रम् । अतोऽतत्तात्त्विकं च वरापरिष्कार-
 णादि वृत्तवद्विज्ञानम् ।—Com. तद्विषयं विवक्षितवर्तमानत्वेन वस्तुना
 व्यवहारमज्ञेयम्—Com.] अतएववस्तुमन्वर्तमानं विवक्षितवर्तमानतात्त्विक-
 त्वमवधारणमवयवमिति वस्तुतः तत्वेन अवयवोपनिषत्तत्वेन तद्वि-
 (IL 7 8) । वया वज्रात् वदित्वा वया तत्तत्तद्विज्ञातारं वदित्वा वदित्वा वदित्वा
 वदित्वा वदित्वा । [अतएववस्तुमन्वर्तमानं प्रमाणमात्रेण वदित्वा वदित्वा]

संभव इत्यस्यैवेति कारककृतिकम् । विवाहीकृतिकानां कान्तवर्तित्वोः साध्य-
साधनबोध्यत्वममकयोः लक्षणोपविधानादौ व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥ आदिर्देवाद्येव
देवत्वकृतिवाचकलक्षणत्वान्मन्त्रं गोचरः इत्युक्तयेति विपक्षविच्छेदम् ।
इत्यस्मिन् साधये भवतीत्यादिवाच्यमित्यसिद्धं सति न भवत्येवाकार साध्य-
साधनलक्षणत्वममकम् । स्वभातीयः इत्युक्तं स्वभातीवत्त्वार्थस्य वाचकः सोऽपि
उक्तानुवृत्तवाच्यस्य वाच्य इत्याकारं वाच्यवाचकमात्रान्मन्त्रं च संवेदनमिदो-
पादीयते इति स्वकृतमतिप्राप्तम् । कथं नोक्तं स तर्क इति कीर्त्यते अह इति च
लक्षणार्थं त्रयम्—*Comm.*] अहमार्थं द्विपक्षार्थं स्वार्थं परार्थं च (III. 9) । तत्र
द्विपक्षार्थस्य स्वपरव्यवहारकं साध्यविधानं स्वार्थम् (III. 10) । पक्षोद्वेगवत्त्वार्थं
परार्थमिदमाह पक्षप्राप्तम् (III. 28) । [पक्षोद्वेगवत्त्वस्य च अहमन्तरात्प्राप्तत्वात्
प्राप्त्याप्त्यसौमे तद्विद्वत्प्राप्तित्वमुक्तम् । कारके कार्योपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । प्रतिपाद्यार्थं
हि वाच्यं तस्य कारकं स्वार्थविधानम् । कार्यं कारकोपपत्तिप्राप्तम् । प्रतिपाद्यत्वार्थं
हि वाच्यार्थविधानं तस्य कार्यं तद्वत्त्वमिति—*Comm.*] आत्मवत्त्वानुवृत्तवत्
संवेदनममकम् (IV. 1) उपपत्तिप्राप्तत्वार्थं च (IV. 2) ।

The same subject will be found in Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-
śāstra*, *Pratya* द्विवा । इत्युक्तं पक्षे च (L. L. 9 10) इन्द्रियबोध्यमित्योऽह-
मोद्वेगवत्त्ववाच्यता साध्यवृत्तिरिति (L. L. 21) । अकारणबोध्यं ह्येवाप्यन्तर
मन्त्रममकम् (L. L. 27) । अहमन्तरात्प्राप्तत्वात्प्राप्तत्वात् (L. L. 28) ।
इतिविधेर्वर्तित्वोऽसाध्यः (L. L. 29) । अतिविशेषात्प्राप्तम् (L. L. 30) ।

अविचारः परोक्षम् (अ. मी. १-२-१) ॥ स्वार्थ-व्यतिरेक-वा-ह्यत्व-
मयात्प्राप्तम् (१-२-२) ॥ वाच्योद्वेगवत्त्वता वरित्वाकारात् स्वार्थं (१-२-३) ॥
हर्षस्मरणवत्त्वमर्थं तदेवैव उक्तवत् तद्विषयस्य स्वार्थविधेर्वाच्यत्वमर्थं प्रत्यु-
त्पन्नम् (१-२-४) ॥ उपपत्तिप्राप्तत्वमिति च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्राप्तम् (१-२-५) ॥
साधनात् साध्यविधानममकम् (१-२-६) ॥ तद्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च (१-२-७) ॥
स्वार्थं स्वनिमित्तसाध्यविधानमात्रेणैव साध्यता साध्यताम् (१-२-८) ॥
बोध्यतावत्त्वमिति च [विज्ञेय] परार्थम् (१-२-९) ॥ अहमन्तरात्प्राप्तम्
(१-२-१०) ॥

Note 1 वाच्योद्वेगवत्त्वता (अ. मी.) 'लक्षणवत्त्वार्थवत्त्वम्' (*Text*)
The text adds अहमन्तरात्प्राप्तम्

॥ हर्ष-स्मरणवत्त्वम् (अ. मी.) अहमन्तरात्प्राप्तम् (*Text*). The
text omits the details तदेवैव to तद्विषयस्य and inserts तद्विषयस्य
साध्यतावत्त्वम्.

3. उपपत्तिप्राप्तत्वमिति च (अ. मी.) अह (वा in the text is a
misprint) उपपत्तिप्राप्तत्वम् (*Text*). The text substitutes for

अ गवादिषु योच्चारित्वस्य सहस्रपरिणामात्मकम् । कर्मसाधामर्थं च वरापर
विचर्तव्यापि दूष्णावादिष्वप्यम् । (Ratnakarāvatārikā on P.N.T. III. 5).

हरहम्यादुपपन्नम्—Arising from the presence and absence.

विराज्यविराजिता—resting upon the eternal relation of concomitance between ज्ञाय and साधन Pr N T III. 7

इदम्—Otherwise called इति, e. g. whatever वृत्त there is is only when there is इति; it is not when इति is not. See Pr N T with Ratna. III. 7

अनुमान विद्या etc.—See Pr N T with Ratn. III. 9.

आयवचनम्—The primary sense of आयव is the knowledge of things which springs from the word of a reliable person (अयम्); its secondary sense is the word itself. Pr N T with Ratn. IV 1,2.

प्रमाणसूत्रम्—Cf. Tarka books Muktvāli and Nīlakaṣṭhi etc.

Reference Books.

1. Tv Śā. Dhārya. Sarvārtha-Siddhi.
2. " Rajavārtika.
3. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā.
4. Pr N T etc with Ratnakarāvatārikā.
5. " Nyādvāda-Ratnakara.
6. Saptabhaṅgi T.
7. Saṃmatī-tarka with Commentary
8. Nyāyāvātāra with Commentary
9. Vīśeṣārṇava'yaka.
10. "A History of Indian Philosophy"—by S. N. Dasgupta Vol I pp. 176-179
11. "Indian Philosophy"—by Radhakrishnan Vol. I pp. 299-302.
12. A History of Indian Logic"—by S. C. Vidyābhāṣya pp. 170-171.
13. "An Epitome of Jainism"—by Habel and Ghoosh Ch. VII pp. 8-103.

Stanza XXIX.

सप्त सप्तैः etc.—Refer to the Brahmanical geography of seven islands and seven oceans. As against it, the Jaina holds that the oceans and the islands are infinite in number. For Brahmanical and Jaina cosmographies see Barnett's "Antiquities of India" pp. 196-99.

The Stanza. According to Jainas, souls are infinite in number. The stanza contains criticism of the contrary doctrine.

सुखमयम् etc.—If there be only finite number of souls, a time is conceivable when all the souls shall have achieved सुख leaving the world empty; or the once emancipated soul should return to the world to keep it ever populated! The second alternative is absurd, for all thinkers are agreed that emancipation once accomplished is accomplished for ever; in fact, it would be contrary to the notion of emancipation to suppose that emancipated souls are born again in the world and subjected to the round of births and deaths. For is not emancipation an end of *all* karmas? And if *all* karmas have once ended, how can there be return to bondage? Is not bondage necessary result of karmas only? The first alternative is also impossible. For it would be contrary to the very nature of the world (सत्त्व) to be emptied of all souls.

एते सौख्ये etc.—Quoted also in the Rāj Vārt. p. 381, which the editor traces to सप्तसौख्ये

साय व सप्तसौख्ये—Vide Yogachitra. II 12.

सप्तसौख्ये—The com. by Vyāsa on the same. सप्तसौख्ये in the AMP edition of the Nyāyavārtamanjari is mistake for सप्तसौख्ये

सत्त्व सौख्ये—While the root, viz. the passions, lasts, the abode of सुख produces their fruitfulness but not when the root is eradicated. For example, paddy which is rice with their earthen husk will become the seed of the next paddy crop, but

the paddy from which husk has been removed or which is scorched by fire will never do so.

तथा ज्ञेयमनन्तं etc.—In the same way the abode of karmans, while it is wrapped in passions, has the power to germinate into Satchitra but when it is stripped of them, or the root is scorched it is no longer capable of doing so जलदहनद्वारा—burnt deliberately

विचारविधि etc.—The three varieties of the fruition of karmans are (1) ज्ञानि (quality of birth) (2) आयु (duration life) and (3) मोक्ष (joy or suffering).

अप्रयत्नोपपत्ति—Vide Nyāyasūtras IV i 64 When the passions have been destroyed no action (कर्म) makes for fruition

विमूर्ध्नाविचिरात्मनि—One whose wisdom was mutilated or incomplete having been hindered by jalalvaranāśya karma.

प्राप्तद्वारा—Discovered and taught by the master

पृथिवीवायुमहोदधिस्थानस्य स्वामिनाः तत्रोपाय इन्द्रियव्यापनम्—Ty Sūtra: 11, 13-14. Souls of Earth Water and the Vegetable Kingdom are immobile and those of Light, Air and those possessed of two or more senses are mobile.

अजीवन् etc.—Those that have lived are living or will live, i.e. जीव contains potential as well as actual life

इन्द्रियविधि—इन्द्रिया are called इन्द्रियाश्च and इन्द्रिया etc प्राण इन्द्रियाः By प्राण we here understand not vital airs but vital energies manifested either on the physical or the mental plane. The former are called प्राणश्च and the latter वायुश्च. The point of calling both of them प्राण is to emphasise that one sort of activity is as much a part of life as the other. That the प्राण at first mean not the vital airs but all regions of vital activity may be seen in the अष्टांगयोग of the Upanishads. And this fact throws a new & interesting light on the meaning of 'प्राणायाम' as a spiritual exercise. It will not then mean a control of the vital airs of exhalation and inhalation but a

control of the very physical basis of life. The Jaina extends the meaning still further

हमेन्द्र्ये (Hama V 41, 80) — द्वावन्तवृत्ता from the root वि.

पुष्पिण्यारि वज्जी etc.— वज्जीवरावज्जी a compound dissolved in two ways: (1) वज्जी जीवकापानां क्षमाहारः वज्जीवरावज्जी (2) वज्जी जीवकापानां वज्जी ... इति ।

The 18 kinds of संसारि जीवः are those of (1) Earth, (2) Water (3) Fire, (4) Air (5) Vegetable Kingdom and (6) Animal Kingdom, called respectively (1) पृथ्वीकाव (2) जलकाव (3) तेजकाव (4) वायुकाव (5) वनस्पतिकाव and (6) जन्तुकाव. See Ācārāṅga Sūtra 1 Adh. 3 Tattvārtha II, 13-14.

पुष्पिण्यारिणां पुनर्जीवन्त्ये etc.—अथ च पुष्पिण्ये वारो वेद्यमिति निम्नः BII com on Ācār Bā. I. II. 79 84, 85 and BII com pp. 30-31.

Mrs. Brodley Stevenson asks us to note and lightly The Jaina believes that water itself (note is so often supposed the inanimate living in it) is inhabited by Ekendriya Jiva called Aphāya kendriya. See "Heart of Jainism" p. 98.

सप्तकल्मषे इति etc.—The six classes of Jivas may be arranged thus: the ascending order of their numbers:

वज्जी- तेज - पृथ्वी- जल- वायु- and वनस्पति-जाविकः.

The तेज जाविकः are infinitely more numerous than the वनस्पतिजाविकः similarly still more numerous are पृथ्वीजाविकः still more numerous are जलजाविकः; still more are वायुजाविकः infinitely multiplied in number are वनस्पतिजाविकः and so on.

ते च जन्तुहारिकाव etc.—The वनस्पतिजाविकः are जन्तुहारिकाव and जन्तुहारिकाव

गोत्रा तो — Quoted partly in BII com. Ācārāṅga (p. 69). See Bhagavati X, XL.

जन्तुहारिकाव इति कावे etc — Live if we were to put together all the Jivas who have attained विमोक्ष (मोक्ष), who are now attaining it, who will attain it hereafter still their number falls infinitely short of the number of विमोक्षा. Hence the

कथं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यं तस्मिन् पृथिवीवादिषा इति । उच्यते—तद्विहित-
परीतोक्तमप्ये । अविद्यमति प्रतीयतिर्गन्तावादिष इति । न हि वयस्योपाधि-
कृतानि पृथिवीवादेः पञ्चानि सङ्गमन्वयन्ते । तावमेव । अथवा इति
विषये । यथा वस्तुविद् ईदं दत्तदृश्यमिति विधयति तद्विषयविज्ञोदयादप्ये-
कताम्यत्वात्तरविद्येयत्वात्तथा चैतदा न कैनायता तत्त्वाविद्वत्ता स्वमयान्-
त्यवेतन्वर्तमयो-रुपगमनम् । नह्यप्यथोक्ततादिभिरप्यवेतनादिभिरपि
न चेत् तद्विषयं किंचिदेतन्नादिभिरपि । नैतदेवम्—इहानि तत्त्वानां
कृतोद्देशपरिकर्मणोर्मात्रादुरवेतनादिभिरप्येव । अथवा चेत्तन्नां हि तन्वर्तित-
वेतनादिभिरपि वस्तुविद्येयमिति चेत्तन्ना-रुपगमनमप्येति । वस्तुमेव चैतन्मं विवि-
तुल्यत्वं प्रत्ययेव स्वयं तावदित्येव । ततोऽप्यथोक्ततादिभिरप्यवेतनादि-
वादिषा पृथिवीति स्थितम् ।

B'il. Com. on Acārāṅga I II 84

तत्वेतन्ना वायुः कश्चित् जातयुमित्यन्तमादिष्यमवगन्तात् । इदं तत् । अवय-
वत्वेतन्ना अन्तर्हितोदया वायुः इत्यादि उच्यते मर्त्यसूतकतित्वात् । मत्स्यत् ।

तत्वेतन्मं देवो वयस्योपाधौपादानेन पृथिवीवादिषादिभिरप्यवेतनादिभिरपि
इत्यादि उच्यते मर्त्योपादानेन वायुः इति ।

चेतनात्वाद् वायुः अपरमेरित्तिकैव विवक्षितमिति मत्स्यत् । गवाक्षानिह ।
For वत् see B'il. k's Com. on Acārāṅga I vl. 80 and
Barrāthasiddhā on Tattvārtha II 14 "वयस्यं च द्विविधं विदुः
मर्त्यवत्तत् । तत् विदुः कर्म कर्म देवान्तरादि । अतः द्विषां वायुः तेजोऽन्वो-
त्तम् । अविद्यन्तु वत्तन्नामकचर्चोदयो वस्तुविद्येयमिति विदुः च देवान्तरा-
दिभिरप्यवेतनादिभिरपि । मत्स्यत् । पृथिवीवादिषां पञ्चमयत्वात् । तर्हि त्वा-
न्वयत्वात्तन्नादिभिरपि । तत्त्वाविद्वत्ता स्वमयान्त्यवेतनादिभिरपि
वस्तुमेव चैतन्मं विवि-
तुल्यत्वं प्रत्ययेव स्वयं तावदित्येव । ततोऽप्यथोक्ततादिभिरप्यवेतनादि-
वादिषा पृथिवीति स्थितम् ।

—Barrāthasiddhā II 18

A similar doctrine of sentience of matter held by a
certain school of Vedāntins the basis of Upanishad text
is noticed by Bāṅkara in his Com. on Br Sūtra II I 4.

Stanza XXX

महर्षेय etc.—महापुरुषः The blatant heresies.

अनिष्टादिभेदे etc.—Hem.

महर्षिभ्यः Full of jealousies or angry passions. The post-term applied in the sense of excessiveness. Quoted in B. K. on Pāṇ. १. १. ११.

अभ्योदयश्च etc.—यज्ञः यज्ञेनेति etc.—यज्ञ is so called because it is set forth (यज्ञेनेत्यधीक्षते) as possessed of the साम् by means of the हेतु. It is thus the presentation of the साम् (हेतु) in order to prove the साम् (कार्य).

यद्यपि मीमांसकाश्च etc.—The Mim hold that यज्ञः is नित्यः the Brāhmin on the other hand hold that यज्ञः is अनित्यः. Here is an example of two schools diametrically opposed to each other.

सत्यमेति etc.—सत्यं explained in different ways—(1) सत्यमेति यज्ञोत्पत्तेरेति—मेवम् that by which the word goes well to the reality, the teaching in which the word harmonises with truth. यज्ञादिभेदे—Hem.

(2) यद्वा सत्यमविवक्षितेयमेव आद्यमेव यीमांसिकार्योर्वा अनेनेति सत्यमविवक्षितम्. That is to say which gives correct knowledge of the nine categories viz. जीव अजीव etc.

(3) अथवा सत्यमविवक्षितम्—सत्यं आगतम्. The teaching of the Master in which the above named categories come to their own, that is to say, present their true state.

(4) अथवा सत्यम्—The doctrine of सत्यम् सत्यम् and सौम्यम् (See supra notes on St. १ pp 31-3) which has been declared by the Master as “the Mother” (cf. अथवा यज्ञादिभेदे) that is to say good as I kind as a mother.

यद्यपि मीमांसकाश्च etc.—Not leaning exclusively towards either side. When there are no passions such as jealousy and hatred, there is no partisanship.

यद्यपि मीमांसकाश्च etc.—Hem. Let proclaimed by you. His Master proclaimed the same thing as I have? Let in way. For

Stanza XXX

बल्लवैरु etc.—यवाराः The blatant horses.

अनिष्टादिने etc.—Hem.

दल्लरिषः Fall of jealousies or angry passions. The poet-term applied in the sense of excruciation. Quoted in B. K. on Pān. V II 94

अप्योग्यवद्व etc.—यद्व—यद्वपने etc.—यद्व is so called because it is put forth (यद्वपने प्यनीक्षित) as possessed of the लाम्ब by means of the हेतु. It is thus the presentation of the लाम्ब (हेतु) in order to prove the लाम्ब (चर्मे).

य वर मीमांसवतां etc.—The Mim hold that अर्थ is नित्य; the Dailhists on the other hand hold that अर्थ is अदित्य. Her is an example of two schools diametrically opposed to each other.

छावतेति etc.—अर्थ explained in different ways: “(1) लम्बमेति छावतेति सहेतुः that by which the word goes well to the reality the teaching in which the word harmonizes with truth. अर्थविदे—Hem.

(2) यदा लम्बमीमांसवेत्यने छावते मीमांसवद्वपौ अनेनेति लम्बमिति छावते. The doctrine which gives correct knowledge of the actual goes into it जीव अमीर etc.

(3) अथवा लम्बमवने लम्ब आगत्य. The teaching of the Master in which the devotees and categories come to their own, that is say appear their true nature.

(4) अथवा लम्ब—The doctrine of लम्बार वद्व and जीव (See pra Notes on St. V pp 31-3) which has been declared by the Master as the Mitha (cf अर्थमवनाता) that is to say good and kind like mother.

य वल्लवाराः—Not leaning exclusively towards either side. When there are no passions such as jealousy or hatred there is no partiality.

नर लम्ब इति etc.—Yours L. proc'd. by you. Has Hala proclaimed the Jina Agama? Yes in a way. For

although the Ganadharas have presented it in the form of the Sâtras, it is Mahāvīra who has been the real author of the teaching.

वसानवेशाद् etc.—Welcoming all the views without distinction. His teaching is like a necklace of pearls, wherein every system has its proper place like a pearl. This synthetic teaching is the Syādvāda. A similar claim can be made by the Vedāntin of the Sāṅkara school who holds the doctrine of कर्मिर्ब्रह्मविदा.

नह्म मत्वेनैव वसानं etc.—In the Syādvāda, discordant notes are blended so as to make a perfect harmony. In it all the 'little systems' find their great conciliator or peacemaker. As rivers mingle in the ocean, so do all systems mingle in the Syādvāda.

य एवार्थं उच्यते etc.—How is it that we do not see the Syādvāda in the 'little systems'? The question has been answered by Śiddhasena Divākara who, identifying Mahāvīra with his great teaching says "Oh Lord! all views find their place in you like rivers in the ocean; you do not appear in them just as an ocean does not appear in the rivers.

एवमेव etc.—Another way of construing the passage is to take वसानं as an enlargement of the subject एवमेव. It makes मत्वेन (corresponding to मत्वेन in the correlative passage) the predicate.

अथ च सिद्धाद्वयं etc.—The other seems a bit too anxious to void मत्वेन and वसानं. So he would say that the second explanation is सिद्ध.

Appendices.

(१) एते हि दीक्षाएव एवमेव स्वाक्षाएवार्थं सुखमाप्नुयन्मच्छन्तोऽपि स वचनैरेव निराकुर्वन्तो पूर्णं कृत्वा नित्यमिमांविनो बालवत्स एवमवदीक्षाभ्रमोऽप्यवतीयाच क्षान्तस्य इत्यमहङ्कर्षन्ति । अथाहि—अथवात लीनताऽप्युपगमोऽप्येवात्र प्रकटयते । एतन्मैव कथितमकथितमवधारयस्वावैरस्य विचारीतवत् इत्यपि नित्यमिमांविनो वदन्ति न एतन्मैवकथितमेवमार्थं सिद्धं मत्तुवाचमवत् । निरुपेता-

पति ते चेतं पदेहयोग्याः । विद्याभ्यासव्यापकपारमविश्वविद्यालोत्पत्तिभोरनेमि
नीर्वाणधम्मपुत्राणां । अथ वार्यावाविद्याभ्यासकने भावप्रभावस्य विश्वस्य
त्वात् । अनेने तु प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपत्तिवता भवेत् । उक्तवद्वयात् पुनर्विद्याया
विश्वतेति ॥

—Gujaratna s Com. on Śaṅkharāna Samuccaya.

—: —

Stanza XXXI

विश्वस्य वर —वेपर = विश्व Wealth प्रहारिन्वीर Pāp. V. 47 88,
प्रहारिन्वीर Hec. VII. 11. 165. विद्योर्माया वरं etc.—Or विश्व=the
quality and the set of विद् / a. all-comprehensiveness.

इ महीपद्मक etc.—The best of the adorable viz. the Paṇḍu
Paramāmbles to whom bhakti is offered in the famous
formula “अथो अविज्ञेयम्” etc.

नह सिद्धेभ्यो etc.—Why Arhats first? Are not they lower
than the Śiddhas? Do not the Arhats bow to the Śiddhas
on entering the life of asceticism? वाक्य etc.—इत्था वदन्तारं
सिद्धेभ्योऽपि नह तु लोभ्याह

हैर etc.—They do. B. 1. 11 is the teaching of the Arhats
that reveals the existence of the Śiddhas. अत्राप्यु त्वा “नहं तु
हेन विद्या अत्रान्ते वेदाईहति: —विश्वस्यवदन्तारम्—१२११

न्युनेत्वादि—Nidarsatāśamkāra. अवद्या न्यु लोभने etc.—अहं नह
in the sense of to cross being Aśan. pada अहं may have to
be defended by the rule of elasticity of the rule as to padas
(अत्रान्तेपरमितिह्य) = It may be taken as / rm of अहं, नह
to dry p which M seems to pref

अथ वीर्यावपिदिह्येत etc.—A very ingenious bl of comment-
ary Why is there the plural number in आवाप्यो अहं and
वरेण when the person is whom they refer to but one? Answer
It is intended to suggest that there are numberless souls

in the position of the author who venture to describe the greatness of his teaching but fail to do it justice. Thus, the plural number instead of betraying egotism places a banner at the top of the palace of humanity.

यद् वरविपति—Up to this from I to XXXI stamps, the
 motif was वरविपति That in XXXII is विजयिणी

Stanza XXII.

विचित्र—deceitful

अग्रिमिहारी—His teaching is in no point wrong and consequently he is able to show that no other system which differs from it can claim to be altogether right (अग्रमिहारी).

अन्योन्य इत्यादि—Exclusion of all the other systems from the claim of bringing salvation to mankind

एकदम—The wretched beretian.

मायादाता—Jugglers : & the deceitful teachers

शास्त्रीवर्यसे—Practice of the science taught and practised
by the demon *सूक्त* & sorcery

अग्ने दराणि etc.—अग्ने that which blinds + तम darkness =
अग्नेऽवमम् for the affix अ applied to तमम् see अवनमग्नेऽवमम्;
Paṇ. V. 1. 19; Hem. V. 1. 20

द्वयसमम ०१:—Twofold error of confounding, नर with नर and नर with नर A with नर A and नर-A with A.

अर्थः च विशेषण—Thus the Error is what is technically known in the J in Sāstras : विज्ञान मोहनीय चर्च विज्ञान मर्च—The T is like F in VILLI and the V is like W in the latter. The former is of three kinds (1) लक्षणमर्च-मर्च (which makes right of lib or perception defect) (2) विज्ञानमर्च-मोहनीय (the which leads to no y from right of lib or perception)

and (3) **सम्यग्दर्शनम्** (mixed right and wrong faith)—
 Jain's Outlines of Jainism p. 92. On **निष्कारणोक्तिः** Mrs.
 Sinclair Stevenson writes: "The last of the eighty-two
 fruits of **śāra** (निष्कारण-सौमनस्य) is the most terrible of all for
 it deprives a man of the power of believing in the truth. He
 is forced by it to believe in a false instead of in a true god
 and in an evil guru and not in good ones; and in a false
 creed instead of the true faith." ("The Heart of Jainism"
 —p. 139).

उपश्रवणं पञ्चमस्तरे See He-n. Yogasāstra II 3.

अविहंगारिरचन—Whose teaching never swerves from Truth
उप-उद्-उप—the three tests of real gold. The same are ex-
 plained in the Gāthā: वाच्यम् See below

उप—I avoid the life of sin such as Hīma, and practice
 Dhyāna Adhyāyan i. e. meditation, study etc. Mark the
 homogeneity of Brāhmaṇa and Jain religious disciplines
 and practices.

उद्—To see that the outward conduct is in harmony with
 the laws of **वर्ग** and makes for purity

उप—To undergo pain and bondage connected with the
 the life of Jīva.

वाच्यम् वाच्यं वाच्यं etc.—

वाच्यवाच्यो वाच्यवाच्यो वाच्यं वाच्येव ।
 वाच्यवाच्यवाच्यो वाच्यं वाच्येव वाच्येव ॥
 वाच्यवाच्येव वाच्यं वाच्येव वाच्येव वाच्येव ।
 वाच्यवाच्यं वाच्येव वाच्यं वाच्येव वाच्येव ॥
 वाच्यवाच्यवाच्यो वाच्येव वाच्येव वाच्येव ॥
 वाच्यं वाच्येव वाच्येव वाच्येव वाच्येव ॥

—Traced to इतिहासपरिहित पञ्चमस्तरे अनुर्ध्वार by AMP

वाच्यवाच्यवाच्यं etc.—The teachers of the other schools of
 thought teach doctrines which cannot stand the test laid down
 above (**उप-उद्-उप** & **उप**), and are therefore, of gold but

base metal. They can only sink the world in the depths of false knowledge.

ज्ञाता—One who has saved himself and knows how to save others (विद्वत्परिपालयवीज).

एषि etc.—एषि = एष्येय व द्वाप्तरे

वृत्तविक—वृत्ता—संस्कृता—इन्द्रियेण ते वृत्तविका विद्वान् वृद्धा—
Those who have made their intellect; those who have cultivated and refined their mind the wise

वृत्ता in वृत्तविक—परिकर्मिता : a. refined, cultivated adorned, & adorned with wisdom वृत्ता in वृत्तविक—वृद्धा वर्तुमारण्या (परिकर्म विद्यापारिकर्मणो यम्यमाणत्वात्).

SL 1. देवाह्वयजन्हेदुरेदि etc.—One shining with bright weapons consisting of arguments or reason.

ग्रामान्निकमस्तुवाङ्—Those who tread the path which is ग्रामान्निक or which belonged to those who are ग्रामान्निक. Not much difference in sense. It means—those who tread the path of reason or those who follow reason.

हैमचारी—Who have powerful friend in the shape of thought arising from this Song of Praise addressed by Hemacharya to Jina Mahāvira.

तेषां दुर्नवरस्युः—They are never afraid of the robbers namely false systems of philosophy

आगत्येन विद्या—They easily reach the city of विद्या—the scriptures or teaching of Jaina

SL 2. चातुर्विध—(1) व्याकरण (Grammar) (2) आगम (Scriptures) (3) साहित्य (Literature and Rhetoric) and (4) लोके (Logic). See Note on p. 7 and in the Supplementary Notes.

Hemacharya's works in all these branches are well known. (See Introduction)

रौद्रवर्णसमवा—And वारणीयवर्णसमवा

वर्णवर्णसमवा—Where may an evil has been averted by insistent regard for a long time. वारणीय-समवा has been inter

puted as महात्त्व सिद्धान्त (See Hiralal Hansraj's Gujarati translation) But I do not think महात्त्व means महात्त्व and समस्तसिद्धान्त here.

दृष्टिद्वय—The miraculous application which gives a new power to the eye.

६१.४ वायव्यपञ्चमोऽङ्गः इति मन्त्रः—

Let those whose hearts are pure wear this commentary on the praise of the last Tirthankara (Lord Mahāvira) like a garland made of a few doctrines which have been gathered here and which are like tempting flowers resting on the trees of different systems of philosophy

प्रमाणसिद्धान्त—A good expression ! modesty

इत्यनेन दृष्टाव्यं वदति—*to be construed with अहमिति in the second line. It means the inference that he is the teacher of gods on this earth. तेनोक्तविस्तारिणी to be construed with प्रतिभापणम्—from the job imagination which extends thro' ghostly three worlds. निर्द्वयम्—rightly honestly वदेति दशमोद्गारः—अथोद्गारः वदेति.*

संयमोपेक्षितम्—Consists with सत्य—full consistency or agreement with truth. The verse is relative clause, to be construed with हे विप्रश्चर्य of the next line.

SL 6 वायेन्द्रपद्म—Who is in the वायेन्द्रपद्म like the Kaurabha gem on the breast of Vāhnu.

मन्त्राह—May he (इन्द्रायमन्त्रि—the guru of यज्ञिनेय) rejoice

57. 7 लघुपरिमितशालाभ्ये— a. In the Baka year 1214
मह-१४ (चतुर्थ मकर), एदि-२२ (द्वारस आदिनाः):-

दीपमहति—On the day of Diwali the thirtieth day of Āśvina.

87 8. साहस्यो—Composed and made particularly fragrant by the co-operation or rather help of विष्णुवर्धन

87. २. विजयते वदिविजयात्—One who has been like Jina (Lord Mahāvira) owing to his achieving victory over Kāla.

विषय—This is a commentary on the Song of Praise composed by Hemadriya but, truth to say it is not intended to be so much a literary composition as an expression of bhakti towards Hemacandra.

सिद्धि etc.—I do not submit it to the judgment of scholars

उत्पासितवद् etc.—The author is confident that there is plenty of spontaneous thought in his work.

1992-1993

Supplementary Notes

वटिवाचसरे—A title well deserved by one who was 'probably the most learned man of his time

अन्ययोगव्यवहारी—The name of the text commented upon by Mallisena. It means: the work in which the claims of other (non-Jaina) systems of philosophy as expressions of Truth (i. e. the whole Truth) are disproved.

स्वादाह्वयरी—The name of the commentary. In disproving the claims of other systems, the Jaina does not allege that they are wholly untrue, but maintains that they are broken lights of one entire Truth for which J. inism stands in its doctrine of *Syādvāda*—i. e. the doctrine of 'May be or partial truths.

सादस्य —

धीरैववाचसरे च तीर्थे धीमेदिवासना ।
 तर्हि साधुमते तत्रापाज्जिपद्विद्वत्पिता ॥
 निधीयेत्स्वामिनिद्रस्य वासवप्रवृत्तकृपा ।
 आराधनाय नमस्कृत्य मायी ब्रह्महोनिधि ।
 ब्रह्म स्वच्छन्दो वासीर्वाण्य देवदत्तरे वधात् ।
 सुध स्वप्रतिपुत्रार्थं नेत्स्वहीहितपत्रं ते ॥
 इत्युवा ना शिरावच देरी वाचानवीत्यरी ।
 मृत्या तस्या भिक्षा नीत्या पञ्चासगामूपाचयत् ॥
 सिद्धनामन्मनोऽन्नेनैव स्योम सीमा विचरिष्यात् ।
 अमृतमिदमिन्द्रादीरिहबभूव ॥

—Prabhāvakaraṇa of Candraprabha Śrī,

Hema. Prabandha xv 42-46.

रघुनाथ—Author of *पर्यवर्तानुसूय* a *वहावत* See Introduction.

दुग्धनाथ—See Hemachandra's *Abhilaṣanasthāna* I. 42.

ऐराव—Girnar made holy by its association with the name of Neminātha, twenty-second Tirthankara, said to be contemporary and kinsman of Kṛṣṇa.

बाही-सरस्वती. The name points to the original solidarity of Jaina and Brāhmanya beliefs

सोम-सोमचन्द्रः, the name of हेमचन्द्र before he becomes a 'सुरि'

सिद्धचारस्वतः—सिद्धः सारस्वतो (यन्त्रा) वत्स्व to be construed with अक्षर.

चातुर्विधनिर्माणप्रज्ञया—Like Brāhmā who made the four Vedas, Hemacandra made the four vidyās viz. तत्त्वज्ञ भाग्य साहित्य and तर्क In earlier Gujarati inscriptions चातुर्विध is often used for the four Vedas declared by Brāhmā.

For चातुर्विध—Of Prabhākaraśāstrī—

“सोमचन्द्रस्वतन्त्राज्ञोऽक्षरकप्रज्ञाचन्द्रसी ।
सर्वज्ञज्ञानसाहित्यविद्या पर्यन्तिवस्तुतत्त्वम् ॥

—Hema. 37

Of. also श्रीसिद्धराजेन वारविष्णुनामं द्वाः श्रीदेवाचार्यवत्तन्त्रु विद्यासु च वाहीर्षं विचारं कर्णकर्णस्थितं श्रीदेवाचार्यं प्राहुः—Prabodha cintāmaṇi, where the four branches of Knowledge are according to T way “चर्चा the triple Vedas वाच्योक्तिश्चौ । gīo and metaphysics; ह्यव्ययि the science of government and वार्ता practical aia.” This meaning does not seem likely in view of the consensus of explanation given by Jaina writers that the word means वृत्त (Grammar) भाग्य (Canon) साहित्य (Literature including Poetics) and तर्क (Logic including Metaphysics.)

Bhoja, King of Mālava is said to have composed a set of four vidyās which differed from the above in two. They are vārtas of (1) वृत्त (2) अक्षरात् (3) ईश्वर ज्योतिर्विद् or उपैतिव—) and तर्क

Of. अतो हि मानवापीको विद्वच्चरित्रोऽयम् ।
चन्द्राक्षरादीवस्तर्कवाचाणि निर्ममे ॥

Prabhākara—Hema. 76.

For the meaning of वृत्त of. ibidi—

संक्षिप्तं यद्व्योम् सपथेऽस्मिन् वक्तव्यम् ।
महर्षेः सत् विचारितं यद्व्याप्तं वाच्यं सादृशी ॥

पाणिनेर्लक्षणं वेदसाहचर्यस्य च हिमा ।
अनेपादस्यपि बोधेऽस्तिरन्वायिते ॥

— „ 82-83.

औदेषमश्वोऽप्यवागोप्य व्याकरणमश्वम् ।
वाचं चकुर्वन् नीमिन् सिद्धहेमादयमश्वम् ॥
नीतिं तद्वनवागेऽपि निबध्निद्विप्राप्तम् ॥

— 96-98.

For the origin of the use of the word *शब्द* in this sense, Cf. *वर्चं दुषति भवतः पाणिनेराचार्यस्य उच्यते प्रसूतम्*—*Vyākaraṇi Mahābhāṣya*, 1 introduction. The reason for the word *शब्द* as applied to Grammar will be found in the following passage which precedes it. अथैतस्मिन्मन्त्रोपदेशे सति किं शब्दानां प्रविवक्षी प्रविरस्यतः कर्तव्यम् ? । ... । वर्चं तस्मिन् शब्दा प्रविरस्यता ? किञ्चित्तत्त्वान्मन्त्रार्थं प्रवर्तय ।—*M. Bhāṣya* I. a. Grammar lays down general rules, and does not deal with each individual word in the language. Cf. also *शब्दात् एतन्मन्त्रोपदेशे विधात्वात्मनोऽतिरिक्तम् व्याकरणं तु लक्षणप्रधानमिति विवेकः*—*Dargya's Comm. on Yāgy. Brūkta* where *शब्द* in its sense is according with different senses.

अनवरतमिवावगच्छति—*Vid* “अनीतरेषांवाचापरिचयकारणेऽपि चतुर्लोकप्रवर्तमानाः सर्वभूतेषु वाणि विचारितया—*Prabandha* of *Kaṇḍapāla Prabandha* also औपचारिकतरेषु तु हास्यविषयान्ता एवार्थं प्रवृत्ताः । अक्षरचरोऽप्यनारिपदोऽपि विवक्षितः । चतुर्लोकप्रवर्तमानेषु सर्वेषु च औपचारिकं प्रवृत्तम्—*Kaṇḍapāla Prabandha* of *Jñāna-pada-gaṇi*.

विज्ञानं—See *Hemacandra's Abhidhānaśāntikāraṇi* II. 234.—

“पथा तत्प्राप्त्या बोधे कार्यं विज्ञानमन्वयम् ।

तद्वत्ता अथर्वं चैव तदर्थं चारणं तथा ॥

अक्षरचरोऽपि कथम्—*Cf.* अन्तराया दानकाचवीर्यवीरोपमोऽयम् । एतौ एवमर्था बोधितव्यता बोधे एव च ॥ तस्मिन् निष्पत्त्यर्थं विज्ञानं चाभिरुचिस्तथा । एतौ द्वेवच बोधोऽस्तेषामप्यक्षरचरोऽपि ॥—*Abhidhāna* I. 72-73.

अपराधमश्व—*Destruction* । अन्तराश्वकर्म one of the *Karmas*, the eighth the last, which impedes *हास*

व्याप्यविहायैतत्पदो—This consists of the following: कश्चिद्दि दृष्टमस्ति देवदृष्टिं चाप्यत एवम् च । आचक्ष्य देहि कर्तुं शक्नोति विच पदं

देवदत्त (Pravacana Sāroddhāra XXXIX, 440) L. a. अक्षोभ्यस्य
हृदयमधि, दिव्यमणि चामरम्, आलम्ब्य, मायक्य (प्रथममण्डल) मेरी and उच्च

OL. " अक्षोभ्यस्य हृदयमधिर्दिव्यो ज्योतिर्मातरमात्मनः च । धामपङ्क्तौ
हृन्मुमिरातमरं सत्प्राप्तिसदांनि त्रिवेद्यान्नाम् — Quoted in Haribhadra's Com.
मञ्जीवहृति The whole section on त्रिवेद्युति in Haribhadra's Com.
on Nandavātra, will be found interesting in this connection.

ने पदे ज्ञाने etc.—Ācārāṅga L. III 1-4, Sūtra 122.

आत्ममात्रतारक etc.—Who brings about his own salvation
only जन्तुहृत्—Who puts an end to his karmans. देवदी is
अतीतावागमस्तथमन्ववस्तिररापयेती and is described as हृन्मया
हृन्मयावस्तवविह्वानवित्तवयम् । that is, leading a life of
asceticism, with the outward symbol and the inner mentality
of the shaven-headed. हृन्मयेवदी is thus described: "तस्मिन् पदे
निर्देवाराधनितरं हृ प । आत्मा संप्रद्योऽती तदा स्वामुखदेवदी ॥"
—Intense as is the asceticism of the हृन्मयेवदी, he still aims
at his own salvation, and not of the world of living beings, as
does the Tīrthācārya. Compare the distinction between ज्ञाने
and बोधिते or बुद्धे in Buddhism.

अष्टविंशद्विंशति—Thirty-four excellences, 4 सद्देवता (सद्-
जन्मावा) congenital 11 कर्मफलवा L. a. accruing from the
destruction of karmans, and 19 देवता (देवहृता) made by gods.
For further details see the footnote on p. 22 of Ārhat-
Mata-Prabhāṅga edition of प्रमाणमीमांसा

निर्देवपूजो etc.—In the Nīlībhacūpi, 1 th Uddara

हृन्मया—L. a. Stages in the evolution of the soul (Jain).
These are thus enumerated in Gommatācārya Jivakūṇḍ verses
9 10:—विच्छेदो सातपमिस्तो अविरहसम्भो व देवविरहो य । विहरामय
रहो अजुन अविवृ मुहमो व ॥ उपरंतलीमोहो लज्जामेवतिमिहो मज्जोगी व ।
चरुन मीर समता कमेव सिद्धा व पाह्या ॥—L. a. There are 10 stages
of the soul (हृन्मयावा) (1) Kāle bellō (मिच्छे or मिच्छे-
मिच्छाव) (2) Backsliding (अग्रजन्मात्मन or सात्त्विक) (3)
Mixed right a 1 wro g bell ((विरहो-विह्व) (4) Right faith
not noted on, that is, lacking in निरति or abstention (अविरहसम्भो
अविरहसम्भ) (5) Beginnig of right conduct (देवविरहो-देवविरह

St. III.

स्मर वा परो वा etc.—Of. परो स्मरन् वा मा वा निचरत् मतिमान् वा । माचित्त्या विता जाया स्वपदगुणधारिणी ”—quoted in the footnote in A.M.P. edition of *Syadvādamsūtrī* p. 11 from Hemacandra's *S'raṅkācaritra* II 82

ए पयसि चरः etc.—*Tattvārtha-Sūtra-Sarphbandha-Kārika* 29 attributed to Umaprāñi by Mallisāṇa (For the quotation and the authorship of the work see Introduction p. 4 of A.M.P. edition of *सत्त्वार्थ*).

St. VI.

In Notes p. 68 on Page 29 ll. 175-178 of the text read: "The passage that follows is reproduced verbatim in Gunaratna's T. R. D. pp. 261-62" for ".... is taken verbatim from.... सिपिरिह—*S'iva. Śāe* स्वाधोमदेयः सिपिरिहवैरवी"—*Abhidhānasintāman* II 112

इन्द्रोदहृष्टादिकरवले etc.—बुद्धि इन्द्रा प्रबल संकटः परिमाण इन्द्रा सयोग and विनाय

St. VIII

किं विवर्णिता सत्तादोमेव—Possession of सत्ता which is fruitless. The allusion is to the famous character (सिपिरिह) in the *Mahā Bhārata* whom Bhīṣma refused to fight because he was originally a girl. *सिपिरिह* was thus neither male nor a female and, therefore the word stands for what is fruitless. The whole passage is borrowed from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* I L 3. यदि इन्द्रादहृष्टादिकरवले सर्वं सत्ता इन्द्रमपरोप परोप । सत्तादोमेव सत्तामस्येति चेत् अतर्हि सत्तादोमेव सत्ता सत्ता । इन्द्रा इन्द्रा सत्तादोमेव । स्वकपयस्य धावन्तमस्येति चेत् तर्हि किं विवर्णिता सत्तादोमेव । सत्तादोमेव सत्तादोमेव न सत्तादोमेव । सत्तादोमेव सत्तादोमेव सत्तादोमेव । सत्तादोमेव सत्तादोमेव सत्तादोमेव—see pp. 49 50

"योगाचारविमूल्या यस्तोषयित्वा गौडचरम् ।
कवे देवोपिने कावे तस्मै कन्यद्वये नमः ॥"

For "the whole text from एवं तत्त्विका to इति निग्रहस्यावम्" taken verbatim from Gunaratna's Tarkarabhasyadīpikā read "The whole text from एवं तत्त्विका to इति निग्रहस्यावम् is reproduced verbatim in Gunaratna's Tarkarabhasyadīpikā."

In the Bibliography suggested at the end, add Hema-
candra's Pramāṇamīmāṃsā.

अर्थोपनिषदेषु ब्रह्मण्य—Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-
Sūtras, p. 94, l. 5. Quoted also in the Pramāṇamīmāṃsā
l. l. 8 p. 11.

St. XI

साधुनैतिकवेतारे etc.—ब्राह्म, क्षत्रिय, वाइश्य and शूद्र enumerated
here in the ascending order—perhaps with the exception of
Tirthankaras who though men are reckoned as superior to
gods. For the classification see Tattvārtha-Sūtra.

वेत्ताग्निः—The three fires viz. इतिह्य आहवनीय and गार्हपत्य

आरण्यम्—सम्बुद्धमिति विशेषण and

सूत्राकारः—साधुह्यः साग इति साधुवाचः—says AMP.—I do not
know on what authority

आवाचककण्ठः—लोकमनविर्भावः AMP—failare to observe the
verb

आवाचक्यमिति—आवाच साधुवेतसि प्रविचान यत् निश्चये यच्छति तत्रावा-
चमै । इत्येवपरिध्वारिति बहोप । आवाच साधुनिमित्तं वेतता प्रविचाने यथा
पुत्रस्य साधो कश्चयेन मया मच्छति पत्नीयमिति । आवाच कवे पात्रादिदिवा
आवाचमै । लघोमात् मच्छत्यपि आवाचमै । ६ —Preparing a dinner
with the object of serving it to Bādhm.

ननुपेति to.— १ स्वर्ग इवर्ग २ अन्येव वातर्ग ३ अपरेव ह्यपमान-
स्याहमोर्ग ४ स्वर्ग इवर्ग ५ अन्येव पातर्ग ६ अपरेव पात्रमानस्याहमोर्ग
७ स्वर्ग इवर्ग ८ अन्येव कश्चर्ग ९ अपरेव क्षीयमानस्याहमोर्ग—इति मन्त्र-
सिर्षार्थहमात्वा निष्कर्षित्विच्छिन्नात् अमहारे वा ४०३—AMP foot
note on p. 88.

अमरबीजियन्ते कैनास्तिद्वयान्धादि कस्माच्चिरादियन्ते ॥ अग्रे समस्ति यत्रामा
पद्यमिर्बे यत्रामोः । दिवा नाम अवेदयो व नृती न भविष्यति ॥ ... अथ
भास्कम् । यत्रार्थं पक्षपा नृदा स्वयमेव स्वर्गद्वयः । यत्रोऽस्य भूयै सर्वस्य तस्माद्यत्र
बभौत्रया ॥ अथप्य पद्यो द्वास्तिसंज्ञः पक्षिजलनाः । यत्रार्थं निवर्त्तं प्राप्ता
प्राप्तुवन्नुत्पत्तिं पुनः । इत्यारि ननुग्रे द्विजा वैरीकविद्याना वैर्मतावदये प्राहुः
तत्त्वयम् । सति—राजम् । वेतन् तत्त्वम् । यतः दृश्यते इत्यने—अग्निहोमीवमिति
वा पद्यान्ममकारिका । ता न ममार्थं ज्ञानुनां आमका ता मतामिह ॥ यत्रार्थ-
भिन्ना पद्यम् इत्या कृत्वा ध्विरकार्यम् । इत्यत्र यत्रो तितारकादि विद्ं स्वर्गोऽग्नि
कम्पये ॥ तथा श्रीमन्नमस्तुरागे यथोर्विद्यान्ध्याये कृत्वा— ये विदुः शान्तिवत्
इत्यवदेह यद्यत् विस्ततमिह तावदुत्पिन् लोके वैद्यते वरके पतितान् विरवपठयो
बलवित्वा विस्ततमिह इत्यारि ॥ श्रीमन्तावाय् “ अग्रे समस्ति यत्रामा पद्यमिर्बे
यत्रामोः । दिवा नाम अवेदयो व नृती न भविष्यति ॥ ” श्रीमन्नमस्तुरागे इत्यवद्या-
प्यने ज्ञानम् इत्यत्र “ तत्रैव पद्यमुत्पत्तिमिदमितानविपीकृन्मिन्मिन् । व
वेदयोऽपि वि तत्त्ववादा प्रायेण कुलोऽनुचक्षति ताहुः ॥ किंच यत्रार्थं पद्यम्
नृदा परीति इति स्मृतिः । तन्मातममस्त स्मातो वादपमिह न किं नृदा ॥ यदि
यत्रार्थं यद्यः सुहाव्यार्थं व्याप्यतिविरेवा किं न नृत्तम् । अहितास्तं वयो यमः स
हितास्तं कर्म वेदे ॥ न तद्व्यापि यत्रादि आपग्रे जातवेदना ॥ तथाच वर्मनमु
रेके— अन्नमयं सर्वं लोकेषु कृत्वापुत्तिमिदम् । यमस्याविगायोपाक उचित
सत्यमतीत्यम् ॥ इति ॥ श्रीमन्नमस्तुरागे यत्रामन्तावयम्— नार्थं स्वर्गकठो-
यमिन्मिन्मिन्मा मन्त्रार्थिनस्त्वं मया । संतुष्टस्तुवन्मन्त्राय सततं तावो न ह्यत्र तव ।
स्वर्गं वाप्ति इति त्वया विनिह्यत यतः पुन यमिन्मिन् पद्यं किं न करोमि मन्त्रविम्वि
पुनस्तथा वाच्यैः ॥ इत्यारिस्वैमसुरिवाक्यामुत्तसिक्कद्वयं भीच्छेत्तयो वेदोक्त
मार्गस्वाप्रभाज्जममम्वत ॥

—Kumārāvalāprabandha.

2. अविद्येयमीमयो ॥ १, १ ॥—अमरीये अरहपौरस्तन्तु प्यमिहत्वाक-
वत्वे यथोक्तपदेतुल्ये अविद्येय वच मन्त्राय इत्यर्थः । अत्रैव अरिकायामुक्तम्—
इत्यनुवाचिह । न अविद्येयिकातितापमुक्त इति । अत्रैव अरिकायामुक्तम्—
इति । अहितास्तं वयो यमः स हितास्तं कर्म वेदे ॥ न तद्व्यापि यत्रादि आपग्रे जातवेदना ॥ तथाच वर्मनमु
रेके— अन्नमयं सर्वं लोकेषु कृत्वापुत्तिमिदम् । यमस्याविगायोपाक उचित
सत्यमतीत्यम् ॥ इति ॥ श्रीमन्नमस्तुरागे यत्रामन्तावयम्— नार्थं स्वर्गकठो-
यमिन्मिन्मिन्मा मन्त्रार्थिनस्त्वं मया । संतुष्टस्तुवन्मन्त्राय सततं तावो न ह्यत्र तव ।
स्वर्गं वाप्ति इति त्वया विनिह्यत यतः पुन यमिन्मिन् पद्यं किं न करोमि मन्त्रविम्वि
पुनस्तथा वाच्यैः ॥ इत्यारिस्वैमसुरिवाक्यामुत्तसिक्कद्वयं भीच्छेत्तयो वेदोक्त
मार्गस्वाप्रभाज्जममम्वत ॥

ब्रह्मविधि विद् । हुम्नात् हु कं अतामिवेकमेव आत्मविमोक्षः ॥ १८१ ॥ नाह-
 यधिकारं दिव्यारिरीयम् हु अतस्त्वयोर्योगे च हुम्नात् हु-अ हु अन्तरेव पश्यति न तु
 आत्मविमोक्षोऽप्यिवेकमिहति । हुम्नविमोक्षस्तत्तिहृत् एव तिष्ठति । यथा आत्मा-
 तत्त्व अन्तर्निष्ठात् हु अन्तिहृत्तिरेव अस्ति न तु आत्मविमोक्ष इत्यर्थः । तदुक्तम्—
 यथा चक्षुः न दृश्यते दूरता वा उपलब्धम् । अतस्त्वा तत्वेवेष्टा न दृष्टीर्यर्ह्यमिति ।

—Sāṃkhya-sūtras with Bhāṣya.

2. A few texts bearing on the subject of अहिंसा will also be found in Māhār Vṛtti the Sāṃkhya Kārikās.

3. For fairly long list of texts bearing on अहिंसा and अहं and translated in the various volumes of the Sacred Books of the East see Akṣapā In () J nne religion, (b) In Buddh-ism and () in Brahmanism on pp. 30-3. and Sacrifice—(d) Relative value or worthlessness of sacrifice, d symbolical sacrifice on pp. 482-83 in Winternitz Concise Dictionary of Eastern Religion.

4. A most interesting and instructive treatment of the subject with long list of quotations made from the Mīmā and the Purāṇas and the Smṛitis will be found in the edition of the Sāṃkhya Kārikās with Sāṃkhya Tattvakaumudī annotated by Balarāma Uddādes of Benares.

The texts of Bruti, Smṛiti, Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, as well as the views of Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and Bhakti schools of religion cited in the Nyāyādamaspari and in the extracts given above leave no doubt that there was strong body of opinion even in Brahmanism which revolted against हिंसा even वैचरिता (a हिंसा proscribed in Śāstras, not as animal slaughter is sacrifice). This trend of thought seems to have come down from times earlier than the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, mainly in the Bhakti and Jñāna schools as distinguished from the ritualist school of Brahmanism.

St XII

मीमांसकसंस्कृतवाङ्—The school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is one of the two famous schools of Mīmāṃsā a. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā;

परमुक्तोद्योक्षितं हि अस्य लक्षणम् । न च ह्यर्गं कस्त्वहम् इति सिद्धं तावन्म
व्यापकत्वं वाक्यस्य तावन्म तन्मात्रिकत्वं कारकं दृष्टमेव वाक्यं विहाय
स्वमन्त्रवापयत्वं ही च स्वतन्त्रा वाक्यस्य अविशेष्यत्वमिति ॥

कथं तदुत्तरं हि ज्ञानमेवायमर्थमनेवेत्यादि तदपि नावित्तम् । इत्यमर
ज्ञानतत्त्वज्ञानयोश्चैवयमानयो मन्त्रविषयकत्वात् । वाक्यस्यास्य कथावृत्तम्
मुक्तपक्षस्य तत्त्वमिति चेत् । तदुत्तरं । जिज्ञासाश्च तदुत्तरार्थज्ञानज्ञानस्यो-
त्तरमिति पारभाष्यम् । न च जिज्ञासाश्च तदुत्तरार्थं चक्षुरेवार्था लगच्छते । अत्रिज्ञासि
तेष्वपि योग्येतेषु मतेषु तदुत्तरमस्तीति । न चायोग्येतेषु मतेषु ज्ञानम् । आत्म
तन्मतेतस्यास्य तदुत्तराद्या इति जिज्ञासाश्च तदुत्तरार्थज्ञाने ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति ।
तदुत्तरमस्तीति ज्ञाने इत् । नो शेष इति चेत् । कथमेवम् तदुत्तरमस्तीति ज्ञाने
ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति । तदपि ज्ञाने इत् । इत्युत्तरमस्तीति ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति ज्ञाने
ज्ञानोत्तरम् न विषयमस्तीति चेत् । इति न ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति ज्ञाने
ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति ॥

L. The position of the Jains on the problem, whether
ज्ञान is स्वतोद्योक्ष (स्वयमद्योक्ष) or परतोद्योक्ष (परमद्योक्ष) is thus
stated in the P N T स्वपरम्व्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणम् (L. 2.) ज्ञानोत्तर-
परा (L. 15.) तदुत्तरमस्तीति परत पर, कथा तु स्वत परतम् (L. 20).

2. See on a kindred point, Anantavīrya कथं तदुत्तरं on
Māhīryanandin's परीक्षासुखम् —

अत्र मयं तु ज्ञानं स्वतन्त्रमस्तीति प्रमाणं तदपि तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतो
द्योक्ष । न तावत् स्वत अविशेष्यमस्तीति चेत् । तदपि परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । इति
मयं तु ज्ञानमस्तीति तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वतन्त्रमस्तीति पारभाष्यम् ॥ --- ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति
स्वतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । तदपि तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । न ज्ञानमस्तीति
ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति प्रमाणम् । ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् ।
प्रमाणं तदुत्तरमस्तीति ॥

In a portion of his commentary Mallikarjuna has drawn upon
Hemacandra's gloss on his (Hemacandra's) own work—
मयात्मनीयाता—

मयात्मनीयातायां ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति प्रमाणम् । तदपि तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतो
द्योक्ष । न तावत् स्वत अविशेष्यमस्तीति चेत् । तदपि परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । इति
मयात्मनीयातायां ज्ञानमस्तीति तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वतन्त्रमस्तीति पारभाष्यम् ॥ --- ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति
स्वतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । तदपि तदुत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् । न ज्ञानमस्तीति
ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति प्रमाणम् । ज्ञानोत्तरमस्तीति स्वत परतोद्योक्षमस्तीति चेत् ।
प्रमाणं तदुत्तरमस्तीति ॥

प्रत्यक्षावधारणः स्यात्—This is the Mīmāṃsaka's and Vedist-
In's plea for refusing to admit अभाव as a विषय of प्रत्यक्ष or any of
the other ग्रन्थावयव recognised by the Naiyāyikas, and consequently
to setting up a special ग्रन्थ for apprehending अभाव called
अहपरिच्छिन्नः. The verses on this point run as follows in Mīm.
ŚL Vārt. V 17-18:—

प्रत्यक्षावधारणस्तु भावार्थो दृक्ते नरा ।

आप्तप्रत्यक्षप्रतिपत्तिरभावादि विदुषिहेतुः ॥

—I. e. प्रत्यक्ष is possible when something positive or the
positive aspect of a thing, is apprehended; but when
अभाव—a negation or negative aspect of thing—has to be
apprehended, the method by which this is done is the fact
of 'अहपरिच्छिन्नः'—I. e. प्रत्यक्ष etc. do not arise here to testify to
anything positive. This is made clear in the next verse in the
Mīm ŚL Vārt.

य आहपरिच्छिन्नेषां नास्तीत्युत्पत्तेरिति ।

आवाक्येनैव संवाच्ये योग्यत्वादिभिर्निरूप्यते हि ॥

निर्दिष्टेन हि सामान्यं etc.—The preceding verses (Mīm. ŚL
Vārt. V.—आहपरिच्छिन्नः १) will explain this:

अन्वेष्यमाणेच्छिता निर्वर्णं स्यात् सामान्यनिर्देशयोः ।

विशेषणा न सामान्यं ते न तस्य अहपरिच्छिन्नं हि ॥

—सामान्यं हि भाव सामान्यं तत्त्वचमस्तु बहुषु निवेष्टेन स्यात् इति च
विशेषणां निवेष्टेनैव वस्तुमान्तरात्मको भावात् निर्दिष्टमिति । अन्वेष्यमाणेन वि-
शेषणात्तद्व्यतिरेकभावात् अहपरिच्छिन्नमिति—

अहपरिच्छिन्नमिति ह्यत्राकारणं अन्वेष्यमाणं दर्शयति—निर्दिष्टेन न सामान्यं
अन्वेष्यमाणमिति । सामान्यमिति भावात् विशेषणान्तर्गतेन हि ॥ निर्दिष्टेन वस्तुमान्तरा-
त्मको भावात् निर्दिष्टमिति । अन्वेष्यमाणेन विशेषणात्तद्व्यतिरेकभावात् अहपरिच्छिन्नमिति
ह्यत्राकारणं अहपरिच्छिन्नमिति हेतुहेतुवत् ॥.....

तत्र सामान्यनिर्देशोऽपि स्यात् सामान्यविशेषणयोः ।

The reader will notice how the Mīmāṃsaka, in recognis-
ing this aspect, admits the Jain doctrine of अन्वेष्यमाणं

निर्दिष्टेन हि सामान्यम्—This occurs in K. mīm. ŚL Vārt.
ŚL Vārt. C. अहपरिच्छिन्नं इति च आहपरिच्छिन्नमिति । अहपरिच्छिन्नं

विवा सा च न सिध्यति ॥ (S'L Vārt Ākṛti-vāda 5) विशेषमात्र इवे च
न सामान्यमतिर्भवेत् । सामान्यमात्रबोधेन न निर्निमित्ता विशेषणीः ॥ (ibid. 6)
—“यदि तावदसाधारणं स्वच्छन्दमेव वस्तु स्वाङ्ग सामान्यं यथा सौमतेरुपपत्ते
उत्तोऽर्थे गौरवमयीति सामान्यदुर्द्धिर्न स्यात् । यदि तु गौतमिवावधेयविशेषा
नद्वयव्यावृत्तात्मनोऽप्यहत्वं महासामान्यं सम्भावेन वस्तुद्वीकियते यथा
वेदान्तवादिसिद्धयते ततो गौरवमयोर्ध्वं व्यापकेषोपयिति विशेषदुर्द्धिर्न स्यात् ॥
—Hyāyanaśākhā, Comm. on S'L Vārt.

Kuṇḍaliṇa makes a very close approach to the Jain view
on the subject when he says: “अव्योपापेक्षिता निर्यं स्यात् सामान्य
विशेषाः । विशेषार्थं च सामान्यं ते च तस्य भवन्ति हि । निर्निमित्तं न सामान्यं
कवेच्छविषयवत् । सामान्यरहितत्वाच्च विशेषास्तदुपेक्षं हि ॥” (S'L Vārt
Ākṛti 9-10); and further on in answering the objection of
विशेष Kuṇḍaliṇa says “विशेषस्यावरोधमात्रादुपपन्नं न वृज्यते । सामान्या
व्यवस्थिते विशेषे वैचल्युत्तिता । सामान्याव्यवस्थितं विशेषाज्जिज्ञासता ।
एवं च परिहर्तव्या विवक्षितव्यवस्थया ॥ केचिद्व्यावृत्तव्यवस्थं वस्तुतः चास्त
वेवविद् । सामान्यस्य तु बोधे नृते तस्य विशेषता ॥ एवंविद्याऽप्युपेक्षार्थं
विशेषैक्यं च वासितः । यथा वस्तुव्यवस्थं वपेक्षं वर्यविप्रदः ॥ विप्रव्यावृत्तव्यव
स्थेन वेदान्तवादिसाधारणम् । सामान्याद्ये तु निष्कृत्य मेरो देव प्रसाध्यते ॥ (S'L
Vārt. Ākṛti 54-57)—which B. R. elucidates in words which
remind us of the Jain doctrine of सामान्य and विशेष regarded
as two aspects of one reality “यदि कवेच्छुमेव सामान्यं स्वाङ्ग
अव्यवस्थितं इव विशेषा उत्तोरेक्यं विद्यमाने । यथा तु विशेषा अपि
सामान्यात्मनामेकदुष्टका सामान्यं च विशेषाव्यवस्थितव्यवस्थि तदा बो विशेष
इति । एतन्मात्राव्यवस्थेन कवेच्छुमेव—तथाव एवमिति । एतदेव एवंवति
केचिद्विदिति । एतत्वं हि व्यापकेयप्रमत्ता वाङ्मनेवादिबने । स्वकदेन च न विद्यते ।
यथा व्यवस्थितव्यवस्थि व्यक्ति व्यावस्थिता न विद्यते स्वकदेन च विद्यते इति
भवेज्जामेदावबिरोध । व्यवस्थितव्यवस्थि विविधव्यवस्थि वस्तुव्यवस्थामेदादु । एवमपि
हि विविधव्यवस्थि इत्थं विविधव्यवस्थि हीर्षं वक्ष्येऽपि कैचो द्वित्वापेक्षया विवोऽपि
व्यवस्थामेक्षया न विद्यते । जनेवेदान्तव्यवस्थि परिहर्तव्यम् । एतेन हि वस्तुव्यवस्थेन
वर्धं तर्हता कैचनपि व्यापकेयव्यवस्थामेक्षं व्यवस्थिति न विरोधा इति ।—...
नामावर्धं हि वस्तुनि च एव वर्यं निष्कृत्य एवंविद्यमिवते च एव वर्यो
एवंविद्यम् । यथा नामावर्धं वस्तुनि वर्यं वेदान्तव्यवस्थं संवत् इति ।”

हेतोर्ह्यसिद्धिरेव etc —(Āptamīmāṃsā 26) is thus explained
in अद्वैतमीमांसा—उपपत्तिर्नैव साधनम् साध्यतावनवोत्पत्तिर्नैव स्यात् ।

by the other schools, some apprehending and emphasising one aspect and some the other

ते च द्वयस्तिकमवाहयति etc.—For the best exposition of this subject, see the section on नवमीपाता in Abhayadeva's commentary on Siddhasena Divākara's Saṃmatī-tarka. (Pūrṣatattva-mandira Edition Vol. II, pp. 271-310).

ते च द्वयस्तिकमवाहयति नौ गीर्वाणकेशः—I was wondering what could be the point of केश in गीर्वाणकेशः—I then remembered the passages which I have quoted above from Kumārila and his commentator. In view of these passages, Kumārila and his commentator certainly deserve to be assimilated with the Sādvāda school and not claimed as mere द्वयस्तिकमवाहयति. For full exposition of द्वयस्तिकमवाहयति and पञ्चमस्तिकमवाहयति and the schools which severally fall under them, see Abhayadeva's Commentary on Saṃmatī-tarka, Chapters on Naya Mīmāṃsā.

एषा च वदन्ति—एतासु पञ्चस्यवाक्येषु etc.—I think the title of this work by Pandita Aśoka (as the colophon runs)—who is assigned to circa 900 A. D. is really सामान्यवृत्तवृत्तिरिह and not सामान्यवृत्तवृत्तिप्रसारिता as found in M. M. Dr. Haraprasāda Śāstri's edition of "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts" published by the A. B. Bengal and accepted in AMP edition of the Sādvāda-mañjarī footnote, प्रसारिता there being only a predicate of "रिह" and meaning has been set forth.

The concluding verse which follows this as summary of the book is as follows: पञ्चस्यवाक्येषु स्वरूपे (corrected in the Preface into-वर्णने) न पञ्चस्यवाक्येषु स्वरूपे साध्यान्वयमतिवाक्ये न च निश्चयावाक्येषु सदा। ता वदन्तिपञ्चस्यवाक्येषु हि विनाशान्ते न जातिस्ततः साध्यान्वयमवाक्येषु द्वयस्तिकमवाहयतिप्रसारिता ॥ १ ॥ Generally is not found reading in the five fingers whose attributes (i.e. states or phenomenal being) we apprehend by perception; no does it appear in the idea of form which is apprehended by conception. What is perceived is the same fingers distinctly (then in निश्चयावाक्येषु now in द्वयस्तिकमवाहयति). Therefore there is no such

thing as Generality (वार्ति or साधारण्य). That several words produce one idea and are denoted by one word arises from our confounding likeness with unity or sameness. The general line of reasoning is thus indicated in the opening portion of the work: व्यासं निरुक्तं च साधारण्यं वैः प्रकल्पितम् । बोधयन्निन्दते तेषां तद्वचः कृतान्ते । अथविशयवचनतेः परस्परविकल्पकत्वेन प्रकल्प समीक्ष्यमानैक्यविशेषादिप्रकल्पनिष्पन्नमहवाविकल्पं सामान्यं न मान्यं मन्योति व्यभिचि । साकल्यवचनविरहात् साकल्यमानसंस्कारमिति वृत्त । तथापि परिं साधारण्यतापरकमुक्तमवशिष्यते वै । अतस्तत्कारं कार्यं अतस्तत्कृतसुविशयत्वं वक्तुं ननु दुष्तेषु अहं व्यभिचि साकल्यम् । अस्ति च परस्परतर्पणविकल्पकत्वात् कल्पविकल्पकत्वमहवाविकल्पं विज्ञायं तद्व्यवस्थितकृतसोपाकल्पकतया साकल्यतात्पर्यात् । एतौ नवति ननु साकल्येण साकल्यः व्यक्त इति वक्तव्यं परावर्तनम् । न च हेतुमतात्मेन वस्तु व्यभिचि । अतएव हि वाच्ये कथा निष्पन्नसोपाकल्पकतया ह्यवशिष्यते ॥

व्यास रीतिरित्यभिप्रेत्याह सर्वज्ञानव्यवहार अतिविशिष्टादेवे प्रत्येक-
विशेषयोग्यविशयात् पूर्वं एवावगत्यव्यवहारः । एतन्मूर्तज्ञानव्यवहारेकत्वात्
गण्यगुण्यत्वेति पञ्चदेवो रीतिरित्युक्तम्—The word रीतिः denotes
both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems altho gh more
often in this work, the Nyāya. But I have not been ble to
trace to their source these katus, which look like sūtras either
of the Nyāya or th Vaiśeṣika system, but are not found in
their existing sūtras. Of एवं विभाष्यतोवी एतन्मार्गव्यवहारम् ।
रौप्यविकल्पविरहितं अहंमोक्षविकल्पम्—B/L Vārt. VI 108 where
the commentator presents the Jain doctrine as follows
रौप्यं अहंमोक्षव्यवहारं परिमाणं एतौ तेषां चाधिक्यः सर्ववस्तुमपि च
अतिविशेषात्कार्यं कृतान्ते व्यासं प्रकल्पितम् ॥

= In Kārikā 108-113 [of this section of the B/L Vārt.]
we find refutation against the Jains, who believe soul to
be material and tangible, to travel from its place of origin to
our auditory organ, and to consist of component parts
(padgulas). [This is criticised in the foll wing verse]

अहंमोक्षव्यवहारं तद्वचनं परिचयितम् ।

अतिविशेषात्कार्यं च तेषामभिप्रेत्याह ॥

This belief in the substantiality of sound must have had originally more supporters than the Jainas. In Europe too it has been upheld for a long time and is expressed by Lucretius in his *De natura rerum*. — 'The Vaiśeṣika System' by Dr Faddeson, p. 189

In connection with the passage on *अव्ययत्वम्* contained in this Stanza and its commentary consult particularly *अपरिणामविह्वलम्* in Kumārila's *Bhōka Vārtika*, the *Nyāya Sūtras* II. II, and *अव्ययत्वम्* in Abhayadeva's commentary on *Bhammatīarka* (Gujarati *Parā-tattva-mandira* edition Vol. II)

On p. 16. of the Notes with reference to "वैशेषिक—The Vaiśeṣikas would say" please note that the term *वैशेषिक* very often stands for *Naiyāyikas*, but may apply sometimes to *Vaiśeṣikas* also. Here the subject is more in the line of the *Vaiśeṣikas* than of the *Naiyāyikas*; and therefore I have said "The Vaiśeṣikas" etc.

विद्यमानत्वम् कदा—Quoted in *Ratnakaravārtikā* I. 9

सर्वत्रैव स्वरूपेण (p. 91 of the Sanskrit text)—The verse has been quoted by Hemacandra in *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* p. 44. Before him, it was quoted by Siddharṣi in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*. (Siddharṣi, the author of *Upamitibhava-Prapancakathā*, completed it in 908 A.D.)

अविनाशं अविरोधम् etc.—Quoted also by Devabhadra who lived in the second half of the twelfth century that is about a hundred years before Malliṣya

CL. *अव्ययतां न वरजार्थेन किञ्चिद्व्यर्थं बहुवचनव्यतिथिः । सर्वं यत् वाच्य-
तादरो वाच्यः । निश्चेद्यर्थेनमेव वाच्यतादरोऽव्ययतादेव बहुवचनः । यत् तु वार्तव्यं यत्
अपरिणामव्यतिथिर्वाच्यतादरो वाच्यतादेवि तत् यत् तदातीति विद्यमानव्यतिथिर्वाच्यता-
दरो तत् अव्ययतादरो वाच्यतादरोऽव्ययतादेव बहुवचनव्यतिथिः । अविनाश-
वाच्यतादरो वाच्यतादेव बहुवचनव्यतिथिः । अविरोधवाच्यतादरो वाच्यतादेव बहुवचन-
व्यतिथिः । अविनाशवाच्यतादरो वाच्यतादेव बहुवचनव्यतिथिः । अविरोधवाच्यतादरो वाच्यतादेव
—Conn. on *Bhammatīarka* p. 173. *Parā-tattva* Edition. अदो*

o the doctrine of negative denotation is a logical necessity of Śākyavāda. The doctrine is endorsed by other schools of Buddhism also Cf. Stcherbatsky's "Conceptions of the Buddhist Nirvāṇa" p. 155 footnote 8. But the school of Dignāga have a special theory of their own about the meaning of words according to which words express only relations, or mutual negation (अपौरुषेय = परस्परपरिहार = सम्बन्धावधि = व्यवच्छेद = परिच्छेद) between point-instants. For an exposition of this subject see Ratnakīrti's *Apoha Vāda* one of the Six Buddhist Treats collected and published by Haraprasada Śāstri (S. S. Bengal Series). Note, however that the doctrine is not always put forward in the extreme form in which it has been taken by the critics of वास्तवविरोधस्यैव विविधैव केवलेष्वभिहितं वाक्यव्याख्यायां किल व्यापारविशिष्टो विधिः सम्मान्यते. एवम् न मन्वेकप्रकारेणैकविशेषोपायकः — Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* p. 2.

The subject of अपौरुषेय was hotly discussed by the Buddhists, the Jains and the Brāhmanas in the age of Kumārila and also in the few centuries before and after him. See Kumārila's *Śloka-Vārtika*, which contains a special section on the criticism of अपौरुषेय. Both the criticism and the original doctrine have been examined at great length in the section on अवयव-तत्त्वसमीक्षा in Abhayadeva's commentary on *Bhāmatitārka* pp. 172-270 which refers also to the contributions of Uddyotakara and numerous other logicians in the discussion of this great question. See also Śāntarakṣita's "Tattva-saṃgraha" with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, and for a brief discussion, Bhīḍharṣi's commentary on *Nyāyavārtika* pp. 4-5. The subject has been also fully discussed from the Nāyāyika (Brāhman) point of view in the *Nyāya-saṃgraha* of J. yasta. See Vol I pp. 220-227.

अपौरुषेयत्वमात्रस्यैव etc. — As Kumārila contends: अपौरुषेयविः सामान्यं वाच्यं वै परिचयितव्यं । नौर्यं वस्तुवै तैदमत्र बोधोदयमिरा एवम् । Note, however that in Kumārila's philosophy सामान्य is only the other side of विशेष both of them being aspects of the same reality.

विचिचारिण्यु etc.—These are different from the विचिचारिण्यु referred to in the com. on Sammatitarka “अथ विचिचारिण्यु मेर इति” whose “विचिरेण प्रत्यक्षार्थ” means that the denoted object is a positive reality and not an empty negation (अपोह). The विचिचारिण्यु, the विद्योपचारिण्यु and the वैद्यचारिण्यु are different forms of one common doctrine that every proposition (वाक्य) is a positive or negative mandate (आज्ञावाक्य विचार्यवाक्य—Pūrva Mīm. Sūtra) no proposition being in its ultimate effect, a mere statement of fact. Even sentences with a verb in the indicative mood are understood by them as subordinate to some other sentence which has a verb in the imperative mood. Thus all such texts as तत्त्वमसि नर्गं पृथिवीं ब्रह्म ऐतदब्रह्ममिदं सर्वं are subordinate to such central texts as तद्विजिज्ञातव्यं सोमेष्टुः विजिज्ञातव्यं etc. (See the concluding paragraphs of Rāmānuja's Sri-Bhāṣya on विज्ञातव्यकरण (L. L. 1) and his exposition of तत्त्वमसिकरण (L. L. 4) this logical attitude may be compared with that of the present-day Pragmatists in American and European philosophy. The following passage in L. P. Jack “The Education of the Whole Man,” on disguised imperatives will be found interesting: “Then it was that it flashed upon me with the force of a revelation that all philosophies and sciences, without exception—both those I agreed with and those I disagreed with—were injunctions to live in a particular way and avoid living in other ways. They all come to their spearpoint, so to speak, in some kind of injunction. They were all disguised imperatives. Behind the information was the command, which took the form, “Live in this way and avoid living in that.” Commands disguised as information. On the subject of वाक्यार्थ-वैचित्र्य विचार्यवाक्यार्थं विदि विद्योप etc. see Nyāya-manjari of Jayanta Vol. I.

St. XV

ब्रह्मसामानाधिकरान्ये etc.—Cf. ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनेन ब्रह्मब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनेन
 ब्रह्म । अहमिदमिति भूयः तद्विपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ॥—8 K 47 ब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन = ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना-ब्रह्म-ब्रह्म-विपरिवर्तनाः ब्रह्मसामान्यं ततो-बोह-ब्रह्मबोह
 ब्रह्मसामान्यं ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाः ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि B. T. K. 163d The latter
 are the tech. or terms of Śāṅkhya philosophy for ब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन of Yoga which is defined in Patañjali's Sūtras (1) ब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन-ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना-ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना-ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना (Pat. Yoga
 sūtras II 5), (2) ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना (II 6), सुब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन (II 7), ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि (II 8), ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि विपरिवर्तना
 ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना (II 9). For a further light on each of these which
 are collectively called "ब्रह्म" by Patañjali, and "विपरिवर्तना" by
 Vyāsa by way of giving a synonym of ब्रह्म, see Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

ब्रह्मसामानाधिकरान्ये etc.—Cf. अहमिदमिति भूयः तद्विपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ॥—8 K 53 As regards details
 cf. Taittiriya Ka. mull. Māhātmya-Vet. of Śāṅkhya-Cāndrikā
 द्व्यापि or द्व्यापि for लीला १ text d place II after द्व्यापि
 द्व्यापि is the same. The b is in the note of Vācaspatiāli is
 on ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना will be of and interesting. ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि
 ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ।

ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि etc.—अवस्था (Infirmary) which is second on
 the list for विपरिवर्तना is of twenty-eight kinds, of which eleven
 are इन्द्रियवर्तना, or sensations इन्द्रियवर्तना, two of the latter being
 the opposites of also द्व्यापि (Laziness) and eight the
 opposites of eight सिद्धिः (Attainments) (ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिव-
 र्तेन ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि—8 K 49)
 B. T. K. — ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि
 ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि —thus mentioning ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना instead of ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना
 as found in our text.

द्व्यापिब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि etc.—The also द्व्यापि (Occa-
 sional) are thus classified in the B. K. "ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि
 ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तनाद्व्यापि
 While accepting that ब्रह्मविपरिवर्तना is distinct from द्व्यापि if one
 stops there and does not strive to realise the distinction by

अपज, मदन etc. he suffers from तुष्टि (Complacency) regarding the Self (आप्यायिकी). This is of four kinds: (1) प्रवृत्ति (Nature), (2) उपादान (Means) (3) काल (Time) and (4) बाह्य (Look)

(1) The first is thus explained in ■ T. K. कस्मच्चित्तुपरेवे विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि ब्रह्मतिपरिणाममेव स च प्रवृत्तिरेव करोतीति दृष्टं यवान् म्यात्मन तस्मादेवमेवमस्व चेत इति ब्रह्मवृत्तिरेवमस्व तिष्ठत्यस्य तुष्टिः प्रवृत्ती सा तुष्टिः इत्यतस्तस्या नाम्न इत्युच्यते — It is the attitude of complacently resting in प्रवृत्ति instead of rising to the realisation of the true nature of ब्रह्म—the result of a kind of natural Fatalism. It is esoterically known as अस्माः (2) The second वा तु प्रवृत्त्यपि विवेककथातिरिक्ता वा ब्रह्मतिवाञ्छाप्रवृत्ति वा क्षुत् सर्वस्य सर्वदा तस्माच्चस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यविवेचयत् प्रवृत्तिवात्सल्यं वा धवति तस्मात् प्रवृत्त्यामुपादरीया दृष्टं ते व्याप्ताभ्यावेवाप्युच्यते इत्युपरेवे वा तुष्टिः सोपादानाकथा — One may accept the view that Natural Fatalism (प्रवृत्ति) is wrong because Nature is the same for all and consequently the विवेककथातिरिक्ता of one who is content with the fatalism of Nature is no good. But if he thinks that Asceticism is all that one has to add he is mistaken For without the practice of त्याग more asceticism is useless. (3) The complacency of such a man is complacency in regard to Means (उपादान) This complacency is esoterically known as 'सखि' वा तु प्रवृत्त्यपि सर्वो न विधीयतेति किं कान्तारि-वाचनमेव सिद्धि ते निवारयति अनुसुप्ततया तत्र इत्युपरेवे वा तुष्टिः सा क्षमाकथा—ओर इत्युच्यते ■ I imagine that प्रवृत्त्य in the future will come with bears to it and the afore त्याग is unnecessary is wrong This kind of complacency — pathetic belief in the potency of time—is क्षमाकथा तुष्टि which is esoterically known as ओर (4) "वा तु प्रवृत्तेर्न वाक्यावात्पुनरात्मविवेककथातिरिक्ता अपि तु वात्पारेव चेत इव ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमतिशालानि मातुस्त्वदकारर विवेककथातिरिक्ता मुक्तानि ब्रह्म तस्मात् मातुस्त्वद हेतुर्वाप्य इत्युपरेवे वा तुष्टिः सा व्याकथा वा दृष्टिरित्युच्यते ■ When the realisation of the distinction between ब्रह्म and प्रवृत्ति (विवेककथातिरिक्ता) is regarded as a state of pure luck (e.g. the children of मराठवा who practised neither ब्रह्मवा nor त्याग before realising the distinction), it is kind of तुष्टि which is called बाह्य and is esoterically known as इति Next comes the group of five वात्पुष्टि, which with the

—Discussion with friends: = स्वोद्योक्षितं मयममयममेव आमुद्योक्षितम्
 मयमेव स्वोद्योक्षितमप्यये न ब्रह्मते न वातम् पुनश्चिन्तयन्तमप्ययेन संवाचते
 अतः सुहृत् पुनश्चिन्तयन्तमप्ययेन संवाचयन्तं वासि सुहृदप्यति This is
 known in myathic lore as 'रम्यक' (5) दार्ढ्य = दृढिर्बिन्दुद्वयस्य (From
 ईर बोधने to purify) One's own ज्ञान has to be confirmed by
 discussion with friends. This purification takes place when the
 विवेकप्राप्ति is absolutely freed from सन्देह and विपर्यय together
 with their वातवा or संस्कार (अविच्छेदं दृष्टिं ता च सप्तसप्तसप्त-
 विपर्ययानां परिहारेण विवेकतादात्म्यस्य स्वच्छप्रवादिप्रस्थापनम् —This
 सिद्धि is known in esoteric language as सदासुरितम् In add-
 ition to these five, there are three principal सिद्धि consisting of
 the distinction of the three kinds of दृष्टि viz. वाच्यसिद्धि अवि-
 च्येतिद्धि and आधिदैविद्धि. These are called प्रमोद दृष्टि and मोक्षमात्र

संवाचसिद्धि—For this reading of the AMP edition, one
 may read संवाचसिद्धि—which are used elsewhere to evolu-
 tion and involution respectively

For "the whole passage from संक्षयमते to पञ्चविधसिद्धि
 is extracted from Guparatna's com. p. 97 on Sad. II
 Samuccaya 34" in the Notes p. 169 read "The whole passage
 ...is reproduced in Guparatna's com." For the Note
 on महत्त्व—generally understood as Cosmic Intelligence—
 consult Keith's Sākhya System p. 79 where the earlier
 view is distinguished from that of the Sākhya Kārikā where
 Stream is held on the 'Int. Inst. as psychological." On p. 171
 of the Notes read The same are reproduced in Guparatna's
 com." instead of "The same as in... ..On p. 174 of the Notes,
 for "The slip was originally Guparatna's etc." read "The
 slip was originally Mallikarjuna's, which has been repeated by
 GuparatnaCould it be that in the time of Mallikarjuna
 (read this for 'Guparatna') On p. 175 ll. 1-2 for "The whole
 passage.....is reproduced from Guparatna's commentary"
 read "The whole passage is reproduced in Guparatna's com-
 mentary"

वाच्यदार्ढ्यबोधोपपाद—In the AMP edition p. 123 footnote
 वाच्यदार्ढ्य is said to be वैराग्यमप्यविच्छेदः Evidently this is a

mistake, arising from the figure of विष्णुसिद्धि which as a matter of fact is as much a property of Śāṅkhya as of Vedānta. वाचस्पति seems to be a work of Śāṅkhya, as is clear from the text where a number of authorities are quoted in support of the Śāṅkhya theory: Patanjali (This should be Vyāsa, the commentator of Pāṇini who may well be regarded as an authority on Śāṅkhya which is a sister science of Yoga), Vācaspati Miśra, Āndri and Viśvavyāsa. Ābhya-śara Śāri, a Jain writer is also said to have composed work of the same name (see the Preface of Prabhāvakara, verse 4 विष्णुसिद्धिवाचस्पतिरयम्—अथ वाचस्पतिरयम् विष्णु-)

विष्णुसिद्धि लेखी योगवाचस्पति—Viśvavyāsa is well known as contemporary of Vasubandhu who lived in the third century A. D. As regards his identification with Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the Śāṅkhya Kārikas see J. R. A. S. 1905. But this hypothesis is now definitely rejected and we know that the name of this dweller in the Vindhya was Rūdraka, as we see from a verse cited by Kamakṣi in his commentary on the Tattva Saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita which runs as follows: “वदेव एषि इच्छीरे वच्छीरे तद्वीदि च । वरुण एषिच्छेदेव कथारित विष्णुसिद्धिः —।” The Śāṅkhya philosopher—Rūdraka—who identifies cause and effect! his लक्ष्मण—his indeed a man of the jungle (the Viśvavyāsa who does not know what is milk) what is cards and how one differs from the other

तथा वच्छीरे—आपुरि was direct pupil of वशिष्ठ. For the Śāṅkhya गुह्यविश्वरूपता रीति—वचस्पतिप्रसिद्धं मुनिरामुत्तमं वचस्पतिं प्रसीद । आपुरिषि वचस्पतिः देव वसुधा कुले वचस्पतिः —। K. 76. Māthara explains the latter names between वचस्पति and देववचस्पति as follows. वचस्पतिरेव तत्रात्मा चार्णवोद्भूतः सतीति तद्वचस्पतिरा-वचस्पतिः । See also p. 39 of Keith “Śāṅkhya System.

एवं दौर्गतमिदं etc.—Note that this doctrine of the Nāgārjuna which is the opposite of that of the Buddhist logicians Dharmakīrti is similarly rejected. This is in order to establish the resulting अनेकान्तवाद of the Jainas. अपरा पूर्वार्थमिदमप्यथा... आकरोष्य। सौमत्तं क्रितेर्षं प्रमाणयति—सर्वं सत्यं अविचलं etc. of दत्तकव्यवृत्तिं यथा अक्षरं सत्यं यथा इमे सत्तावच्छिन्नार्थवर्णनं मित्रे सिद्धे सिद्धा न ता। नाप्येकमनियाम्यदापि परस्परं क्रिया सा यथेष्ट इवापि अयमप्युक्तविराज सायैव विद्यमान्यति ॥ For a statement of अक्षरवाद see Ratnakīrti's Treatise on 'अक्षरवादसिद्धि' and Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" pp. 181-184, also Śāntarakṣita's Tattva-Saṃgraha with Kamalaśīla's Pañjika—Section on स्थिराक्षरपक्षे (G.O.S. Tattva Saṃgraha Vol. I). For its criticism, see Śāntara Bhāṣya on Br. Sūtras II II, 19-22. The Jain position is thus argued and summed up by Haribhadra who quotes सर्वक्रिया न पुत्रैव नित्यं अविचलवदोः। अमात्रमात्रं यत्तत् सा अक्षरतया मता इ" of also Gaṇaratna's com. on अविचलं सर्वज्ञं सदा ॥ Śāntara Saṃgraha 7 pp. 30-31. On p. 195 of the Notes, in l. 8 from the bottom read Br. Sūtras II, II, 11-17 and in the last line of Prajñāka Gupta's date is given in Dr. Vidyābhāṣana's L.L. about 940 A.D. On p. 199 of the Notes—for if we read "we cannot" in ll. 6 and 7 read "if there are" and "we could not" respectively. For "Śāntara Com." read "Śāntara Com. of Gaṇaratna; and the same for "Śāntara" on p. 202. To the list of Reference Books add 6 Abhayadeva's Com. on Saṃmatitarka, 7 Nyāyabindu of Dharmottara with Nyāyabandhinīkā of Dharmakīrti 8. Śāntarakṣita's Tattva-Saṃgraha with Kamalaśīla's Pañjika, 9 "Six Buddhist Treatises" 10. Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṅkāra Mādhyamikā Vṛtti, 11. Vijnapti-mātṛakāśhī, 12. Account of Buddhist schools in Kern's "Indian Buddhism" 13 Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" 14 Sogen's "Systems of Buddhist Thought" 15. Suzuki's "Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism" 16 and Stcherbatsky's Introduction to his "The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa".

St. XVII. —

इह व्यापारिनामपक्षवितर्कितः—For S'ānyavāda see Madhya mīkāvrtti, Stcherbatsky's "Buddhist Concept of Nirvāṇa and Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" Ch. XIII.—"The Negativism of the Madhyamaka

For an examination of the doctrine from the Brāhmaṇa point of view see Kumārila's Ślokavṛtika, sections on निरात्मकत्वम् and व्यापारम्. For the Jaina examination, See Com. on Saṃmatikāra, चक्षुषीमात्रम्.

व्यापारि वेदवचनं हि—Quoted in Ratnakaravārtikā on P.H.T. VII 55 p. 142. The whole commentary on "अथात्र प्रायश्चित्तं मत्तित्वात्" and "वेदवचनम्: परिच्छादी कर्तुं आह्वयतोऽप्यवरोहपरिवाचः मत्तित्वेन हि तत्तत्परिवाचोऽप्यवमिति" (P. H. T. VII 55, 56), both in Ratnakara and Avācika, contains good dissertation on the nature of Ātman according to the Jainas. See in this connection, Pravacanaśāstra. For the Buddhist examination of rival doctrines see Tattvasaṃgraha with Pañjikā Vol. I, sections on व्यापारिणा B'l. 171-249 pp. 79-180.

For the interesting question of the nature of Ātman according to other schools, consult Jayanātha's Nyāyamañjarī, Rāmānuja's Bṛīhatsya etc. On p. 211 of the Notes in II 8 & 6 from the bottom "beavatten" is a wonderful misprint for "obscuration." It puzzled me for few minutes to find out with what word it could have been confounded. On लुप्ति = concealment or obscuration, see Suzukī's Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism. लुप्ति corresponds to "व्यापारिणी लप्ति" which conceals (by the व्यापारवर्धन of अविवक्षा or वाचा) the "वार्तावर्धनी लप्ति" which lies beyond it.

एकान्तवर्तनीयान्तराद्ये etc.—"एवं च व्यापारवर्धनी, एतेषु पुनः द्वयवर्धन आचरणम् । त एव च वेदवर्धनी, एतावन्तर्धनी च धीवर्धनी —i. e. व्यापारवर्धनी which is the first of the four obscuring Karmmas. धीवर्धनी—वर्धनिकैः वस्तुवर्धने वस्तुवर्धनवर्धनी वरति = a. the Karma which detracts the exercise of moral will; moral weakness. See A. M. P. edition of Pramāṇasamūhikā pp. 18-19 footnotes.

अन्वयं हि स्पृत्यसंभवे तावन्मुक्तम् । तत्र कार्यकारणभावमिच्छादेवि भाष्यतम् ।
 न हि कार्यकारणभावाद्विद्यते तत्तात्पार्यत्वादीनामन्यतमो दोषः प्रतिपद्यते ।
 नापि स्वपक्षेतिहिरणेन विद्यते । नहि कार्यकारणभावात् स्पृतिरित्यस्योपपत्तिरिति
 द्योतिता । अथ—“वस्मिन्नेव हि संज्ञान आदिता कर्मभावनया । कर्मैव तत्रैव
 संवदे कर्ताते रक्षता यथा ॥” इति कर्तातरक्षताद्वयान्तोऽन्वयमिति चेत् तद्वत्तावीचय
 तावन्वृत्तात्तमभावात् । अन्वयपर्यवसानात् साध्यम् । नहि कार्यकारणभावात् न
 तत्र स्पृतिः कर्ताते रक्षतावदिति अन्वयः संभवति । नापि वद्व न स्पृतिस्तत्र न
 कार्यकारणभाव इति अतिरेकोऽस्ति । अतिहत्वाद्यद्वयान्तात् न वृत्तम् । नहि
 ह्येतोऽन्वयवदित्यत्र हेतोः कर्ताते रक्षतावदित्यनेन कर्मिहोरा प्रतिपाद्यते । किं च ।
 वद्वन्त्येव कार्यकारणभावेन स्पृतेस्तपश्चिरिभ्यस्ते तदा सिम्बाबावीरिद्वयोनामपि
 कार्यकारणभावतन्त्रेण स्पृत्यसि स्यात् । अथ नार्थं प्रसङ्गः । एकसंज्ञानत्वे मतीति
 विवेकपरिति चेत् तद्वत्तुक्तम् । वेदावेवपक्षान्तां तत्त्वोपपत्तीवत्त्वात् । कर्मपरिपरा-
 त्तत्त्वावेदे हि कर्मपरिपरात् सा तथा च संज्ञान इति न किञ्चिद्विरुद्धम् ।
 ये तु परमार्थिचोऽन्तरमार्थिचो वास्तौ स्यात् । अन्तरमार्थिचत्वे त्वत्वं तदेव वृत्त-
 तम् । परमार्थिचत्वे स्थितौ वा स्यात् क्वचिद्वि वा क्वचिद्वि संज्ञानविनिर्दिष्टेन
 रक्षामिति किम्मेन स्तेनवीर्यस्य स्तेनान्तरवद्वत्त्ववीर्यवद्वत्त्वम् । स्थिरमप-
 र्वात्मन्युदेवाः ब्रह्मन्तं परमार्थवत्त्वम् । अष्टौ विद पुत्राऽन्योऽन्य-
 स्थिरवद्वत् परमार्थिचः प्रसिद्धः ॥—P N T Ratnakaravāṭikā.
 Ch. VII pp. 142-143.

Of a similar line of argument in Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on
 Br. Śā. II il. 25—अवृत्तत्वेन.

Appendices

1. In Hindu and Jain accounts of Buddhist philosophy we find mention of only four schools, viz. (1) the Mādhyamīkas, or nihilists, (2) the Yogācāras, or subjective idealists, (3) the Sautrāntikas or representationists and (4) Vāśīṣṭhīkas or presentationists. The chief tenets of each of these schools are supposed to be summed up in the well-known stanza—

अर्थो ह्यनन्तमन्वितो मतिवता वैद्याविद्वेजोऽप्यते
 मत्तद्धो नहि वाच्यस्तु विनरु लीलाप्रियेराभितः ॥
 योगाचारमतस्यैवमिदं तावन्वृत्तिः । यथा
 अन्वयः सत्तमन्वयः कृतवित्तः स्वर्गा पदं संविदम् ॥

These four probably represented the principal classes of Buddhists who flourished in India at a time when militant

Vedāntism was hurling the missiles against the moribund faith of Śūta.

—Sogen's Systems of Buddhist Thought—

Mallīnga does not mention any of these four schools by name, but they are just those which have been criticised by him. The doctrine attributed to the Mādhyamika in the last line of the Śāstra makes it identical with the doctrine of "Para-Brahma" as maintained in the Śāṅkara school. The Jain, like the other schoolmen, takes it to be the doctrine of *śūnyatā* in the sense of Universal Void or Emptiness which is the very opposite of Śāṅkara's Universal Plenum (पूर्व—of पूर्वनिर्दिष्ट पूर्वपद पूर्वार्थ पूर्ववृत्तयस्ते : पूर्वस्य पूर्वकारण पूर्ववैचारविषये [Upasādh.]), and yet it is curious that as a representative text of the *śūnyatā* Mallīnga quoted a passage (सर्वं स्वात्मनः प्रत्यक्षमेवमवसरे व हृदयस्थेन चरितमिति वाच्यं) which has been attributed to Dīṇāga (See Randle's "Fragments from Dīṇāga" and Parthasarathi on Mīm. S' Vāri and Uddotakara's Nyāya-Vārtika and Vācaspati's N V Tātparya) who was certainly not a Mādhyamika Śūnyavādin.

Śābharavānśa and Kumārila—the great Bhāṣyakāra and Vārtikakāra respectively of the Mīmāṃsā Darśana—however use the word *śūny* not in the sense of Universal Void, but as negation of distinction between *śūny* and *anye*, the *anyatā* i.e. the particular form, being one which cannot be said to be either that of *śūny* or that of *anye*. The *śūnyatā* is thus different from *śūnyavāda* in which only one of the two viz. *śūny* is supposed to possess the *anyatā*, thus rendering the reality of the other superfluous. Both these have been considered apart from the *śūnyatā* [Śāstra XVII].

ॐ नह सर्वं एव निरात्मनः स्वभावः । प्रत्यक्षं हि निरात्मन्यतया स्वभावः स्वकीयः स्वमे । आद्यतोऽपि स्वमे इति वा दुःखं इति वा प्रत्यक्षं एव वदति । तस्मात् नोऽपि निरात्मन्यः ॥ स्वमे । स्वमे इति आद्यतोऽपि दुःखं दुःखमिति वाच्यं निरात्मन्यतया । स्वमेऽप्येवमेव दुःखमिति वाच्यं । प्राज्ञः स्वमेऽपि न वदति इति वाच्यं । न । स्वमे निरात्मन्यतया । निरात्मन्यतया

इत्युक्तिम् । तस्मान्मात्रादितरत्रापि भविष्यतीति चेत्तद्वि स्वप्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्या-
पक्षः आपत्त्यवस्थापि तथा भवितुमर्हति । अथ प्रतीतिस्तथामात्रस्य हेतुः न
वक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् अयमप्य इति वक्तव्यम् । अन्वयस्तु स्वप्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्याभावो
निर्णयानुबन्धतः । कुत इति चेत् । तद्विज्ञेयं मन्त्रो दीर्घत्वाद् मित्रा मिथ्याभावस्य
हेतुः स्वमात्रे स्वप्नान्ते च । सुषुप्तत्वाभावात् न । अन्तेयमेव हि चतु इत्युच्यते ।
तस्मात्तस्मात्प्रत्ययो न भिद्येति । नह्य आपत्तोऽपि कल्पयितुः स्यात् । यदि
स्यात् अवगम्येत । स्वप्नदीर्घत्वादेऽपि नावयम्बत इति चेत् । तत्र प्रहृष्टो
मन्त्रोऽप्युक्ति विज्ञाकामं ये यत्र आसीदिति ॥

अप्यस्तु वक्ष्य—अर्धज्ञानघोषकारयेर् नोवक्ष्यमाणे । प्रत्यक्षा च नो बुद्धिः ।
तत्तत्तद्विषयवैक्यं नप्य न विविचिस्तीति पक्ष्याम् ॥ स्वादेतरेषं यथार्थकारा बुद्धिः
स्यात् निराकारा तु नो बुद्धिः आकारवान् वाच्योऽयं । स हि तद्विषयसंज्ञः
प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । अर्धविषया । हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः न बुध्यन्तरविषया । इति
हि स न बुध्यन्तराकारमवस्थास्यत इति । तत्प्रमाणैवासीत् तावदे । आपत्तिरिति च
अर्धज्ञानघोषकारयेरिति यदुच्यते तत्र । न अज्ञातेर्न कश्चिद् बुद्धिमुपपन्नते । ताते
तु अज्ञानादवगम्यते । तत्र औपपत्त्यवस्थापयत् । वक्ष्यमाणानेव बुद्धौ तातोऽयं
इत्युच्यते वाच्यत्वाभावात् । अतः पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रत्यक्षते यथार्थतातोऽयं । तस्य । पूर्वं
बुद्धिः प्रत्यक्षते न तु पूर्वं तावते । यद्वि हि कदाचिदेतद् यथातोऽयं स्यात् अज्ञात
इत्युच्यते । न चाप्येवमपरेषामन्तरेण हरे कपोपकम्पयत् । तस्मात्तस्मात्परेषाम्
इति । अप्येवैव च न । प्रत्यक्षत्वं । तस्मादप्यवस्था बुद्धिः अपि च कथमेवकम्पयत्
इत्येवमाभावात् नार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्र । न वैकम्पयत् । अवाकारानेव बुद्धिः
पक्षमिदमेव । तावत् नार्थं प्रत्यक्षत्वेवावगम्यते । तस्मादर्थकम्पयत् प्रत्यक्षम् ।
अपि च निवृत्तिमिच्छतस्तन्मन्त्रोवादीकमानेन परप्रत्यक्षम् । इतरत्र तस्मादर्थेवि
करादिद् वदुद्धिः पक्षमेवमवस्था स्यात् । न वैकम्पयत् । अतो न निरालम्बका
प्रत्यक्षः । अतो न व्यभिचरति प्रत्यक्षम् ॥

—Śābara Bh. on P. Mīm. I. 1. 5.

—Note that the second paragraph begins with “अप्यस्तु”
and yet ends with “निरालम्बका प्रत्यक्षा —thus making little
distinction between अन्वयत्वाद् and निरालम्बनत्वाद् The same is the
case with the Vārtika also.

See also Kumārila B'l. Vārt on निरालम्बनत्वाद् and अन्वयत्वाद्,
and Śānkara Bh. on II B'l. “वैकम्पयत् न स्वप्रतिपत्तिः”

2. “The fundamental doctrine of this Mādhyamika school
has been imperfectly understood and grossly misrepresented
by the so-called scholars of Buddhism in Europe, and latter

day India. Most of them give the appellation of Nihilism to this school, simply because Nagrjuna applied the terms

Sūnyatā or emptiness to express his conception of human life and truth. Sūnyatā, however.....does not imply "nothingness; it simply expresses "the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world" or absolute restrictedness of the non-moral side of the universe"—Bogen's "Systems of Buddhist Thought"—p. 194. Bogen approvingly cites the following passage from Suzuki's "Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism"—

Sūnyatā simply means conditionality or transitoriness of all phenomenal existence. It is synonym for *śūnyatā* or *pragati*. Therefore, 'emptiness' according to the Buddhists, signifies negatively the absence of particularity the non-existence of individuals as such, and positively the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of causes and effects. It must never be understood in the sense of annihilation or absolute nothingness; for nihilism is as much condemned by Buddhism as naive realism.

Similarly in regard to the अचरकण्डार Mr Bogen says that it asserts the "momentariness" of the phenomenal world only leaving the noumenal reality untouched. I agree that the original teaching of Gautama Buddha probably amounted to this only but I am not sure whether the later Buddhists did not go further. If Mr Bogen's interpretation of अचरकण्डार is correct, it coincides with the Jaina's "अवयवपरमार्थः सः।"

St. XIX.

वीरवदिकानां—The word वीरवद originally meant scientists who based their conclusions on observation or Nature-love (see Rhys Davids's note in his Introduction to Kūṭadanta Sūtra, in "Dialogues of Buddha" Vol. II. S. B. R. p. 165. See also Haraprasād Sastri's "Lokāyata," a Bulletin of the Dacca University

As regards the unreliability of अहमात्र as a प्रमाण Gunaratna narrates an interesting story alluded to in the following couplet of Saddarśana-samuccaya of Haribhadra:

“एतावानेव लोकोऽर्थं वागानिन्द्रियमीकृतः । अत्रैव बुद्धयर्थं पश्य बहुरन्त्यबु-
 दुताः ॥ (8D) अत्रार्थं संयच्छन्—अस्मिन् पुनरी वासितक्यवाद्यवासातितान्त्र
 कालो निजं आवासासितक्यमतिविश्रमतिं स्ववाच्योक्तुमिच्छतिपुनः प्रत्यं
 वसिषोवदति । ता तु वदा न प्रतिशुक्ले तदा त इवमेवोपादेव प्रतिशोत्स्व
 इति स्वयेति विचिन्त्य विज्ञाया पथिमे वामे तथा तत्र वमपथिमेव श्री प्रत्य-
 वासीत्—मिमे व इमे वमरवासीती वम पथेकविश्वेश्वमावादिमान्प्रमाकवा
 ओकेन च बहुकृततवा व्यवहियमाया विपश्ये पश्य तेषां वाक्यविचारवाक्यं अत्यु-
 मिति । ततः स नयच्छासारात्म्यं अत्युपार्थं वाक्यमन्वारहप्रमुमरतमीत्यतमीकृत
 वाह्यप्रकरे रात्रमार्गे इवोपनि स्वकथोरुदुद्यमरेधिमीनमवाहुतिवर्षं यौकित्या
 स्वच्छरीरसोवसो वदसो यंस्तु न्यायेन बुद्धयर्थमि प्रकथे । तत्र जातस्त्वानि
 वानि विटिक्वस्तोक्ते लोके रात्रमार्गेमिच्छत् । वस्तुतः अपि तथामता अत्र
 प्रत्यमीकृतं यो यो बुद्धयर्थमन्त्यवाह्यपरात्वा त्रं विधिं बुद्धः वमव कर्तव्यमा-
 प्यत् इत्यादि । ततः स वास्तवाभावमावाविरीक्य निजं अर्थं अत्रत्य इमे
 विदे बुद्धयर्थं पश्य निरीकृत ॥

The principles of the school are thus summarised in the Saddarśana Samuccaya.

कोशवत्ता वरमर्देनं वदति जीवो न निर्हति । वशीयमो न विवेके न कर्म
 पुण्यपराधे ॥ एतावानेव लोकोऽर्थं वागानिन्द्रियमीकृतः ॥ अत्रैव बुद्धयर्थं पश्य
 बहुरन्त्य(J मि)अबुदुता ॥ निजं अत्र च वाच्योक्ते वरतीत वरमग्निं तु तत्र
 ते । यदि जीव मर्त निवर्तते मनुष्यवत्तामिति कथेवम् ॥ (११ 80-83).

Appendix.

“वदन्तुर्बं प्रत्यक्षमेवैवं अत्रार्थं वास्तवावदिवयित्वेतरप्रवृत्तिमित्युपेक्षितं ।
 इत्यदि—अर्थावित्तवाहक अत्रार्थमित्युच्यते । प्रत्यक्षस्य च प्रामाण्यमेव व्यवस्था-
 प्यते । अस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षप्रतीर्षित्वेनोपाद्य प्रमाणवति—प्रमाणवेत्ता अर्था-
 वित्तवाहकान् अद्वैतवास्तव्यकिंचित् । न च तानिरेव प्रत्यक्षप्रतिदि-
 स्वतविदित्यति पर व्यवहार्येदुमवगीत तादां स्वर्तमिचिह्नत्वात् । बुद्ध्याव
 मत्वकथं । तथा वास्तव्यं प्रमाणमित्युपादेयैववाह्यमावित्तत्वं कुर्यात्तर्था
 कोऽप्यत्र स्वात् । त्रं अतो तद्वामार्थं प्रतिपादयेत् वम-वाह्यपार्थं प्रमाणं विदे
 वाह्यत्वात् अद्वैतवाह्यमाव्यकिंचित् । क्त्वत्वात्वात् । अत्र परवर्तित्वेन
 प्यते । वरमपुनः वदन्तुर्प्रतिशुक्लपार्थं प्रवतः प्रमाणमत्रवार्थं वा । प्रमाणं
 वेत्तव्यमुपावमवावित्तुच्यते । अत्रार्थवार्थं कथमववात्वेन तदा वेव वरा प्रमा-

नये । एतेषु तस्य प्रामाण्येनाभ्युपगताव्यवहिते चेत् तदव्यवहितं प्रथम् । यदि वाप्य
एते प्रामाण्यप्रमाणमेव प्रमाणमित्यव्यवहितं चेत् नवताऽतिविशेषेणापि वैवाची
प्रतिपाद्यते । यो ह्यतो दृष्टमेव विद्यमिति ज्ञायते किं तस्य मातृविशेषमेवापि इति-
वता पुत्र एव हीनते । तदेवं प्रत्यक्षाद्व्याप्यतेः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये व्यवस्थापकतो
नवतोऽतिविशेषतोऽपि कवरावातमहमात्मनः प्रामाण्यम् ।—*Siddhānta & Commentary*
on Sātra Kṛtikā p. 17

एवं वास्तविकप्रियमयो दृष्टविज्ञानोऽपि विचारार्थः—*OL. S'il. Com. on*
Sātra-Kṛtikā pp. 15-17 । न दृष्टिवाचित्यतिरिक्तं नान्यथास्ति तद्वाहक
प्रमाणवत्त्वात् ।—अतः केतनं तेष्टव्यमते तद्वृत्तेष्वेव कावरावातरिजतेष्वपि
व्यवहारे मयाहेतु उच्यते । यदव्यवहितं । तदेवं दृष्टव्यतिरिक्तमव्यवहितोऽ
व्यवहाराद्यव्याप्येव केतनव्यवहितं व्यवहारादव्यवहितं ।—... ननु च
यदि दृष्टव्यतिरिक्तोऽप्यतः कवरावातमहमात्मनः परार्थो न विद्यते कथं तर्हि दृष्ट इति
व्यवहारे इत्यव्यवहितम् ।—अथैवं कावरावातरिजतौ केतनव्यवहितौ तत्त्वं तद्वृत्तं
हेतुमव्यवहितम् किंवा व्यवहारे वाच्योक्तमव्यवहितं वाच्यं हेतुमव्यवहितं व्यवहारे
किंवा व्यवहारे भवति ततश्च दृष्ट इति व्यवहारे व्यवहारे ।—इति दृष्टव्यतिरि-
क्तव्यवहितव्यवहितं ।—... इत्यव्यवहितं नवा दृष्टव्य नवव्यवहितव्यवहितं
व्यवहितव्यवहितव्यवहितं तच्च विचार्यमाणं किंवा वैवाची तद्व्यवहितं विचार्यमाणं
विचार्यमाणं । विचार्यमाणं नवव्यवहितम् ।—... नवव्यवहितं तद्व्यवहितं
वैवाची—किं दृष्टव्यं प्रत्येकं केतनव्यवहितव्यवहितं वा ।—... नवव्यवहितं नवा
नवाव्यवहितव्यवहितं प्रत्येकं नवव्यवहितं तद्व्यवहितं मातृव्यवहितं तद्व्यवहितं
विचार्यमाणं वा नवाव्यवहितं वा विचार्यमाणम् ।—... किं च दृष्टव्यव्यवहितव्यवहितं
नवाव्यवहितं ... केतनव्यवहितं । तच्च दृष्टव्यव्यवहितं वाच्योक्तमव्यवहितं
व्यवहितव्यवहितव्यवहितं । तद्व्यवहितं वाच्योक्तमव्यवहितं वाच्योक्तमव्यवहितं
व्यवहितव्यवहितव्यवहितं । नवाव्यवहितं कवरावातमहमात्मनः ततोपगत
इति विचार्यमाणं एवं च यदि एव प्रामाण्येनाभ्युपगता नवता

To the List of Books of Reference add 5 Nyāya Sūtras,
6 Prakaraṇa Bhāṣya with Nyāyakandallī.

St. XXI.

परवैवाची etc.—*OL. "प्रत्येकं नवव्यवहितं तद्व्यवहितं नवाव्यवहितं तद्व्यवहितं पुत्रः
पुत्रिहारादव्यवहितं दृष्टं विचार्यमाणं नवव्यवहितम् । नवाव्यवहितव्यवहितव्यवहितं
व्यवहितव्यवहितव्यवहितं इति विचार्यमाणं नवव्यवहितं नवाव्यवहितम् ।—Ratnakar-*
raṭikā.

पूर्वोक्तबोधकारणोर्विचर्यबोर्वासांतंरूपेण बी परिहारस्वीकार्य तासां स्थिति
 तैव स्वार्थं वर्य स चासी परिचामय । इतेनास्य इत्यपर्पोवाक्यकार्यकिंनो-
 पपत्ते । अयमर्थः । न इत्यर्थं न पर्पोवर्य बोधयव्य वस्तु येन तत्त्वमासी शेष
 व्याप । किंतु स्थित्युत्पादक्यात्मकं धर्म्म जाद्वन्तरमेव वर्य । तेन तत्वात्तदकारि
 संनिवर्त्ते अर्थेव इत्यपहा तां सामर्थ्यकिंतां इति तदकारिहतां बोधवार्यपर्य-
 वपत्रीपतो विद्याविबोपवासाविबोर्वासातमोर्वासाप्रसुरितात्मन इत्यपव्यमात्रिदो-
 वस्तुतादृशान्निदीयस्व भावस्व न व्यापवाव्यवस्थितिवर्त्तेनार्थकिंवासा नापि
 तत्त्वव्यस्य तत्त्वस्व विद्वत्तिरिति सिद्धं इत्यपर्पोवाक्यं वस्तु प्रमायस्य विवर्त्त ॥
 —Com. on Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā pp. 45-46

Stanza XXV



३७४

Note that reference is here made to those fundamental problems of Ontology on which the philosophers, not only of India but of the whole world, are divided, and which, therefore provide suitable principles for their classification (1) Some are *Eternalists* in regard to all things; they believe that everything is *permanent*. Some are "*Non-Eternalists*"; they believe that *everything changes*. Intermediate between the two are "*Semi-Eternalists*"; they believe that some things are permanent, while others not; in other words, some change while others do not. To the first category belong Vedāntins of the Śāṅkara school, who believe that one eternal principle, Brahman, is the only reality. They have however to recognise the fact of change or impermanence even if they may not consider it necessary to explain it, change, according to them, being unreal and irrational and therefore, by its very nature incapable of explanation. To the second category belong the Buddhists who believe in impermanence or change of all things. All the other schools of thought fall between these two extremes, which are represented in the history of Greek Philosophy by Parmenides and Heraclitus, and in Modern European Philosophy by Spinoza and Hume. Between the two fall all other schools of thought, which accept both the extremes in one way or another. In the Nyāya Vedānta

school, some things are regarded as permanent, and others as impermanent. Things, accordingly fall in two distinct classes; nothing being at once permanent and impermanent, as with the Jainas. The Sāṃkhya school maintains the doctrine of Prakṛti and Vikṛti, that is to say of one eternally changing Prakṛti. Virtually this makes the nearest approach to the Jain doctrine of *śūnya* and *vyākhyāna* but it still differs from it, inasmuch as the Sāṃkhya view the two viz., Prakṛti and Vikṛti are not regarded as *two aspects of one Reality from different points of view* as in the Jain Philosophy. I do not know however whether this difference should be regarded as substantial and essential, or as formal and of no moment. Patañjali, Yāgya and those schools of Vedānta which are known as Bhedābheda and Viśiṣṭādvaita belong to this intermediate class, as far as they endorse the view of the Sāṃkhya.

(2) Another principle of the classification of philosophers is their attitude regarding the problem of the *Universal* and the *Particular* or the *One* and the *Many*. The differences among philosophers in this matter run on parallel lines to those which divide them on the question of Permanence and Change. Compare on the problem of the Universal and the Particular the controversies of Realism, Nominalism and Conceptualism in the history of European Philosophy.

(3) The third point on which Philosophers are divided is the competence or incompetence of words to capture the nature of Reality when it is found to be consisting of contradictions from opposite points of view. All philosophers agree that Reality cannot contain contradiction from one and the same point of view. But the Jain maintains that it can.

It does contain contradiction, although from different points of view. According to the Vedānta of the Śāṅkara school this only points to unreality and irrationality (*Māyā*, *Ākāśa*, *Anirvacanīyatā*), or contradiction in Reality or Truth.

(4) *Being vs. Non-Being* is another problem which divides philosophers. This division also, like No (3) runs parallel to that in No (1). The two are not only reconcilable, but always coexist, although as viewed from different viewpoints, according to Jainas. The two extremes were harmonised by Heraclitus in the category of Becoming which however sinks back into that of non-Being.

Stanza XXVI

These controversies of *निव्वार* and *अनिव्वार* go back to the *Brahmajāla Sūtra* of the Buddhist canon where a record is made of the various schools of *Brāhmanas* and *recluses* who held different views. Among them are *Eternalists* (*Sāśvātikā*), *Non-eternalists* (*Asāśvātikā*) *Semi-eternalists*, *Annihilationists* (*Ucchēdāśvādikā*). Thus some are reported as holding—Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new is steadfast as a mountain peak as a pillar firmly fixed and though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away fall from one state of existence and spring up in another yet they are for ever and ever. Again it is said There are brethren some recluses and *Brāhmanas* who are *Eternalists* with regard to some things, and in regard to others *Non-eternalists*. Some recluses and *Brāhmanas* are *Semi-eternalists*, and maintain that the soul and the world are in some respects eternal and in some not. (S B R. *Brahmajāla Sūtra*)

In some of these doctrines, one may see *Anekāntavāda* of the Jainas. Also This world is neither finite nor yet infinite.

अवस्थितस्य इत्यस्य पूर्ववर्गनिवृत्तौ etc.—O is the commentator *Vācaspathiśra*, puts a note “*वर्गश्च अविद्यते वर्गश्चावस्था वाच्यः*” I. e. *वर्ग* incl. des., besides itself, *उत्पन्न* and *अवस्था*

Stanza XXVII

अप्रमाणं भवति :- Definition of सदान as given in Pra
śastapāda-Bhāṣya

अप्रमाणं इति, — and इतिप्रमाणं हि नान्ये इति, — Quoted in the
Ratollārīvatīkā Ch. VII 6 pp. 143 and 143 respectively

Stanza XXVIII

अप्रमाणं — This is a strange misprint in the Notes on
p. 293 for अप्रमाणं

नैव — None of the commentators' explanations of the
word seems to be satisfactory and there is, besides, no certain
tradition the point. Probably it rigually meant the
point of view invol ed in coming from the general to the
particular in which both the general and the particular get
equal recognition. Compare सिद्धय of the Nyāya school in
which one comes to the particular from the general or
universal, both of which are equally real.

सदृश — The viewpoint of th comprehension and con-
sequent merging of particulars i the universal. (सम. सदृ-
शं प्रेक्षते — to take-सदृश).

सदृश — Superficial point of view. Probably applied at
first t those who read the Sātras superficially witho t the
light of the commentary

सदृश, समसिद्ध and सदृश — In these mayas exaggerated im-
portance is attached to the form of expression in the ascending
order सदृश — In it differences of grammatical forms mark
realities different. समसिद्ध — In it differences implied by
different synonyms cause differences t Reality सदृश — It
takes note of the present condition only and unless an object
is possessing the kriyā at the time, the nam will not be
pelled to it.

Stanza XXIX.

अथा चोक्तं शक्तिविकारेण—अत एव न विहास्य सुखमाप्नुयुः etc.—“अथ प्रसूतो न विहासते”—A. M. P. But Śrīdhara quotes this in his *Hyāyakandali* p. 88. “यथासुखीतिविकाराः” etc.

युक्तिव्यवस्थेर्वा जीवत्वमित्येव साधनीयम् etc.—I cannot agree with Jacobi and other writers who see primitive animism in the Jaina doctrine of Universal sentience. To me it appears to be a conscious and deliberate expression of sympathy with all Nature which is based on the belief that all its objects are endowed with life. I would rather go without the early date if it rests only on this ground than accept this humiliating characterisation of its great religious tenet.

Stanza XXX.

अन्वे त्वेवं व्यावहृते—Evidently Mallisona seems to know earlier glosses on the *Dvātrāṃśikā*, written or oral

अन्वोन्मेषश्च etc.—The derivation of the word एव given by M and found elsewhere also (see Commentary on the “*Hyāya pravaśa*”) is clearly far-fetched. एव implies the metaphor of one wing of the bird as opposed to the other wing; this word having originated in the atmosphere of debate.

अथा हि सर्वोपपत्तिं etc.—Unlike the Vedāntin who demonstrates अनिर्वचनीयता and gives rise to gnosticism—although unintentionally—the Jaina establishes harmony among all the *dārśanas* by recognising that all are partially right rather than that every one is partially wrong†. This implies however that the Jaina steps in only after other systems have done their work, it may be, even of mutual recriminations.

B. B. E. Vol. XLV I introduction, p. xxxiii.

† That the present work displays the latter feature shows how difficult it is to live up to one's ideal.

सहस्रस्यपिर्वाद्यत्वात्—(Bāṅkhyasūtra V 56) । न च सप्त
रापोरिदमेव इति वाच्यम् । प्रत्यक्षभेदेनापिरोचत् । अपाहि लौकिकं विन्दन्त्येन
सत् एतद्विगतप्रतिविम्बत्वेन आसन्निति दृश्यम् । अपा वा एतत्तं वज्रिणीदीप्त-
त्वेन सप्तसहस्रस्यस्तत्त्वेन आसत् तत्रैव सर्वं जगत् स्वरूपताः सत् किमप्याह्वय-
त्वेनकल्प्य आसन्निति । एतमेवावस्थाभेदेनापि लक्ष्मणमनिरुद्धम् । अपा हि
इहोति प्रकटावस्थाभिः सत्त्ववृद्ध्याद्यवस्थाभिरनन्तरं मयि तस्मिन् प्रकृता
निर्दे सप्तसहस्रस्यमिति ॥—Bāṅkhye Pravacane Bhāṣya.

Stanza XXXI

बहुशक्त्याविष्कृतत्वात्वेनवच्यम्. बहुशक्ता literally means the
state of being possessed of good powerful things, hence of
powerful legs.

दुर्लभं परमैश्वर्यम्—I think Mallikena is wrong in rejecting
the better known √दृष्ट् to cross (अतिशयमार्थं लक्ष्मि) and
preferring the obscure √मृ to dry up (लक्ष्मि कोटम्). The
reason which he suggests for his preference of the latter (दुर्लभं
परमैश्वर्यम्) is not very weighty being rightly countered by his
second thought— अविर्लभं वा आत्मनेश्वरम्

Stanza XXXII

सिद्धाश्रय—Of the titles स्वावतिश्रय and सिद्धाश्रय-
सिद्धाश्रय of Kṛishṇānanda.

शरद्वचन—a thor of चर्माश्रय not of “ चर्मचर्माश्रय ”
The supplementary not occurring on p. 378 slip, which
has been corrected on p. xli of the Introduction.

Appendix A Various Readings

I

Page 1

- A. B. E. Om. begin with ई वम सर्वज्ञाः C. ई वमो वातमयाय
H. ई वमः श्रीसर्वज्ञाय वमः D F G अह
2. H F K. read चाग्रेवमुपदिष्टां
10 E. G अचक्षि for अपन्ते

Page 2.

- 17 A C. E. F पूष्यमात्राणि Bm. Om. Dm Em H पूष्यमा-
त्राणि Bm पूष्यमात्राणि
19 G Bm. पूष्य for इयायाः H omits इयायाः I reads
भीष्मपुत्रजीवितं
20 Bm. वक्रावधिरिपरीहृत् for वक्रावधिरिप्राधि
21 H adds उत्सवतादित्यतर्जना after विरय
22 Am. omits हार्दिशद् after विरयित
23 G reads वपयरोम्यमप्येव
26 A. Bm. also परिषद् to H & पर्यद्
29 Am Bm Cm omit विषय after पर्यद्
30 A omits एवं लोभगतविज्ञान
31 B adds अतीतरोचयिनि after तथा
33. Am reads अद्यावदसिद्धाश्च Am. लक्ष्मणोऽय
31.—40. H omits from तथाऽतीता to अद्यावदविषय

Page 3

40. G omits जलान् after प्रत्यय
40 Am. omits अवि after तीर्थनिवारणम्
53 D अक्षरं for अक्षर्यः Am reads विज्ञानस्य to विज्ञानमस्य
H वैरं for व
56 D E H. read लर्षे पर्यद् वा वा वा इहपर्ये तु पर्यद् for
तस्याहृष्ट्यमगतम् also but H notes the latter on
margin as पाठान्तरम्
57 D F H read वनाद् पुत्राद् for वने पुत्राद्

Page 4.

70. Am. omits अनेन after विशेषनेन
80 G omits विशेषपरमणि after वीर्यवानमिति

Page 5.

- 81 Am. Bm. Om Dm Em अनुयायान् or अनुयायान्

82. Am. omits सिद्धान्ते प्रसिद्धत्वात्
 84. Am. and D read वास्तव्यमन्तेन for वास्तव्यमन्तेन
 85. A omits लङ्गानां after अन्तरंग
 87. A omits प्राप्ति after पुनस्तथा
 94. A. B. C. F. G. H. read अनादित्वात्प्रत्ययोऽप्युक्तः for
 अनादिता
 95. and ह्यन्तरेण for वास्तव्यं
 98. C. omits सर्वम् after अन्तरंगि
 99. G. ह्यन्तरेण for लङ्गानां
 100. G. लोचनिकोत्पत्ति for स्मृति
 104. Am. परोपदेशात्प्रत्ययै for परोपदेशात्प्रत्ययै

Page 8.

106. Am. reads श्रीवर्धमानविशेषणम्
 107. H. reads हेतुमन्तेन for हेतुहेतुमन्तेन
 110. G. H. वस्तुम् for वस्तुम्
 111. C. omits सर्वमन्तःप्रत्ययै after अन्तःप्रत्ययै
 116. F. reads विज्ञापकम् for विज्ञापकम्
 117. A. C. D. E. F. G. अति वेदार्थमापरपर्यायस्य (वेदार्थमा
 परपर्यायस्य Bm. परार्थम् for परार्थम्
 119. H. विज्ञापकम् for प्रत्ययम्
 121. Am. reads इत्यन्तःप्रत्ययम् for इत्यन्तःप्रत्ययम्
 122. Am. omits लङ्गानां

Page

134. H. लङ्गानां for लङ्गानां Am. reads लङ्गानां
 135. Am. omits इति after श्रीवर्धमानम्
 137. D. reads श्रीवर्धमानाधिकारप्रत्ययमिति विशेषणम् प्रत्ययम् अन्तः
 आत्मकम् परमत्त्वमिति and omits from विशेषणम्
 प्रत्ययम् to आत्मकमिति
 138. A. C. E. F. G. H. and Am. add प्रत्यय (Am. प्रत्यय)
 आत्मा आत्मकम् परमत्त्वमिति प्रत्ययम् after विशेषणम्
 but Am. omits from प्रत्ययम् to आत्मकमिति
 140. G. प्रत्ययम् for प्रत्ययम्

II

2. A. अन्तःप्रत्ययम् for आत्मकमिति
 3. Am. reads अन्तःप्रत्ययम् लङ्गानां for अन्तःप्रत्ययम्

5. Am. Em. वस्तुसादिनाम्य for वस्तुसादिनाम्यम् Am. omit
एत after गुणविधेयम्

Page 8

- 10 F. reads लक्ष्मणाचमुप्री
12 D F. and Am. Em. read तर्हि तावन्नि वयोप्यने इत
वेत्तार्थम् for तन्निवर्त्य तत्रोत्प्रेषणाम्
15 Am. (1) H add पूर्व before विनेत H इह for इदमेवम्
23. D अतिम् for ततिम्; Am. reads ततिवर्ति ततिवर्ति for
ततिवर्तिवर्तिवर्ति.
21. H Am. एतद्वा for एतद्वा
26. A. एतद्वा for एतद्वा

III

- 1 D F H कुनीर्धरा for कुनीर्धरा

Page 9

- 4 A. C. G. Com. omit अतएव विवृते इति वचनात्
6. H वा विदम् for वा विदम्
10 A. C. F. and Am. वगन् for वगन्; F एतद्वा for एतद्वा
11. D विदम् for विदम्
12 Am. एतद्वा for एतद्वा
13. Am. Em. read लक्ष्मणाचमुप्री
16. Am. omit एतद्वा after अतिम् Em. Com. Dm. Em.
read एतद्वाचमुप्री
17 D add ए before लक्ष्मणा
18. E. लक्ष्मणा for विदम्
20. C. omit एतद्वा before एतद्वा
22. (1) omit इति before एतद्वा
24 D विदम् एतद्वा for विदम् एतद्वा

Page 10.

25. D F अतएव; अतएव
26. F एतद्वा for एतद्वा
2 A. विदम् एतद्वा विदम् एतद्वा
2 H 31 एतद्वा for एतद्वा F एतद्वा for एतद्वा

IV

- 3 Am. Em. Com. Dm. Em. एतद्वा for एतद्वा; Dm.
omit अतिम् before एतद्वा

Page 11.

- F reads एतद्वाचमुप्री; एतद्वाचमुप्री

Page 17

93. Am. नक्ष्त्रं च for नक्षत्रं च। H वरतिष्ठता for वरप्रतिष्ठता।
 94. A reads दृष्ट for दृष्टम्
 95. H. वरावाद् for वृषिष्वाद्
 98. D. निष्ठा चादिना च for निष्ठादिना च
 99. H E F इत्यन्तर्गतम् for अन्तर्गतम् ; Am. इत्यन्तः।
 H. omits विषयः after अन्तः
 101. A. H. अवसिति for अवसितु
 103. Dm. निष्ठावातिनि निष्ठावतिपक्षम्
 109. Am. omits तावत् before अथ
 111. H reads वस्तुहेतुवैयर्थ्यात्पूर्वप्रत्ये। Om. omits किं after
 प्रत्ये.
 112. B C D E F G H. तावत् for लक्ष्यम्
 116. A. C. D E. F G omits लक्ष्यं वा.
 117. Fm reads वस्तु लक्ष्येति वीर्यम्। C. E F G H. लक्ष्येति for
 लक्ष्येति

Page 18.

118. A. C. E. G H. read अक्षयवर्षादि Am. reads अक्षय-
 वर्षादि
 121. D reads विष्ठावर्षादिवास्तुवास्तु, F विष्ठा लक्ष्येतिवास्तुवास्तु for
 विष्ठा न अक्षयवर्षादिवास्तुवास्तु.
 123. K. निष्ठादि. for निष्ठादि ; Am. वरप्रतिष्ठा for वरप्रति
 134. Am. omits नक्ष after अथवर्षादिवास्तु

Page 19

143. Am. omits अथ after अक्षयवर्षम्
 153. Am. omits अथ after वस्तुत्वे। Am. F वृषिवास्तु for अक्षयवर्षम्
 155. O E. G H. omits वरादि after वृषादि। Bm. Om. Dm. read
 वीर्यवर्षादिवास्तु
 158. F G H. K इति हे for इति हे।
 161. Am. Dm. वस्तुवास्तुमेकम् प्रत्येति। H. प्रत्येति for प्रत्येति
 164. Am. Bm D E. वर्षावर्षादि for वर्षावर्षादि
 165. Am. reads अक्षयवर्षम् न अक्षय वर्षादि
 167. H C. G H. K. add अक्षय before वरावाद्

Page 20

172. Dm. omits लक्ष्येति before अक्षयवर्षादिवास्तुमेति। Dm. विष्ठा
 for विष्ठा.

175. F adds इति for वरुण
176. Am Bm Dm. read निरुपपन्नानिपराधनिष्ठमन्त्रः A. उत्तमस्य
F विरुद्धमन्त्र for निरुद्धमन्त्र
177 P adds इति after अनुमन्त्र
181 H तिरोहः for वेद्येतिहः Am. निविशन्नाथ for निविहरथ
182 E adds वराय after वरायवः A B C D. H. वृणावावृ-
त्तति for वृणावावृत्तति
183 A B D F G H K. Dm Cm. वरति E वरति for वरति
and वरति for वरति
189 F omits वरुण

VI

Page 21

4. K reads क्या रिपन-जि
 6. D. मन्तं for मन्तं
 9. A. E. real मन्तं मन्तं
 11. D. E. F. G. H. मन्तं मन्तं for मन्तं मन्तं

† R 22

2. A. B. C. E. K अज्ञातबीजपत्र
31. *Am. omis* ज *b'oro* दबाव
26. E. अवीचारादि for अवीचारादि
- 38 F हुनदगारादि for हुनदगारादि
- 40 *Em. omis* दगान् after अविष्को वर
42. C. G. E. विष्वाविष्वाहमरावाज B विष्वा विष्वादिहमरावाज

Г. 10 21

- [illegible]

84. *वपान्नवीर* for *वपान्नवीरः*

85. *Am. H. read* आलोकितो न आनरीता आननः

86. *Dm. नीतिविराजोऽप्येव* *Am. D. नीतिविराजोऽप्येव* , *F. नीति*
नस्याप्येव

P. go 24.

72. *Dm. reads* वपान्नवीरं नूनं

87. *Am. reads* वपान्नवीरं for *वपान्नवीर* and adds *विराजोऽप्येव* before
वपान्नवीरः *F. omits* वपान्नवीरं *Am. adds* वपान्नवीरं after
वपान्नवीरं and reads *वपान्नवीरं विराजोऽप्येव*

91. *Bm. reads* वपान्नवीरं

Page 24

103. *A. तर* for *तेषां*

107. *Am. तेषां विवाधात्*

111. *F. पश्यन्त्य* for *पश्यन्त्यः* *II. reads* वपान्नवीरं *Am. reads*
पश्यन्त्य

112. *Dm. वेदेन* न *विराजः*

115. *Am. पश्यन्त्यः*

Page 26

120. *D F H. Id. वपान्नवीरं* *Am. reads* वपान्नवीरं *Am. D. read*
वपान्नवीरं *Am. omits* *Am. D. read*
वपान्नवीरं

122. *Am. reads* वपान्नवीरं न वपान्नवीरं

124. *A. H. तेषां* for *वपान्नवीरं* *Bm. वपान्नवीरं* *F. omits* from
वपान्नवीरं to *वपान्नवीरं*

129. *A. वपान्नवीरं* *Q. D. E. G. H. K. वपान्नवीरं* for *वपान्नवीरं*
D. वपान्नवीरं for *वपान्नवीरं*

140. *A. H. न हि* for *वपान्नवीरं*

141. *Bm. reads* वपान्नवीरं

142. *H. reads* वपान्नवीरं *Am. reads* वपान्नवीरं

145. *A. वपान्नवीरं* *Am. reads* वपान्नवीरं

147. *D. वपान्नवीरं* for *वपान्नवीरं*

Page 27

157. *E. reads* वपान्नवीरं

164. *K. वपान्नवीरं* for *वपान्नवीरं*

Page 28

168. *Am. omits* वपान्नवीरं

169. Am. omits एष after कर्तृत्वम्
 181. A. B. F. H. K. read अनुसमाप्य प्रथमं निरिष्य and omit
 नान्तं नृपादित्वादिना

Page 29

194. G H कृष्ण for कृष्णा
 197. F omits पञ्चाद्वि before कर्तृत्वनिग्रहात्
 214. A. D. E. F. K. हाम् for हानि

Page 30

218. D omits fro D सूत्रेस्वमावाधोपात् to स्वभावेन समानि
 219. H सुहिरिष for सुहिरत्
 220. Q. reads तानि सुहरेष वा and omits तानि सुहरेस्वमावाधोपात्
 वा K अपत्ये for स्वकपत्
 223. K. कन्यादित्यस्यादि for अपत्यस्यादि
 227. K. कन्यादित्यस्यादि for स्त्री, B. K. किति for कति: G adds इति
 after केन कार्यते; K. omits केनचत् before कदात्.

VII

Page 31.

4. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. add इति after अनुवते
 5. B. C. F. K. add अहिमे after अनीहमे
 H adds स्वयावहानि after अनुवित्तमाने
 10. B. omits अति after निचले
 12. D reads अनुपत्त for अनुत्
 13. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. समवायवात् for समवधानात्

Page 32

14. Am. H. व्याख्यायते for आख्यायते
 17. Am. F. मिति for मति
 22. D प्रतिमात्म for प्रतिमाई D. omits from किंनु इत्येतेष to
 व शब्दे प्रतिमात्म
 25. Om. omits न before वत् D. H. K. add वत् before. समग्र
 26. Am. reads व्यापक्ये; G omits निष्कन्ध after वत्तत्; D. E. F.
 27. G. H. K. read कथावाक्येर्न विज्ञं व्यापक्यमर्थं च तत् (G. K.)
 तत्) इति संश्लिष्टानि &c. etc.
 28. G. K. तत्तत् for तत् in some.
 30. Am. reads स्वभावाभावादिनि

31. Am. इत्थे न for न इत्थे
 F reads नच कर्षं च समवायस्य प्रतिभावा for नच कर्षं सम-
 वायस्य न इत्थे प्रतिभावात्
 H. प्रतिभावात् for प्रतिभावा
 32. A. हरेमिति यति fo हरेमिति हरेमिति
 B. F G H K read हरेमिति यति विहरेमिति

Page 23.

33. D तथा च f r यथा
 40. E. omits वस्तुवन्तरं after वापरं
 45. H. reads इति स्वयं एव लभ्यते इह समवायत्वं for इह समवाये
 समवायत्वं
 47. A. B. C. D E. F G H K. add एवं after समवेत
 A. B. C. D E. omits एवं after समवायत्वं
 50. Om. reads बहलाहसिक्य f r साहसिक्य
 Am. Ben. Om. Em. omits ह्य after बहलम्
 52. Dm. reads स्वतन्त्रमिन्द्रियत्वं for स्वतन्त्रमिन्द्रियत्वम्
 56. Reading of A. B. C. D E F G H K.; some add विदितम्
 before चेत्; Am. reads ज्ञातिवत्त्वमिति चेत् B reads
 ज्ञातिवत्त्वमिति for ज्ञातिवत्त्वमिति. D adds इति after वत्त्वमिति
 61. Am. reads समवायवि धर्मिणाराध्

Page 34.

- 69 D reads अलाभ्य for लाभ्य

VIII

Page 35.

18. G omits from तुल्यद्वयम् 10 तुल्यं लाभात्
 20. F वरादिर्ह for वरादिर्ह

Page 36.

37. D. E. G. H K इत्थं न जयति; F इत्थं न जयति न यति
 38. B. omits तथा before न तथा कर्षं
 D F G H K. वाच fo तथा
 43. A ज्ञाति fo तुल्यवत्त्वमिति
 49. Om. Dm. इत्थं विदितम् f r इत्थं विदितम्

Page 3

54. C omits कारणं after अज्ञातत्वं.
 H वचो बुद्धि for वाचो

61-65. C. omits from सवित्र सता to अहोरात्रिप्रत्ययः and from स एव सविति to स्वयमपि विपत्ते

71. F स्वयमप्यस्यहानिः K स्वयमप्यस्यहानिः कश्चन्यत्वं for कश्चन्य

Page 38.

85. C. आत्मनो वैशेषिकगुणानां for आत्मवैशेषिकगुणानां

91. A. D. विवेकगुणानां for वैशेषिकगुणानां

Page 39

109 B. मोक्ष to कृत.

123. Am. Dm. G H. लघ्वन्तरोपविबन्धनः कृत ; E. वन्तार्य for वाच्यार्थ

123. Am. अप for अत्र

125 Am. adds सुसुचयिति चोपहस्तप्रत्यय before उपहस्तयिता etc.

Page 40

130 Dm. विवेकेषु to अवेकेषु

134. C. omits from बहुलाक्षयमपि to सत्तद्विषयगतम्

136 A. F G H K. स्वकर्मत्व Am. स्वपरकर्मत्व for स्वकर्मत्व.

139 F adds वैश्व before अस्तिति

142. C. सुप्र for सुप्र

144. Am. H omit पुन after विवेकेषु

Page 41.

166 Am. ends सर्वत्राहारेण नियेषत

168 Am. H omit च after विवाहे

Page 42.

179 F G H. read स्वपरप्रकाशसमावृता

181. E. H प्रकाशार्थ for प्रकाशवर्ण

183 E. G स्वकर्मत्व for स्वकर्मत्व H. स्वकर्मत्वपरमापी । । स्वपर etc.

184. C F H. K. निबन्धनस्य for निबन्धनस्य

187 Am. reads उपेक्षासम्पत्तिः ज्ञानम्

195. Dm. omits आन्तरं before एवमन्तेन

198. B. D E. F G H K. om omits दीपेय before अह्वय

199 Reading । D F G H. some omit सति after उवाच च

201 A B. O D. E. परिणामे च or परिणामेन

202. Am. reads गृहीत्वा तमर्थं व्यक्तवति

Page 43.

313. Am. Om. read वेदवतीत्यत्र अथ परिकल्पित

213 A B. O D. H. F G H. K અમેરે નવા કર્ણકરખમાવસ્યવા
આપિ

216 B. કર્ણકર for કર્ણકરખમા

217 Am. omits અપિ after અમેરે

226 F સમાભાષિકરણ for સમાભાષિકરણતવા

Page 45.

257 Am. Om. A. O G H. સામનવિકરણો for સામ

262 F adds પ્રિત્વ after અમ

269 G omits વરસ્તરાહવચનો after ત્રિવાપ્રિચનો

Page 46.

286 Am. વિજાલવચનર્ણ for વિજાલર્ણ

287 Ben. Ben. O. H. K add કુલકર્ણવેદવચનભારત્વ સ્વકુલકર્ણો
કલ્પમાર્ગેડવસ્થાવર્ણ ધ્યાત્વ after કલ્પમાર્ગેડવસ્થાવર્ણ

298, Am. reads વિજાલવચનિ for વિજેવચનિ

Page 47

305 B. D. F H. K. add દ્વાપિ વિષયવિદ્યુર્ણિયં કલ્પમાર્ગવચનિયં
સમપિ ચોક્ષવિદ્યુર્ણિયં વાસિ તત્તો ચોક્ષો કુલકર્ણ એ વાતવર્ણ
સ્વર્ણ after વિષયમાર્ગે

311 A. B. O. D. H. F G H. K. add સ્વાચર ન પ્રેક્ષાવર્ણ
(K. નામ ન) પ્રકરિ સ્વાચરવચિ ચે(K. ચે) ન વાત સિદ્ધો
ચોક્ષ after સ્વાચરવચિ ચોક્ષ

Page 48.

331 A. G H. K વાતવર્ણ for વાતવર્ણ

337 Dm. ચોક્ષવિય ચોક્ષ

310 G omits કલ્પિરિચેવચનિયિતિ ચાત્તવાર્ણ

IX.

1. D. omits સ્વર્ણ before સ્વિચરવર્ણ ; and adds વાતિ વાતવર્ણ

2. A. B. O. D. H. F G H. K add અપિ after સ્વેચરવર્ણ
A O D F G H. K. add વાત after કુલકર્ણ A. B. O
D. H. F G H. K. read વિષયવચન for વિષયવર્ણ

6. K. અચારો for અચારા

Page 49

33. B. F આત્મવર્ણ for આત્મવર્ણ

Page 50.

33. D અચાર for અચાર

- 37 Reading of G H K., some read उत्पद्यन्ते for उत्पद्यन्ते
 38 F omits सप्तमे after सर्वगतम्
 40. D अहङ्कारिणं for अहङ्कारितम्
 41. H. दण्डकियत् for दण्डकियत्
 42. A. O. D. G. H. K. स एव for एवम्
 43. Q. D. F. G. H. K. विरञ्ज for विरोप
 48. Am D H. add एत after व्यापकः
 49 G reads परस्परद्वये H. परस्परद्वये K. परस्परद्वये
 51. B. F read सम्यक्समापनीयते
 53. H D read सुमाद्यमर्मेविपाकेन Am omits संवेद्य B. C. D
 F G H. K. सप्तमिव for संवेद्य D इति for इति

Page 51

61. A B O H. read अन्तुवगमेवार्थं दोषः
 63 G मत्ताङ्गिणः for अविद्यता
 65 H omits रिक् before देवान्तर
 68. Om. विद्यमानायाः for विद्यमानायाः
 ~ Am. संवृत्त्यर्थमे for संवृत्त्यर्थमे
 78. Dm. omits समाप्ति

Page 52

81. Dm A B. C. E F omit आत्मा after आत्मनि
 88 A. B. C. E. F. G. H. K. read इत्यर्थकारणम्
 94. A B C. D. E. F. G. read संयोगारम्भः for संयोगारम्भः
 98. Om. omits अपि एवम् its आत्मः
 101. D reads अनित्यतावृत्त्या
 102. Am. a. l. d. आत्मः before प्रतिस्वात्म
 103. D एवमपि for एवमपि

Page 53.

106. A कृति B. F. G. H. K. कृति E. O. कृति for कृते
 107. A. B. C. D. G. परिभाष्यते some परिभाष्यते
 109. B. परिभाष्यते for परिभाष्यते
 113. D omits from आकाशरात्रिगोचरा to प्रतिवेद्यता
 117. K reads प्रवेद्यानुपपत्ति for अनुपपत्ति
 118. D एवमपि प्रतिपिद्यते for एवमपि
 122. H. omits परिभाष्य before परिभाष्यते

- 126 A. F. G. K. omit **यत्** before **अतएव**
 128 B. C. D. F read **अतीरत्तवद्वयत्** for **अतीरत्तवद्वयत्** etc.

X

Page 54.

- 4 H चाये for चाये

Page 55

- 11 D. K. reads **अतातेवचवात्** for **अतातेवचवचवोमात्**
 12. Am. reads **एवतातात्तवद्वयत्** for **अतातेवचवचवोमात्** D. reads **एवतातात्तवद्वयत्** etc.
 14 D omits **अपि** after **तावतोपपत्त्याः**
 17 B. **हुत्** for **कस्मिन्** D. reads **तावतोपपत्त्याः** for **तावतोपपत्त्याः**
 19 Am. **अतएवचवात्** A. B. C. E. F. G. H. K. **तावतोपपत्त्याः** and
 D **अतएवचवात्** for **तावतोपपत्त्याः**
 21. A. omits **यत्** after **अतएवचवात्** F omits **यत्** after
अतएवचवात् F reads **तावतोपपत्त्याः**
 25. D. F read **यत्** for **यत्** after **अतएवचवात्**
 27 D H. K. read **यत्** after **अतएवचवात्** **यत्** for **यत्**
यत् etc.

Page 56

- 37 Am. Dm. Fm. A. E. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्** D
अतएवचवात् for **अतएवचवात्**
 40 Am. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 43. D K. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 44. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 47 Am. adds **अतएवचवात्** after **अतएवचवात्** D omits **यत्** after **यत्**
 49. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 62. Dm. E. omits **अतएवचवात्** A. omits **अतएवचवात्**

Page 57

- 58 F **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्** K adds **अतएवचवात्** after **अतएवचवात्**
 59 D. omits **यत्** before **अतएवचवात्**
 61. D. reads **अतएवचवात्**
 61. D **यत्** for **यत्** E. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 62. D. H. **अतएवचवात्** for **अतएवचवात्**
 65. D omits **यत्** before **अतएवचवात्**

66. Q. omits from प्रायाग्ये is तत्र after सत्यपि
 67. A. B. C. D. E. F. add च after अव्यवहितः F. कारकं
 for करण ।
 69. च for अव्यव
 73. Am. reads स्वपरम्यवसावप्रार्थ

Page 58

79. E. omits प्रमेयत्वाभावाः after करणत्वात् and reads दुःखप्रमे-
 याभावाः
 79. D. F. A. C. F. प्रमेयाभावाः for प्रमेयत्वाभावाः
 79. Bm. Dm. add असूया after मोह
 83. K. व्यापारकत्वात् for व्यापारत्वकत्वात्
 83. F. पदेन for कर्तुं
 87. Am. reads कर्तुं द्वारद्विषं प्रमेयमिति तु सपीपीयं
 88. E. F. G. H. K. अनुपेक्षणीयं for अनुपेक्षणीयं
 90. D. प्रत्यान्तरं for प्रत्यान्तरत्वात्
 93. A. omits कपट after प्रकट
 102. F. प्रेक्षार्थं for प्रेक्षार्थी
 103. F. omits कथिते after विचक्षण
 104. K. निवेदिनं H. निवेदयति.
 100. G. omits प्राज्ञता after असी-

Page 59.

108. E. वाङ्मयस्य for वाङ्मयस्य-
 112. D. F. G. add तु after वक्ष्यताः
 113. A. B. इति for इति
 114. E. reads हेतुप्रतिपत्त्यवशात् for हेतुप्रतिपत्त्यवशात्
 114. C. adds च नित्यवशात्तावम्योऽप्यवस्थानित्यं च इत्येते तर्हि
 नित्यावाक्यतावम्योऽप्यवस्थानित्यं प्राप्तेति : after प्रत्यवस्थानं
 115. Am. reads तावम्योऽप्यवस्थानं
 125. II प्रपुत्रं for प्रपुत्रं
 125. A. B. H. add चरन्ति हि निरवर्तनं वैश्वं सर्वं तावदन्त्यात्
 after प्रपुत्रं
 127. Cm. reads च पुनर्वैश्वम्योऽप्य
 130. II विचित्रं for विचित्रं
 131. D. F. add अति after वृत्ति-

133 A omits अति after जमित्वा

Page 60.

133. G omits दृष्टवान्नासे before दृष्टवद्भिरिति

144 A. B. H. G. H. विरहचौपाद्ययोगः

146. D F K. 3d यदिति after निग्रहस्यार्थं

14 Bm. Pm. वेन्निपदमपि to वेन्निपदमपि

149 Om. omits तः before एव पुत्राणां

153. A. G add इत् before सावान्

153. Am. omits तद्धि before तर्जयति

156. D omits इति after उच्यते

Page 61.

158. Am. Dm. उपरोक्तः for उपरिक्तः

159 D. वैराग्यदर्शने for वैराग्यपञ्चादर्शने D प्रसादात्क for प्रसादात्कृतम्

XI.

13. H reads प्रतिविद्यमानम्

15 D. दिवा for विद्या

16. Bm. reads मोक्षिष्यति

Page 62.

19 B. omits अत्रार्थः before प्रतिविद्यते.

22. D omits अत्रार्थः विद्यादर्शने after दर्शनार्थः

23. F omits सूक्तं ह्यन्वयः for कथं

27 G omits प्राप्तिर्निर्णयः and reads यदानीति हि

28 A. अत्रार्थः F अत्रार्थः for अत्रार्थः

34. H. omits अत्रार्थः अत्रार्थः । अत्रार्थः अत्रार्थः अत्रार्थः

37 B. C D E. F G read अत्रार्थः

41. A. B. C. D E. F G K इति for अत्रार्थः

Page 63

43. Om reads अत्रार्थः अत्रार्थः

44. K. वैराग्यः for वैराग्यः.

45. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. अत्रार्थः

4 Dm. reads अत्रार्थः

47 D. अत्रार्थः F. G. अत्रार्थः for अत्रार्थः.

48. D omits चत् after इति
 52. G. गताईवात् for गताईव
 53. K. विद्यापने for विद्याने
 57. Am. reads अन्वयोपापनेन सयतनया
 61. Am. reads प्रतिपारितेयु विद्यापि
 62. A C. D F.G H. K. सीमिकाभिः some सीमिकाभिः
 64. D साधर्म्यमात्रेण for साधर्म्यहारेण
 65. D विद्यापन for विद्यापन

Page 64.

72. Am. Bm. Cm. Dm. and E मिमार्थ some मतार्थ
 75. B. वैदिकविपिविद्याने for वैदिकविद्याने
 77. D पुत्रात्रेण for पुत्रोपात्रेण
 81. D धुरिद्यम for धुरिद्यमः
 82. Om. K. साध्यमानत्वात् for साध्यत्वात्
 87. F omits पश्चिबस्तथा after तिर्बन्ध
 88. B. C. K इति ॥ इति for इति
 91. B. इत्याहः for इत्याहः

Page 65.

92. A. B. D F G H.K. पारमर्था, C.परमर्था another परमार्थ
 95. F स्वर्गो वरक for स्वर्गे वरके
 97. H K मातृविनाशित्वापारणेन
 98. C. तथा for च
 99. H. मन्त्रिण्यमहीषधानाम्
 101. K. omits विद्या before गर्भापात्र
 102. Dm. omits विद्या before विद्युत्
 103. Am. omits च before पुण्यन्वते
 109. G adds समाहितान् after वाहितान्
 114. Am. reads विद्याहीनापि
 116. A. वेदस्वावर्तितः another वेदस्य पर्यवर्तिनः
 K. वन्द्यत्वं for वन्द्यत्वं

Page 66.

121. K. पुत्रे for विपुत्रे
 134. Am. reads आत्मा हि नियते.
 136. G adds इत्यं after इत्यर्थं

- 137 K. ब्रह्मदेः for ब्रह्मदेः
 138 A. B. D E. F H. K. *हृत्तेः; another *हृत्तेः
 139 Om. K. च for तु

Page 67

- 147 D. H. प्रतिपुद्गीती; another प्रपुद्गीती for *प्रतिपुद्गीती
 153. A. B. C. add इति after अस्मदादिषु
 167 D E. H. देवतायां for देवतां
 158. K. omits इति before प्रपुद्गी
 166. A. D F G add यच्च after विदुषः

Page 68.

- 166-67 Am Om. *अतिवर्षा; Dm. reads अतिवर्षा On the margin of Om. there is note explaining this reading by the word अतिवर्षा. A. अतिवर्षा B. C. D E. G अतिवर्षा F. H. अति च वर्षा K. इत्यं च वर्षा; for अतिवर्षा
 177 A. H. जयक for जयक.
 178. H. परिशोषिष्यन्त्यम्; H. omits from एव is परिशोष
 179 A. B. D प्रतीकबोधनात् for प्रतीकबोधनात्
 180. A. B. ब्रह्मदेः for ब्रह्मदेः; one MB reads ब्रह्मदेः for ब्रह्मदेः
 182. K. लयनात् for लयनात्
 184. Om. omits तु after अतिवर्षा K. ब्रह्मदेःवापि
 185. K. ब्रह्मदेःवापि
 186. A. B. विद्यते for विद्यते
 189 B. omits एव; another reads अतः for च

Page 69

191. B. वीक्षेव पठितं for वृक्षिः पठितं
 193 Am. D E read वृक्षिः पठितं
 195 H. आदिभिः for अदिभिः F H. K. omits ब्रह्मदेःवापि after एव
 196. Am. omits अच before हेतुः.
 197 K omits इति
 199. Om. reads विधीय for विधीय A F G omits विद्य
 पापद्वयविपुलतावच्छाः पापमेव after विद्यमानेन
 200. F adds अच after हेतुः

203. B अनुपर्वमात् for ननुवर्गोऽन्मात्.
 204. K. adds मृच्छावा after आह्वयतरं and omits अह्वयमा before
 प्रेतप्राया-
 205. Com. reads यदि च for इति
 206. Am. विमृशामे
 214. A, B, D add अत् before वचने

Page 70.

232. F omits अन्वाहः after अन्वाहयो-
 233. D. अन्वाह for अन्वाह-
 234. Com. D read अन्वाहसत्वात् for अन्वाहमात्
 235. B. अन्वाहपर्वमर्तसरे
 239. F omits वाक्येव after प्रमुक्तेन A. अन्वापोवते.
 240. Com. वत्ते for प्रवर्तते.

Page 71.

248. Am. सुन्द for सुव-
 256. Com. वाक्यवरोधि for वाक्यविरोधि Com. अन्वाह for अन्वाह-
 258. Dm. पर्व परिहार-
 262. K. omits विव after अतिपि

Page 72.

263. D स्वर्गदेवते for सुयतिदेवते
 272. A, C, H, K. वाक्यस्य, com reads वाक्यवत्
 274. D omits मावातिहोर् before अन्वाह-
 276. A. प्रवचन for वचन। D. अन्वाह for अन्वाह-
 290. D H. अन्वाह for अन्वाह-
 291. Am. and K. read एवं कृतां वचनस्यैवमिच्छति स्वोन्मदवचन-
 कर्मिन्मननिपातेन वेदविहिता हिंसाया तन्मन्त्रवचनानिपद्यन्ते
 वचनविप्रतिपत्तिज्ञापयि
 292. K. वचने for वचन-
 293. B omits अन्वाह after अन्वाह-
 294. Am. and H. read मात्रमेव मन्त्रवचनविहितायां वचनविप्रतिपत्तिज्ञाप-
 नान्वाहस्यो न वचनविप्रतिपत्ति-
 295. A, H, H. add अन्वाहमे before वेदविहिता K. परित्रोवेव for
 परित्रोवेव
 G H. add एवं कृतां वचनस्यैवमिच्छतिस्वोन्मदवचनकर्मिन्मननिपातेन
 निपातेन मन्त्रवचनानिपद्यन्ते वेदविहिता

280. A. K. ग्रीतिः for वृत्तिः. C. adds किंपूज्यते B. C. D. E.
F omit वसन्तपूज्यते इति विधीयते च before वृत्तिः ।
D. G. H. ग्रीतिः for वृत्तिः. K. देवतायां for विधीयते.

Verse XII.

Page 72.

2. H. योग्यां for योग्या ।
4. A. reads अर्थस्य वदार्थस्य च ।
5. D. F. omit from इति विद्वत् to बोधस्यापि तत्तत्तदि ।
6. G. omits सर्वप्रकाशना and reads सर्वप्रकाशकत्वेन for सर्व
प्रकाशकत्वेन । A. adds तु after प्रकाशना ।
10. H. reads वस्तुत्वकथम् ।
17. B. कथम् for कथं कथं ।
18. D. न स्वर्गमिति for अस्वर्गम् ।

Page 74.

22. G. कथा for कथा ।
24. B. H. वदन्तु one MS. वदन्तु; G. कथा for कथन्तु
A. C. D. E. K. read only वद
29. Am. Dm. read प्रकाशकत्वेन for विद्वत्
32. D. वाच्यम् for स्वातन्त्र्यम्
46. K. omits होषः

Page 8.

49. Dm. omits अपि after स्वोन्मुक्तता
50. Om. reads स्वर्गमिति ।
55. G. adds अनुकम्पयत्युत्तिवात्प्रतीत्यम् वया प्रतीत्यर्थान्पेक्षया
प्रकाशकत्वं स्वातेतया च प्रकाशकत्वात्प्रतीत्यमिति after एतत्तद्वत्
and omits आह्वयप्रकारम् ।
56. B. लीनमिति for लीनम् ।
57. D. स्वर्गमिति for लीनम् ।
59. Om. F. read वदन्तु कथम् for वदन्तु
60. H. reads प्रकाशकत्वेन ।
61. F. कथन्तु for कथन्तुमात्रम् ।
63. H. प्रकाशक for प्रकाश ।
65. Bm. Etm. read सर्वप्रतीत्यम् ।
67. F. मातृता for मातृता ।
71. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. कथाकथम् for कथाकथम् of 600 Ms.

Page 76.

73. Dm. omits पक्षस्य before प्रत्यक्षमात्रं ।
 76. A. B. C. प्रतिदिः for प्रतिदे ।
 79. Am. reads विसेष्य for विसेष्य ।
 79. A. C. अप्रमेय च for वा
 81. D. लोपाधिकत्वात् for सापाधिकत्वात् ।
 84. Am. omits च after प्रमेयत्वे ।
 84. Am. reads 'अभिज्ञातामन्तरेण ।
 96. H. reads न हेतुत्वं for अन्वयेत्येतत् ।

Page 77

102. Am. reads तथापि च चावमित्यपरापरं ।
 Om. reads तथापि चावमित्यपरापरं ।
 K. add न्याय after अने ।

Verse XIII.

- 9 H. omits वर्ति after विस्मय
 11 H. उपर्युक्तं for उपर्युक्ते
 12. D. सर्वोपेक्षाविच्छिन्नत्वं for सर्वोपाख्या

Page 78

- 19 D E. F. मात्रैव चेत्तथापि
 22. D. adds अत्राहोपो यद्विषयस्याः कार्यविधिः(दे?)र्हि अत्राप्य
 after आदिदृश्य
 23. D. काव्याय for वाक्याय
 25 Dm. मात्रैव
 25. A. H. add हे after सर्व
 36 A. B. Dm. read पश्यामि f r पश्यन्ति A. B. E. G. K.
 omni आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति च उत्तरवति बन्धन
 37 C. reads इति तमयात् for इति न्यायात् । A. B. C. E. G. H
 अर्थदपञ्च for अर्थ तु ।
 43 B. H. omits अत्राप्याति after अन्वयस्यपक्षे
 40. B. omits ए before प्रपञ्चः ।
 53. D. reads प्रतिदेवयति ।
 56. Dm. reads 'अन्तरेण तत्त्वमन्वयविधेयमन्तरेण तत्त्वमन्वयति ।
 59. B. omits प्रतिपक्षि after प्रतिषेधः ।
 62. D. reads वस्तुव्यवस्थित for वस्तुव्यवस्थित ।
 64 H. लिङ्गि K. निज for तिङ्ग ।

Page 80

65. F अहवाचित for अहमानवाचित ।
 68. Am. A. G. omits तेरा before अहसी ।
 72. D reads अहूँ for अहूँतान् ।
 76. Am. reads परमज्जम स्वीकृत्य परमार्थततो विधिकृतस्य विधान-
 र्वाद् वास्तविकार्थं र्वाद् ।
 77. D. Om. read इत्थं च वास्तविकं अहमार्थव्याख्याहारोवेन विहित-
 मिहोक्त्यर्थं तावत्तद्व्याख्येयोक्त्यवधानो वह परमज्जम स्वीकृत्य for
 अहवा प्रकाशान्तरेण etc., but H. adds this before अहवा
 79. Dm. A. E. omits द्वितीयस्य after अहस्य ।
 81. F विद्वत्प्रकाशान् for अहमन्वयभेदात् ।
 82. Om. reads प्रत्यक्षात्तद्व्याख्येयं तस्मैव स्वीकृत्य ।
 87. Am. reads वयं अविचार्य प्रत्यक्षं B. वयं for वयं ।

Page 81.

101. E. adds तस्मात् after परार्थः ।
 103. D. omits from अहमन्वयस्य to सर्वस्यास्य वाक्यः ।
 107. A. K. omits अहमन्वय after अहमन्वयः ।
 113. A. Om. D. E. read अहमन्वयेण ।

Page 82.

117. G. D. H. K. गच्छतेति for गच्छतेति
 118. Am. omits हि after सर्वः ।
 118. G. D. E. G. K. read अहमन्वयनिर्दिष्टं सिद्धं ।
 121. B. C. दृश्यते; some तस्मात् for तस्मात्
 122. Om. omits नित्यं before निर्वाणं
 124. F omits from प्रत्यक्षं to अहमन्वयेण
 H omits from आवाक्योपाहं to सर्वस्यापि ।
 125. Dm. reads वयं च for वयं
 131. B. omits परमज्जम after अहस्य ।

Page 83

141. B. G. तावन्वाक्यं for तावन्वाक्यं ।

Verse XIV

1. Om. reads अहमन्वित for अहमन्वित ।
 2. H omits अहमन्व after अहमन्व
 5. H. इत्थं for अहमन्वः । Dm. reads तावन्वाक्यस्यात् for *अहमन्व

6. Om. Fm. omit *कर्म* after *अनेक* ।
 8. A. C. E. F G विशेषात्मकत्वात् for विशेषोपचालकत्वात्
 10. H. reads एकत्वकर्म for एकपदेकात्मकत्वे ।
 20. F adds *अन्वयैतया* after *वाच्यतया* ।

Page 84

22. F omits *वाच्यं* before *निर्दिष्टम्* ।
 28. Am. reads सत्तात्मकत्वात् for सत्ताकत्वात्
 35. C. omits व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययैतान् ठञ्जम्
 38. Dm. reads स्वक्यात् for स्वक्यसत्तात्,
 45 K. reads *कर्म* न व्यावृत्ति

Page 85.

48. H. omits *अन्वया* before *अनुरूपे*
 53. C. E. F G H. K. read सामान्यिकस्य for 'वादः'
 77 Dm. reads वेदाद्विज्ज्ञात्

Page 87

71. D कर्मणि for कर्मिन् Dm. reads 'विशेषाद्यप्य' for 'विशेषाद्यप्य'
 75. Am. Dm. Fm. read तथा instead of तथा हि
 85. Dm. reads द्वावेतावेकमनुपगम्य । एवं सामान्यत्वान्ने विशेष-
 कर्मन् विशेषत्वान्ने च सामान्यकर्मन् ग्रहजानेन सामान्येऽपि
 यथा वाच्यं etc.
 92. II omits *सामान्य* after *कर्म*

Page 88.

- 99 K. omits *सदृश* before *वाच्य*.
 101. Dm. Fm. विशेषकत्वकर्म for विशेषात्मकत्वे
 107 A. C. D E F G निर्दिष्ट for कर्मिन् C. D. F G omit
 कर्मिन्निर्दिष्ट
 112. D reads सामान्यविशेषता for 'कर्मता'
 114. D reads व्यपदेशमात्रत्वात् for व्यपदेशादिमात्रत्वात्
 115. Om. *तत्* for *यत्* ।

Page 89.

122. A. K. read, some omit its सत्त्वपरिणामकारण विस्तृत
 परिचयकत्वं before कर्मिन्
 132. D. omits कर्मिन् ।

124. F omits कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
125. H. reads कर्षाप्रवेष्ट for प्रवेष्टा ।
126. H. reads वातकलकम्
129. C. reads विपरीत for विपरीत
130. H. सुवर्ण for सुवर्ण
141. A. पण्डित for परमाह्वय.

Page 90.

145. E. निरीमी fo निरुमी
147. A. अतिदि for अतिद्व
154. E. अहयुत for अहयुते.
152. E. omits कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
165. D omits अहयुतयात् after तादात्म्य

Page 91.

176. Om. reads सत्तर्ष
180. Dm. reads सत्तर्ष कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष.
188. H. omits विपरीत
185. A. D reads कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष ; some objects कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
एवविपरीतम् B. O E. F G H E. omits विप
before सत्तर्ष
190. D कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष E omits सत्तर्ष before
सत्तर्ष

Page 92

196. Am adds एवं before कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष.
204. A B. D G read कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
205. Om. सत्तर्ष for सत्तर्ष
216. Om. reads कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
247. Am. पूर्वोत्तर fo कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष Om. कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
250. A. B E. F G omit कर्षय before कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष Om. reads
कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
251. Om. omits तु after कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
252. F कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
255. H कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
257. H. कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष for कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष
259. Am omits तु after कर्षयिद्माम्वातित्तर्ष.

Page 94

- 46 Dm. reads "विरिति क्प"
 247 Am. reads दध्गोचर-
 248. Dm. reads विद्वान्.
 250 C. adds क्प after प्रनिरुद्ध
 251 Cm. omits न पुन before विवेका-
 257 Am. reads पृथग्प्रमाण

Verse XV

3. B omits विद् before विद्वत्प्रमाण-
 6 B omits एवम् before प्रवृत्ति

Page 95

- 8-9 D reads अवाप्तवा for अवाप्तवरण and omits आत्मन-
 15 16. C. परिचर for उपनिचर C. यमि for यमि

Page 96

- 31 Cm reads विश्वार्थान्तर-
 32 Am reads विश्वार्थानां उत्पत्ति-
 41 Dm. read समस्तान् इति शब्दाणि
 43 Am. reads सम्प्रदायीनि विद्वत्प्रमाण-
 47 A. B. C. D. E. I. G. H. K. Dm. omits तदवा before दान्

Page 97

- 62 C. G. H. K. अनन्तानां some अनन्तानां
 63. D. I. E. H. K. अनन्तानां 1 अनन्तानां

Page 98

- 8 Dm. read निवृत्तवर्णविशेषप्रमाण-
 21. C. लक्षितवर्ण 1 लक्षितवर्णकना
 100 Dm. reads अनुपपन्न प्रनिरुद्ध and omits द्वावर्ण

Page 99

103. C. F Dm. read वेदवाचनीयमात्रे
 112. R. omits अति after ननु
 113. C. D. E. G. K. वर्णार्थ some वर्णार्थ for वर्णार्थ.
 120 Dm. omits वेदां before 1 मातृविद्वा. वर्णार्थ.

Page 100

141. A. E. G. H. K. omits इति वेद् before न
 142. Am. reads वद् before वर्णार्थ

- 149 C. सिद्धाती for अद्याती
 151. A विदुत् for विदुता.
 153. A. E. omits युवा before वर्य.

Page 101.

- 164 Dm reads उपरतपचार्येन Am. उपरतपचार्येन
 165 A E अपदेष्टा for उपदेष्टा.

XVI

Page 102

5. Cm omits आर्ष after उदेव
 6 Am omits कृत before वर्य
 9 A C. reads सिद्धाविदुत्तत्वात्
 11. Am reads वदे वरत्ये for वदे वरत्ये
 13. D F G H. read स वैद्यन्तमेवे न वरते
 K omits उद्यो after वरवमानयो.
 19. K omits होषी विदीये न वरत्ये धामा इति
 22. K. प्रसङ्गात् for प्रसङ्गात्
 25. Am reads प्रसङ्गात्प्रसङ्गात्

Page 103

- 30 A B. C. D E. F G. H K read विज्ञानं यत् सत्तादीकृत्य
 प्रतीतिरवलीकते केनो हि after नीकविमोर्त्त and before
 चङ्गरादिभ्यः some others omit H.
 32. Dm. वीकृतिरुत्तम्
 40 Am. Bm P read साकम्पनार्थीयार्थं तत्
 43. D अवस्यते for अवस्यते
 49. G adds यथावाच्यारहितं यत् साकम्पनं यत् साकम्पनं यथावे
 कम्पने after यथाकम्पन्यावृत्तिः and before साकम्प
 K. प्रसङ्गे- fo प्रसङ्गात्
 56 A. B C D E. F G H. K. read वैध after अवस्येति वैध
 B. C. G add अति before अङ्गवर्त्त.

Page 104

53. H. अवस्य वेत् for अवस्यवत्
 55. A. B C. D E F G H K read सत्तादीवारि before
 व्यावृत्तवत्, some others omit H.
 62. Am. Dm. read प्रसङ्ग इत्यम्

- 70 A B C D E F G H K. omit एष अतः लघिवायेति
 72. Cm reads वज्रप्रतिप्रित्त
 74 A. B. C D E. I H K. add अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 before अजगुव

Page 105

82. FL F अनचारे for अनिचारेति
 84. F omits तन् before विनयनि some read it
 86. Dm. omits विनयस्वयं
 102. A omits पादोत्तर before प्रागेव

Page 106.

- 104 D omits वाच b fore वचि
 107 FL K. read स्वाह्वारपादिनां
 114 H. अमय for अपरवा
 124 D अदुपुग्ने for अ वग्ने

Page 10

130. F omits from निर्देनयेत् to अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति after अतीतवान्
 and before नचालवधतिरवाच्यतः D reads प्रागेवा रवान्
 13. A B. C F G K omits अमयवा तदुपुग्नेत्तमहात् after
 अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 134 D. omits अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति after अमयवा
 135. C. अर्धेत्त for अमयत्त
 141 Gm. reads वेत्त for अत्त
 149 Dm. read अर्धेत्तानयो विपनयवत्तवा अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति तद
 विवितावधतिरवाच्यतः

Page 102

153. K. omits वित्त after अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 156 Cm. adds अति after अर्धेत्तानि H K. omits अतीतान्
 नाचारे एत्त omits अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 15 F omits from अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति to अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 19 Cm. D. G. अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति Dm. omits अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 167 Cm. reads अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 169 C. adds अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 171 h. अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति
 172. C. अजगुवस्वधिरागुनरति

Page 109

- 179 H K omits अर्थ परमाद्यम्-
 184. H. स्वमात्रमेवात् for स्वमात्रमेवेव
 185 B. C. D. F. G. H. असत्त्वमादिः for असत्त्वादि
 187 E omits निरपेक्षत्वात्
 188. U adds आत्मा after अपेक्षतो दि

Page 110

206. U reads मायिरोवे हुरीम्-
 210 A B C. D. E. F. G. H. K. read दाह्यार्थं किञ्चात्मनेका
 वरवाचर इत्यते ते वाचक्या यदि विरोधिनस्तर्हि नैव स्वभावस्य
 before विद्वज्जगत्प्राप्तात् । also अत्रापि स्वभावस्य
 some omit it. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. read some
 विरोध for वाच
 225. B H. K. विपक्षकः fo विपक्षक एव
 226. Cam. omits इति after आकाशस्येति

Page 111.

244. H. H विधीया for प्रधीया

Page 112.

250. A B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. Dm. अनुपपन्न for अनुप-
 कार्यम् of them.
 258. D H. अविवक्षा for अविवक्षा
 264. B. omits अविवक्षित before अविवक्षित
 265 D इति for इत्यर्थम्
 266 K. adds प्रतीति before केतु
 271 H. वस्तुस्थिति for वस्तुस्थिति

Page 113

- 281 A. D. E. F. G. H. K. omit मिश्रयोः before वीक्षणीयो
 292. Cam. reads वीक्षणीयत्वाद्वाच्यम् ।
 293. Am. Bm. read अत्रास्त्वान्वाच्यम्
 296. H. omits विपक्षितमेवे
 297 U. adds ए विषय । अविवक्षित वाच्य after वाच्यविषयवाच्य
 299 D वाच्यवाच्ये । वाच्यवाच्ये

Page 114.

311. Am. reads "प्रतीति for "वस्तुति
 316. A B G. H. K. read वाच्यवाच्य after वस्तु some omit it

322. A C. विद्यायात् for विद्यायिण्यात् of some.

327 C. D E. F G H K. दुर्विष for दुर्विरण्य

Page 115.

342 A. B C. इयदिसिम्नि for इयमि

Verse XVII

7 F omits विषय

10 Cm. स इषा

11 A. B. C. F अयमायक, some अयमायिक-

15. D reads प्रत्यहायतयत्

Page 116

21 C H अङ्गीकारात् F प्रमाणाङ्गीकरणात्

23. C. D. K. हास्यरहस्य

26. F सर्वेषां for सर्वेषां. C. omits तदा after विपत्ते ।

31 D लक्ष्यतया for लक्ष्यया

38. Dm omits पर before परिचरित

Page 117

50. A omits च after प्रमेय

51. Cm. reads प्रतिक्षेपे विरोधित

52. Am. reads प्राप्तेय वाच्य

Page 118.

67 II अवसेष for अवशेषणीय

69 D प्रतिविषी विधीयते for प्रतिविधीयते

71. Am. reads विक्षिप्तमात्र

6. Am. Cm. omi व befo • सिद्धि

9 A. D E. G आत्मात्मन्य for आत्मात्मन्य

81. B. C. F H K. अनुसोवात् for अनुसोवा

89 इतिवाक्ये ।

Page 119

101. A. C. G H Dm. mit हि after अति

103. A E Fm. प्रमाणे for अनिष्टमे-

106. II H. K. तदाहो for तदाहोः

109 Cm. भाष्येहा

Page 120

1 2. Dm. Fm. पुनराह for पुनराह-

132. C. G. पण्यैः for वर्याणां
 128. Bm. Dm. Em. read वराविष्मतिरे°
 130. D adds after अम्मोपहादय-
 आगमो आसुराश्च आम्भरोचनश्च विष्णु ।
 आचरोपोऽपुर्त आनन न पूतरेवसम्मयात् ॥
 131. D adds after स प्रमानयेव-
 तावाग्देवाविजयात्तन्ममिह पण्डितः ।
 वरीश्वरीश्वर वो वर्या महुषो न तु गीर्यन् ॥
 135. C अकपटवत्
 139. C अक for प्रकव
 141. D एग्रीयणां for रागतिदोषाणां

Page 121

144. D omits अथास before परिचायतारत्नम्बन्ध-
 161. D omits अथ before वैचलेव
 161. B. विचयवात् to रिचयवात्
 166. A. read हलोवेकादश

Page 122

170. A C आम्भारिक for आम्भारिका
 176. A B. C omits तद्विनी च

XVIII

E. Om. reads अथवा...विनाशकयज्ञः°

Page 123

16. K. adds अथवा after एवमथवा-
 25. C. वाणिनां to विनाशिका Om. reads प्रविशन्मन्त्रोनात्

Page 124

44. C omits इत्याहु-
 52. Bm. अथ एतर्षे अकते Cm. ए एतर्षे अकते
 K. अतिवकते for अकते
 55. K omits प्राप्नोति-

Page 125

72. Om. omits हि ite तथा
 72. C. वर्यालयाणां for वर्यालयालयाणां
 76. E. एतद्विरिचते for एतद्विरिचते

XIX.

Page 126

1. D H लयागता
 2. A. E. F G H read अत्यार्यानां
 7. A. B. C. D E. F G H अकामात् for अकामवपानात्

Page 127

12. A. B. C. read सुतरा
 14. K. reads बालना स्वात्
 17. A C. D E F G पितिहते B K. अवतिहते; some अवविहते.
 22. Om. reads न इदमे

Page 128.

44. H reads पूर्वकक्षेत्रे for पूर्वक्षेत्रे
 46. B. reads स्थिरमपठय

Page 129

59. Dm. Fm. read मेरादिषर्षा
 61. K omits अथात् Om. सूत्रानि Am. सूत्रानि for वृत्तानि
 70. K. adds प्रतिपद्यते
 73. B. अनेकदा for अनेकान्यदा
 75. K. omits हर्षत् before वस्तु
 77. F omits अयमीति

XX.

Page 130.

- L. A. B C. D E. F इषादिभिर्ग्रहः; H कतिहृषादिभिर्ग्रहः; H K
 इषादिभिर्ग्रहः

Page 131

14. D. G कीचप्रविष्टस्य C लोचप्रविष्टस्य
 17. B H अविशेष for अवशेष
 23. Cm. हतम् for अतम्

Page 132

51. K. reads प्रतिपद्यतिद्वारा Am. लघुपद्यते for लघुपद्यते.
 61. K. adds ज्योतिष्यान्ति र परिणयेष्व
 62. B. C E. F G H K. omits आत्मनः उपयोगस्य before
 अनेकान्ये A. B. C E. G H. E. omit उपरोक्त before
 स्वात्; some read it

Page 133

- 71 F Am. read वाचनिकारणस्य
73. A. B. C. E. F G H. K read परिचयम्
75. B. omits लुप्त and reads for लुप्त for लुप्त
78. A. B. C. D E. G H. and प्रमाणम् for प्रमाणम्

XXI

Page 134

12. C. E. G विव (० ५) लुप्त for विव
13. A. B. C. D. F G H. जीवम् for जीवम्
23. D विव for विव A. B E. H. अविव for अविव

Page 135

32. D. प्रविवम् for प्रविवम्
33. D. reads अविवम्
43. G omits पतिविपरीतम् लुप्त and omits from
अविवम् to परम्
50 A. B G E F K. अविवम् to अविवम्
54 A. B C. D E. F G H K omits after अविवम्

Page 136

- 56 G omits अविवम्
60. A C. G K. omits लुप्त and अविवम्

XXII

3. C. G H read अविवम् for अविवम्

Page 137

- 10 E. अविवम् F H अविवम् for अविवम्
24. D अविवम् D पात्रम्पात्रम् for पात्रम्पात्रम्
25. A. C. E. and Dm. अविवम् K. अविवम् to अविवम्
26. Cm. reads अविवम्। अविवम्

Page 138

34. A B. E. F H. K. read अविवम्
35. F and Dm. अविवम्। अविवम्
37 D omits अविवम्
40. A. B. C. E. F G H K. and Dm. अविवम् for अविवम्
43. E. F G read अविवम्
44. D omits अविवम्
46. Dm. omits अविवम्। अविवम्
49 D. read अविवम्। अविवम्। अविवम्। and omits
from अविवम् to अविवम्

XXIII

Page 139

5. A B (1 E F (1 K read गुणाः वर्षाद्याः

11 A. वर्षादिभ्यां for वर्षाद्यवर्षाद्यभ्यां

26 H. इत्यर्थे for इति

Page 140.

30 Some omit इति.

47 A. B. C. D E F G K. वरिणमने; H परिणमने

Page 141.

55. A. B. C. D E F G K. इत्यादिभ्यः some इत्यादिभ्यः

Page 142.

97 D H वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः F K. 11 Am. वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः for वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः

98. A B. C G E. omit अति before प्रत्यक्षे

101. G. C. K. and Om. read वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः

Page 143.

114. Om. अव्ययि D अव्ययि for आप्ययि

117 B. वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः for वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः

120. A. B. C. D E. F G H K. तदर्थे for तदर्थे

Page 144.

137 D = 1 Am. वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः for वृत्तव्युत्पत्तिः

151. B. तदर्थे A. C. E. F G K. तदर्थे तदर्थे for तदर्थे
तदर्थे.

Page 145

161-5-6. B. H D. all इतरस्य विशेषणता A E. G F K. इतरस्य
व विशेषणता Q. इति विशेषणता before एवं नरैश्च etc.
C. वचना for विविधता176. B. E. G H. K. omit प्रथमं and read अनेकवृत्ता A. C.
प्रथमं for प्रथमं

Page 146.

195 A. G D. and Dm. read वरिष्णव्ययः

196. G and Dm. तदर्थे तदर्थे.

200. C. D. H. all प्रथमं after अनेक

Page 14

223. H. reads तदर्थे तदर्थे C. D E. तदर्थे तदर्थे

XXIV

Page 148.

2. B. अत्यर्थ for अत्यवर्त B मन्वेन for मन्वेन
 7 Am. reads वारिगलेन महविरोध
 12. E. वृद्धावस्थे for वृद्धाति
 13, H reads अवस्थित for अवस्थित D omits अवस्थित

Page 149

- 27 Am. reads अथ न वातरथं
 30. Bm. omits तु after अम्बोपाधिर्; some read तु
 34. A. B. C. E. वेचररथेति Bm. वेचरे रथेति
 35. Bm. वृद्धाति for वृद्धि
 40. Am. mits अत्यवर्त
 41. Bm. वृद्धि for वृद्धिद्वयार्थ

Page 150.

45. A. B. C. E. K. H. read ए विरोध and omits वा
 60. A. E. H. K. वृद्धावस्थे for वृद्धाति
 D. reads वृद्धावस्थे दोषा स्ववृद्धावस्थेति निष्कारणीकृत्या
 वृद्धिमिति वाच्यम्. and omits from अम्बुषा to निररथ
 एव and from स्ववृद्धावस्थे to the end.
 65. Bm. omits वृद्धि after वैवृद्धिरथ
 69 B. C. omits तावति स्ववृद्धावस्थेति.

XXV

Page 151.

2. Am Bm. 'एवमे' for 'एवम्'

Page 152.

25. A. E. K. omits मेव and read वृद्धावस्थेति
 H. read वृद्धावस्थेति
 27 Bm. एते A. H. K. एते च for एते

Page 153.

31. B. C. E. F. H. omits वृद्धि
 34. A. B. C. D. E. F. H. omits वृद्धि
 45. A. B. C. D. E. F. H. omits वृद्धि

XXVI.

1. E. F. H. read अङ्गुलकृतता

2. Am. विधिदेव for विविधदेव

Page 154

22. Dm and D F omit अयेव after विपारां

24. Am. and D F H. K. read अभिरवकङ्कणत्वात्

29. D omits एकान्तवारिह

40. Am. and K. read द्वारकाद्वीपके for द्वारकाद्वीप

Page 155

42. A. B. D. E. omit अचरामचनीवत्

A. C. K. read पराभक्त्यानां f r परमिभक्त्यानां

D omits परमिभक्त्यानां

43. D इति विधानात् for इति इत्यविधानात्

43. D reads अर्द्धिदुर्गं अयति and omits असद्वर्गं अर्द्धिदुर्गं वा

45. D अङ्गु for द्विपत्त

XXVII.

3. D. H. omit अङ्गु after अङ्गुलकृतता

7. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. नक् नयोग for ननः प्रयोगः

11. D अपि सुद्धे for उपसुद्धे

14. D omits एर and reads वरं सुव

Page 156

16. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. K. add नह after वास्तवः and omit न

18. D reads अङ्गुलकृतता for अङ्गुलीकृतता

19. A. omits अपि after अवस्थाभेदः

31. D. H. नोत् for अवयव

33. Bm. read नाप्यन्य विधेय

35. Bm. and F. H. K. अनुपपत्तेः for अनुपपत्तिः

Page 157

41. D reads अपि after विवाहपरिचयः

42. Am. निरवर्गं निरवस्थात् II. निरव्यपनिवाधे for निरवस्थाभेदे

50. D. पूर्वकृत for पूर्वकृत

58. D कपयते F H. K. कपयते for कपयते.
63. A. B. F H. K. कपीयमाने for कपीयमाने

Page 158.

- 6 Bm. adds लीत्य before इत्यस्य
72. B. कर्तत for कर्तत
74. D. कर्त for कर्तत.
77 D कर्त for कर्तत
77 H. omits कर्त but re इत्यस्य
78 D reads कर्तित कर्तत etc. and omits from कर्तित to
इत्यस्य
78. A omits कर्तित कर्तत कर्तत etc. after इत्यस्य
81. D reads कर्तित कर्तत etc. and omits कर्तत to
कर्तत
85. Dm. कर्तित कर्तत F. कर्तित for कर्तित
86 Dm. कर्तित for कर्तित
87 D omits कर्त after इत्यस्य

XXVIII

Page 159

2. A. C. D E. G omits कर्त before कर्तत
F H K omits कर्तत
Am. Bm. and कर्तत कर्तत कर्तत कर्तत कर्तत
7 A. D G E. F H. K. omits कर्तित after कर्तत
9. Some read कर्तत f कर्तत
11. D कर्तत f कर्तत.
15. D omits कर्तत कर्तत to कर्तत f line 10

Page 160.

24. C D E. K. कर्तत for कर्तत
27 B कर्तत for कर्तत
29 Bm. कर्तत for कर्तत
31. D omits from कर्तत to कर्तत
35. H कर्तत f कर्तत
44 H reads कर्तत and omits कर्तत कर्तत before
कर्तत

Page 161.

- 47 C. D. omit कृत before समाप्तम्.
 50 D इतिपप्रमाणवत्पर्य
 54 Bm. omits प्रापयति
 70. D अस्मिन् for अथ
 D omits from प्रवचन to अथम् line 0- 1 on p. 162

Page 162

- 89 Bm. reads °कोकापचितं प्रमाणं सिद्धं for °कोकापचितं प्रमाणं प्रसिद्धं
 87 A. उपचरयति Bm उपचरयति for उपचरयति
 92 Am. omits वर्तमान before लक्ष्यविषयैः

Page 163.

108. Bm. omits अथ before अभिवेति
 109 D omits from तत्रैव to प्रतीकम् lines 109-11
 102. C. K. वक्तव्यं for एव
 110. H. पुरन्दराचार्य for पुरन्दराचार्य
 111. C. प्रत्यक्षेण for प्रतीकम्
 113. A. C. एतेषां १२ वक्ता
 113. E. पदार्थप्रमाणं १ पदार्थप्रमाणम्

Page 164

130. Bm. omits एव प्राप्ते
 131. D विरक्तते for प्रवर्तते
 138. D. repeats १ om वेदाव्यापदि to अनिवार्यम् in line 140.
 138. C. D. H. K. and Dm. omits तथा after प्रवृत्ते

Page 165.

- 157 Dm. प्रवर्तित for प्रवर्तित
 170. Bm. reads लक्ष्यवेद्यगुणी

Page 166.

- 179 C. D. omits जीव before इत्याद्या
 180. D प्रतिपद्यमान for प्रतिपद्यमानः.
 181. Am. Bm. वक्ता for वक्ता.

Page 167

200. H. बल्लुसचन्द्रम् for बल्लु चन्द्रम्
 212. C. rd Dm. वर्तमान for प्रवर्तमान
 213. H निमित्तिवेद्यान्ता for निमित्तिप्रतिवेद्यान्ता
 215. F omits टीका
 216. A B. C. G H. K. read लयन्त चयन्

Page 168.

231. 22. F लम्बवहिरिदं for लाम्बवहिरिदं
 232. A. B. U. G K. वहीरु II वहरमात् for वरमा
 234. A. B. D. E. F H K. लर्पोरपर्याप्त for लपरमात्ता लर्पो-
 235. D omits विद्या after लक्ष्मणम्.
 243. H. लकीरुत for निगीरुत.

XXIX

Page 169.

- A. B. C. D B F G H. K. वदमावर्त्य for वरदमावर्त्य
 in l. 3 of the 31
 5. Fm निवृत्तिमात् A. E. D F K. निवृत्तिमात् C. H निवृत्ति
 मात् G निवृत्तिमात् ! निवृत्तिमात्
 12. Bm. omits ३ after लक्ष्मणम्.
 A. B. C. D K. निवृत्ति- some निवृत्ति

Page 170

27. A. B. C. D E. F G H. K. प्ररोहम् for प्ररोहं
 28. Bm. विद्याधरम्भी भवति- some विद्याधरम्भी भवति-
 29. A. B. C. D. E. F G H. K. omits प्रत्यक्षम् rd द्वे
 and read वाचसीतयेद्यो व वाचसीतयेद्यो वेति.
 34. A B. C. E. F G H omits तथा तेव प्रत्यक्ष before
 लयन्तचयन्.
 43. D omits वर्तमान before प्रवर्तितमात्
 45. A. B. C. E. F G H. K. जीवत्य for जीव
 48. D. लक्ष्मणम्; some लक्ष्मणम्

Page 171.

49. Bm. reads लयन्तचयन्तमावर्त्यवहिरुतम्

55. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. K. स्थाप्यादि; H. माठिम्बानि for
स्थाप्यादि
59. A. B. C. E. G. H. भवदुपपदे; omit भवदुपपदे
60. Bm. सर्वस्तोकाविद्या H. सर्वस्तोकावसा for सर्वस्तोकावसा
विद्या--
64. D. F. omit अभ्यवहारिका-
70. D तावतावसा for तावता-
72. D K. अरसेर् for अवगम्यते

XXX.

Page 172.

6. Am. अलङ्कारादिभिः Ac. अलङ्कारादिभिः for अलङ्कारादिभिः
8. F omits from स्वयंकीकृतपद to हेतुपरिमिति पदः in line 10
10. D निमित्ते A. C. E. निमित्ते for निमित्ते

Page 173.

- 12-13. A. D. omit पञ्चप्रतिपदमात्र after तस्य मात्रा and omit
पञ्च after परस्पर च
K. omits पञ्च after तस्य मात्रा-
17. Bm. एवं सर्वत्र प्रयोगे C. एवं सर्वत्र योगे
24. Dm. मातुः हि after पञ्चपातित्वा
31. D अपतता E वातकपतता for वदकपतता
36. Bm. 'अपतत' for 'वातत'

Page 174.

60. E omits अथर्व before स्वादिनिर्देशार्थ

XXXI

Page 175.

4. Dm. विग्रहमात्र for विग्रहमात्र
8. D omits लक्ष्मिर्न before निर्दिष्ट
15. Am. H. omit परि before इत्यादि

Page 176.

34. A. B. C. D. F. G. H. K. add विहार after अर्धवार
Bm. omits बहु before अथमात्रेण
Bm. न न कल्पद्वारा for न कल्पद्वारा
34-35. D omits स्तावति प्रयोगे and reads प्रयोगीकः for बहुवीक

Page 177

- 16 F अतिरिक्तताम् for अतिरिक्तताम्विभक्त
D. K. omits स्वभावविनिम्ब
A E. omits आविभक्त
C. reads अतिरिक्तता विविध
17 Dm. लक्ष्म्याम् for लक्ष्म्याम्
18 Dm. reads—तथा च श्रीविष्णुचक्रवर्त्त
देवीनस्तुष्टोविभक्तं कृतवदो वीर्यव देवीरति
लक्ष्मीरति कृतमुत्पन्नवर्गं लक्ष्म्यावर्गवति
वर्त्तमानि विभक्तवर्गवर्त्त लक्ष्म्यावर्गवर्त्त
विष्णुवर्त्तवर्त्तमेव। लक्ष्म्यावर्त्तं कृतवर्त्तविभक्ति ॥ १ ॥
अथ तथा च लक्ष्म्यावर्त्त
21 Dm. and A. K. वरविभक्त for वरविभक्ति

Page 178.

42. A B. F G H E. omits कृतः वारणा
43. A. B C. D F G and Dm. देव्यावर्त्तमेव to देव्यावर्त्तमेव
48. Dm. reads वारिच्यमेव for वारिच्यमेव
D omits वारिच्यमेव विभक्ति to वारिच्यमेव in line 50.

Page 179

80. In श्रीवाराह प्रवृत्ति D reads वारिच्यमेव वारिच्यमेव विभक्ति
for विभक्ति वारिच्यमेव विभक्ति and A B. C. D. E. F
G H. K वारिच्यमेव for वारिच्यमेव
K omits Verses 1 to 5 (both inclusive) in the
श्रीवाराहप्रवृत्ति and also Verse 2.

Stanza III

बहसस्तु विमङ्गले [इहमस्तु संनिहृते समीपतरावर्ति वैतरो हम् ।
बहसस्तु विमङ्गले तदिति तरोक्षे विजायीवात् ॥]

बहसः वा तरो मा वा विर्षं वा परिबहसः ।

भासिषम्या हिवा भासा सपञ्चगुणकारिवा ॥

(बहसु मा वा तरो मा वा विर्षं वा बर्षस्तु (विषयः प्रतिमातु वा) ।

भासिषम्या हिवा भासा सपञ्चगुणकारिवा (कारिणी) ॥

OE. तरो बहसु वा वा वा विषयः प्रतिमातु वा ।

भासिषम्या हिवा भासा सपञ्चगुणकारिणी ॥)

—Homa-Sraṣṭakāra II. 11

भासिषम्याः—अ यवति यवी जौतुः सर्वस्वैकान्ततो हितवन्मव ।

मुक्तेरुमहन्मव कस्तुस्वैकान्ततो यवति ॥

—Uṇṣadī (‘Vācakaḥ kya’)s Tait. Sūtra-Sambandha-
Kārikā 29

Stanza IV

यन्मवपः कमीचारे

—Homa Śāstra II. 11. 4

Stanza V

यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं अत् —Taittirīya Sūtra V 29

यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं —Bhāṣavijayagapī’s Vṛtti on Uttar-
Śākhayama Adh. XXVIII. 9

यत्पादमव हि जेहो जेहोतुवी यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं

—Uṇṣad-

यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं

यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं

—Tait. Sūtra V 20.

यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं

॥ यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं ॥

[OE. यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं यत्पादमवजौल्यमुत्तं]

त्रिविधाः कल्पयन् धर्मिणः परोक्षामो धर्मकल्पयन्स्वरूपाः ।

—Yoga Sūtra III 18, Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

सा तु त्रिविधा-विद्याऽगित्वा च

—Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya, Section on पृथ्वी

चन्द्रकारणत्ववचनात् सयोगविद्यायी—Section on आकाश

वस्तुतादृश्यत्व...—आकाशकाशीका कथमुत्पत्तिः

—Taken substantially and almost verbatim from Hema-
chandra's com. on his own Prāmāṇya-Mīmāṃsā.

सापेक्षकमर्थम्—A nyāya of in Hema Śābharānāṣṭaka and
noted in the collection of nyāyas made by Hemachandraganā.

यो ब्रह्म तस्यैव यो ब्रह्म तस्यैव स ।

व दैवकामयोर्ब्रह्मसिद्धिर्नामानामिह विद्यते ॥ —Untraced.

Attributed to Ājivakas in A. M. P. edition.

मागे सिद्धो नरो जाये योऽर्थो भाग्यवतस्य च ।

तमभागं विभाग्येन वदसिद्धिं वदस्यते ॥ —Untraced

सर्वे गणवो ज्ञातायौ—A nyāya from Hema. 44. (see supra).

Stanza VI

ईश्वरमेरितो यच्छेत् स्वयं वा ब्रह्ममेव वा (व. l. ब्रह्ममेव वा)

ब्रह्मो (नो) ब्रह्मपुरीषोऽप्यमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥

—Māhābhāṣya. Attributed to Vyāsa (and rightly) by
the author of the Parīkṣamukha Sūtra Laghavyūti. Found
quoted in Śābharā-Bhāṣya on Mīm. Sūtra L. H. 4. Also in
Māhābhāṣya on Sāṃkhya-kārikā 61.

वपपतमहे हि मवसि...—ब्रह्मममप्यस्य

—Kādambarī-Pūrvārdha, Peterson's edition p. 102.

सर्वमर्थोऽवयवमात्रमस्तीति कल्प

वस्तुत्वमात्रम् तथापि विद्यान्वयम् ।

तद्वस्तुत्वं कथमुक्तम् इति चामतेषु

स्वार्थयोः अनुकरीचरमात्रमात्रम् ॥

—Buddhasen's Dvātrīṃśikā II 13.

Stanza III

अदसस्तु विमर्शे [इदमस्तु संविद्धौ क्षमीपतरवर्ति केतवो ह्यम् ।
अदसस्तु विमर्शे तद्विति वरोक्षे विजायीतात् ॥]

इच्छा वा परो मा वा विमर्श वा परिषत्तम् ।

आदिषत्तम् हिता भासा अपनस्तुमपरिषा ॥

(वस्तु मा वा परो मा वा विमर्श वा वरंस्तु (विषयत् प्रतिपत्तु वा) ।

अदिषत्तम् हिता भासा अपनस्तुमपरिषा (वरिषी) ॥

(X. वरो इच्छा वा मा वा विषयत् प्रतिपत्तु वा ।

आदिषत्तम् हिता भासा अपनस्तुमपरिषा ॥)

—Homa-S'raṅgikācūtra II. 22.

आदिषत्तम् —अ भवति वरीः औत्तुः सर्वस्वीकृत्यो हितव्यम् ।

मुक्त्येवमुत्तराद्या अपनस्तुमपरिषा भवति ॥

—Uddāṛṣṭi ('Vācakaṁ khye')s Tatt. Sātra-Sambandha-
Kārikā 29

Stanza IV

अम्यका क्षमीकरो

—Homa S'abde II. 24.

Stanza V

असादम्यकाक्षीयस्तुत्तम् अम्

—Taittirīya Sātra V 29

अवकाक्षदमाकाक्षम् —Bhāvarījayaṅga's Vṛtti on Ullar-
Sāhyayana Adh. XXVIII. 9

अवमेव हि मेवो मेवहेतुर्वा वहिस्त्ववर्जाभासाः कात्ममेवमेति

—Uttaraśāstra

अम्यकाक्षीयस्तुत्तम् अम्

॥

असादम्यकाक्षीयस्तुत्तम्

—Tatt. Sātra V 20.

इत्थं वर्यादिविस्तृतं वरीषा इत्यवर्जिताः ।

अ वरा केव विस्तृता इत्थं जलिव केव वा ॥

[Cf. इत्थं वर्यादिविस्तृतं इत्यवर्जिताव वर्यादिव जलिव

—Bhāvarījayaṅga I. 12.]

विविधाः कस्यचिद् धर्मिनः परिणामो धर्मस्यैवावस्थाकृतः ।

—Yoga Sūtra III. 13, Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

सा तु द्विविधा—विशेषाद्विधा च ..

—Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya, Section on दृष्टी

कर्मकारणत्ववचनात् सद्योपविमर्गा—Section on जाग्रत

कन्धुतापुत्तव ... वाचाकाशोक्तं कथमुत्पत्तिः

—Taken substantially and almost verbatim from Hemacandra's com. on his own Prāmāṇya-Mīmāṃsā.

सत्येष्टसमर्थम्—A nyāya of in Hemacandra's and noted in the collection of nyāyas made by Hemachandragiri.

यो नैवैव तद्वैव यो नैवैव तद्वैव स ।

न वैवैवकरोष्योद्विष्टोवाचामिह विचरे ॥ —Untraced.

Attributed to Ājivakas in A. M. P. edition.

भावे सिद्धो नरो भागे चोत्तरो मागध्वजस्यक ।

तममाग विमायेव वरसिंह मचक्रे ॥ —Untraced

सर्वे कस्यचिद् ज्ञानावा—A nyāya from Hem. 44. (see supra).

Stanza VI.

ईश्वरमेरितो मध्येन स्वर्गं वा जलमेव वा (व ल. वरकमेव वा)

कस्यो(न्मो)कान्तुरगीकोऽवमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥

—Mahābhārata. Attributed to Vyāsa (and rightly) by the author of the Parikṣāmukha Sūtra Laghuvṛtti. Found quoted in Śābara-Bhāṣya on Mīm. Sūtra I. II. 4. Also in Māṇava Vṛtti on Śaṅkhyakārikā 61.

अपवत्तमहे हि मवति ... सुकममवत्तव

—Kādambari-Pūrvārtha, Peterson's edition p. 103.

सद्योऽधीश्वरपदावधौषाकस्य

वहीकवान्धव तदापि शिकान्धमूवम् ।

तदापुनः कान्तुकेषिह तामसीतु

सुर्वाकयो मङ्गकरीवरवद्वारा ॥

—Biddhagana = Drāśtrikā II 13.

विद्यमानस्तुत विद्यतोस्तुतो विद्यतवाविस्त विद्यतवा ।

—Śukla Yajurveda Brāhmin XVII. 19

किञ्च गुणो न दूर्ध्वं तेषां दवातो गुणो न वा दूर्ध्वः ।

अं नानं आधगुणो दूर्ध्वदूर्ध्वो स नानं ॥ १ ॥

गन्धो न परिधिर्दूर्ध्वं नानं तेषां तवमि दैवमि ।

आवर्त्य विद्य नानं अविद्यतस्यो न विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

योहोवदस्य सद्यो आवर्त्या येन निवर्त्यते ।

योहो अविद्यतस्यो दैवदूर्ध्व इह कञ्चनच कल्पत ॥ ३ ॥

दूर्ध्वमिह वाग्वर्त्यो आवर्त्या येन ईदृि योहो ।

नानं परिधिर्दूर्ध्वं नानं योहो विद्यतो येन सद्य दूर्ध्व ॥ ४ ॥

—Dharma-Samgrahī of Haribhadraśāstra 370-373.

न हिस्वात् सद्यो गुणवि ।

—Untraced.

Often quoted

वदस्य विद्यमानो वदस्यो मयमेव ।

अवमेवत्य वदस्यो न्युपवि वदस्यमि ।

(V L वदस्य वदस्यमि वदस्यमि)

—Quoted in Mahābhāra Bhāṣya on Y Jos Brāhmin Adh. 34, and in Mahābhāra Vṛtti on B. Kārikā.

अतीत्येवमि वदस्यमि । —Āitareya Āraṇyaka VI. 2.

सद्यस्य वदस्यमि वदस्यमि । —Taittirīya Brāhmin I. 4.

वदस्यमि वदस्यमि । —Āpastamba.

न नमोस्तु वदस्य विद्यते न योहो सद्य विद्यते ।

वदस्यमि सद्यस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि ।

OX वदस्यमि इति सद्यस्य वदस्यमि सद्यस्यमि ।

विद्यते नानं वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि ।

—Vasishtha Dharma Sūtra XVI. 36

वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि ।

(वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि)

—Mānu Smṛti I. 101 b.

वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि वदस्यमि ।

OX Bhāṣya.

—Mānu Smṛti I. 101 a.

बहुवचनं यतिर्नास्ति ।

—Datt Bhāgavata.

अनेकानि सहस्रानि कुमारमहाभारिण्याम् ।

दिवं पतानि विप्रायामङ्गुला इह संततिम् ॥ —Āpastamba.

Stanza VII

आवर्तिता किञ्चिद्विष्य स्तनाभ्याम् ।

—Kumārasmābhava III. 54.

इदं इति क इव मुखाग्रं परीक्षम् ।

—Ś'hopābhavada.

अप्राप्तमेव प्राप्तिं समवाच ।

—Vide Prāśastipāda's 'अप्राप्तमेव प्राप्तिं' लक्षणे and Ś'ridhara's comment thereon: अप्राप्तपरीति समवाचमवच्छेदार्थम् ।

अन्वमिच्छाटी मुक्त्वोपविच्छाटीमाधारणोऽन्तरात् ।

विपरीतो दीनोऽर्थं नति मुक्त्वा वी कर्त्तुं गीत्वे ॥ —Untraced.

ईहायां प्रावचमेवतः । —Hama Līgānāṣṭaka पुष्पी 5.

Stanza VIII

पुष्टिप्राप्येतेषां बाहुसामानाः कालो हिमायाम् इति नव प्रव्यापि ।

—Vaid. Sūtra I L 5 and Prāśast.

स्वरसगन्धस्पर्शसंस्पर्शपरिमाणानि बुधश्च संशोयविभागी परत्वापरत्वे
पुष्टिं मुक्तुराधे इष्टप्रवृत्तौ प्रवामतः ।—Vaid. Sūtra I. L 6 and Pr
āśastipāda Bhāṣya.

अन्तेषु अथा अन्त्याः। स्वात्मविशेषकत्वाद् विशेषाः । विद्याधारम्भरहि
तेषु नित्यब्रह्मेण्यन्त्याकाशकाकदिगाऽप्रममन सु—प्रतिबुद्धमर्कितो वर्तमाना
अन्तराध्यातुविशुद्धिहेतवः । अथाप्रमदादीनां गवादिष्वन्त्यास्तुत्वाहृति-
गुणविचारयोपचवाचकविशेषसंशोयविमिषा प्रत्यक्षत्वाहृतिर्य—नो। मुक्ता
पीप्रमतिः पीनः कपुचाम् महावष्ट इति तत्राऽस्मद्विरिष्टानां योगीनां—विशेषे
मुक्त्वाहृतिगुणविशेषेषु परमाणुषु मुक्त्यमन सु आम्भविमिषाप्रमदाहृ वेभ्यो
विमिषेभ्यः प्रत्याहारं विच्छेदोऽयमिति प्रत्यक्षत्वाहृतिः, ईशप्रकविप्रहृते च
परमात्मे स द्वावमिति प्रत्यक्षिणार्थं च नवति तस्या विशेषाः ।

—Prāśastipāda Bhāṣya p. 163

अथेरेमेवस्तुस्वर्गं सङ्गृहीतमवस्थितिः ।

अथवाविरहमन्वो आतिथ्यमवस्थितिः ॥

—Udayanikāya & Dravya Khagāraṇī p. 161.

अ हि वै सङ्गृहीतस्य विवायिवधोरपहविरसि ।

अङ्गीरं वाचं सङ्गं विवायिवधे न लुप्ततः ।

—Chāndogya VIII. 12.

वाचमवस्थितिः सर्वं बोधित्वा वाचमावधः ।

तावदावस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः विवायिवधे ॥ १ ॥

अर्थावस्थितिः हि सर्वं बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ।

बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ॥ २ ॥

तदुच्यते न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ।

वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ॥ ३ ॥

बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ।

अर्थावस्थितिः वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ॥ ४ ॥

तदेवं विवायिवधो वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ।

बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ॥ ५ ॥

ननु तावदावस्थितिः वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ।

एवमेव विवायिवधो वाचमवस्थितिः ॥ ६ ॥

अर्थावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ।

संसारसङ्गः वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ॥ ७ ॥

काममवस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः—अर्थावस्थितिः ।

—Nyāyamañjarī of Jayasī.

अनं विवायिवधो वाचमवस्थितिः बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ।

अथ बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ॥

—Attributed to grammarians—Untraced.

अ हि वै सङ्गृहीतस्य नन विवायिवधोरपहविरसि

—Chāndogya VIII. 12.

बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः न तावदावस्थितिः संसारसङ्गः ।

अ हि बोधं विवायिवधो बुद्ध्यावस्थितिः ॥ —Untraced.

—The first line is found also in the Bhagavadgītā.

वर्तुमानवे रम्ये श्रीकृष्णममिषाम्भितम् ।

व तु वैलेखिनीं मुक्तिं गौतमीं वान्मुमिच्छति ॥

—Untraced

मोक्षे मने च सर्वत्र मिच्छादो मुनिप्रथमः ।

—Untraced.

वर्तुमिष छात्रममिषु वाने ।

(वपममि अम्यते वर्तुमिष छात्रममिषु वाने ।

वर्तुं सपत्नी महोत्सवममि उम्याने ।

वपममि वाने च छात्रममि वाने ।

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Āśvayaka Parvavibhāga 539

पुन्यपापवन्तौ मीमा

—Untraced.

asked to be आगमवचन

सर्वमममि उम्याने महोत्सवममि उम्याने । वान्मुमिच्छति । वान्मुमिच्छति । वान्मुमिच्छति । वान्मुमिच्छति ।

—Bṛīhara's Nyāyakandali.

वपममि वाने च छात्रममि वाने ।

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Attributed in the text to the author of Dravyāśaṅkāra.

इम वाने

—Hema S'abda III ll. 121

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Hema S'abda II ll. 77

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Haribhadraśārī's Astaka XII. 4.

Cl. वाने च वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

व वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Jyanta Nyāyamañjarī.

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

—Uddyotakara's Nyāya-Vārtika I. l. 1.

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

वपममि वाने महोत्सवममि उम्याने ॥

तदाबुधसिद्धौ काकः कुमारो तत्परावित् ।

मातृद्वयं कथयति माह काकसिद्धौ बुधः ॥ —Uttarod-

यमावयमेव ...वि शेषाविमया ॥

—Gautama's Nyāyasūtra I. I. I.

अर्थोपपत्तिहेतुः प्रमाणम्

—Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

सम्बन्धप्रमाणवत् प्रमाणम् —Bhāṣarjāṇi Nyāyasūtra

which has a commentary called Nyāyabhāṣarjā.

स्वरूपवत्प्रमाणं प्रमाणम् —Pramāṇasūtra-tattvāloka-

śāhikā of Devesvārī and Pramāṇasūtras of Hemacandra.

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु तदावत्

—Jayanta's Nyāyabhāṣarjā.

प्रमाणवत्प्रमाणं वस्तु प्रमाणम्

—Pramāṇasūtra-tattvālokaśāhikā.

प्रमाणवत्प्रमाणं... ..

—Gautama's Nyāyasūtra.

Stanza XI

महोक्तं वा महोक्तं वा जीवितान् नान्यथा

—Y jñāvalkyā Smṛti, Āra 109

ही माही नान्यथाविधं जीव मायात् इतिवत् तु ।

जीवितान् नान्यथा जीवितान् नान्यथा जीवितान् नान्यथा ॥ —Manuśāstrī III. 268.

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु

—Chāṇakya I. 7

also M. Bh.

तदावत् कथितं वा बुधसिद्धौ कथितं—

—Kumārila Mīm. Śā. Vārtika IV 84.

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ।

तदावत् कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ॥

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ।

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ॥

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ।

बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधसिद्धौ कथितं बुधं कथं तदावत् तु ॥

[=पृथिव्यादीनां यद्यपि यद्वारेण विचारो निवृत्तकथादिभ्यः ।

यद्विषयापि सुखहेतुप्राप्तौ प्राप्त्यनुकम्पा ॥

पृथग्भो ब्रह्मा विरता रक्षन्ति येन पृथिव्यादीन् ।

कठो निर्वाणगता जगन्विता आनन्दमेवाय ॥

तेषां विराजेत् इह सुखमक्षिपा इह सुप्रमुखा तु ।

परिग्रामसुन्दर इह वेद्या सा वाचयोगेति ॥—

—Jagadgurur's Pāṇinīyā 58-59-60,

वैत सारव्यमजमाकनेत सूत्रिकामय—Sātapatha Brāhmaṇa (7)

वीर्यम् । यद्यपि ब्रह्मास्तिवैद्यः पश्चिमस्तथा ।

यद्यपि विषयं याताः याप्युक्त्यनुष्णित पुनः ॥

—Quoted in Homa-Yogaśāstra.

पूर्व (४) कृतं) कित्ता यद्यन् इत्या कृत्वा कविरकर्तृमन् ।

यद्येव गम्यते स्वर्गं वरके केन गम्यते ॥

—Found quoted in Māhara Vrtti on Śākhyaśāstra.

आरोप्य बोद्धव्यम् समाधिबन्धुचर्म विदुः ।

[=आरोप्यं बुद्धव्यम् समाधिबन्धुचर्म वदतु]

—Āraṇyaka XXIV 6.

देवीपहारप्राप्तेन ब्रह्मप्राप्तेन वैश्वया ।

अन्ति कन्तुं यतश्च योरो ते नास्ति हृदयिन् ॥ —Untrood.

अन्ते समधि मज्जामः पशुमिर्मे ब्रह्मामहे ।

दिष्टा वाम भवेत् कर्मो न यतो न अविष्यति ॥ —Untrood

अभिर्मानैतस्माद्विस्मय्यते देवलो मुञ्चतुः ।

—Untrood.

Pāṇsaka (7)

ज्ञानवाकिपरिच्छिन्ने जगत्कर्तृत्वाम्यसि ।

स्वावर्तातिविमले त्विर्मे पापपद्मपद्मविधि ॥

प्राचार्यं वीर्यकुण्डलैश्च सममावृत्तीपिते ।

अष्टात्म्यमिच्छामिपैरभिदोर्त्रं कुक्कुचमम् ॥

कथापपद्ममिहृदयैर्ममामार्गवाधकैः ।

जममन्त्रद्विपैश्च विवेदि विहितं बुधिः ॥

अथावातात् तु यो वर्मशीहते मृगमावसः ।

स चावति मुच्यद्वर्णि कृष्णादिमुच्यश्वेतरात् ॥

—Attributed in the Text to Vyāsa (Mahābhārata).

चतुष्पन्थं पद्मेन वेरता ।

—Pārvamimāṃsā.

सम्प्रेतरात्रे मुगसद्विजयेद्यो नृपु ।

न सा अवाति सविर्ण्यं कृतेषावस्मद्विदत् ॥ —Mṛgśāstra (?)

अमिमुच्य वै देवाः ।

—Āśvalāyana Grhyasūtra 4.

मृगवात्रिणं कर्णं कर्णं वैपुतिव्यवहारम् ।

उचिर्वाक्यदीपनं स्वीहः संवद्विपुतिव्यवहारम् ॥

—Untraced.

अदीग्निवाक्यमर्वाणं साङ्गात् अथा न विद्यते ।

विश्वेभ्यो वेदवाक्येभ्यो नवावीक्यविशिष्टाः ॥

(V L. उत्साहती अहुरवाक्यः)

—Haribhadraśāstrī's Śaṅkharāṣṭra Samantapāñcāyana.

तावदादिकस्या ननु वसैवर्ण्यं कर्वाण्यो वेद इति लुप्तं न ।

हंसक तावदादिकः कर्णं स्वाद्विपुतिव्यवहारमिति अस्तीति ॥

—Untraced.

अग्निदीपं कृष्णात् स्वर्णकस्याः

—Taittirīya Śaṅkharāṣṭra (?)

न हिस्मात् कर्वा कृष्णादि

—Untraced

वातादीपवाक्योपपत्तादौ विविर्वाक्यवात् ।

—Hemabhaṅgagāpī Hem. Nyāya-

अथवा संवद्विपुतिव्यवहारो अप्यावर्ण्य इति न्यायः ।

मुच्य अहवाक्यो कृष्णी विपुतिव्यवहारमिति ॥

[अथैव संवद्विपुतिव्यवहारमप्येव रक्षितम् ।

मुच्यतेति वाताद्विपुतिव्यवहारमिति ।]

—Untraced.

अथवा हि वाताद्विपुतिव्यवहारमिति ।

नवावर्ण्यं कर्वा स्वात्, कर्वा कर्वा तु वसैव ॥

—Untraced.

अथवा विपुतिव्यवहारमिति अथवा कर्वा विपुतिव्यवहारम् ।

अथवा विपुतिव्यवहारमिति अथवा कर्वा विपुतिव्यवहारम् ॥

पूजया विपुलं राज्यमशिक्षार्थेन संपदा ।

तया पापविमोक्षार्थं ज्ञानं ध्यानं च मुक्तिरयम् ॥

—Attributed to Vyāsa (Mahābhārata).

Stanza XII.

सर्वमन्त्रोदे हृदिप्रपद्यन्निष्कम्पकम्पनं ज्ञानं ततोऽर्थप्राप्तकम् तस्मादर्थोपपत्तिः
तस्य प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्योपकल्पः —Based on Jaimini's *Sūtra* I. I. 45.

Stanza XIII

ते च प्राप्नुस्त्वन्मन्त्रं मुमुक्षुः चादिदृश्याः । —Rigveda X. 6.

सर्वं कश्चिद् न ह्यत्र वेदो वाचाप्रतिष्ठि कश्चन ।

आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन ॥

—Chāndogya Upaniṣad III 14

अद्भुतं चातु प्रत्यक्षं न विवेकं विपश्चित् ।

वैकल्यं अगमस्येव प्रत्यक्षेन प्रवाच्यते ॥

—Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa-Vārtika I 36 and quoted in Jayantī's Nyāyamañjarī.

अस्ति ह्यक्षोचमाज्ञानं प्रथमं विविक्तस्वरूपम् ।

आकम्प्यमदिविज्ञानसदृशं मुद्वजस्तुभम् ॥

—Mīmāṃsā Brāhmaṇa-Vārtika (Pratyakṣa) 113

पदद्वैतं तद् ब्रह्मणो रूपम् ।

—Vedānta(?)

प्रत्यक्षाप्यवतारः स्वाद् भाषांस्तो गृह्यते यदा ।

ध्यापारस्तद्गुणस्यैव भाषांति विवृण्वते ॥

—Mīmāṃsā Brāhmaṇa Vārtika V (Abhāṣa) 17

पुरुष इवेदं सर्वं ब्रह्म न च मायम् ।

कथामृतत्वस्येतावो बह्वेवातिरीहति ।

—Yajurveda's variant of Rg. X.

बदेत्यति बर्हिजति बह्वरे बह्वन्तिके ।

बह्वन्तरस्य सर्वस्य बह्वत् सर्वस्यास्य बाह्वत् । —Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.

अब्रह्ममा ओतव्यो अन्तव्यो विहिष्यासितव्यमुमन्तव्यम् ।

—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (without 'अब्रह्मन्तव्यम्')

सर्वं वै शक्तिरहं ब्रह्म वेदं नामाग्रसिद्धिः किञ्चन ।
 अग्रसिद्धिं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत् पश्यति कश्चन ॥ (See Supra)
 विविधेषु हि सामान्यं मयेन कारविद्यामयम् ।
 सामान्यरहितत्वेन विशेषास्तद्वत् हि ॥

—Māṇḍūkya Śrī Varika V (Ākṣi) 10. (with न for हि and
 वित्तत्वात् for रसितरेण

हेतुर्हेतुसिद्धिमेव हेतु एवाहं हेतुसाम्ययोः ।
 हेतुस्य चैव विद्या सिद्धिहेतुं चाहमावसी न किञ्च ॥
 —Āptamīmāṃsā II. 26.

कर्महेतुं कर्महेतुं कोऽर्थं विदधते ।
 विद्याविद्याहेतुं न एवाहं कर्ममोक्षहेतुं तदा ॥
 —Āptamīmāṃsā II. 25.

Stanza XIV

यः सोऽग्रसिद्धिं प्राप्तो कोऽर्थे वा संप्राप्तुमाप्सते ।
 अनुविद्यमानं तानं सर्वं सम्यगेव भासते ॥
 —Bharṛhari's Vākya-padīya L. 124

प्राप्तुं पश्यन्त्यवभासिनीषु प्राप्तकथोऽर्थे संप्राप्तुमाप्सते ।
 साधारणं सममेषते वाः सः सिरस्वारमव ईक्षते साः ॥
 —Āśoka's Śaṅkha-dāśaṅgīk.

अविद्यात्वं अविद्यात्वं हीनं मिथ्यं अविद्यात्वं न ।
 सुखमिन्द्रियगुणधारणं ब्रह्म न वचनं सचचार्यं ॥
 यदि किञ्चैव न वि दाहो न पूरणं तैव मिथ्यं तु ।
 ब्रह्म न मीमांसुषारणमिन्द्रियेण वचनो बोद्ध ॥
 न न हीनं न वचनं तैव अविद्यात्वं सचचार्यं
 (= न मीमांसुषारणमिन्द्रियेण वचनं विद्यामिथ्यं न ।
 ब्रह्म मीमांसुषारणमिन्द्रियेण वचनं वचनमवचनीः ।
 अविद्यात्वं न वि दाहो न पूरणं तैव मिथ्यं तु ।
 वचनं मीमांसुषारणं सचचार्यं सचचार्यं
 न न वचनं अविद्यात्वं तैवमिन्द्रियं वचनीम्)

—Bhadrabāhu (where ?)

विष्णुपौत्राय सदा विष्णुपौत्रायः ।
कार्यकारयता तेषां नार्थं सदा । सृष्टयन्त्यपि ॥ —Untraced.

सर्वमस्ति एवमेव परकृपण नास्ति च ।
अन्वया सर्वस्य सदा, एवकृपणान्वयस्यः ॥ —Untraced

ये पूर्ण जायन्ते ते सर्वं जायन्ते ।
ते सर्वं जायन्ते ते पूर्ण जायन्ते । —See supra. St. I.

एवमेव भावाः सर्वथा वेद सदा सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन सदा ।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा वेद सदा एवमेव भावाः सर्वथा तेन सदा ॥
—See Supra. St. I.

स्वामाधिकृतमर्थसमवायाम्भामर्थयोपविशन्त्यर्थं सदा ।
—Prasāpanaya IV 11.

नदीह सदाविष्णुपौत्राय न वस्तु विविचोच्यते । —See Dīnaga.

Stanza XV

समाह न वदते नापि मुच्यते नापि ससरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति वदते मुच्यते च नावागवा प्रवृत्ति ॥
—Śāmkhyakārikā 62.

सूक्ष्मकृतिरविष्णुतिमहदायाः प्रकृतिरविष्णुत्वा सदा ।
चोदयन्त्य विष्णुता न प्रकृतिर विष्णुता पुनरा ॥
—Śāmkhyakārikā 8.

अमूर्तमेतनो योगी शिवः सर्वयतोऽधिकः ।
अकरो निर्गुणः सुखम आत्मा अपि कदाचन ॥ —Untraced.

सुखोऽपि पुनराः प्रत्यक्षं बीजमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन् अतदात्मनो तदाऽऽ-
त्मक इव प्रतिमासते । —Vijāi Bhāṣya.

अथो व्यवहृतं आकौशिक-गन्धहमजाविहृत इत्यपिमत्त कर्तव्यमेतन्मया
इत्यन्वयस्यति । ततश्च प्रवर्तते इति लोकात् सिद्धम् । तत्र कर्तव्यमिति चोदय-
विश्वकृतिरसिद्धिवाचापकर्षणत्वात् नृदेः सौम्यवत्तायो बुद्धेरप्राचार्यो व्यापारः ।
—Śāmkhya-tīva Kaṇṇadī on B. K. Verse 23.

शुद्धिर्नमस्तस्मै नमस्तस्मै प्रतिष्ठितं द्वितीयवर्षकाले पुस्तकपारोहः। तत्र
भोक्तृत्वमस्य न त्वामयो विद्यापतिः । —Vaidyanathācārya (7)

विनिवेदं हृदयपरिवर्तय नुनी भाषीऽस्य कथ्यते ।
प्रतिनिवेदोक्त्या स्वपदे वया अङ्गमस्योक्तमसि ॥ ~Amar~

सुहृदोऽपि ह्युतामिह स्वभिर्ज्ञातमकैतवम् ।
ममः क्रीतिः स्वसिन्धुनामुपयति । स्वदिने नवा ॥ —Vladhyavata.

नरविद्यामिदं भौतशक्तिरातिमंजमा च परिचायिष्यते मतिचंचाले च
 वरुणमिन्द्रमथ । —Yajñ on Patañjali's Yogasūtra—

समस्तजनबाधकम् । —१५५. २०५५.

—Based on Bāṅkhyakārīs 62.

इष्टार्थं मन्त्रमावा वरीहं यन्मन्त्रोऽपि वैभक्तिमन्त्रि यथा ।
 यन्मन्त्रं वृद्धं ते सुहृदेभ्यः श्रुत्वा इहं कोऽपि हीनतरं वा विनष्टि ॥
 —Mundaka Upanishad 1.2.10—

एतत्प्रवृत्तिर्वा विवर्तते वरुणी यथा वृक्षस्य ।
 पुष्पस्य लम्बायाम् प्रकाशस्य विनिवर्तने ब्रह्मणि ॥
 —Śaṅkara's prakṛiti 59

तमोमोहमहामोहव्याविसाश्वतामिसमैकान् पञ्चदशविंशतिवारात्तयैचमि-
विशेषकजो विपर्ययः ।

—Sarkkhysskrikä 47; Gaodapida and Vāospati 53, 49 50, 51

वसवस्य तस्यैव कार्यं प्रसाधयन्मयिष्यन्मयिष्यन् ।
 (= तस्यैव च वसवस्यैव कार्यं प्रसाधयन्मयिष्यन्मयिष्यन् ।)
 —Nyāyabodha I 18.

—See however P. N. Tattva-Bhāṣa p. 43.

—Vytybild I 19 80

भीकृन्मौढे हि विज्ञानं नतस्तस्माद् भीकृत्प्रवर्तयसीकृते ।

वेम्भो हि चतुरादिम्भो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तदुच्चात् तद्व्याप्यं भीकृत्प्रवर्तयसीकृते ।
 न चान्न ज्ञानजनकमात्रविषयत्वः साध्यसाध्यवभाषः । नैकैकस्मिन् नस्तु वि-
 शिष्टेयः स्वतः । अपि तु व्यक्तत्वाप्यव्यक्तत्वापकभावेन तत् पृथक् नस्तु नः
 विधिपूर्वं प्रमाणं विधिपूर्वं प्रमाणकक न विद्यते । व्यक्तत्वाप्यव्यक्तत्वा-
 दस्य ज्ञानस्य व्यक्तत्वाप्यं न भीकृत्प्रवर्तयसीकृते । —Vyākhyānīkā.

वाच्यत्वं विषयः

—Untraced.

न विज्ञानयथा यथा पुंशो यत्किञ्चिज्ज्ञानाय ।

विष्णुया मेव विष्णुति कारणे सविस्मयमा ।

— "

न विज्ञानयथा यथा पुंशो वास्तवनागते ।

तिष्ठन्ति नैव तिष्ठन्ति कारणे सविस्मयमा ।

सर्वेन चरकवेनां य हि सुखवाच्यकृतताम ।

तस्मात् प्रमेयविषयते प्रमाणं भवत्यस्य ॥

— "

सूतिर्वैद्यो ज्ञिया सैव कारणं सैव बोध्यते ।

— "

प्रमेयं हि मनेहोचो ह्युच्यते कथं न सः । ॥

—

स्वाकाराद्युद्दिष्टनका दद्यात् नैव विज्ञानयोगता ।

— "

नदि ध्विद्यते भीकं कथं वाच्यं तदुच्यते ? ।

न चेत्सवेद्यते भीकं कथं वाच्यं तदुच्यते ? ॥

—Pratīca Vārtikāṅkāra of Prajñākaragupta.

आन्वीक्षुमान्भी सुप्यादिति तस्या वाच्यवर्गीयता ।

प्राज्ञमाहकैषुर्वात् स्वर्गं सैव प्रकाशते ॥

वाच्यो न विद्यते ह्यर्थो नवा वाच्यवर्गीयता ।

वाच्यवाच्यमिति विज्ञानमर्थाभासे प्रवर्तते ॥

—Untraced.

नस्तु ज्ञानदिग्दर्शितिसुखपदहविचारवैयर्थ्यात् ।

सुखिनस्त निमित्ताहं ह्यर्थं पार्थ न वाच्यता ॥

(नस्तु ज्ञानदिग्दर्शितिसुखपदहविचारवैयर्थ्यात् ।

कथं न विज्ञानमिति पुनर्पार्थ न वाच्यता)

—Jinabhadragapī Kāśīśāstraṇa s M bhāṣyā on

Ylāṣāśāstra 1703.

इत पृथक्पथे कथौ अक्षय मे प्रहरी इतः ।

तेषु कर्मविपाकेषु पादेषु विद्योद्भिसि मिश्रणः

—Unterschied.

Stanza XIX

प्रत्येक को सर्वज्ञ होनी इच्छायाँ कर्तव्य है ।

—Unterschied.

Stanza XX

प्रातिपदिकादिदिनम् ० —Hema Sabdānu. VI. 17 66.

—Hence $\text{Stab}(M_n) \cong \text{Stab}(M_{n-1}) \times \text{Stab}(M_1)$.

एवमपि भूतवर्मा सत्त्वगुणित्वादिभ्यः । मयातेषु प्रत्यदिमद्वयत्विह वा
मयोक्तमवस्थमाह ।

धर्मः कुरुषु न मृत्युमाप्नुयसीति धर्मेच्छति ।

वायेक्युपकम्भः स्यात्प्रायो वा विष्णुप्रायः ॥

—Dravyšlankāruktāna (P)

STATUS XL

सप्तमोऽध्यायः ॥ —Homa S'uddi VII. H. 61.

धर्मप्रतिष्ठा निषिद्धं कथं धर्मप्रवर्धनमथ न न विधीत ।

सत्यमेव जयते ॥ — Untraced.

बहुज्योतीषो मित्राः कवनेनं ब्रह्मण्यम् ।

अथोत्पत्त्यादयोऽभिज्ञा कथमेकं ज्ञापयाम् ॥

अथ-श्रीशिव-सुखार्थीनां वासोत्पादस्थितिष्वथम् ।

श्लोक-ब्रह्मोद्-भाष्यस्य ब्रह्मो वाचि सदैश्वर्यम् ।

इषोऽमृतो न इष्यति न इषोऽमृति इषिमतः ।

अप्येहामती श्रीमे तस्माद् वस्तु ज्ञानमकम् ।

—Aptamindat 59 60

Quoted in P. N. T. Ratn.

Stanza XXII

अथानुसङ्गात्तद्विषयस्य च ।

—Tattvārtha V 29

Stanza XXIII.

भान्न एव हि चासन्ते संविदिद्यदावा तथा ।

तदाह वैव शुभं कश्चिद्विभीषा संपत्तीयते ॥

—Uttarod.

वर्धितान्वर्धितसिद्धे ।

—Taittirīya V 31

अहहृदयसिद्धिमात्रं भवहेतुं अविधिं जीवकंमात्रं ।

आनन्दमात्रमात्रमिच्छाविहितं नान्यथा ॥

(अहहृदयसिद्धिमात्रं भवहेतुं अहहृदयसिद्धिमात्रं ।

आनन्दमात्रमात्रमिच्छाविहितं नान्यथा ॥) —Vishuddhāyaka 11k

अन्यथायत्नम् ।

विद्यावत्तु वृत्तेभ्यो ध्येयैः समुत्पाद्यमानैश्चान्यथायत्नम् न केन
कदाचित् । —BṛhadĀraṇyaka Upaniṣad II iv 1k

न सोऽप्यत्र न सोऽपि न सोऽपि न सोऽपि ।

अहहृदयसिद्धिमात्रं भवहेतुं अहहृदयसिद्धिमात्रं ॥ —Māṇḍūkya V 56.

आमात्रं न पञ्चाशत् न विपञ्चाशत् न पञ्चाशत् ।

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथा नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

अपञ्चति अमुकवाचो नान्यथायत्नम् ॥

—Sambodhanupāṅga of Ratnālekha 55, 65, 62.

मये मनुनि मसि मवर्षते मनुर्वके ।
 वारमन्तेऽमन्तास्तृणास्तत्र जन्तवः ॥
 मैधुवर्षं द्वाकडो मवकडं हन्ति सुस्मशीवानाम् ।
 केवकिमा प्रश्रुतिताः सद्वातण्याः सदाकाकम ॥
 मीषोमी संभवन्ति ह्रीमिवादिस्तु वै बीवाः ।
 एधो वा ह्री वा चपो वा मधपृषुर्ध्वं चोत्तुष्टम् ॥
 पुण्यस्य सह गतामी तेषां बीवानां मवन्ति उडुषजम् ।
 वैशुकराष्टम्येव तत्तावन्मधवाकागमैव ॥
 पठेन्मिवा मनुष्या एक नरस्तु कमाशीगर्भे ।
 उक्तुर्ध्वं मवकडा जायन्ते एकवेत्सपाम् ॥
 मवकडायां मये जायते एकस्य ह्योर्ध्वं ममाशिः ।
 सेषाः पुनरवमेव विडवः जन्मन्ति तत्रैव—

निवृत्तिस्तु महापथा ।

—Manu. V 86

तु स्वाङ् मरेऽन्वधारणे

—Amarakośa III. 239

वर्षे वर्षेऽवमेधेन वा पञ्चत रात समाः ।

मांसानि च न कारेयस्तथोस्तुस्यं मरेण् चकड् ॥—Manu. V 53

वृकराश्चोस्मिन्स्याऽपि वा गतिर्नैवधारिषाः ।

य सा मनुमहज्जेन प्राप्नुं शक्या पुषिष्ठिर ॥

वाक्येऽन्वधारणं तावद्विज्ञाऽर्धैर्विहृतये ।

वर्धम्यमन्वयान्मुक्तसमस्यान् तस्य कुत्रचिन् ॥

—Tatvārtha Śā. Vārtika I. vi 53.

मोऽप्युच्छेदि वा तर्हीः सर्वेवाऽर्थाप्रतीवते ।

वैवैवकारीऽप्योगादिष्वप्येवमवोमना ॥

T II ārtiśa 82. Vārtika I. vi. 54.

अर्पिताऽवर्षितमिदं ।

—Tatvārtha Śāstra V 11

Stanza XXVI

राजर्षे ह्यन्वाजः ।

—Homa Śādhana. V iv 2

Stanza XXVII.

अवर्षादीं प्रतिः

—Pratīkṣāpāda.

वर्षाऽऽतपाश्वी किं श्रौतान्तमन्वलिं तपोऽप्यम् ।

अमोपममौहोप्रित्तः पशुपतमेवसत्तका ॥ —Untraced.

Quoted in P N T Ratnakaravārtikā

वरिमवेव हि संवाते आहिता कर्मवासथा ।

कर्म तदेव संवाते कर्मांते रक्षा यथा ॥

वरिणमोऽमत्वात्तरागमं य य सर्वथा कर्मवासथम् ।

य य सर्वथा विवासा परिणामस्तद्विदामिह ॥

अपस्विस्तस्य ब्रह्मस्य पूर्वपर्वविदुषां कर्मान्तरीयसिः परिणामा ।

—Vyāsa on Patañjali's Yogasūtra II L 12

ममत्वावैश्वस्यम् ।

—Tattvārtha sūtra L 6

Stanza XXVIII

आस्यसुखसिन्धुतेरह ।

—Hama III iv 60.

अस्यसुखस्यता आस्यसुखस्यम् ।

—Hama IV hL 103.

स्वपदेच्छासु ।

—Hama IV iv 31.

आस्यता अमलपदा आस्यता येन हृति नक्तथा । —Untraced.

कीर्तितमम अमलपदायो विलुतायी अमलपदा ।

—Tattvārtha Bhāṣya L 35.

अस्यसुखसिन्धुतेरह तदेव परमावैश्वम् ।

—Untraced.

अस्यसुख हि कामान्तरमभिज्ञानावधारणम् ।

अभिज्ञानेन मित्रतादेवभूतोमिमन्वर्त

—Untraced.

वीर्ये वेव अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदा अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह
अमलपदा अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदा अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह ॥ —Taken from P N T of
Darsanā

अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह ॥

—Prasāngasūtra VII

अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह ॥

अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह अमलपदावधारणसिन्धुतेरह ॥

—Vimśatikāśāstra of Saṃantabhadra.

परमात्मिण सर्वशिष्येभ्यः सम्प्राप्तीनाम्भ्यः नाम उच्यते ।

न च तस्मै भवान् नमस्कृते प्रणिमत्तस्तु सरित्तिष्ठरोद्धिः ॥

—Deutschlandvater No. IV 18.

ना कश्च नमोऽस्मै सिद्धान्तम मिमांसे तु लो पिबे ।

आहन्तावप्येन सिद्धा जग्यंति तेन अरिहर्त ।

(पञ्चत्वा वसुकारं विद्वेम्बोऽभिप्राह तु वीर्यहीनः ।)

आईएनडीएस विद्या शास्त्रे कैवर्दीयादि

—Vlastivestnik on 3212.

042052 XXXII

समस्याओं का समाधान ।

—Hans VII. DL 80

मरेवे देवदरिवां पुकवीछती न ना ।

[illegible]

—Hemacandra's Yoga-Sūtra II. 2.

समस्तार्थार्थानां साधनार्थानां श्री कृष्णस्यै ।

शाकम्भकपार्श्वे चो व शिरी रस चम्पकसो ॥ १ ॥

पञ्चमहाभूतैर्जं क्षेत्रं न बाहिर्यए तर्पं निषत्ता ।

સમગ્ર ૧ વારિસુખ્યે સો ગુણ વચ્ચમિ ઉત્તર પિ ૦ ૧ ૫

बीबाइ बाबराजी बीबाइ कथागद्दी ईह छपी ।

इष्टं परिशुष्यो जमो जम्भजनहृषेह ॥ ९ ॥

(—जात्यवधारिणी वाक्यभाषायां वस्तुप्रतिषेधः ।

प्रायश्चित्तनामादीनां च विविरेष उक्तम् ॥

अथानुष्ठानेन वेन न वाञ्छते लक्षितमायम् ।

संभवति च परिहृत्य स हनर्धर्मो हेतु इति ॥

जीवादिभाषणादौ कन्धादिप्रसाधक इह लभः ।

पृष्ठैः परिहृत्यो जस्यो जर्मणमुपैति ॥)

—Haribhadra Paṇḍavasthakaśāstrīyaḥ āra.

Note—Most of these quotations I have traced to their sources with the help of the *Āḥita-Mata-Prabhākara* edition of the *Syādvādaśāstrī* published at Poona by Sheth Motilal.

ladhajl. Even when many of them I could have traced easily I have unhesitatingly utilised the work done by my predecessor as I found it both handy and on the whole reliable. I have corrected, however a few mistakes, and have traced certain passages which had been declared untraceable. The sources of a few of these quotations as given in the A.M.P edition, have appeared to me doubtful, but I regret that I have not been able to verify them, being often far away, while doing this work from my private, public and University Libraries.

Appendix C Authors and Works quoted, referred to or borrowed from

A. *Brahmana authors and works quoted, referred to or borrowed from:*

(1) सांख्य—

जाडुति—a direct pupil of कृति a prehistoric figure. See Intr p. xxvi.

वदसि—Referred to in the M. Bhārata See Intr p. xxvii.

ईश्वर्य and his सांख्यकारिका 1st cent. B. C. See Intr p. xlix.

माडर—1st Century A. D. See Intr pp. xlix to li.

विष्णुसिंह—Contemporary of बहसु 3rd or 4th century A. D. See Intr pp. xlii, li.

वीरपाद चम्प—G grand-preceptor of Saṅkarakṛya; consequently he belongs to early 5th century A. D.

बाबूपति and his सांख्यकारिका—About 850 A. D. See Intr p. lvi.

बाबुदास—?

(2) योग—

वदसि—160 B. C. See Wood's Introduction to the "Yoga-Sūtras" and Des-Gupta's "Yoga and Patañjali" in the History of Indian Philosophy "V. I. L.

व्यास (पातञ्जल योगाचार्य)—1st century B. C. Earlier than Vātsyāyana, the thor of the Nyāy Bhāṣya. for whose date see Introduction pp. xlix and li.

(3) वैशेषिक—

वैशेषिकसूत्र of कृति—Their nucleus, some centuries B. C. the lower limit of their date 1st century A. D. See Intr pp. xli-xlii.

प्रवर (वर) — Earlier than Dīnāga who lived in the 4th century A. D. Latest date assigned 450 A. D. See Intr. pp. liv-lv and my Intro. in the Nyāyapravai Part I (Gaskwad Oriental Series).

वीर — author of the व्याख्यान commentary on Prastapāda Bhāṣya—A. D. 991. See I tr p. liv.

(4) व्यास—

अथर्व — or वीर्य author of the Nyāyastotra. I refer the nucleus of the work to second century B. C. See Intr pp. xivd-lix For a fuller discussion see my paper on "विश्वामित्र-वर्णनं पूर्ववत् केवलम् सामान्यतया च" read at the First Oriental Conference.

वत्सव्यासव्यास — 1st century A. D. but generally referred to the 3rd or 4th century See Intr pp. xivd-lv

वसुधर — author of व्याख्यान 1st half of the 7th century A. D. See Intr. p. lv

वसुधर — व्याख्यानव्यास (व्याख्यान)व्यास — Beginning of the 10th century A. D. See Intr p. liv.

वसुधर — author of Vaiśaṅghika work called विवर्तन and also of व्याख्यानव्यासव्यास which is commentary on Vācaspati's व्याख्यानव्यासव्यास which is commentary on Uddyotakara's व्याख्यानव्यास first half of the written in defence of the व्याख्यानव्यास of Akṣapāda against the attacks of Buddhists such as Dīnāga etc. Latter half of the 10th century A. D. See Intr pp. lv-lviv.

वसुधर and his व्याख्यानव्यास — 880 A. D., little later than Vācaspatiśāstra.

(5) पूर्ववर्तिनः—

A system earlier than व्यास and as old as the oldest Brāhma sūtras.

वसुधरव्यास — 400 A. D. See Introduction pp. lvul-lix.

वसुधरव्यास — the author of the Bhokavārtika—first part of the 8th A. D. See Intr lix

(6) वेदव्यास—

व्यासविष्णु—सांख्य and बृहदारण्यक Some centuries before
Gautama Buddha.

(7) महाभारत-स्मृति-संग्रह

मनु and his बृहत्स्मृति

वाल्मिकि-रामायण

मयास—the author of the Mahābhārata.

ऐतरेयब्राह्मण

तैत्तिरीयारण्यक

विदुरचर्च

B. *Buddhist authors and works —*

बुद्धचरित of बर्मकीर्ति—first part of the 7th century A. D
(635 A. D.)

बुद्धचरित of बर्मोसर—middle of the 9th century A. D.
(847 A. D.)

मोक्षचरित—about 1100 A. D See Dr. B. C. Vidyā-
bhāṣana's History of Indian Logic

सुशेखर—?

तत्त्वोपपत्तवर्तिन ?

C. *Jaina authors and works —*

आचारानु—

अभ्यास—

आवहिककथाया

तत्त्वार्थमाप्य

मन्त्रहस्तिदीक्षा

बर्मसंमिश्रणी

विहीनचर्चा

न्यायकुमुदचम्पू

न्यायचत्वार

जीवनचम्पू

अथाह्वयविद्—8th in the line of teachers after Mahāvīra
c. 4th century B. C.

अनन्तवर्मा ('अनन्तवर्मा')—a thōr of तत्त्वार्थसंग्रह and अथ
—1st century A. D. See Intr p. lxxix lxxx.

अनन्तवर्मा—author of अथाह्वयविद्, लंकाशिव etc. 6th or
7th century A. D. See Intr p. lxxx.

अनन्तवर्मा—author of अथाह्वयविद् believed to be the author
of the lost अथाह्वयविद् according to Digambaras. Contempor-
ary of Siddhasena Divākara. See Intr p. lxxx.

अनन्तवर्मा—about the same time.

अनन्तवर्मा—author of अथाह्वयविद् अथाह्वयविद्, and his own अथाह्वयविद्

अनन्तवर्मा—author of अथाह्वयविद् अथाह्वयविद् etc. See Introduction.

English Index

A		B	
Advaitavādin	7-83 85	Bandha (Sāṃkhya)	92
Āgama	120-121	Prākṛtika	
Āśvameha	120	Vaiśārīka	
Abadhakāra	99	Dāksya	
Akṣipāda	61-72	Bauddha	101-130
Āṣṭika	3	Bhadrabāhusvāmin	90
Akriyāvādin	180	Bhāṣyamabodadhi	167
Akṣipāda	56	Bhaṭṭa (Kumāṛila)	73-74
Ākṣipāda	85	Brahmādvaitavādin	7-83
Abadhakāra	110	Buddhi	96-98
Ānandamaya samvid	46-49		
Amanta caturka	6		
Āpekāntavāda	183-136 148-154	Caityanya = Jgama	42-43
Aniṣya	19-20	Cārvāka	180-183
Antaravyāpti	187	Caturtripāśadīśaya	5
Ānya yoga vyavaccheda	2		
Āpāyāgama atīśaya	3		
Āpoha	94	Devasthī	93, 165
Āra	2	Dharmadharma-sambandha	31-34
Arçir mārga	66	Dharmasāgrahini	96
Ārhanṭya	6	Dharmottara	103
Ārhatā	2	Dopa	3
Ātādasādaśa	3	Dravya-kṣetra kāla bhāva	11
Āsuri	97	Dravyāstika-naya	85
Atīśaya	5	Dubkhatraya (Sāṃkhya)	95
Ātman	38, 42-43, 119-120	Dubhama	2
	168-172	Dvātrimīśikā	3
	10		
Āulākya	77		
Āvidyā	3	Evambhūta	164
Āyogavyavaccheda			

G		K	L
Gaṇḍabharti Tīkṣā ...	10	Kaivalin ...	4
Gaṇḍapāda (Bhāṣya)	101	Kṛiyā śālin ...	130
Gerivāda ...	179	Kṛṣṇabhaṅga ...	131
Gurusthāna ...	8	Kṛṣṇakavādin ...	122-126
H		Kumārāpāda ...	9
Haribhadraśūtri ...	26 55	L	
Harisaṅgārāma Hemācārya		La kāyatik ...	130-133
Hemastūtri ...	1, 179 180	M	
Himśā ...	61-73	M Nīpāstūtri ...	173
I		Māyā (anti or anti?)	77
Īvara ...	21-31	Mīmāṃsaka ...	61-75
Īśvarī ...	29-30	Mīśra ...	67
Independent ...	22 29	M īti (Samvādi śāstrā	
Maker ...	21, 24	mayi) ...	45-48
Omnipresent ...	22 27	Mōlātīya ...	3
Omniscient ...	2 25 27-28	M pākevalin ...	4
One ...	22, 25	N	
J		Nāgārjunaśāstra ...	179
Jana ...	5, 6	Nāgārjuna vya ...	85 161, 165
Jñānabhadraśūtri ...	190	Nāya ...	169-168
Jñānaka ...	98	Nāyāśāstrī ...	5
Jñānāntya ...	171	Nāya ...	16-18
Jñānāntya ...	101 115	Nāyāśāstrī ...	12-17 158-155
Jñāna (antya)	42-43	Nāyāśāstrī ...	
Jñāna (kevala) ..	2	Nāyāśāstrī ...	94
Jñāna (svaprakāśya		Nāyāśāstrī ...	116
para-prakāśya).	73-77	Nāyāśāstrī ...	
Jñānātīya ...	8	Nāyāśāstrī ...	67
K		Nāyāśāstrī ...	167
Kāśī ...	113	Nāyāśāstrī ...	11
Kāśī ...	95	P	
Kāśī (Jñāna) ...	2	Pāśāṇāśāstrī ...	64
		Pāśāṇāśāstrī ...	17

R		T	
Rjasastra	162-163	Tattvakaumudi	101
S		Tattvopaplavasthpa	118
Sabda	103	Tupā (Sāmkhya)	101
Sakti (Sāmkhya)	101	U	
Sambhiraṅga	163-164	Udayaprabha	1, 179
Samatābhada	167	Udayana	37
Samayasāgara	171	V	
Sāṅkya	10-11, 34-36, 168	Vācakaśukhya	10
Samavāya (Vṛtti)	31-34	Vacastīsa	8
Samāra (Sāmkhya)	101	Vācaspati	97
Sāmkhya	85 94-101	Vādamahārṣa	97
Samvid-advaita	101-115	Vāyavācakaśukhya	84-84
Samvid ānandamayī		V rāhama	2
(mukti)	45-48	Vārtikakāra	172
Samgrahamaya	85 162	Vāsanā	125, 127-129
Septaṅga	143-143	Vedāntavādin	60
Saravataḥ ma irah	1	Vibhagaśāstra	170
Sarga (Sāmkhya)	101	Vibhava (of ātman)	48-54
Satā	34-36 41-42	Vimānāsthastava	167
Saudharma	7	Vindhyāśāstra	97
Saṅgata	85, 101-150	Vira	1
Siddhasepadivākara	2 174	Vīra	10-11 36
Siddhi (Sāmkhya)	101	Viveka (Sāmkhya)	100
S'ivārjari	171	Vṛtti (Samavāya)	32
Sodasapadārthāḥ	56-61	Madhyama (Parimāṇa	
S'rilāra (Bhaṭṭa)	50	of ātman)	31-34
Śrutakevala	5	Vyāsa	65, 72
Śānya (Śānyavādin)	115-118	Vyavahāra	163
Śvabhāvaśāstra	123	Y	
Śvayambhū	5	Y uga	54, 116
Śyādvāda	136-157		
Śvāyambhava	16		

Sanskrit Index

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ
अभिवाचयिन्	130	आह्वयि (लाङ्ग)	97		
अक्षरार्	86				
अतिशय	8 5	ईश्वर	31-31		
अद्वैतवादिन् (मल)	77-83, 85	—वर्त	21-34		
अनन्तचक्र	6	—वृत्त	23-25		
अवित्त	19 20	—सर्वभाष्य	22 27		
अवेकान्तचार	123-126, 145-154	—सर्वज्ञ	22, 26, 27 28		
अन्तरध्यात्रि	187	—अन्तः	23 29		
अनन्तचक्रचक्र	2	—विषय	22 29-30		
अनात्मन्यम अतिशय	8				
अपेक्ष	114	अक्षय	27		
अद्वैत चक्रचक्र	2	अक्षय	1, 179		
अभिर्भाषी	86				
अनन्तारम्भ	110	अक्षय	162-163		
अविद्या	77				
अक्षयचक्र	3				
अहङ्कार	99				
अद्वैता	61-72				
		अक्षय	10		
अक्षय	85	अक्षय	85		
अक्षय	120-121	अक्षय	3		
अक्षयिन्	3	अक्षय (लाङ्ग)	2		
अक्षय 38, 42-43	119-	अक्षयिन्	4		
	120, 168-172	अक्षयानि	130		
—वैतन्य (लाङ्ग)	88, 42-43	अक्षय	122		
—वैतन्य	48-54	अक्षयानि	120		
अक्षयचक्र	45-48				
आर	2				
आर		अक्षयचक्र	157		

बोधिम्	--	179	म	
गौडपाद (याज्ज)		101	न	159-168
क				179
कटुभिद्यद् अतिष्ठप	---	5	नित्य	16-18
कपाङ्क	--	130-133	नित्यानित्य	18-16 153-155
केतव्य (ज्ञान)	--	42-43	निष्ठीयपूर्ति	5
ख			नैयामनय	85 161, 165
खिन्न	---	5 6	न्यायाचचार	-- 167
खिन्नमनसुरि	--	180	न्यायचरुपधुनकार (भातराङ्ग)	57
खीयकन्य	--	171	प	
खान (केरुड)	---	3	पतञ्जलि	--- 98 170
खन (चैतन्य)	---	42-43	परिमात्र (भाष्यकार)	-- 48-54
खान (स्वामिनाथ वा परमकाश)	--	73-77	परिमितान्तरादि	--- 168-1 2
खानातिष्ठत		3	पर्यायलिङ्गनय	--- 85
खानाहैव		101-115	पुरुष (साङ्ख्य)	--- 96, 98
ख			पूजातिष्ठय	-- 3
खल्लौमुनी	---	101	प्रकृति (साङ्ख्य)	--- 94-96
खीरान्तरादीय	---		प्रतिर्लभ्यार (साङ्ख्य)	--- 101
खीरिन्ध	---	3	प्रमाण	--- 7 167-168
खीर्य	---	8	धर्मिनि	--- 121
खि (साङ्ख्य)	---	101	प्रमेय	--- 57
ख			प्रकृत्यनर	--- 36
खल्लन (साङ्ख्य)	--	95	ख	
खु पमा	--	2	खल्ल (साङ्ख्य)	--- 99
खल्लपुरि	---	163	— प्राकृतिक	
खेय	--	3	— वैदिक	
खल्ल-खेय-कमल भाष्य	---	11	— दार्शनिक	
खन्यालिङ्गनय	---	85	खुडि (साङ्ख्य)	--- 96 98
खनिधि	---	3	खीर	--- 101, 120
ख			खल्लहैववार्ति	-- 77-83
ख			म	
खमे-खमि लंछन	---	31-34	मह (कुम्भारिण)	--- 73, 74
खमेयनर	---	102	महाराष्ट्रवादि	--- 90
			माध्यमदीपनि	--- 167

म	पिण्डादि	171
मन्त्रिकेयसूरि	—	101 115
माया (माती वा जलती ?)	—	8
मीमांसक	—	प
मुक्ति (संतिष्ठ नाम्नायसी)	—	56-61
मुण्ड केवलिन्	—	4
मृगतिवच	—	8
य	स	
यम	यम 75, 104	यम 84-87 89-93
यम	—	142 143
यम	—	163 164
यम	—	101
यम	—	85 163
यम	—	101
यम	—	101-116
यम	—	45-48
यम	—	167
यम	—	10-11, 34-36
यम	—	87
यम	—	1
यम	—	83-84, 101
यम	—	101
यम	—	2, 174
यम	—	86, 116
यम	—	7
यम	—	136, 153
यम	—	123
यम	—	5
य	ह	
यम	—	55
यम	—	61 73
यम	—	1, 172 180

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